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Abstract 
 
 
During the second half of the 18th century, a debate about Russia developed in 
France and Germany. Spurred on by a preoccupation with Peter I’s project to 
swiftly civilise his country through Europeanisation, and by the evolving idea of a 
philosophic history with its concern to explain the historical process of civilisation 
in general, and Europe’s historical journey out of a state of barbarism in 
particular, an array of thinkers turned to the example of Russia with a set of 
interrelated historiographical and political questions: Does Russia share a history 
with Europe, and if so, how can its particular history be related to generalised 
accounts of the development of civilisation? What was the role of Peter I in 
fostering civilisation in Russia, and what political lessons can be learned from his 
reign? Can the historical process of civilisation be accelerated through willed, top-
down reform and through wholesale importation of ideas and models from 
without as Peter attempted, or are there unsurpassable limits to such a project? 
 
The present thesis reconstructs this central Enlightenment debate, which has so far 
only received scant attention in modern scholarship, by providing an in-depth 
analysis of the relevant works of its main participants: Voltaire, Denis Diderot, 
Pierre Charles Levesque, August Ludwig Schlözer and Johann Gottfried Herder. 
By contextualising their Russian writings in terms of wider Enlightenment 
discourse on philosophic history and political reform, it seeks to recover the rich 
and conflicting nature of the debate about Russia. In this way, it ultimately 
contributes to the revision of the customary portrayal of the Enlightenment as a 
unified ‘project’ based on a universalising and rationalistic approach to the human 
sciences, and marked by a concomitant inability either to appreciate the 
complexities of historical development or to conceive of a reforming politics 
outside the framework of enlightened despotism. 
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Introduction 
 
During the 18th century, Russia became an increasingly important topic in 
European scholarly discourse.1 Even though knowledge about Russia was 
available in Europe since the early medieval period and a certain exchange of 
information flowed between the two uninterruptedly throughout the ages, it is 
nevertheless the case that a quantitative change occurred around 1700 that 
developed into a qualitative change by around the middle of the century. This 
first, quantitative, change manifested itself primarily in increased direct contact 
through travellers, diplomats and merchants, leading in turn to a significant rise in 
European publications dealing with Russian affairs.2
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis the term ‘Europe’ is used to denote those countries which we would today 
label ‘Western European’. It is, in a sense, an unsatisfactory usage since all the thinkers considered 
in this thesis were of the opinion that Russia had either joined Europe, or that its European status 
was open to debate. Restricting the meaning of the term ‘Europe’ to its Western half thus runs 
counter to the potentially wider sense imputed to it in 18th-century discourse. However, using 
‘Europe’ in the way suggested as a term of convenience to differentiate between those countries 
regarded as unambiguously European from Russia, whose status was contested, is preferable to the 
employment of concepts such as the ‘West’ or ‘Western Europe’ as opposed to ‘Eastern Europe’, 
simply because such a division was completely foreign to the 18th century. Indeed, if a division of 
Europe was conceptualised in the 18th century, it was generally between its Northern and Southern 
half. To my knowledge, no 18th century thinker ever thought that, say, Russia and Poland may 
have something in common because of their geographic position to the East. On this question, see 
Hans Lemberg, ‘Zur Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert vom "Norden" zum 
"Osten" Europas’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 33, no. 1 (1985), esp. pp. 48-62. For a 
different, but as we shall see below, problematic view, see Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: 
The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1994).  
 The second, qualitative, 
change points to a radical shift in interest: whilst previously Russia had been 
predominantly a subject of travel accounts offering their readers an ever 
increasing mass of more or less factual information about its geography, culture, 
society, history, politics and economy that usually stressed the country's 
backwardness and idiosyncrasies, the trend from about the 1750s onwards was 
towards interpretation and debate. The crucial interpretative question that was 
increasingly discussed was whether and to what extent Russia, far from being an 
2 For general accounts on the history of European perceptions of Russia, see Michel Mervaud and 
Jean-Claude Roberti, Une infinie brutalité: l'image de la Russie dans la France des XVIe et XVIIe 
siècles (Paris: Institut d'études slaves, 1991); Dimitri S. von Mohrenschildt, Russia in the 
Intellectual Life of Eighteenth-Century France (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1936), pp. 4-28; Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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exotic flower in a faraway corner of the globe, might actually be related to, or 
even be a part of, Europe. 
 
There are a number of interrelated reasons that underlie this radical shift. 
Undoubtedly the most important one is a belated recognition and consideration of 
the reign of Peter I (1672-1725). Two features of his reign in particular drove 
consideration of Russia's relation to Europe. First, Peter's victories over Sweden in 
the Great Northern War had forcefully integrated Russia diplomatically and 
militarily into the European system of balancing states. Second, his programme of 
Europeanisation had seemingly narrowed the gap between Russia and Europe 
institutionally, socially and culturally. 
 
However, the form and structure that the ensuing debate about Russia's relation to 
Europe was to take was determined by two developments within European 
scholarship happening roughly simultaneously with the recognition that Russia 
may have been fundamentally transformed in recent times. The first such 
development is the rise to prominence of the term ‘Europe’ itself, and the related 
emergence of the neologism ‘civilisation’.3
                                                 
3 On the semantic development of the term ‘civilisation’ in 18th-century France, see Jean 
Starobinski, ‘Le mot "civilisation"’, Le temps de la réflexion IV (1983) and Émile Benveniste, 
Problèmes de linguistique générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), chap. 28. In Germany ‘Kultur’ was 
often used instead of the neologism ‘Zivilisation’. However, during the 18th century the two terms 
had practically identical meanings, and only started to significantly drift apart in the course of the 
19th century. See Jörg Fisch, ‘Zivilisation, Kultur’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches 
Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and 
Reinhart Koselleck, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972-1997), vol. 6, esp. pp. 679-82.  
 Indeed, in the course of the 18th 
century, usage of the term ‘Europe’ increased dramatically, coinciding with a shift 
in the meaning of the term. At its most fundamental level Europe came to signify 
something much wider and more complex than a purely geographical concept. 
Instead it came to express the idea that there exists, within a certain geographical 
space, a community of states and peoples that is defined by cultural, political, and 
economic inter-connections. The idea of Europe thereby began to replace the 
older notion of a Respublica Christiana as an integrative framework. As a 
consequence, membership of this new Europe was no longer primarily determined 
by religious values and Latin Christian solidarity – criteria that had generally led 
to an exclusion of Russia due to its profession of the Greek faith – but by a 
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political idea of the existence of a fiercely competitive balance between individual 
states, and a cultural notion that is close to what by the end of the 18th century 
came to be termed as civilisation.4
 
 
Central to the notion of this newly conceptualised entity of Europe was the idea of 
historical development: what marked Europe in the eyes of many 18th-century 
thinkers was that it had become civilised. As a consequence, attempts to 
understand this new Europe were invariably bound up with investigations into the 
historical causes, mechanisms and pathways that underlie, and move forward, the 
process of becoming civilised. Such investigations themselves were rendered 
possible by, and interacted with, a profound redefinition of the concept of history 
itself. Most importantly, as Reinhart Koselleck has shown, the idea of history 
became increasingly singularised, and thereby generalised and universalised from 
the mid-18th century onwards. Whilst it had of course always been recognised that 
there existed countless individual histories, a new regulative idea emerged: that 
underlying all these histories, history as such existed; a unifying developmental 
process regulating and explaining all possible histories.5 In the first instance this 
transformation manifested itself in the development of philosophic history - a 
highly contested concept whose manifold definitions will occupy us throughout 
this thesis - with its overriding concern to establish what J. G. A. Pocock has 
called the 'enlightened narrative'.6 This narrative attempted to explicate the 
historical process by which a country develops from a state of savagery and/or 
barbarism to civilisation. The particular case most often used to illustrate this 
process was that of Europe itself, leading to a preoccupation with the question of 
how the continent had left a perceived state of barbarism and superstition after the 
fall of the Western Roman Empire, and had entered a state of civilisation and 
enlightenment by the 18th century.7
 
 
                                                 
4 See Lucien Febvre, L'Europe: genèse d'une civilisation (Libraire académique Perrin, 1999), pp. 
210-43. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L'Idée d'Europe dans l'histoire (Paris: Denoël, 1965), chaps. 3-5, 
pp. 59-134. 
5 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Geschichte, Historie’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 2, pp. 641-53. 
6 J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 4 vols. to date (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999-), vol. 2, p. 1. 
7 For an alternative view on the crafting of the Enlightenment narrative, see Karen O'Brien, 
Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 8  
 
 
 
The increased recognition of Russia, and especially the soaring interest in Peter's 
Europeanising project, naturally interacted in complex ways with the development 
of the ideas of Europe, civilisation and philosophic history sketched above. Just at 
the time when the historical narrative of European civilisation began to be crafted, 
Russia burst onto the scene and begged the question about its relation to this 
narrative. It is this interaction that underlies and drives the debate about Russia 
and provides it with its subject matter; and it is this debate as it ensued in France 
and Germany from the 1750s to the end of the century that the present thesis seeks 
to recover. 
 
It will endeavour to undertake this recovery by means of in-depth analysis of the 
historical works of three of the best known French and German Enlightenment 
thinkers - Voltaire, Denis Diderot and Johann Gottfried Herder - as well as of two 
authors who have gained much less posthumous acclaim and prominence: Pierre 
Charles Levesque and August Ludwig Schlözer. What unites these five figures, 
who otherwise professed highly divergent scholarly, religious and political 
convictions, is a sustained concern with the central question of my thesis: to what 
extent, by what means and with what historiographical and political consequences 
can the particular history of Russia be aligned with, and related to, the generalised 
narrative of European civilisation, or of the development of civilisation tout 
court? Indeed, Voltaire's Essai sur les mœurs and Siècle de Louis XIV,8 Diderot's 
contributions to Guillaume Raynal's third edition of the Histoire des deux Indes,9 
Levesque's L’homme moral and L’homme pensant,10 Herder's Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit and Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit11 and Schlözer's Vorstellung seiner 
Universal-Historie und Weltgeschichte nach ihren Haupttheilen12
                                                 
8 See ESM and OH, pp. 605-1222. 
 are all 
concerned with defining the historical process in general, and, more or less 
explicitly, with the principal historical features of European civilisation in 
particular. At the same time, all these thinkers had a significant interest in Russia 
and Russian history: all (with the notable exception of Voltaire) had lived for 
9 HDI. 
10 HM and HP. 
11 Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 589-683 and Hanser, vol. 3.  
12 UH and WG. 
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varying periods of time on Russian territory, and all have left us with historical 
and/or political works on Russia that were concerned with the country's past, 
present and future and with its relations to Europe.13
 
 
In the context of the growing European preoccupation with Russian history during 
the 18th century, a detailed study of the works of the most prominent French and 
German historians of Russia naturally possesses an interest and relevance sui 
generis. But the subject matter covered here additionally allows a substantive 
contribution to two wider fields of enquiry that have recently been established as 
central to the understanding of the European Enlightenment. The first such field is 
concerned with a re-evaluation of the status of history and historical scholarship 
within Enlightenment discourse as a whole; the second one with re-discovering 
the sophisticated and complex nature of the 18th century debate about the most 
appropriate means of political reform.  
 
Regarding the status of history, this thesis will argue that for all the thinkers under 
consideration, history and the study of history were central to their core concern to 
understand humanity and the human predicament. Thereby, it will feed into a 
growing literature that suggests that the second half of the 18th century was an age 
profoundly concerned with history and historical modes of enquiry. Such a 
position has been most prominently advanced by Peter Hanns Reill in regard to 
the German Aufklärung, and by Pocock for the English and French context.14
 
 
Implicit in their works is a rejection of a persistent characterisation of the 
Enlightenment as an age unduly preoccupied with natural and rational philosophy; 
a preoccupation which supposedly prevented the emergence of truly historical 
modes of consciousness and understanding.  
                                                 
13 See the individual chapters and the bibliography for details. 
14 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion; Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 
Historicism (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1975). For the increasing concern with 
uncovering the principles of Enlightenment historiography in Germany, see also Hans Erich 
Bödeker et al., eds., Aufklärung und Geschichte, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1992); Wolfang Küttler, Jörn Rüsen, and Ernst Schulin, eds., Anfänge modernen historischen 
Denkens, 5 vols., vol. 2, Geschichtsdiskurs (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1994). 
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Arguably the most important source for this idea of the unhistorical 
Enlightenment is provided by the 19th century, mainly German, tradition of 
historicism, which set itself up as standing in irrevocable opposition to the 
preceding conception of history.15 In its most general terms, the historicist critique 
of the Enlightenment makes two interrelated claims. First, it asserts that the 
Enlightenment tried to reduce the complex, dynamic process of historical 
development or Entwicklung to static, mechanical and universal laws similar to 
the ones established in the Newtonian mechanical-mathematical account of the 
working of the universe. Second, hand-in-hand with this reduction of history to a 
static account of nature, so the critique goes, went ahistorical evaluations of 
historical events and periods according to similarly static and trans-historical 
moral absolutes derived from a rationalistic natural law philosophy; absolutes, 
moreover, which the enlightened historians saw increasingly realised in their own 
times and places. Hence, a complete inability on the part of 18th century historians 
to appreciate, or to judge fairly, the irreducible individuality or Individualität of 
any culture not conforming to their inflexible moral yardstick.16 This second part 
of the historicist objection has gained further impetus by more recent post-
modernist criticisms of the Enlightenment project in general, and its mode of 
history in particular. For postmodernists, the Enlightenment marks above all the 
beginning of modernity with its triple commitment to universalism, rationalism 
and historical progress, and thereby to highly reductionist modes of historical 
evaluation, against which the post-modernist project is directed.17
 
  
                                                 
15 The classic account of historicism’s relation to the Enlightenment, written from within the 
former tradition, is Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, 2nd ed. (München: 
Leibniz Verlag München, 1946). For a good, general overview of the historical development of 
historicism, see Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus (München: Verlag 
C. H. Beck, 1992), esp. chaps. 1-3. For an analysis of historicists’ criticism of the Enlightenment, 
see Jonathan B. Knudsen, ‘The Historicist Enlightenment’, in What's left of Enlightenment? A 
Postmodern Question, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Peter H. Reill (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2001). 
16 See especially Meinecke’s evaluation of Voltaire and the early works of Herder. According to 
Meinecke, Voltaire is the first, and most typical, representative of Enlightenment historiography; 
the historical works of Herder – and especially his Auch eine Philosophe zur Geschichte der 
Menschheit – the earliest sustained attempt to break free from this paradigm. Meinecke, Die 
Entstehung des Historismus, chaps. 2, 9. 
17 On the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment, see Robert Wokler, ‘The Enlightenment 
Project and its Critics’, in The Postmodernist Critique of the Project of Enlightenment, ed. Sven-
Eric Liedman (Amsterdam - Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997).  
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I will of course not attempt to show here that Voltaire’s, Diderot’s, Levesque’s, 
Schlözer’s or Herder’s conception of history are compatible with the kind of 
historical sensibility that would satisfy historicists or post-modernists. My 
objective is to investigate their respective conceptions on their own terms, rather 
than studying them through the lenses provided by a subsequent theoretical 
position. Nevertheless, a case will be made that the most general and dramatic 
objection, namely that the Enlightenment was at its roots a profoundly 
unhistorical current of thought, bent on reducing historical particularly and 
diversity to naturalistic or philosophical universality and unity, is untenable. 
 
In the first instance it will be shown that whilst philosophic history could entail a 
radical integration of the study of history and the study of nature, this was not 
necessarily the case. There is simply little evidence to suggest that, say, Voltaire’s 
Newtonian conception of the universe impinged significantly on his conception of 
history. More importantly, in the cases where history became naturalised, as it 
undoubtedly did in the works of Diderot and Herder, no reduction of the complex, 
dynamic laws of historical development to static, mechanical laws of nature 
occurred. On the contrary, Diderot’s and Herder’s respective accounts of nature 
were not of the static Newtonian kind, but inherently dynamic, and their attempts 
to combine history and nature involved as much a historicisation of nature as a 
naturalisation of history.18
 
 
Even though it is certainly the case that philosophic history valued the general 
above the particular and unity above diversity, this did not imply that 
Enlightenment historians as a whole solved the problem of particularity and 
diversity by means of a straight-forward imposition of a universal standard. The 
relation of the particular history of Russia to generalised accounts of the 
development of (European) civilisation was a serious problem and subject to 
sophisticated debate. Crucially, to the extent that reductionist moves were made 
within this debate – most notably Voltaire’s and Diderot’s claims that the 
                                                 
18 Reill has shown that a good deal of Enlightenment historiography was influenced by a dynamic, 
vitalist conception of nature, rather than a static, mechanical one. See Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing 
Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 2005), esp. pp. 187-8, 
249-50; Peter Hanns Reill, 'Science and the science of history in the Spätaufklärung', in 
Aufklärung und Geschichte. 
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particularities of Russia’s pre-Petrine history do not matter much at all to the 
general question of its civilisation – they were vigorously challenged from within 
the Enlightenment tradition. This challenge was most prominently launched by 
scholars such as Levesque and Schlözer, who attempted to reconfigure the relation 
between a traditional erudite mode of historical scholarship, with its focus on the 
unique and particular, and the newfangled approach of the philosophers with their 
characteristic generalising attitude.19
 
 We shall further see that Herder, often 
considered as one of the first thinkers to have transcended the apparent limitations 
of the Enlightenment’s conception of history, was still responding to the problem 
of how to combine philosophy and erudition, or the general and particular, and 
that his solution is best conceived as an attempt at a synthesis of competing 
strands of thought operating at the time he was writing, rather than a radical 
rupture or departure. 
If philosophic history is therefore a great deal more complex and marked by much 
more tension and internal conflict than stereotypical accounts might suggest, its 
practitioners nevertheless substantially concurred about its political function. 
Indeed, despite all their considerable disagreements, Voltaire, Diderot, Levesque, 
Schlözer and Herder all agreed that history, or more particularly, philosophic 
history, is not to be studied or written as an end in itself, but that its importance is 
constituted by its ability to inform and guide political reform in the present. 
Philosophic history is, above all else, an investigation into the general drivers and 
stumbling blocks of civilisation, and, as such, an essential source of knowledge 
for attempts consciously to improve the human condition in the present by 
political means. 
 
Since the 1950s, the concern of 18th century thinkers with the practical and 
pragmatic matter of political reform has increasingly been recognised and studied 
by historians of the Enlightenment. Reacting against a tendency to characterise the 
Enlightenment as an age of abstract reason, predominately concerned with 
philosophy – a tendency maybe best illustrated in Cassirer’s Die Philosophie der 
                                                 
19 On the complex relationship between erudite and philosophical modes of historical scholarship 
during the 18th century, see Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 1, chaps. 6-8. 
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Aufklärung20 – historians such as Peter Gay, Franco Venturi, and, more recently, 
John Robertson, have drawn attention to the profoundly political and practical 
aspects of 18th century thought.21 Indeed, Venturi and Robertson have found in the 
commitment to political reform and in a complex discussion about both its ends 
and most appropriate means, rather than in adherence to any philosophical system, 
unifying features that makes it possible to group together an otherwise highly 
heterogeneous collection of thinkers, and thereby conceive of the phenomenon 
labelled the European Enlightenment.22
 
 
There are of course problems with the idea, advanced above all by Robertson, that 
the Enlightenment is somehow reducible to an exclusive preoccupation with 
secular reform, or ‘betterment in this world’.23
                                                 
20 Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B Mohr, 1932). 
 Nonetheless, the analysis 
undertaken here will show that a concern with the prospects of improvement 
within civilising polities was a pivotal concern of Enlightenment thinkers, and that 
historical analysis provided them with their tools of investigation. Indeed, the 
various 18th century attempts to establish the relation between the history of 
Russian and European civilisation are invariably bound up with investigations into 
the nature of the relation between history and reforming politics; and, throughout 
this thesis, the resulting political debate will be investigated alongside the 
historiographical one. This political debate is principally centred around the 
question of enlightened despotism or absolutism, or, more precisely, its point of 
departure is an assessment of the historical importance of the reign of the 
reforming absolute monarchs, Peter I, and later, Catherine II, in the civilisation of 
Russia. In grappling with this particular question, all the thinkers considered here 
addressed a set of wider, interrelated problems, which, as Gay, Venturi and 
21 For the affirmation of the practical, political character of the Enlightenment, see Peter Gay, The 
Party of Humanity: Studies in the French Enlightenment (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1954), esp. preface and chaps. 4, 7, 9; Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), introduction, chap. 5; Franco Venturi, Italy and 
the Enlightenment. Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century (London: Longman, 1972), chap. 1; John 
Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), introduction. For the relationship between the 
Enlightenment’s interest in history and its commitment to political reform, see Franco Venturi, 
‘History and Reform in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century’, in The Diversity of History: Essays 
in Honour of Sir Herbert Butterfield, ed. John Huxtable Elliott and Helmut George Koenigsberger 
(1970). 
22 See especially Robertson’s review of Venturi’s work - John Robertson, ‘Franco Venturi's 
Enlightenment’, Past and Present 137, no. 1 (1992), esp. 204-6. 
23 Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, p. 8. 
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Robertson have shown, are central to the Enlightenment discourse about reform in 
general. 
 
The first and most general problem concerns the extent to which willed acts as 
manifested in the grand reform projects of Peter and Catherine can influence the 
historical process; or, to put it negatively, the extent to which the complex, 
impersonal, social, economic and cultural forces underlying this process impose 
unsurpassable limits to any conscious attempt to rapidly re-direct and speed up the 
march of history. Closely related to the delineation of the importance of the will in 
history are two further questions regarding both the content and direction of 
political reform: first, to what extent, and, crucially, for how long, can reform 
flow exclusively from the top, that is to say, from the enlightened ruler?24 This 
naturally leads to a consideration of whether society at large is merely a passive 
mass to be moulded from the top, or whether it possesses historical agency that 
deserves both respect and nurturing; a consideration which is itself bound up with 
the central question of the respective roles and importance of legislation and 
education as means of reform.25 Secondly, discussion of Peter’s project of 
civilisation through Europeanisation brought to the forefront a tension between 
autochthonous and allochthonous modes of development and reform,26
 
 expressed 
in an uninterrupted debate from Voltaire to Herder in regard to the question of 
whether Peter’s wholesale importation, and imposition, of aspects of European 
culture can ever form the basis of a viable Russian civilisation, or, whether such 
imports need to be rejected tout court, or, at the very least, be moulded to, and 
made compatible with, specifically Russian circumstances. 
                                                 
24 On the problem of the will in history see ibid., esp. pp. 30, 37. 
25 This question lies for instance at the root of Gay’s discussion of the philosophes’ ambivalent 
attitude towards the reforming activities of absolutist rulers, and their interest in educational 
reform as an alternative to the politics of enlightened absolutism. See Peter Gay, The 
Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966-69), vol. 
2, pp. 483-516. 
26 This tension is in many ways an instance of Venturi’s definition of the Enlightenment as an 
attempt to combine the cosmopolitan – an awareness of the existence of a common stock of 
universal ideas – with the patriotic – a realisation that the universal ideals need adaptation to 
flourish in any particular context. See Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment. Studies in a 
Cosmopolitan Century, pp. 18-20. For such an interpretation of Venturi’s project, see also 
Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, pp. 38, 357. 
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Given the enormous range of contemporary scholarship on the Enlightenment, it 
is surprising how little research has been undertaken in the rich field of historical 
writing on Russia during the 18th century. No substantive work devoted to the 
study of historians of Russia exists in the extensive academic literature on the 
Enlightenment.27 Most investigations into the wider field of European scholarly 
engagement with Russia in the 18th century have typically concentrated on the 
work of one singularly prominent thinker such as Voltaire, Diderot, and Herder,28 
or have focused on the European perception of particular aspects of Russian 
history; most prominently its most celebrated rulers Peter I and Catherine II.29
 
 
This thesis, analysing the works of a cross-national group of historians, and 
focusing on their project of integrating Russia's history into general conceptions 
of the historical process of civilisation, thus sets itself clearly apart from existing 
studies. 
Studies that are more limited in scope do, however, exist: Dimitri von 
Mohrenschildt's Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth Century France 
(1936), Albert Lortholary's Le Mirage Russe en France au XVIII siècle (1951) and 
Larry Wolff's Inventing Eastern Europe: the Map of Civilization on the Mind of 
the Enlightenment (1994).30
                                                 
27 The only monograph I am aware of that particularly investigates the place of Russia in European 
historical writings is Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas by Groh. However, Groh’s 
focus is on 19th century philosophies of histories and specifically on the question of how a 
fundamental difference in historical development in regard to Russia and Europe was 
conceptualised. He only summarily deals with 18th-century historical conceptions of Russia, in 
order to emphasise the novelty of the ones developed during the next century. Dieter Groh, 
Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas: Ein Beitrag zur Europäischen Geistesgeschichte 
(Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961). 
 Chronologically the first is von Mohrenschildt's 
study. It comprehensively outlines the place of Russia across 18th-century French 
thought by considering almost every publication that had something to say about 
Russia. The work is both comprehensive and pioneering yet in the end it is more 
28 References to such studies can be found in the respective introductions to the chapters on 
Voltaire, Diderot and Herder. 
29 See, for instance, Carolyn H. Wilberger, Peter the Great: An Eighteenth-Century Hero of our 
Times?, ed. Theodore Besterman, vol. XCVI, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1972); Isabel de Madariaga, ‘Catherine and the Philosophes’, in 
Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century, ed. A. G. Cross (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental 
Research Partners, 1983); Inna Gorbatov, Catherine the Great and the French Philosophers of the 
Enlightenment: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and Grimm (Bethesda: Academica 
Press, 2006). 
30 von Mohrenschildt, Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth-Century France; Wolff, 
Inventing Eastern Europe. 
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descriptive than analytical, and does not present any detailed examination of the 
thinkers considered.  
 
Much closer to the analytical scope of the present study are the works by 
Lortholary and Wolff. They both examine how a set of thinkers - exclusively 
French in Lortholary's case, broadly European in Wolff's - drew up a distinct 
Enlightenment conception of Russia (Lortholary) or of Eastern Europe more 
widely (Wolff). Both authors, moreover, see this conception as being deeply 
flawed, and as a particular instance of a general intellectual failure of the 
Enlightenment. According to Lortholary, this flaw is located in the political 
sphere. Indeed, he argues that the philosophes drew up an image of Russia that 
was essentially a mirage, marked by almost non-existent knowledge about the 
complex realities of Russia's past and present, a concomitant massive 
exaggeration of the efficacy of the reforms undertaken by Peter I and Catherine II, 
and a deafening silence in regard to the violence that accompanied the reform 
work both inside Russia and externally. By constructing such a mirage, Lortholary 
concludes, its authors could historically verify their most cherished, but 
hopelessly abstract and rationalistic, political thesis: the thesis of enlightened 
despotism, according to which a ruler invested with unlimited power, but guided 
by the principles of Enlightenment philosophy, could quickly build a perfect 
civilisation from scratch.31
 
  
According to Wolff, conversely, the underlying reasons for the Enlightenment's 
failure to deal adequately with Russia must be located in the cultural sphere. 
Taking his cues from Edward Said’s Orientalism,32
                                                 
31 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, esp. chap. 2.5. 
 he contends that 18th-century 
thinkers constructed a textual image of Russia in particular, and Eastern Europe in 
general, from a position of cultural arrogance. They thus created an idea of 
‘Eastern Europe’ as a semi-Oriental entity, ambivalently occupying a middling 
position on a highly normative developmental scale, whose points of extreme 
were provided by the Orient, marked by unmitigated barbarism and 
backwardness, and the West, the locus of civilisation and progress. Blinded by a 
32 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1995). 
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desire for cultural self-promotion and assertion, and caught in a prison of binary 
oppositions, Wolff argues, Western Enlightenment thinkers were never able to 
deal with the realities of a culture fundamentally different from their own.33
 
 
Whatever the merits of Wolff's and Lortholary's appraisals of individual thinkers, 
it will be shown here that their general contention of a considerable unity in the 
18th-century discourse about Russia, based on either cultural arrogance or undue 
political abstractness and inflexibility, is unwarranted. Even though they 
investigate the right kind of questions - the relation of Russia to European 
civilisation (Wolff) and the efficacy of enlightened absolutism as a civilising 
means (Lortholary) are indeed the central problems underlying the Russian 
writings of the thinkers considered here - their respective arguments that the 
Enlightenment produced hegemonic, or even monolithic, answers to these 
questions is simply not tenable.  
 
The following chapters will develop the argument that it is impossible to do 
justice to the richness and complexity of the Enlightenment if we conceive it as a 
movement united by shared philosophical, cultural or political theories. Instead, a 
case will be made here that it is more fruitful to consider the Enlightenment as a 
series of debates, unified solely by the range of questions posed and by a number 
of flexible intellectual frameworks that allow discussion of those questions, but 
not by the specific answers given. In the case of the Enlightenment debate about 
the history of Russia, the unifying framework to assess the questions of Russia's 
relation to European civilisation and the efficacy of enlightened despotism as a 
means of civilising reform, is provided by the contested and evolving idea of a 
philosophic history. The present attempt to trace Voltaire's, Diderot's, Levesque's, 
Schlözer's and Herder's contribution to the resolution of both questions as well as 
to the concept of philosophic history itself, will hopefully furnish a story 
characterised by richness, contestation and complexity, rather than by failure and 
allegedly almost hard-wired intellectual flaws. 
 
                                                 
33 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, introduction. 
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To arrive at a sense of the rich and complex nature of this debate, it is essential to 
ground our protagonists’ writings on Russia in their proper context in order to 
avoid the pitfalls of teleology and anachronism. Indeed, one key problem with 
Lortholary’s and Wolff’s respective accounts is their projection of what they 
perceived as pressing contemporary problems back into the 18th century. 
Lortholary’s study, written in the early 1950s, outlining the philosophes’ 
ostensibly facile and uninformed praise for the despots Peter I and Catherine II, 
takes, at least implicitly, as much aim at Voltaire, Diderot and d’Alembert, as it is 
does at sections of the French intelligentsia of his own time and their lack of 
criticism of the new Russian despot Stalin.34 Wolff, finishing his account shortly 
after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, explicitly conceives his work as a 
contribution to the tearing down of a mental and cultural wall between Eastern 
and Western Europe, whose influence has allegedly persisted after the fall of the 
political one, by tracing back its foundations to the Enlightenment.35
 
 The dangers 
inherent in either approach seem clear, for by at least implicitly conceiving, say, 
Voltaire’s and Rousseau’s profound disagreement over Peter I as a test run or a 
pre-history to Sartre’s and Camus’ clash over Stalin, or by treating the whole of 
the European Enlightenment’s engagement with Eastern Europe as a prequel to 
Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, we are highly unlikely ever to approach an 
understanding of, to give but one example, Voltaire’s project in penning the 
Histoire de l’empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand. 
There are at least two levels of contextualisation required to arrive at a proper 
historical account of the Enlightenment debate about Russia. First, the Russian 
writings of Voltaire, Diderot, Levesque, Schlözer and Herder must be considered 
within the context of their own wider bodies of thought. This is particularly 
germane in the case of Diderot, Herder, and, to a lesser extent, Voltaire, simply 
because Russia and Russian history, even though subjects of considerable interest, 
stood not at the centre of their respective intellectual concerns. Therefore, in order 
to understand the full import and meaning of these writings, and to prevent 
significant misreading and misinterpretation, they must be fully integrated within 
                                                 
34 Wolff has drawn attention to the presentist starting point of Lortholary’s work. See Larry Wolff 
and Serguei Karp, eds., Le mirage russe au XVIIIe siècle (Ferney: Centre international d'étude d 
XVIIIe siècle, 2001), pp. 239-41. 
35 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 3. 
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wider fields of which they form an integral part: the construction of a new kind of 
historical narrative of European civilisation as outlined in the Essai sur les mœurs 
and the Siècle de Louis XIV in the case of Voltaire; the attempts to integrate 
history with natural philosophy and anthropology in the case of Diderot and 
Herder as most prominently attempted in the Histoire des deux Indes and the 
Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, respectively. Secondly, the 
evolving and fluid debate about Russian history and the politics of its two most 
prominent rulers, which is, in itself, part of a wider debate about history and its 
relation to politics in general, forms a further layer of context. Only by 
considering the Russian writings of the thinkers under consideration as 
interventions in these specific late 18th-century debates, can we hope to arrive at a 
reading of those writings that enhances our understanding of the Enlightenment 
rather than merely illuminate or reflect problems and concerns of the present. 
 
This thesis is structured in a way that facilitates such a contextualised reading. 
Each of its five chapters provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian writings of 
one individual thinker, whereby close attention is paid to the status and relevance 
of these writings within each respective oeuvre as a whole. I will thus provide an 
account of five highly original solutions to the historiographical and political 
problem posed by the emergence of Russia. The chapters themselves are arranged 
in approximate chronological order, starting with Voltaire whose most relevant 
writings for our present concerns were published in the 1750s and 1760s, 
proceeding via Diderot (1770s), Levesque (1780s), Schlözer (late 1760s to 1770s 
and 1790s to 1800s) to Herder, who grappled with the double commitment of 
establishing a philosophic history, and of highlighting the significance of newly 
civilised Russia in the context of such a history across his career, from the early 
Journal meiner Reise (1769) to the late Adrastea (1801-1803). Such a diachronic 
reading of the evolution of the debate about Russia’s civilisation will reveal its 
coherence and unity in terms of the questions addressed, if not in terms of the 
answers given. We shall see that each thinker engages in some depth with the 
legacy left by his predecessors, and that their respective arguments about the 
interrelated problems of integrating Russian history into generalised accounts of 
the development of civilisation, and the efficacy of enlightened despotism as a 
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means of political reform, despite their often conflicting conclusions, emerge from 
a common ground of shared theoretical and practical concerns.  
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1. Voltaire: The slow emergence of Europe versus the 
swift civilisation of Russia 
 
Introduction 
 
A consideration of Voltaire's historical works is in several respects a fitting 
starting point for the present thesis. On the one hand, his oeuvre contains the first 
sustained attempt at writing a new kind of history, explicitly termed philosophical; 
a history whose main subject matter is the process of Europe's transition from a 
state of barbarism to one of civilisation.36 The impact of Voltaire’s ideal of 
philosophic history on Enlightenment historiography has been widely stressed in 
modern scholarship. Even though there exists considerable debate about the 
quality and merit of his historical works, his status as a highly innovative and 
prominent figure within the history of historiography is almost universally 
acknowledged.37
 
 Throughout this thesis we will have occasion to note the 
influence Voltaire exerted on contemporary historical thought. Indeed, he was an 
important point of departure for the historical reflections of all the thinkers 
covered here. Not necessarily, or even primarily, as a purveyor of a fixed 
paradigm, but as the author of a conception of the historical project against which 
rivalling ones could be defined. 
Moreover, Voltaire wrote arguably the most influential history of Russia of the 
18th century: the Histoire de l’empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand of 
1761/63.38
                                                 
36 It should be noted that Voltaire did not use the noun ‘civilisation’, an 18th-century neologism 
whose French roots have been traced to physiocratic writings. Instead, he employed the verbs ‘se 
civiliser’ and ‘policer’ to denote the historical process by which a country may become civilised, 
and the adjectives ‘civilisé’ and ‘policé’ to denote a civilised state of being. On the semantic 
development of the word ‘civilisation’ in 18th-century France, see Starobinski, ‘Le mot 
"civilisation"’ and also Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, chap. 28. 
 The stated reason for writing this work was to increase knowledge 
about an empire of immense extent that had so far been almost entirely neglected 
37 See, for instance, John Henry Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1958); O'Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment, chap. 2; Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 2, 
chaps. 5-10; Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, chap. 2; Donald R. Kelley, ed., Versions 
of History from Antiquity to the Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), chap. 
9.  
38 OC, vols. 46-47  
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in Europe.39
 
 Crucially, however, Voltaire’s aim was not merely to disseminate 
disparate facts about Russia’s past and its most illustrious czar, but to highlight 
the world historical importance of the transformation the country underwent 
during the reign of Peter I. As Voltaire himself expressed it in the preface to the 
Histoire de l’empire de Russie: 
L'empire de Russie est devenue de notre temps si considérable pour 
l'Europe que Pierre, son vrai fondateur, en est encore plus intéressant. 
C’est lui qui a donné au Nord une nouvelle face; et, après lui, sa 
nation a été sur le point de changer le sort de l’Allemagne, et son 
influence s’est étendue sur la France et sur l’Espagne, malgré 
l’immense distance des lieux. L'établissement de cet empire est peut-
être la plus grande époque pour l'Europe, après la découverte du 
Nouveau Monde.40
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the implications of Voltaire’s contention that 
Peter’s reign must be considered epochal because he had managed to close the gap 
between the states of development of Russia and Europe. Its key argument is that 
the Histoire de l’empire de Russie can only be meaningfully understood when 
considered within the context of Voltaire’s conception of philosophic history, and 
the practical application of this conception to European history as outlined in the 
Essai sur les mœurs41 and Siècle de Louis XIV.42
 
 As will become clear throughout 
this thesis, Voltaire’s work on Peter I is highly original, and kick starts the 
Enlightenment debate about Russia, precisely because he systematically 
considered Peter’s Russia as a particular instance of the much more general 
historical narrative of the emergence of European civilisation. It is the 
multifaceted nexus between Europe, Russia and civilisation first broached by 
Voltaire that stands at the very heart of this debate, and his attempt at defining the 
nature of the relationship between the three concepts became subject to 
continuous discussion over the next four decades. 
                                                 
39 See, for instance, Voltaire’s letter to Charles Augustin Feriol, comte d’Argental, in which he 
described his project of writing a history of Peter in the following manner: ‘Il ne s’agit pas icy de 
redire ce qui s’est passé aux batailles de Narva et de Pultava. Il s’agit de faire connnaitre un empire 
de deux mille lieues d’étendue dont à peine on avait entendu parler il y a cinquante ans.’ OC, vol. 
102, 19 August 1757, D7349, pp. 133-4. 
40 OC, vol. 47, p. 983. 
41 ESM. 
42 OH, pp. 605-1267. 
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This importance of Voltaire in defining the terms of the late 18th-century debate 
about Russia has been recognised in modern scholarship, but has often been 
assessed in wholly negative terms. In both Lortholary’s and Wolff’s accounts of 
Europe’s engagement with Russia in the 18th century, Voltaire emerges as the 
central figure. According to the former, the portrayal of Peter in the Histoire de 
l’empire de Russie marks the formal elaboration of the myth of enlightened 
despotism that allegedly became hegemonic in 18th century France.43 According 
to Wolff, by contrast, Voltaire’s history of the czar provides the most important 
point of origin for the Enlightened idea of Eastern Europe as a semi-Oriental and 
semi-barbarian domain standing in sharp opposition to Western, civilised 
Europe.44
 
 
The reading of the Histoire de l’empire de Russie provided here will reveal that 
both lines of criticism are misconceived. Contrary to Wolff’s assertion, we will 
see that far from Orientalising Russia, Voltaire in fact does the opposite. Indeed, if 
there is a legitimate criticism of the Histoire de l’empire de Russie to be made, it 
is that Voltaire unduly Europeanises Russia, and specifically underestimates the 
particularities of its pre-Petrine state by uncompromisingly regarding it through 
the lenses provided by his own conception of medieval, feudal Europe. It is on the 
basis of this questionable alignment between the historical states of late 17th 
century Russia and early medieval Europe that Voltaire is able to tell the story of 
the great reforming czar who swiftly civilised his country by means of 
Europeanisation: Peter, according to Voltaire, effectively concentrated 
approximately 450 years of European history into his reign by learning the lessons 
of the continent’s past; lessons seemingly directly applicable because of the 
similarity of the two territories’ respective historical situations.  
 
Even though Voltaire undoubtedly panders towards an ideal of enlightened 
despotism by reducing the process of civilisation in Russia to the swift and 
ruthless imposition of Peter’s historically informed will, Lortholary’s argument 
nevertheless needs revision in at least two respects. The analysis provided here 
will show that the apparent advocacy of enlightened despotism in the Histoire de 
                                                 
43 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, chap. 1.4. 
44 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, chap. 5. 
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l’empire de Russie stands in sharp contrast to the much more complex political 
lessons that Voltaire derived from the Essai sur les mœurs and Siècle de Louis 
XIV. Therefore, rather than simply regarding Voltaire’s portrayal of Peter I as 
indicative of a general flaw in his political thought, this chapter will conclude with 
an investigation into the particular causes that may have led Voltaire to such a 
portrayal. Moreover, the subsequent chapters on Diderot and Levesque will reveal 
that Voltaire’s interpretation of Peter I as the perfect enlightened despot, far from 
ever becoming hegemonic in the French Enlightenment, was fundamentally 
challenged from within that tradition.  
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The genesis of European civilisation: The Essai sur les mœurs and 
the Siècle de Louis XIV 
 
 
Voltaire had already explored one aspect of the tripartite relationship between 
Europe, Russia and civilisation that interests us here in his very first major 
historical work: the Histoire de Charles XII roi de Suède of 1731.45 Whilst the 
work is principally concerned with the deeds of Charles XII during the Great 
Northern War (1700-1721), in the course of the narrative Peter I emerges as the 
principal, and increasingly successful, rival of the Swedish king, who ultimately 
manages to substitute his own country for Sweden as the dominant power around 
the Baltic Sea. Russia, which had hardly been known in Europe at the turn of the 
century, Voltaire contended, had in the course of two decades become a military 
and political force to be reckoned with.46 But in this early work Voltaire showed 
as yet little concern with the third ingredient that was to mark his later conception 
of Russia and its relationship to Europe: civilisation. It is only through the 
interaction of all three concepts that the Enlightenment debate about Russia took 
off, and the scheme of history underlying the Histoire de Charles XII did not yet 
allow Voltaire to conceive of such an interaction. Indeed, it is in several respects a 
highly traditional kind of history, firmly centred around the particular deeds of a 
particular king, and, as such, conceptually far removed from what Voltaire would 
later term histoire en philosophe.47
  
 
It was while preparing his next two histories – the Siècle de Louis XIV (first 
published in 1751, but later considerably augmented and from 1756 integrated 
into the Essai sur les mœurs) and the Essai sur les mœurs itself (first complete 
version published in 1756, and major revised editions appeared in 1761, 1769 and 
1775) – that Voltaire elaborated upon philosophic history and turned his focus 
                                                 
45 OC, vol. 4, pp. 149-556. 
46 For Voltaire's conception of the shift of power occurring in Northern Europe during the reign of 
Charles XII, see ibid., bk. 5, pp. 388-94. 
47 This conceptual gap between the Histoire de Charles XII and Voltaire's later conception of 
histoire en philosophe has also been stressed by Brumfitt, Voltaire, chap. 1.  
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sharply towards a history of civilisation.48 Crucially, as we shall see in detail in 
the next section of this chapter, it was also during this time that he rekindled his 
earlier interest in Russian history, and specifically began to formulate the project 
of writing a history of Peter I. This project finally came to fruition in 1760/63 
through the two volume Histoire de l'empire de Russie49
 
 - a history that focuses 
primarily on the question of how the historical gap between Russia's and Europe's 
civilisation was closed during the reign of czar Peter I. 
Before we can investigate the history of the czar, we must, however, turn our 
attention to the wider context from which it emerged. This context is provided by 
the works on philosophic history in the 1740s and 1750s, and especially the Siècle 
de Louis XIV and Essai sur les mœurs. It is in these works, as well as in a number 
of closely related shorter essays,50
 
 that Voltaire defined his new approach of a 
philosophic history, and, crucially, it is in these works that he provides us with a 
comprehensive account of how civilisation developed in Europe. As will become 
clear in the course of this chapter, this account strongly determines, and arguably 
over-determines, Voltaire's conception of Russia's entry into Europe, and, 
therefore, must be considered in some detail if we are to make sense of his 
Histoire de l'empire de Russie. 
Voltaire most prominently defined his ideal of a philosophic history in negative 
terms, by juxtaposing it to older historical conceptions that were deemed 
unsatisfactory.51
                                                 
48 On the complicated history of the composition of the Essai sur les mœurs, see Pomeau’s 
introduction to his edition, ESM, vol. 1, pp. II-XVIII. 
 The most prominent target of his criticism is the tradition of 
49 OC, vols. 46-7. 
50 These essays are: Remarques sur l’histoire (1742), OH, pp. 41-5; Nouvelles Considérations sur 
l’histoire (1744), OH, pp. 46-9; Nouveau plan d’une histoire de l’esprit homme (1745), ESM, vol. 
2, pp. 815-17; Remarques pour servir de supplément à l’Essai sur les mœurs (1763), ESM, vol. 2, 
pp. 900-49; article Histoire (composed 1755-56) written for l'Encyclopédie, OC, vol. 33, pp. 164-
86.  
51 Voltaire undoubtedly significantly overstated the contrast between traditional historiography and 
his new ideal of histoire en philosophe. Indeed, several of the key characteristics of this ideal had 
been anticipated by the late 17th- and early 18th-century tradition of histoire raisonnée. This was a 
genre of historical writing professed by a widely diverse group of thinkers that encompassed the 
Jesuit and historiographe de France Gabriel Daniel, the noble parlementaire and érudit Henri le 
comte de Boulainvilliers, and the Huguenot exiles Henri Philippe de Limiers and Isaac de Larrey. 
Aspects of this historical conception silently taken over by Voltaire include: the elevation of the 
nation vis-à-vis the king, the associated widening of history’s subject matter beyond political and 
diplomatic history, and the focus on systemic changes in the manners and the spirit of a given 
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historical erudition which developed out of Renaissance humanism.52
 
 According 
to Voltaire, the research into the past undertaken by erudites and antiquarians only 
ever produces a more or less random accumulation of unimportant facts relating to 
unimportant events. Voltaire made this point most succinctly in the preface of the 
1754 edition of the Essai sur les mœurs, where he expressed his own displeasure 
with erudite historiography through the mouth of his mistress – Madame du 
Châtelet – a lady with a profound mind and an unsurpassed knowledge of 
metaphysics and the natural sciences, but who, Voltaire alleged, could so far find 
no pleasure in history: 
“Que m’importe, disait-elle, à moi Française vivant dans ma terre, de 
savoir qu’Égil succéda au roi Haquin en Suède? et qu’Ottoman était 
fils d’Ortogrul? … [J]e n’ai pu achever aucune grande histoire 
moderne; je n’y vois guère que de la confusion, une foule de petits 
événements sans liaison et sans suite, mille batailles qui n’ont décidé 
de rien, et dans lesquelles je n’apprenais pas seulement de quelles 
armes on servait pour se détruire. J’ai renoncé à une étude aussi sèche 
qu’immense, qui accable l’esprit sans l’éclairer.”53
 
 
Erudite historiography weighs down, rather than enlightens, the mind because by 
merely narrating fact after fact without connection or plan, it only speaks to the 
faculty of memory and not the one of reason.54
 
 It is because of its overbearing 
emphasis on factual detail and because of its underlying idea that everything that 
happened in the past is worth recovering for its own sake, that purely erudite 
historiography was unpalatable to both Voltaire and du Châtelet: 
Les détails qui ne mènent à rien sont dans l’histoire ce que sont les 
bagages dans une armée, impedimenta. Il faut voir les choses en grand 
par cela même que l’esprit humain est petit, et qu’il s’affaisse sous les 
poids des minuties … .55
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
nation over time. On the tradition of histoire raisonnée, see Phyllis K. Leffler, ‘French Historians 
and the Challenge to Louis XIV's Absolutism’, French Historical Studies 14, no. 1 (1985). 
52 On Voltaire's troubled relationship with erudition, see also Brumfitt, Voltaire, pp. 129-47. On 
the tense relation between érudits and philosophes in 18th-century historiography more generally, 
see Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 1, chaps. 6-8 and Arnaldo Momigliano, ‘Gibbon's 
Contribution to Historical Method’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 2, no. 4 (1954), esp. 
pp. 450-3. 
53 ESM, vol. 2, p. 883. 
54 See also Remarques sur l’histoire, OH, p. 43. 
55 Préface de l’édition Walther (1754), ESM, vol. 2, pp. 889-90. 
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To write histoire en philosophe we must regard history en grand, and to achieve 
such a widening of perspective, a radical exclusion of those facts that are 
unimportant and not worth remembering, and a foregrounding of the ones that are, 
is required. However, Voltaire claimed, in so far as traditional historiography has 
selected from the mass of available data at all, it has selected badly, 
predominantly taking the deeds of kings as history’s subject matter. In what is 
undoubtedly partially a self-criticism of his own Histoire de Charles XII, Voltaire 
moved decisively against traditional histories of kings and their battles, and urged 
a wholesale reconsideration of what really matters in the past: 
 
Il [i.e. the philosophical historian] recherchera quel a été le vice 
radical et la vertu dominante d’une nation; pourquoi elle a été 
puissante ou faible sur la mer; comment et jusqu’à quel point elle s’est 
enrichie depuis un siècle … . Il voudra savoir comment les arts, les 
manufactures se sont établis; il suivra leur passage et leur retour d’un 
pays dans un autre. Les changements dans les mœurs et dans les lois 
seront enfin son grand objet. On saurait ainsi l’histoire des hommes, 
au lieu de savoir une faible partie de l’histoire des rois et des courts. 
 
En vain je lis les annales de France: nos historiens se taisent tous sur 
ces détails. Aucun n’a eu pour devise: Homo sum, humani nil a me 
alienum puto. Il faudrait donc, me semble, incorporer avec art ces 
connaissances utiles dans le tissu des événements. Je crois que c’est la 
seule manière d’écrire l’histoire moderne en vrai politique et en vrai 
philosophe.56
 
 
Mankind in general, and not kings and their deeds, is the subject of philosophic 
history. In order to understand the human predicament at various points in the 
past, historians must be interested in much more than diplomatic treatises, court 
intrigues and accounts of battles. Instead, they must turn their attention to the 
various compartments of civilisation - political institutions, laws, industry, trade, 
the arts and sciences, social mores and customs - and trace their interrelated 
development over time.  
 
It is the developmental aspect of civilisation that gives philosophic history 
coherence, and sets it apart from mere compilations of random facts that overload 
their readers’ memories. In the Essai sur les mœurs, for instance, Voltaire 
                                                 
56 In Nouvelles considerations sur l’histoire, OH, pp. 48-9. For a very similar argument, see also 
Plan d’une histoire de l’espirt humain, ESM, vol. 2, p. 816. 
 29  
 
 
 
presented his aim as that of tracing ‘par quels degrés on est parvenu de la rusticité 
barbare de ces temps là [i.e. the early medieval period] à la politesse du nôtre’.57 It 
is the present that determines which historical facts are important, and should be 
related by the historian, and which ones are not.58
 
 Events and deeds of the past are 
only worthy of historical excavation, Voltaire implied, to the extent that they can 
illuminate how we arrived at a stage of present politesse, juxtaposed to a previous 
one of a rusticité barbare - only a history that can tell us something about our 
present condition, in other words, is instructive or enlightening. 
Such a philosophic history is particularly instructive in the domain of politics. By 
redefining history’s subject matter, and by rigorously subjecting the past to 
present concerns, Voltaire gave history a new political significance: the prime 
political function of historiography is no longer to establish whether a given 
action by a king is morally good or bad, or appropriate in terms of statecraft, as 
had been the case in much humanist historiography.59
                                                 
57 Remarques pour servir de supplément à l’Essai sur les mœurs, ESM, vol. 2, p. 904. 
 Instead, the focus is now 
one of endeavouring to understand how a given civilisation works by means of 
58 On Voltaire’s radical presentism, see also Pierre Force, ‘Voltaire and the Necessity of Modern 
History’, Modern Intellectual History 6, no. 3 (2009). 
59 This is of course not to say that Voltaire completely abandoned writing miroirs des princes. In 
fact, he frequently addressed sovereigns directly in his histories and urged them to learn from the 
historical examples provided. The best example of a Voltairian miroir des princes is of course the 
Histoire de Charles XII, explicitly conceived to educate overly ambitious kings out of the folly of 
conquests: ‘Mais on n'a pas été déterminé seulement à donner cette vie par la petite satisfaction 
d'écrire des faits extraordinaires; on a pensé que cette lecture pourrait être utiles à quelques 
princes, si ce livre leur tombe par hasard entre les mains. Certainement il n'y a point de souverain 
qui, en lisant la vie de Charles XII, ne doive être guéri de la folie des conquêtes.’ See Histoire de 
Charles XII, OH, p. 55. However, in his philosophical histories there is a clear change in 
motivation. Here kings are no longer primarily advised to behave according to strict moral or 
political principles; instead these histories intend to urge sovereigns to actively reform and 
improve their dominions by emulating illustrious predecessors: 'On doit cette justice aux hommes 
publics qui ont fait du bien à leur siècle, de regarder le point dont ils sont partis, pour mieux voir 
les changements qu'ils ont faits dans leur patrie. La postérité leur doit une éternelle reconnaissance 
des exemples qu'ils ont donnés, lors même qu'ils sont surpassés. Cette juste gloire est leur unique 
récompense. Il est certain que l'amour de cette gloire anima Louis XIV, lorsque, commençant à 
gouverner par lui-même, il voulut réformer son royaume, embellir sa cour, et perfectionner les 
arts.' See Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, p. 963. Philosophic history, in other words, is still useful 
because of its capacity to provide examples that are either to be emulated or avoided. However, 
these examples no longer primarily pertain to the morality of individual actions. Instead the 
philosophic historian outlines how the various compartments of civilisation have been instituted at 
different times and in different places, thereby opening up a comparative perspective that enables 
purposeful reform in the present: 'De l'utilité de l'histoire. Cet avantage consiste dans la 
comparaison qu'un homme d'Etat, un citoyen peut faire de lois et des mœurs étrangères avec celles 
de son pays: c'est ce qui excite les nations modernes à enchérir les unes sur les autres dans les arts, 
dans le commerce, dans l'agriculture.’ Article Histoire written for l'Encyclopédie, in OC, vol. 33, 
p. 176.  
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tracing its genesis. Thereby the philosophic historian is able to distinguish 
between the forces that are likely to contribute to its future progress (and hence 
need political support) and the ones which are likely to act as impediments (and 
therefore must be fought against). 
 
A consideration of the content of the Essai sur les mœurs and the Siècle de Louis 
XIV will not only reveal the extent to which Voltaire managed to put his 
aspirations into practice, but also provide us with a detailed account of the 
mechanisms that he believed had driven Europe from the rusticité barbare of the 
early medieval period to a state of politesse in his own age. The Essai sur les 
mœurs is of course much more than a history of European civilisation, containing 
substantive sections on the ancient Oriental empires of China, India and Persia as 
well as excursions into the history of the Americas. And yet, its main thread 
clearly revolves around the emergence of modern, civilised Europe out of the 
ruins left by the fall of the Western Roman Empire. It is the dynamic process of 
this emergence, rather than the static accounts provided of the Oriental 
civilisations, that significantly informed Voltaire’s thought on Russia, and 
therefore needs elaboration here.  
 
The starting point of the European section of the Essai sur les mœurs is the 
destruction of the Western Roman Empire brought about by the barbarian 
invasions, happening just at the time when the Empire itself was weakened by 
quarrels about religion. These quarrels had been emerging ever since Constantine 
I had made Christianity Rome’s dominant religion. By the time Alaric threatened 
the capital, the Francs invaded Gaul and the Visigoths started to penetrate into 
Spain, mighty Rome was crippled by the division between Arians and 
Athanasiens, bogged down in irresolvable debates about the consubstantiality of 
the Word, with quarrelsome monks outnumbering much-needed soldiers. All of 
which led Voltaire to conclude: ‘Deux fléaux détruisirent enfin ce grand colosse: 
les barbares, et les disputes de religion.’60
 
 
                                                 
60 ESM, vol. 1, p. 303. 
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There was little doubt in Voltaire’s mind that a materially rich, well governed, and 
cultured civilisation was thus destroyed, and replaced by its barbarous opposite: 
  
Lorsqu’on passe de l’histoire de l’empire romain à celle des peuples 
qui l’ont déchiré dans l’Occident, on ressemble à un voyageur qui, au 
sortir d’une ville superbe, se trouve dans des déserts couverts de 
ronces. Vingt jargons barbares succédèrent à cette belle langue latine 
… . Au lieu de ces sages lois qui gouvernaient la moitié de notre 
hémisphère, on ne trouve plus que des coutumes sauvages. ... La 
même révolution se fait dans les esprits; et Grégoire de Tours, le 
moine de Saint-Gall Frédegaire, sont nos Polybe et nos Tite-Live. 
L’entendement humain s’abrutit dans les superstitions les plus lâches 
et les plus insensées.61
 
 
If religion and barbarism brought about the end of the Roman Empire, they are 
also treated as the main explanatory factors for the long time it took until a new 
civilised way of living could emerge in Europe. Indeed, the chapters directly 
following the ones about the fall of Rome concern the establishment of papal 
power, inaugurating a long period in which popes could exert political and 
cultural, if not military, supremacy over Europe. Concurrent with this, and further 
reinforcing papal power, Voltaire described the rise of feudal governance across 
Europe and treated feudalism as an outcome of barbarism. We shall see how 
Voltaire judged the conjunction of feudalism and papal supremacy to be 
catastrophic, because he believed that it prevented the emergence of unified and 
strong states in Europe that could act as secure frameworks and drivers for 
civilising processes. 
 
This rise of papal power was, according to Voltaire, based on a three-fold myth 
crafted in the early Latin church: first, the idea that Jesus had transmitted spiritual 
authority to Peter the apostle; second, that spiritual authority ultimately trumps 
any countervailing temporal authority; and third, that Peter had travelled to Rome 
and thereby founded and instituted the pontificate as the seat of this authority.62
                                                 
61 Ibid., pp. 309-10. 
 
From this imposture arose the papacy’s claim of supreme jurisdiction over the 
whole Christian world – a claim gradually put into practice by a succession of 
62 Ibid., pp. 109-114, 279-81 & passim. The importance of Peter the apostle for the rise of papal 
power is further stressed in the article Pierre in Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique, OC, vol. 
36, pp. 447-55. On the same question, see also Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 2, pp. 121-3. 
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popes. During the pontificate of Gregory VII in the 11th century, this claim had 
been honed into a powerful political weapon, used by Gregory and his successors 
to assault the temporal sovereignty of European states. Such assaults may happen 
directly through claims to a right to dispose of kingdoms and implementation of 
this claim by means of papal bulls and excommunications of sovereigns, or 
indirectly through assertion of the superiority of ecclesiastic and monastic 
jurisdictions over civil courts.63 At this point, Voltaire has established a theme 
that provides much of the internal structure of the Essai sur les mœurs well into 
the 16th century, the issue of ‘[l]a domination temporelle, cet éternel sujet de 
discorde.’64
 
  
The second great theme guiding Voltaire through the early stages of medieval 
history is the establishment of feudal structures across Europe. In Voltaire’s eyes 
feudalism was a direct outcome of the conquest of Europe: after having overrun 
the Roman Empire and destroyed its political structures and laws, the barbarian 
invaders shared the spoils of their conquests in a way that befits warrior peoples. 
According to Voltaire, feudalism is nothing other than the usurpation of the right 
to govern over a territory by the strongest, the usurper’s imposition of tributes on 
the weak, thus effectively constituting a very thinly disguised form of armed 
robbery.65 Its effects are deplorable in a number of ways. Politically, the division 
of states into a multitude of semi-independent fiefs further weakened the authority 
of kings, who were constantly obliged to fight both papal and feudal 
encroachment on royal sovereignty.66 Socially, the usurpation of the power of 
feudal lords went hand in hand with the enslavement of the population at large: 
attached to their glebe and belonging to their lords, the majority of the population 
were kept in tight bondage and had no means to improve their social position.67
                                                 
63 ESM, vol. 1, pp. 493-505. 
 
From this bondage, Voltaire argued, also arose the economic problems of 
64 Ibid., p. 319. On the importance of the quarrel between the temporal and sacred authority for the 
Essai sur les mœurs as a whole, see also Remarques pour servir de supplément à l’Essai sur les 
mœurs, ibid., vol. 2, pp. 904-5. This leitmotiv of the Voltairian conception of European history is 
taken up again in the Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, p. 1042: ‘Cet Essai sur les mœurs que vous avez 
parcouru vous a fait voir, depuis Théodose, une lutte perpétuelle entre la juridiction séculière et 
l’ecclésiastique; et, depuis Charlemagne, les efforts réitérés des grands fiefs contre les souverains, 
les évêques élevés souvent contre les rois, les papes aux prises avec les rois et les évêques.’ 
65 ESM, vol. 1, pp. 425, 443; vol. 2, p. 19. 
66 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 443-4, 522-4. 
67 Ibid., pp. 525, 597, 760, 777-9; vol. 2, p. 27. 
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feudalism. With the aristocracy mainly driven by a desire to enhance their power 
and to make further conquests rather than to improve their lands, and the 
productive parts of the population reduced to serfdom, feudalism is equated with a 
languishing economy and poverty: ‘Cette administration [i.e. feudal governance] 
… paraît injuste en ce que le plus grand nombre des hommes est écrasé par le plus 
petit, et que jamais le simple citoyen ne peut s’élever que par un bouleversement 
général: nulle grande ville, point du commerce, point de beaux-arts sous un 
gouvernement purement féodal.’68
 
 
The political, social and economic depression of Europe in the early medieval 
period was further marked by a complete cultural decline. Apart from relating the 
major political and social transformations and tracing the progress of human 
industry, Voltaire also sought to throw light on how manners, human 
understanding and the arts developed from the time of Charlemagne to the 
present. And yet, up until at least the 14th century he only discovered the absence 
of any development: the conquerors of Rome had turned the polite Roman 
manners into their barbarous opposite, had destroyed all useful knowledge and 
had seemingly banished the arts forever from Europe.69
 
  
The crusades provide a neat summary of all that Voltaire saw as being wrong with 
early medieval Europe: excited by pope Urban II as a means to arrive at a 
universal temporal and spiritual monarchy, enthusiastically welcomed by a 
superstitious and fanatical population, led by nobles driven by a desire for robbery 
and usurpation of further fiefs in the holy land, the episodes left Europe 
depopulated, economically ruined, and politically in a state of utter anarchy.70
                                                 
68 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 18. 
 
Nonetheless, the crusades mark something of a turning point in European history. 
Indeed, from the early 14th century onwards, Voltaire was able to relate how 
civilised Europe slowly evolved out of its barbarous, feudal and Christian 
opposite. This civilising process is first of all characterised by the gradual 
establishment of powerful and increasingly ordered states, strong enough to 
counteract the power of the lords and to correct the worst abuses of the feudal 
69 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 337-41, 349-50. 
70 Ibid., pp. 558-603. 
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anarchy, as well as to resist papal and ecclesiastical encroachments in its many 
guises. 
 
In Voltaire’s eyes, the paradigmatic case of how this happened is provided in 
French history, and manifested itself most conspicuously by the amassing of 
increasingly absolute power in royal hands. In a succession of reigns starting with 
Philip the IV (1285–1314) and coming to a head under Louis XI (1423-1483), 
Voltaire described the abolishment of feudal privileges first in the royal demesne 
and later across the kingdom, the often violent taking over of fiefs by kings, the 
gradual enfranchisement of serfs, and the corresponding humiliation of the 
nobility.71 If Louis XI had thus become the first absolute king in France, Louis 
XIV vigorously followed his example in the 17th century after the French nobility 
and the aristocratic controlled parlements had re-gained strength during the wars 
of religion and the civil war of the Fronde. By claiming absolute legislative, 
juridical and executive power and depriving the parlements of their right to 
remonstrate against royal decisions, the ‘Sun King’ effectively brought the power 
of the French monarchy to its climax.72
 
 
Crucially, Voltaire stressed that with their authority increasingly on a safe footing, 
French kings started to look after the happiness of their subjects by improving 
their kingdom. In his account, such improvements encompass the gradual 
institution of a de-feudalised, professional army, the development of royal, 
efficient and impartial courts of justice, and the establishment of France’s basic 
infrastructure.73
                                                 
71 Ibid., pp. 776-9; vol. 2, pp. 1-5, 17-21. 
 Furthermore, with the fight over the question of sovereignty won 
against the feudal nobility, French sovereigns had reached a much stronger 
position in their dealings with the papacy. There was an intimate connection, 
Voltaire argued, between the assumption of absolute power and Philip IV’s 
forceful insistence that he was the sole master of his jurisdiction against the 
countervailing pretensions by pope Boniface VIII’s; or with the Charles VII’s 
declaration of the pragmatic sanction of Bourges that instituted the liberties of the 
72 Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, esp. pp. 963-82. 
73 For an account of the reform of the army under Charles VII, see ESM, vol. 1, p. 749; for the 
reform of the justice system, vol. 1. p. 84 (under Philip IV), vol. 2, p. 9 (under Louis XI), vol. 2, p. 
115 (under Louis XII). 
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Gallican church under royal patronage – a declaration subsequently reaffirmed 
both by Louis XII in 1510 and Louis XIV in 1682.74
 
 
Through this account of post-Roman France’s descent into feudalism and its 
subsequent emergence through the activities of reforming sovereigns Voltaire 
entered the fray in a long standing debate between constitutionalists and 
absolutists about the true nature of France’s government. By the early 18th century 
this debate had taken a distinctly historical turn, and was defined by two rival 
readings of France’s past: the thèse nobiliaire on the one hand, and the thèse 
royale, on the other. The principle bone of contention was the nature of the system 
of government the Frankish conquerors of Gaul had initially instituted, and how 
this system had subsequently evolved. The main lines of battle had been drawn by 
Henri le comte de Boulainvilliers, whose Histoire de l’ancien gouvernement de 
France became a standard work of reference for the noble camp, and Jean-Baptise 
Du Bos’ Histoire critique de l’établissement de la monarchie française, fighting 
the corner of the royalists. But by the time Voltaire entered the debate, the thèse 
nobiliaire had already found further and significant support through Charles de 
Secondat, baron de Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois.75
 
 
According to Du Bos, the early kings of the Franks taking possession of Gaul did 
not destroy the political arrangements instituted by the Romans, but merely 
inherited the absolute power of the Roman emperors over the conquered territory. 
Under their sway all inhabitants of France were initially substantially equal – 
feudal distinctions being a later usurpation by the lords, and hence a perversion of 
France’s rightful form of government. For proponents of the thèse nobiliaire, by 
contrast, the Frankish conquerors were free noblemen bringing a completely new 
form of rule to France whose origins are to be found in the German woods rather 
than in Rome. This German system of government granted the free Frankish 
                                                 
74 For Voltaire’s assessment of Philip IV, see ibid., vol. 1, pp. 649-57; on the establishment of the 
Gallican church, see vol. 1, pp. 795-6 and vol. 2, pp. 108-9, 270-3. On Louis XIV and the Gallican 
church, see Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, pp. 1037-40. 
75 The debate between proponents of the thèse nobiliaire and the thèse royale has been analysed in 
depth by Nannerl O. Keohane and Michael Sonenscher. My brief summary here is derived from 
their respective accounts. See Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to 
the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 343-50; Sonenscher, 
Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), chap. 2. 
 36  
 
 
 
nobility a raft of privileges over the conquered native Gauls and, importantly, a 
substantive share of political power through their various assemblies and 
constituted bodies. Even though the status and function of the noble bodies had 
been subject to significant change over time, they were nevertheless conceived as 
forming the key part in France’s constitutional arrangements by negotiating 
between the king and the populace at large. To the extent that they had 
subsequently been dismantled by the monarchy, so the proponents of the thèse 
nobiliaire claimed, France had slid towards a simple form of despotism. Although 
an argument about the correct interpretation of France’s past, the quarrel between 
the two camps was of course substantially about contemporary French politics, 
and specifically about the direction political reform should take: further 
elimination of any residual feudal privileges through an alliance between the 
absolute monarch and the bourgeoisie on the one hand, or a shoring up of the 
remaining noble institutions, and especially the parlements, against further 
despotic encroachments, on the other.  
 
Voltaire’s position in the quarrel is in several respects straightforward. There was 
no doubt in his mind that the establishment of feudalism in France – the historical 
root of the institutions proponents of the thèse nobiliaire set out to defend – was 
an act of violent usurpation, and he had no intention of following Montesquieu in 
attempting to trace how feudal structures were transformed from a system of 
conquest into one of moderate, limited government over the course of a long and 
complicated history.76
                                                 
76 On Montesquieu’s account of the transformation of a cluster of Germanic customs regarding 
property into a system of government, see Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, pp. 131-49. On 
Voltaire’s refusal to take this account seriously, see his article Lois (Esprit des) in Molland, vol. 
20, esp. p. 44.  
 Moreover, Voltaire consistently painted the French 
monarchy as the most significant agent in reform, improving France by chiselling 
away at noble privileges and prerogatives. And yet, despite thus clearly pitching 
his tent in the royal camp, Voltaire never accepted the thèse royal’s historical 
assumptions: according to Voltaire, the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy in no 
way derived from a transfer of power from the Roman emperors to the early 
Frankish kings. On the contrary, he argued that the barbarian invaders had 
completely destroyed the structure of Roman governance across Europe, thereby 
implying that claims on behalf of the French monarchs as the rightful heirs of the 
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Roman emperors are as fanciful as the corresponding ones of the contemporary 
French nobility in regard to their Frankish predecessors. According to Voltaire, 
French history does not substantially legitimise the claims of either camp; history 
merely provides pragmatic and tactical support to the royalist position by 
demonstrating the significant role played by a series of French monarchs in 
improving their dominions, and, by contrast, undermines the noble position by 
highlighting the responsibility of the feudal aristocracy for acting as a barrier to 
progressive political, social and economic change. 
 
Voltaire’s flexible and pragmatic stance taken in the quarrel between royalists and 
nobles in the French context is further reflected in his wider European post-feudal 
history. Even though he detected a similar process of royal ascent in Spain77 as he 
had in France, Voltaire was far from describing the formation of ordered states as 
a uniform process across Europe, and recognised a host of solutions different from 
the French-absolutist model as being valid in response to the anarchy created by 
feudalism. Therefore, it would be wrong to see Voltaire as a narrow absolutist, 
who only recognised kings with undivided authority as possible drivers behind 
social, political, economic and cultural progress. Indeed, while the French 
chapters of the Essai sur les mœurs and the Siècle de Louis XIV described the 
humiliation of the nobility at the hand of increasingly absolute kings as the 
precondition for France’s subsequent development, the English chapters sketched 
the emergence of a mixed form of government in which the House of Commons, 
in conjunction with the royal court, became the principle mechanism to stem the 
undue influence of the feudal aristocracy.78
                                                 
77 ESM, vol. 2, p. 626. 
 In the German chapters a form of 
political organisation emerges even further removed from the French model, as it 
is based on a partial accommodation with feudalism rather than its outright 
rejection: in Voltaire’s account, from the issuing of the Golden Bull by emperor 
Charles IV in 1356 via the establishment of the German concordat during the 
council of Basle in the 1430s, to the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Germany 
became increasingly ordered and stable through a series of treatises that 
constituted the laws of the Empire, and fixed the respective rights and obligations 
78 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 710-11. Voltaire had already aired a similar view on the English constitution in 
his Lettres philosophiques, see Mélanges, pp. 23-37.  
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of emperor, princes, lords, bishops and imperial cities.79 As both England and 
Germany are fully integrated in the general account of the progress of European 
civilisation, it becomes clear that it is not the emergence of monarchies in tandem 
with absolutist pretensions per se that is central to Voltaire’s conception of how 
progress had to be achieved, but the institution of public order achieved by 
settling the ultimate authority in a state, independent of the exact form such 
settlements may take.80
 
  
If the ordering of sovereignty in European states emerges as one important cause 
behind development in Voltaire’s account of European history, a second, and 
equally pertinent one, is the gradual rise of towns. Although during the worst time 
of the feudal anarchy towns were depressed, neglected and subjugated to the 
interests of the rural aristocracy, from the late 13th century onwards, Europe 
becomes more urban, and the bourgeoisie emerges as the ally of strong and 
ordered governments in the quest for civilisation. In Northern Europe this urban 
rise was initially due to the emancipation of a number of imperial towns from 
feudal servitude undertaken by a series of emperors to strengthen their hold over 
their nobility – a policy soon followed in France – and the establishment of the 
Hanseatic league of free towns as a common defence mechanism against les 
‘seigneurs de châteaux, qui subsistaient de brigandage’.81 In Italy it is the gradual 
emergence to strength of city republics such as Venice, Florence, Genoa, and Pisa 
from the 12th century onwards, gaining and defending their liberty against both 
imperial and papal encroachments, that greatly contributed to the urbanisation of 
Europe.82
 
 
The emergence of towns is treated prominently by Voltaire because their activities 
are based on a different set of principles than the ones of feudal lords: rather than 
military valour, brigandage and a thirst for conquest, the raison d’être of towns is 
‘le commerce et l’industrie’.83
                                                 
79 ESM, vol. 1, pp. 355-7, 796; vol. 2, pp. 648-9. 
 Animated by such principles towns allow the 
80 A very similar argument is made by Peter Gay, Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 90-102. 
81 ESM, vol. 1, p. 776; see also, vol. 2, pp. 634, 709-10. 
82 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 474-85, 704. 
83 Ibid., p. 721. On the complex relationship between conquest and commerce in 18th-century 
thought in general, see Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, pp. 108-21 and Istavan Hont, Jealousy of 
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peaceful activity of artisans and merchants that gradually can bring about an 
increase in material wealth and the invention of new useful arts and technologies 
that further increase the speed of wealth creation. Over time this dynamism 
engenders opulence, luxury and the fine arts – all the superfluities of life that can 
only arise once the basic necessities have been satisfied.84 The prime example of 
such a virtuous circle is provided by the Italian city republics of the 14th century: 
increased industry of obscure artisans and merchants leads to useful inventions 
such as spectacles, windmills, the compass, and paper as well as to increased 
opulence and luxury among the populace.85 From thence the fine arts could arise – 
the poetry of Dante and Petarch, the painting of Le Giotte, or the architecture of 
Brunelleschi.86
 
 
Flourishing industry, great material wealth, and especially existence of fine arts 
were for Voltaire important indices to civilisation, as much, if not more, than 
strong and ordered governments.87 The elevation of the development of the fine 
arts to a place of utmost importance in his historical universe may partly reflect a 
certain amount of self-satisfaction and egoism on the part of the poet and 
dramatist Voltaire, as Meinecke argues,88
 
 but there are other, much more pertinent 
reasons, why Voltaire consistently stressed the historical benefits of all the 
superfluities of life. 
One such reason is that superfluities can lead to a secularisation of the mind. 
People driven by a desire to enjoy luxury and the agreeable things in life turn 
towards the this-worldly affairs of industry, commerce and cultivation of the arts, 
and leave the realms of theological speculation and religious superstition behind. 
                                                                                                                                     
Trade: International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Mass: Belknap, 2005), esp. pp. 1-62. 
84 See ESM, vol. 1, p. 769: ‘Si les belles-lettres étaient ainsi cultivées …, c’est une preuve que les 
autres arts qui contribuent aux agréments de la vie étaient très connus. On n’a le superflu qu’après 
le nécessaire … ’.  
85 Ibid., pp. 757-61. 
86 Ibid., pp. 762-6. 
87 See Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, p. 616: 'Tous les temps ont produit des héros et des politiques: … 
toutes les histoires sont presque égales pour qui ne veut mettre que des faits dans sa mémoire. 
Mais quiconque pense, et, ce qui est encore plus rare, quiconque a du goût, ne compte que quatre 
siècle dans l'histoire du monde. Ces quatre âges heureux sont ceux où les arts on été perfectionnés, 
et qui, servant d'époque à la grandeur de l'esprit humain, sont l'exemple de la postérité.' The 
importance of the fine arts in Voltaire’s historical universe has also been stressed by Pocock, 
Barbarism and Religion, vol. 2, pp. 84-7. 
88 Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 100-1. 
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Consider, for instance, Voltaire’s account of the court of pope Leo X in the 16th 
century, just before the reformation started to trouble Europe. The Rome of Leo 
was marked by the cultivation of letters and the fine arts, public displays of 
courtly magnificence and the enjoyment of the most voluptuous luxury, but 
showed no desire to engage in dogmatic debate that might undermine public 
peace. Thereby Leo set an example that was soon followed across Europe:  
 
Le faste de la cour voluptueuse de Léon X pouvait blesser les yeux; 
mais aussi on devait voir que cette cour même poliçait l’Europe, et 
rendait les hommes plus sociables. La religion … ne causait plus 
aucun trouble dans le monde. … La plupart des chrétiens vivaient 
dans une ignorance heureuse. Il n’y avait peut-être pas en Europe dix 
gentilshommes qui eussent la Bible. … Le haut clergé, occupé 
uniquement du temporel, savait jouir et ne savait pas disputer.89
 
 
Likewise, whilst the French Huguenots had troubled the French state throughout 
the 16th century with their religious disputes and their politically seditious 
behaviour, they were, at least temporally, brought back into useful civil life 
through Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s encouragement of trade and industry: 
 
Colbert, qui ranima l’industrie de la nation, et qu’on peut regarder 
comme le fondateur du commerce, employa beaucoup de huguenots 
dans les arts, dans les manufactures, dans la marine. Tous ces objets 
utiles, qui les occupaient, adoucirent peu à peu dans eux la fureur 
épidémique de la controverse … .90
 
 
Apart from their secularising potential, luxury and the fine arts also have a 
socially integrative and progressive function. While during the early Middle Ages 
the great feudal lords were confined to their castles with little interaction among 
themselves, and virtually none with other social strata, the enjoyment of luxury is, 
in Voltaire’s eyes, a sociable affair, taking place at court festivals, at public 
ceremonies, in theatres and in shops. Sociability and continuous interaction in turn 
improves people’s manners: the ferocious, savage and coarse customs, 
mannerisms and habits are polished in good company and turned into their 
civilised and refined opposites. This Epicurean conception of the relationship 
between pleasure, fine arts, good manners and sociability was neatly expressed by 
                                                 
89 ESM, vol. 2, p. 214. 
90 Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, p. 1048.  
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Voltaire when he discussed the increased frequency of public performances of 
plays in Europe from the 16th-century onwards: ‘Presque toutes les nations polies 
de l’Europe sentirent alors le besoin de l’art théâtral, qui rassemble les citoyens, 
adoucit les mœurs, et conduit à la morale par le plaisir.’91
 
 
Again, in Voltaire’s view, it is the court of Louis XIV that brought this 
mechanism to perfection. Indeed, since the reign of François II and especially 
during the war of the Fronde, Voltaire argued, France had been troubled by 
rebellions and factions, the manners had taken on a fierce turn, and social 
interaction was reduced to violent disputation: ‘Point de maisons où les gens de 
mérite s'assemblassent pour se communiquer leurs lumières, point d'académies, 
point de théâtres réguliers.’92
 
 Louis, by establishing a court unprecedented in its 
magnificence, splendour and opulence managed to entice the nobility from their 
provincial castles to Paris by using the pleasures and diversions to be found there 
as incentives. Thereby a process was set into motion leading to a continuous 
reciprocal interaction between softer manners and increased sociability: 
Les maisons que tous les seigneurs bâtirent ou achetèrent dans Paris, 
et leurs femmes qui y vécurent avec dignité, formèrent des écoles de 
politesse … . [L]es maisons, les spectacles, les promenades publiques, 
où l'on commençait à se rassembler pour goûter une vie plus douce, 
rendirent peu à peu près l'extérieur de tous les citoyens presque 
semblable. On s’aperçoit aujourd’hui, jusque dans le fond d’une 
boutique que la politesse a gagné toutes les conditions.93
 
 
The nexus industry, luxury and arts not only improved the social dynamics within 
European countries by putting them on a more polite footing, but also changed the 
relations between these countries. During the early medieval period these relations 
were mainly informed by a spirit of envy and conquest – the desire of each state, 
and each feudal lord, to steal the little riches their neighbours may possess. With 
the advent of industry, luxury and the fine arts, however, a new principle 
emerged: the spirit of emulation. Voltaire never treated emulation as a simple 
antithesis of envy and conquest. Indeed, when discussing Mandeville’s contention 
that selfishness, restlessness and envy are social goods since they promote a thirst 
                                                 
91 ESM, vol. 2, p. 169. 
92 Siècle de Louis XIV, OH, p. 635. 
93 Ibid., pp. 980-1. 
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after luxury and industriousness, thereby creating the necessary conditions for a 
materially rich society, Voltaire concluded that 'Mandeville a peut-être pris 
l'émulation pour l'envie; peut-être aussi l'émulation n'est-elle qu'une envie qui se 
tient dans les bornes de la décence'.94 There is only a very fine distinction between 
envy and emulation as both spring from the same primordial selfish passions. 
However, historically, they have produced very different outcomes. During the 
envious period of European history, relations between countries were a zero-sum 
game based on robbery and progress was unknown: ‘à peine un pays était un peu 
cultivé, qu' il était envahi par une nation affamée, chassée à son tour par une 
autre.’95 From the 16th century onwards, this eternal cycle of invasions and 
counter-invasions, in which achievements were continuously destroyed, was not 
so much replaced as augmented by emulative cycles, potentially leading to open-
ended progress. 96
 
 Voltaire provides us with an analysis of the reasons why 
emulative behaviour started to occur at this point in time, as well as with a 
description of its beneficial outcomes. 
On the one hand, with European states better ordered, richer and more powerful, 
simple conquest had become much more difficult. Hence the imperative to 
emulate the sources of a rival’s riches and power. This mechanism is for instance 
highlighted in Voltaire’s discussion of the conflict between Spain and England 
during the reigns of Elizabeth I and Philippe II in the late 16th century. Apart from 
relating the details of the conflict, culminating in the defeat of the Spanish 
armada, Voltaire also pointed out how the England consistently attempted to 
emulate its rival. The Spanish navy, the discovery and colonisation of extra-
European lands, and the resulting increase in trade, riches and power became 
objects of English emulation – an emulation that thereby provided the foundation 
for England’s subsequent military, commercial and political rise.97
  
  
Moreover, given the general improvement of European manners from the 15th 
century onwards, the chances that emulation – envy carried out within the limits 
                                                 
94 Article Envie in M. de V*** [i.e. François Marie Arouet de Voltaire], Questions sur 
l'Encyclopédie, 6 vols. (Genève: 1777), vol. 4, p. 130. 
95 ESM, vol. 1, pp. 407-8.  
96 For an in-depth discussion of the concept of ‘emulation’ in Enlightenment thought, see Hont, 
Jealousy of Trade, pp. 115-35. 
97 ESM, vol. 2, pp. 465-8.  
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of decency - degenerates into envy had itself decreased. So much so that manners, 
decency and politeness themselves could become objects of emulation and 
provide a counterpoint to ongoing warfare. Voltaire’s description of the 
relationship between Emperor Charles V and François I of France provides a good 
example. These two ‘rival de gloire et de politique’ plunged half of Europe into a 
long, destructive series of wars in a fight for supremacy.98 Despite this bloody 
rivalry, however, they frequently met ‘familièrement comme deux gentilshommes 
voisins’, treated each other with greatest generosity and respect, and accompanied 
their meetings with sumptuous courtly festivals in which each party could vie with 
the other in the flouting of luxury, magnificence, and courtly manners.99 Their 
rivalry, therefore, despite the barbarity of their wars, became also an engine to 
civilise European manners: ‘Il y eut entre Charles-Quint et lui [François I] une 
émulation de gloire, d’esprit de chevalerie, de courtoisie, au milieu même de leurs 
plus furieuses dissensions; et cette émulation, qui se communiqua à tous les 
courtisans, donna à ce siècle un air de grandeur et de politesse inconnu 
jusqu’alors.’100
 
 
We are now at a point were can see all the principal ingredients that Voltaire 
believed marked progressive European history and civilisation and enabled the 
continent to develop out of its barbarous and feudal past: strong and well ordered 
states; industrious populations; material wealth and luxury; useful and fine arts; 
polite manners - all these ingredients were, according to Voltaire, inter-dependent, 
and, if properly arranged, could lead to cycles of emulative behaviour which in 
turn further accelerates progress. Through this conception, Voltaire arrived at a 
historical narrative, that conformed to the standards he himself had set: it is a 
history setting out Europe’s emergence out of a state of barbarism, and the process 
underlying this emergence is understood as a complex one, driven by a variety of 
forces ranging from glorious kings to obscure artisans. Civilisation itself is 
conceived as a broad canvas that includes political institutions, the economy, 
social relations, mores as well as the arts and sciences. Moreover, it is an account 
with obvious political significance, providing its reader with a characterisation of 
                                                 
98 Ibid., p. 134. 
99 Ibid., pp. 197-9.  
100 Ibid., p. 135. 
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these forces that Voltaire believed deserved his support in the ongoing struggle 
against barbarism and religion: the reforming monarchy first of all, but also all the 
lower social strata that are economically active; the royal court as the centre of 
polished manners, as well as the theatre and the marketplace as important spaces 
where a refined way of life can be sampled and communicated. 
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Russia’s entry into Europe: The Histoire de l’empire de Russie 
sous Pierre le Grand 
 
Russia only makes a very marginal appearance in the Essai sur les mœurs with 
merely two short chapters, very rapidly sketching its situation in the 16th and 17th 
century, devoted to it.101 And yet, throughout the time of the Essai’s initial 
composition and later augmentation, Voltaire had intended to write a history of 
Russia centring on the reign of Peter I. In 1737, for instance, he asked his 
correspondent Frederic II of Prussia for help in assembling source material for a 
history of the czar. In 1745 he approached czarina Elizabeth to enquire whether 
she would guarantee official co-operation for his project of writing such a history. 
However, for a long time the Russian court did not warm to Voltaire’s project. 
Deprived of necessary source material for a detailed history, Voltaire wrote the 
Anecdotes sur le czar Pierre le Grand (published in 1748) - a short portrayal of 
the character of Peter and his principal deeds.102 In 1757, finally, Elizabeth gave 
Voltaire an official invitation to write the history of Peter I, and ordered the St. 
Petersburg Academy to offer assistance through provision of any source material 
that Voltaire may need. The Histoire de l’empire de Russie in two volumes 
(volume one first published in 1760; second volume in 1763) was the outcome of 
this commission, and is by far Voltaire’s most detailed account on Russian history 
and its relation to Europe, and will provide the main source for my analysis.103
 
 
In the introduction of the Histoire de l’empire de Russie, Voltaire made it clear 
that the work was intended to be a histoire en philosophe. In a self-reference he 
described his own Histoire de Charles XII as merely ‘amusante’; the work on the 
Russian czar, by contrast, was to be ‘instructive’.104
                                                 
101 See ESM, vol. 2, pp. 137-40, 745-51.  
 Whilst the earlier work was 
simply a portrayal of a king and his (futile) battles, the present volume was to be 
an account of how civilisation had developed in Russia: 
102 OC, vol. 46, pp. 51-84. 
103 OC, vol. 46-7. For detailed accounts on Voltaire’s long quest to write a history of Russia under 
Peter I, the collaboration between Voltaire and Russian scholars, and the source material Voltaire 
assembled for his history, see Carolyn H. Wilberger, Voltaire's Russia: Window on the East, ed. 
Theodore Besterman, vol. CLXIV, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: The 
Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institute, 1976), chap. 2 and also Michel Mervaud’s introduction 
to the Voltaire Foundation’s edition of the Histoire de l’empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, pp. 89-150.  
104 OC, vol. 46, avant-propos, p. 414. 
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L'un [i.e. Charles XII] n'a laissé que des ruines, l'autre [Peter I] est un 
fondateur en tout genre ... Les mémoires qu'on me fournit aujourd'hui 
sur la Russie, me mettent en état de faire connaître cet empire, dont les 
peuples sont si anciens, et chez qui les lois, les mœurs et les arts sont 
d'une création nouvelle.105
 
 
In the correspondence that developed between Voltaire and Ivan Shuvalov – the 
Russian official charged by Elizabeth to act as mediator between the former and 
the Academy – Voltaire frequently raised the problem of how such an instructive 
history of the czar was to be written, and framed it in terms similar to the ones he 
used in his earlier reflections on philosophic history. What is absolutely essential, 
according to Voltaire, is to ‘forcer les lecteurs à voir Pierre en grand’.106 
However, readers will only regard Peter en grand if his historian paints him en 
philosophe. It is not Peter’s character or individual deeds that are in need of 
elaboration, but how Russia has been civilised during the czar’s reign.107 Indeed, 
Voltaire explained to Shuvalov, the aim of his work was not to write the history of 
Peter, but, as its full title indicates, the history of Russia under Peter – and this 
particular history is instructive to the philosophic reader because of the rapid 
economic, social and cultural development that Russia underwent during the 
period under consideration.108
                                                 
105 Ibid., p. 414. 
 It is the comprehensiveness of the transformation 
achieved, and the short time span required to effect it, that justifies the attribution 
of a création nouvelle to Peter. As Voltaire put it to Shuvalov, Peter’s rapid 
creation of a new civilisation is unique in history, and so far no explanation for 
this historically unprecedented feat has been forthcoming; a gap in historical 
knowledge which his own account of the czar’s reign endeavours to close: 
106 OC, vol. 108, 14 November 1761, D10154, pp. 112-14. 
107 See, for instance, OC, vol. 103, 17 July 1758, D7792, pp. 88-91; OC, vol. 102, 7 August 1757, 
D7336, pp. 120-2. 
108 See, esp., OC, vol. 102, 24 June 1757, D7298, pp. 86-7: ‘Je vois avec satisfaction, Monsieur, 
que vous avez jugez comme moi, que ce n'est pas assez d'écrire les actions & les enterprises en 
tout genre, de Pierre le grand, Lesquelles pour la plûpart sont connües. L’esprit éclairé qui règne 
aujourd’hui dans les principales nations de l’Europe, demande qu’on aprofondisse ce que les 
historiens efleuraient autrefois à peine. On veut savoir de combine une nation s’est accrüe, quelle 
était sa population avant l’Epoque dont on parle, & quelle elle est depuis cette époque, le nombre 
de troupes régulières qu’elle entretenait, & celui qu’elle entretient; Quel a été son commerce, & 
comment il s’est étendu; quels arts sont nés dans le païs, quels arts y ont été apellés d’ailleurs, & 
s’y sont perfectionnés; quel était à peu près le revenu ordinaire de L’état, & à quoi il se monte 
aujourd’hui, quelle a été la naissance & le progrès de la marine; quelle est la proportion du nombre 
des nobles avec les Ecclésiastiques & les moines, & quelle est celle de ceux cy avec les 
cultivateurs &c.’ 
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Il n’y a point d’exemple sur la terre d’une nation qui soit devenue si 
considerable en tout genre en si peu de temps. Il ne vous a fallu qu’un 
demi siècle pour embrasser tous les arts utile et agréables. C’est 
surtout ce prodige unique que je voudrais developer.109
  
 
In order to be able to demonstrate the prodigious development Russia experienced 
during Peter’s reign, Voltaire of course needed to give an account of the state of 
Russia prior to the czar taking over the reins of government. In the Histoire de 
l’empire de Russie this account forms the first five chapters, providing a 
geographical description of the Empire and a sketch of pre-Petrine Russia’s social, 
economic, political and cultural situation, which, throughout the remainder of the 
work, act as the baseline against which the achievements of Peter are measured. 
These achievements are then related in the following twenty-nine chapters, 
focusing on the czar’s main military and diplomatic victories and, importantly, on 
his comprehensive programme of reform, specifically calibrated, according to 
Voltaire, to propel Russia into the orbit of European civilisation.  
 
It is in the first, lengthy chapter - a geographical and historical description of the 
sixteen different provinces of Russia - where Voltaire stressed some of the 
problems faced both by Peter in his attempt to civilise Russia, as well as by any 
historian who attempts to relate Russian history en philosophe. The very first 
thing that struck Voltaire when surveying Russia's geography was the sheer size 
of its territory: 
 
L’empire de Russie est le plus vaste de notre hémisphère; il s’étend 
d’occident en orient, l’espace de plus de deux mille lieues communes 
de France, et il a plus de huit cents lieues du sud au nord dans sa plus 
grand largeur. Il confine à la Pologne et à la mer Glaciale; il touche à 
la Suède et à la Chine.110
 
 
The passage not only highlighted the size of the Empire, but also indicated the 
manifold relations of Russia to other historical and cultural complexes, and, 
Voltaire continued, thus far the rest of Europe had been largely ignorant of its 
extent, its many relations and its global importance: 
                                                 
109 OC, vol. 103, 20 April 1758, D7715, pp. 117-18. 
110 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, p. 415. 
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Nous connaissions si peu les limites de ce pays dans le siècle passé, 
que lorsque en 1689 nous apprîmes que les Chinois et les Russes 
étaient en guerre … nous traitâmes d’abord cet événement de fable.111
 
 
The rest of the chapter is clearly designed to counter such ignorance, and to 
convey an idea of the geographical, historical, and cultural diversity of Russia. 
For instance, Voltaire reminded his readers that Livonia was for a long time a 
disputed territory between Sweden, Poland and Russia, and has had at least since 
the 12th century strong cultural and commercial ties to Northern Europe through 
its integration into the hansa trade system; a connection to Europe shared by other 
Russian towns and provinces such as Smolensk and Novgorod. By contrast, Kiev 
in the Ukraine, seat of the early Russian grand-dukes, has a historical tradition 
closely related to the one of Byzantium. Siberia, still mostly inhabited by savages 
– that is by hunter gatherer tribes – was seen by Voltaire as a place of non-history 
and cultural isolation, while in Kazan we not only find Tatar Muslims but also 
evidence of an ancient, flourishing trade with Persia and India.112
 
 
Voltaire summed up the chapter by reiterating the remarkable diversity of Russia 
and by reflecting on the challenges this very diversity poses to the Empire's 
civilisation:  
 
C’est ainsi que dans l’empire de Russie il y a plus de différentes 
espèces, plus de singularités, plus de mœurs différentes que dans 
aucun pays de l’univers.113
  
 
Quand les nations se sont ainsi mêlées, elles sont longtemps à se 
civiliser … les unes se policent plus tôt, les autre plus tard. La police 
et les arts s’établissent si difficilement les révolutions ruinent si 
souvent l’édifice commencé, que si l’on doit s’étonner, c’est que la 
plupart des nations ne vivent pas en Tartares.114
 
 
However, if the work’s first chapter stresses the singularities of Russia and its 
history, all the challenges associated with this are swiftly resolved in chapters two 
and three, where Voltaire turned to an account of the political, social, economic 
                                                 
111 Ibid., p. 416. 
112 Ibid., pp. 415-79. 
113 Ibid., pp. 472-3. 
114 Ibid., p. 479. 
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and cultural state of Russia prior to Peter’s arrival on the scene. Essentially, the 
negation of cultural and historical singularities was achieved by means of 
complete alignment of the state of pre-Petrine Russia with the one of pre-civilised 
Europe. What we find therefore in these chapters is a sketch of a country beset by 
precisely the same problems that were identified in the Essai sur les mœurs as 
having prevented civilisation from emerging in Europe. 
 
Pre-Petrine Russia, Voltaire argued, was subjected to a conflict between the 
secular and ecclesiastic powers just as Europe had been throughout most of its 
post-classical history. This conflict was started by the patriarchs of the Russian 
church, who, since gaining their independence from Constantinople in 1588, had 
allegedly attempted to encroach on the czar’s authority.115 Furthermore, the 
Russian czars had to contend with a strong and unruly nobility (the boyars) who 
acted as an impediment on the progress of the country. According to Voltaire, the 
boyars, in conjunction with the ecclesiastics, weakened the state economically by 
keeping the majority of the population in serfdom, politically by frequently 
stirring up revolts against the czars, and militarily through their pre-eminence in 
the army coupled with their independence and lack of discipline.116 Given the 
existence of these two familiar stumbling blocks to any progressive history, the 
assessment that pre-Petrine Russia was weak, poor and lacking industry, riches 
and almost all of the useful and fine arts hardly comes as a surprise.117 A 
predicament rendered even more severe by an alleged complete isolation of 
Russia from the rest of the world – an isolation which, of course, denied the 
possibility that processes of cross-cultural enrichment through emulation could 
occur. Indeed, Voltaire argued, there existed in 17th-century Russia a religious law 
that forbade Russians from leaving their country and engaging with foreigners, 
thereby effectively condemning the country to an eternal state of poverty and 
ignorance.118
  
 
                                                 
115 Ibid., pp. 495-501.  
116 Ibid., p. 481 (on serfdom), pp. 599-600 (on the nobility’s propensity to trouble the state), pp. 
560-3 (on the feudal characteristics of the Russian army). 
117 Ibid., pp. 507-8. 
118 Ibid., pp. 508-10. 
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And yet, Voltaire did not claim that pre-Petrine Russia was exactly the same as 
medieval Europe, and he noted a few aspects that set the former apart from the 
latter. Most notably, a concession was made that Russian manners and customs 
had always been influenced by Oriental culture, and, when compared to the 
corresponding European ones, they were portrayed as being preferable: 
 
Les usages, les vêtements, les mœurs en Russie avaient toujours plus 
tenu de l'Asie que de l'Europe chrétienne: telle était … celle de ne se 
présenter ni dans l'église ni devant le trône avec une épée, coutume 
orientale opposée à notre usage ridicule et barbare d'aller parler à 
Dieu, aux rois, à ses amis et aux femmes, avec une longue arme 
offensive qui descend au bas des jambes. L’habit long dans les jours 
de cérémonie, semblait plus noble que le vêtement court des nations 
occidentales de l'Europe. Une tunique doublée de pelisse … et ces 
espèces de hauts turbans qui élevaient la taille, étaient plus imposants 
aux yeux que les perruques et le justaucorps, et plus convenables aux 
climats froids …. .119
  
 
Despite such sentiments the main strategy informing the opening chapters was 
clearly to demonstrate the similarities between Russia and Europe. Indeed, 
Voltaire's short essay Pierre le Grand et J.-J. Rousseau, published five years after 
completion of the first volume of the Histoire de l'empire de Russie, shows 
emphatically the extent to which Voltaire was prepared to push these 
similarities.120 As we shall see in much more detail in the next chapter, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau had attacked Voltaire's portrayal of Peter I in his Du contrat 
social.121
 
 He claimed that the czar, far from having been a genial creator of a new 
civilisation, had in effect corrupted Russia in an untimely fashion. Voltaire's essay 
was intended as a comprehensive refutation of this claim by showing that 
Rousseau had not considered the historical state from which Peter had to start his 
project of civilisation and, as a consequence, had not made allowance for the 
enormity of the task to be performed. In the course of this refutation, Voltaire 
rendered explicit and amplified what was already implicit in the opening passages 
of the Histoire de l'empire de Russie: 
                                                 
119 Ibid., p. 489.  
120 In Molland, vol. 20, pp. 218-22.  
121 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, 5 
vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-), vol. 3, p. 386. 
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Lorsque Pierre monta sur le trône, la Russie était à peu près au même 
état que la France, l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre au XIe siècle. Les 
Russes ont fait en quatre-vingt ans, que les vues de Pierre ont été 
suivies, plus de progrès que nous n'en avons fait en quatre siècles: 
n'est-ce pas une preuve que ces vues n'étaient pas celles d'un homme 
ordinaire?122
 
 
Just as he had done in the Histoire de l’empire de Russie, Voltaire insisted that the 
similarity between 11th century Europe and late 17th century Russia most 
prominently manifested itself in three regards: first, 'l'excesif pouvoir de la 
superstition sur les esprit, et l'influence des prêtres sur le gouvernement et sur les 
sujets', second, 'l'esclavage presque général des paysans, soit artisans, soit 
cultivateurs' and third, 'l'ignorance'.123
 
  
Crucially, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Voltaire was well aware 
of the fact that this close alignment of the state of pre-Petrine Russia with the one 
of early medieval Europe was problematic. For instance, in the Essai sur les 
mœurs, Voltaire had argued that the usurpation of temporal authority by 
ecclesiastics – the phenomenon that dominated so much of the history of Latin 
Christianity - had been virtually unknown in the Greek church.124 In his Russian 
history, by contrast, he defined the usurpation of temporal powers by the Russian 
clergy as a key problem facing Peter at the start of this reign, without giving us an 
account of how such an usurpation might have happened in a theological tradition 
that, according to his own arguments in the Essai sur les mœurs, had generally 
refrained from making claims on secular dominion. The activities of Nicon – 
patriarch immediately prior to Peter’s ascent to power – who claimed the right to 
be seated next to the czar in the senate, and who excommunicated a number of 
senators, was the only evidence Voltaire marshalled to prove his point.125
                                                 
122 Molland, vol. 20, p. 219.  
 
However, he never showed whether Nicon’s claim to power was part of a larger 
systemic pattern, or just a temporary occurrence. 
123 Ibid., p. 218. 
124 See ESM, vol. 1, p. 319: ‘La domination temporelle, cet éternel sujet de discorde dans 
l’Occident, fut inconnue aux Églises d’Orient. Les évêques sous les yeux du maître restèrent sujets 
… .’ See also the article Pierre in the Dictionnaire philosophique, OC, vol. 36, p. 447:‘Pourquoi 
les successeurs de Pierre ont-ils eu tant de pouvoir en Occident, et aucun en Orient? C’est 
demander pourquoi les évêques de Vurtzbourg et de Saltzbourg se sont attribués les droit régaliens 
dans des temps d’anarchie, tandis que les évêques grecs sont toujours restés sujets.’  
125 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, pp. 500-1. 
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Likewise, Voltaire's equation of feudal European nobles and 17th-century Russian 
boyars in regard to the institution of serfdom is not fully warranted. Even though 
it is undoubtedly true that the Russian boyars kept their peasants in bondage, this 
problem was further exacerbated in 17th-century Russia by the fact that the czar 
and the state themselves possessed a large number of serfs.126 Tellingly, Voltaire 
did not deny this fact, but attempted to downplay it as much as he could. Indeed, 
he provides us with the results of a census of Russia after Peter’s reign in 1747 
which clearly shows the various classes of peasants belonging to the crown, but 
this fact was hidden away in this statistic and never mentioned in the narrative.127
 
 
Conversely, he was much more explicit in regard to the existence of peasants 
bonded to the church and to the nobility, thereby highlighting the similarity of 
Russian and European serfdom: 
De ces vingt-quatre millions d'hommes [i.e. the total population of 
Russia as calculated by Voltaire] la plupart sont des serfs, comme 
dans la Pologne, dans plusieurs provinces de l'Allemagne, et autrefois 
dans presque toute l'Europe. On compte en Russie et en Pologne les 
richesses d'un gentilhomme et d'un ecclésiastique, non par leur 
revenue en argent, mais par le nombre de leurs esclaves.128
 
 
The immediate objective of this strategy of historical alignment is easy to identify. 
Having established that pre-Petrine Russia was beset by exactly the same 
problems as feudal Europe had been, and having claimed that thus far next to 
nothing had been undertaken to solve these problems,129
 
 he could now turn to the 
principle object of his history – Peter I – and demonstrate how the czar virtually 
single-handedly had brought civilisation to Russia: 
Ils [i.e. les Russes] possédaient les plus vastes Etats de l’univers, et 
tout y était à faire. Enfin, Pierre naquit, et la Russie fut formée.130
 
 
                                                 
126 On crown and court serfs in 17th- and 18th-century Russia, see also Isabel de Madariaga, Russia 
in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) pp. 98-106.  
127 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, pp. 481-3. 
128 Ibid., p. 481. 
129 Voltaire claimed that Peter’s two immediate predecessors as czars – Alexei I and Feodor III – 
had undertaken some feeble steps toward reforming their country without, however, having left a 
lasting legacy. See ibid., pp. 519-27. 
130 Ibid., pp. 509-10. 
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The same strategy also enabled Voltaire to dismiss the many historical and 
cultural traditions that converge on the territory of Russia, and that he himself had 
discovered, as irrelevant in the great quest for attainment of civilisation in Russia. 
Given that the state of pre-Petrine Russia was essentially the same as the one of 
pre-civilised Europe, the history of Russia under Peter I could to a large extent be 
reduced to the czar’s great programme of imitating civilised Europe, and the 
appropriateness of this programme as a remedy to all of Russia’s ills was put 
beyond doubt. Indeed, there is in Voltaire’s narrative a distinct point where 
Peter’s great civilising mission begins in earnest. Having beaten the Turkish army 
in the course of his first major military campaign in 1696, and thereby having 
gained a foothold in the Crimea, Peter turned decisively to Europe: 
 
Ce n'était pas assez d'inquiéter les Turcs sur la mer Noire: des 
établissements sur les Palus-Méotides, et vers la mer Caspienne, ne 
suffisaient pas à ses projets de marine, de commerce et de puissance; 
la gloire même que tout réformateur désire ardemment, n'était ni en 
Perse ni en Turquie; elle était dans notre partie de l'Europe, où l'on 
éternise les grands talents en tout genre. Enfin Pierre ne voulait 
introduire dans ses Etats ni les mœurs turques, ni les persanes, mais 
les nôtres.131
 
 
From this point onward, the Histoire de l’empire de Russie becomes a 
straightforward account of Peter’s project of propelling Russia into the orbit of 
European civilisation. The first step in this project was, of course, military. It 
principally concerns Peter’s successful involvement in the Great Northern War 
(1700-1721), reaching its climax during the battle of Poltava in 1709 when a 
Swedish army was routed – a victory paving the way for Russia becoming the 
dominant power around the Baltic Sea. At the time the peace of Nystadt was 
signed in 1721, Voltaire argued, Peter had not only gained a secure territorial at 
the Baltic coast, but by replacing Sweden as the main power in the European 
North, had secured a prominent place for himself and his country at the table of 
European power politics and diplomacy.132
 
 
                                                 
131 Ibid., p. 583.  
132 Ibid., vol. 47, pp. 902-12. 
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However, in Voltaire’s account, Peter’s internal reforms designed to civilise and 
reform Russia according to European models were even more important than his 
military exploits. In order to achieve this, Peter - having grown up in a country 
allegedly completely isolated from the rest of the world - first had to learn all 
about European civilisation. The Histoire de l’empire de Russie outlines in much 
detail the czar’s two trips to Europe - the first to Prussia, Holland, England and 
Vienna in 1697-98; and the second to Denmark, Prussia, Holland and France in 
1716-17 – where Peter learnt how to better govern his kingdom: 
 
C'était une chose inouïe dans l'histoire du monde qu'un roi de vingt-
cinq ans qui abandonnait ses royaumes pour mieux régner.133
 
 
Voltaire’s guiding theme in the chapters dealing with Peter’s internal reforms is 
accordingly the czar’s increasingly successful emulation of the Europe he had 
come to appreciate during his travels. Thereby, the story told in these chapters is 
to an extent a repetition of the Essai sur les mœurs: it is an account of how the 
stumbling blocks to civilisation were successively removed by a czar who had 
learnt the lessons of Europe’s past. 
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, Voltaire considered the restructuring of the Russian 
church as the most important reform undertaken. This was achieved through the 
abolishment of the office of the patriarch, and its replacement through a new 
synod of bishops, completely subservient to the czar, designed to act as the new 
depositary and executive of the ecclesiastic law. Interestingly, whilst earlier in the 
work Voltaire had claimed that the patriarchs had usurped secular power form the 
czars in the past, when he came to write about the reform of the Russian church, 
he introduced a new justification for the abolishment of the patriarchy. During his 
travels Peter had learnt how much damage the conflict between the secular and 
sacred powers had caused in Europe, and hence wanted to assert his complete 
power over the church by necessitating the members of the new synod to swear 
undivided allegiance to himself. This was a measure, Voltaire noted, directly 
inspired by the English oath of supremacy, but, again, he did not provide a 
                                                 
133 Ibid., vol. 46, p. 581; on Peter’s second trip, see vol. 47, pp. 790-809. 
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detailed consideration as to why this reform was appropriate in the context of 
Russia with its specific ecclesiastical tradition.134
 
 
Equally unsurprising is Voltaire’s account of Peter’s attempt to re-structure 
Russian society by humiliating the nobility. The abolishment of the boyar-
dominated law courts and their replacement with tribunals based on principle of 
Swedish jurisprudence, the reformation of the armed forces by breaking the noble 
stranglehold over the military (inspired by the example of Germany), and the 
institution of a new table of ranks according to which privileges are no longer 
awarded because of birth or blood, but on the basis of services rendered to the 
state all win Voltaire’s unqualified adulation.135 And yet, despite the fact that 
Voltaire frequently invoked the notion that Peter had created a completely new 
society – a society in which industriousness and societal usefulness were the new 
guiding principles – he never discussed the arguably biggest societal problem of 
17th-century Russia: the serf question.136
 
 The reason for this is, of course, that 
Peter never attempted an emancipation. Indeed, the following is Voltaire’s only 
reference to the serf question: 
… [Pierre] abolit le mot de golut, esclave, dont les Russes se servaient 
quand ils pouvaient parler aux czars, et quand ils présentaient des 
requêtes; il ordonna qu’on se servît du mot de raad, qui signifie sujet. 
Ce changement n’ôta rien à l’obéissance, et devait concilier 
l’affection.137
 
 
A reform weak enough in itself, but which did not even have the meaning Voltaire 
attributed to it, since, as Voltaire’s Russian collaborators pointed out, both golut 
and raad signify serf in Russian.138 Voltaire, however, chose to ignore his 
collaborators' correction.139
                                                 
134 Ibid., vol. 46, pp. 605-8; vol. 47, pp. 892-7. 
  
135 Ibid., vol. 46, pp. 603-4; vol. 47, pp. 887-90.  
136 The importance of the serf question in 18th-century Russia, and in European discussions about 
Russia after publication of Voltaire’s Histoire de l'empire de Russie, is stressed by Franco Venturi, 
The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989-91), 
vol. 2, pp. 806-51. 
137 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, p. 613.  
138 See editorial footnote no. 49 in ibid., p. 613. 
139 He even repeated the story of Peter's reform unaltered in his article Esclave of the Questions sur 
l'Encyclopédie; ironically in order to attack factual inaccuracies in Montesquieu's De l'esprit des 
lois. See V***, Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, vol. 4, pp. 200-1. 
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According to his reading, Peter had successfully reformed the internal affairs of 
Russia to such an extent that the building of a materially rich and polite 
civilisation could now begin in earnest. Again, it is the czar that single-handedly 
takes the lead in this by promoting the importation of Dutch, Swiss, English, 
French and German artisans into Russia; by setting up and encouraging new 
industries across the Empire; by improving highways, water channels and ports; 
by encouraging commerce with the rest of the world; and by laying the foundation 
for St. Petersburg.140 This city, Voltaire argued, had gradually become one of the 
most beautiful places in the world, crowned by a magnificent court, which 
through its cultivation of the fine arts could now act as an engine to further 
civilise and polish Russia. Indeed, Voltaire noted that under Peter’s successors 
French comedies and Italian operas were regularly performed in St. Petersburg – a 
clear sign that polite civilisation in all its glory had arrived in Russia.141
 
 
Voltaire considered the Histoire de l’empire de Russie as being a history of the 
same genre as the Essai sur les mœurs and the Siècle de Louis XIV - it is a histoire 
en philosophe concerned with the development of civilisation. However, the two 
accounts are of course marked by a very significant difference: the history of 
European civilisation as outlined in the Essai sur les mœurs and the Siècle de 
Louis XIV is retold in a much condensed time-span in the case of Russia - 29 years 
(the time of Peter’s reign) rather than 450 years (the time between the last crusade 
and the end of the reign of Louis XIV). We have seen that in order to be able to 
tell this story of rapid development, Voltaire needed recourse to a questionable 
strategy of aligning the respective historical states of early medieaval Europe and 
pre-Petrine Russia: Peter's historically unique and prodigious achievement was 
enabled by the czar having successfully learned the lessons of the continent's past, 
and these lessons, Voltaire endeavoured to show, were directly applicable to 
Russia. 
 
And yet, Voltaire, by arguing that civilisation developed at a much quicker pace 
in Russia than it did in Europe, also tells a very different story in regard to 
                                                 
140 Histoire de l’empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, pp. 591-8, pp. 637-49; vol. 47, pp. 867-75. 
141 Anecdotes sur le czar Pierre le Grand, OC, vol. 46, pp. 68-9.  
 57  
 
 
 
political reform and in regard to the agents that drive forward the process of 
becoming civilised in the two contexts. These differences are highlighted most 
succinctly in Voltaire's description of Peter's attempt to alter the fashion habits of 
his subjects: 
 
Il était utile que les Russes ne fussent point vêtus d'une autre manière 
que ceux qui leur enseignaient les arts; la haine contre les étrangers 
étant trop naturelle aux hommes, et trop entretenue par la différence 
des vêtements. L'habit de cérémonie qui tenait alors du polonais, du 
tartare, et de l'ancien hongrois, était, comme on l'a dit, très noble; mais 
l'habit des bourgeois et du bas peuple ressemblait à ces jaquettes 
plissées vers la ceinture, qu'on donne encore à certains pauvres dans 
quelques-uns des nos hôpitaux ... Le czar n'eut pas de peine à 
introduire l'habit de nos nations, et la coutume de se raser à sa cour; 
mais le peuple fut plus difficile; on fut obligé d'imposer une taxe sur 
les habits longs et sur les barbes. On suspendait aux portes de la ville 
des modèles de justaucorps: on coupait les robes et les barbes à qui ne 
voulait pas payer. Tout cela s'exécutait gaiement, et cette gaieté même 
prévint les séditions.142
 
 
There are several noteworthy aspects to Voltaire’s treatment of this reform. First 
of all, it was of course not implemented in a spirit of gaieté. Mervaud, in his 
commentary on the Histoire de l’empire de Russie, notes that it caused a lot of 
resistance and several revolts.143 Moreover, Peter’s method was not justified 
because Voltaire believed that the old, Oriental way of dressing was in any way 
inferior to the European one – in fact, as already noted earlier and reinforced here, 
he considered it to be more noble. But this consideration is completely trumped by 
the need to destroy the barrier between the Russians and the Europeans who had 
come to instruct them. In other words, the desirability of introducing European 
arts, the subject the Russians are taught about, and, by implication, European 
civilisation, has reached for both Peter and Voltaire such a level of importance, 
that the cruelty of the reform becomes justified.144
 
 
                                                 
142 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46, pp. 611-12. 
143 See editorial footnote no. 45 in ibid., p. 612.  
144 On Voltaire's justification of violence as a means to achieve progress in the context of the 
Histoire de l'empire de Russie, see also John R. Iverson, ‘La guerre, le grand homme et l'histoire: 
l'histoire de l'empire de Russie’, in Voltaire et ses combats, ed. Ulla Kölving and Christiane 
Mervaud, 2 vols (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1997), vol. 2, esp. pp. 1420-2. 
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Importantly, to justify the use of force and constraint to change peoples manners 
is not something Voltaire advocated in the Essai sur les mœurs – there, as seen 
earlier, people had gradually become more polished through their own voluntary 
interactions at the court, in towns, during theatre performances and so on. 
However, such slow and voluntary means of social change are not operative in 
Voltaire's account of Russia's swift civilisation. As a consequence, Voltaire 
effectively reduces the long and complex process of becoming civilised, which, he 
had shown in the European context, involved a symbiosis between governmental 
reforms from the top that enabled societal growth and development from below, 
to the rather crude imposition of Peter's will on a passive nation in the context of 
Russia. Indeed, despite baptising his work on the czar the Histoire de l’empire de 
Russie sous Pierre le Grand, Voltaire tells us very little about Russia, but a lot 
about Peter - and unlike the European nations presented in the Essai sur les 
mœurs, Voltaire's Russia possesses next to no historical agency vis-à-vis its 
domineering czar. 
 
The crucial question that still needs investigation pertains to the causes that may 
have led Voltaire to portray Peter I as the single-handed architect of an entirely 
new civilisation in Russia. This question is all the more pressing, since this 
portrayal stands in various respects at odds with the account of the reforming 
sovereign's role in the process of civilisation offered in the Essai sur les mœurs 
and the Siècle de Louis XIV. Modern scholarship on Voltaire provides us with at 
least two prominent answers to this question. However, neither is entirely 
satisfactory. 
 
On the one hand, Wolff situates Voltaire's adulation of Peter, and specifically his 
embarrassed silence vis-à-vis the czar's crudeness, in the context of Voltaire's 
alleged wider project of typecasting Russia as an entity radically different from 
Europe.145
                                                 
145 Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. 
 Given that Voltaire condescendingly regarded semi-Oriental Russia as 
being barbarian and backward by its very nature, so Wolff claims, a despot such 
as Peter, using cruel and violent methods, becomes necessary to carry the light of 
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Western civilisation into the darkness of the East.146
 
 A different approach to 
asserting political authority, Wolff implies, flows directly from the more 
fundamental cultural difference between East and West that allegedly structures 
Voltaire's thought.  
The problem with Wolff’s argument in regard to Voltaire's portrayal of Peter is 
that it is based on an untenable reading of the latter's conception of the 
relationship between Russia, Europe and the Orient. As seen above, Voltaire by 
no means unduly Orientalises Russia; on the contrary, he radically Europeanises it 
by first portraying its 17th-century state as an instance of the general state of pre-
civilised Europe, and, secondly, by outlining how the czar managed to close gap 
in historical development between the two entities. Peter, in other words, is not 
remarkable for Voltaire because he somehow managed to Europeanise a semi-
Oriental empire, but because centuries of European history were repeated during 
his short reign on Russian territory. The Orient hardly makes an appearance in this 
story, and to the very limited extent that Voltaire detected Oriental features of 
Russian culture - such as the clothing habits of the old Russians – these were, 
from a cultural point of view, treated sympathetically rather than 
condescendingly.  
 
Moreover, Wolff thereby also misrepresents Voltaire's status in the wider history 
of European engagement with Russia: far from being the first author of a highly 
influential conception of Russia, whose most distinct feature is a sharp contrast to 
Europe,147
                                                 
146 Ibid., esp. pp. 100, 197-205. Wilberger equally stresses the Oriental nature of Voltaire's sketch 
of pre-Petrine Russia, without, however, deriving the same radical conclusions as Wolff; see 
Wilberger, Voltaire's Russia, pp. 73-4. 
 Voltaire conceived Russia as fundamentally belonging to Europe. As 
will be shown in the following chapters, whilst this aspect of Voltaire's Russian 
writings was widely taken up in late 18th-century European thought, the 
comprehensiveness by which Voltaire regarded Russia through the lenses 
provided by European history was not. Indeed, Levesque, Schlözer and Herder 
were interested in the very questions which Voltaire only briefly touched upon: 
namely whether and to what extent pre-Petrine Russia may have been influenced 
147 For the claim that Voltaire was the first author of the idea of Eastern Europe, see Wolff, 
Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 5. 
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by histories other than the one of Latin Europe - especially Byzantine and Mongol 
or Tatar history - and whether such influences may have explanatory power for 
the nature and success of Peter's project of reform. 
  
An alternative explanation for the laudatory portrayal of Peter is offered by 
Lortholary who claims that Voltaire was never interested in understanding Russia 
as it actually was, but instead constructed the Histoire de l’empire de Russie the 
way he did, in order to lend support to his cherished political theory of 
enlightened despotism. Indeed, Voltaire allegedly created a myth of Peter whose 
prime function was to give credence to the belief that unlimited progress can be 
readily achieved if a sovereign has the will to radical reform and is unhampered 
by any institutional restraints.148
 
 According to Lortholary, Voltaire's ideal of 
enlightened despotism is based on a simplistic, and essentially a-historical, 
conception of the past in which an undue concern with future progress ultimately 
condones present violence: 
Comment nous présente-t-il l'œuvre du tsar? Comme un 
commencement absolu. La Russie lui doit tout. Avant lui, le chaos. Il 
paraît, et sa main souveraine ordonne ce chaos, dissipe les ténèbres.149
 
 
L'auteur plaçait au-dessus des ravageurs de provinces les princes 
législateurs, mais son législateur brandissait une hache et cette hache 
apparaissait comme l'instrument du progrès. Voltaire faisait - ou 
semblait faire - l'apologie de la contrainte, prônait une œuvre fondée 
sur le mépris des hommes et de la vie humaine et sur cette idée que 
progrès implique destruction du passé.150
 
 
On the surface, this explanation corresponds well with the analysis of the Histoire 
de l’empire de Russie provided above: there is no doubt that the enlightened 
despot Peter is the unqualified hero of this history, and, as the account of the 
reform of the old Russian clothing habits amply demonstrates, Voltaire did indeed 
at times turn a blind eye on the czar’s violence. The question remains however, 
whether Voltaire thereby wanted to extol in general terms the kind of political 
theory which Lortholary alleges he did: a theory according to which rapid 
                                                 
148 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, esp. pp. 62-7.  
149 Ibid., p. 59. 
150 Ibid., p. 67. 
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progress is best brought about by one enlightened ruler alone who dares to destroy 
the past in order to bring about a better future. 
 
The problem with such an interpretation is that it supposes a rather radical break 
in Voltaire’s thought. In the Essai sur les mœurs and in the Siècle de Louis XIV no 
such theory can be found: the development of European civilisation was 
conceived as operating too diversely in different countries, as driven by too many 
actors and as spanning too many centuries for such a theory to emerge. Even the 
most absolute ruler that makes a prominent appearance in these works – Louis 
XIV – was not a despot without attachment to the past and his reign was not 
portrayed as having propelled France onto a completely new historical trajectory. 
In Voltaire’s account Louis is firmly embedded within French history, standing at 
the end of a long tradition of rulers who have steadily and pragmatically reformed 
their country. 
 
There is no reason to suppose such a break since there are good indications in the 
Histoire de l’empire de Russie itself, that Voltaire, when penning his work on the 
czar, intended to urge for a continuation of such gradual reform in France rather 
than to advocate a general theory of a-historical despotism. In fact, Lortholary is 
not entirely correct in stating that Voltaire – like Peter - had no interest in Russia’s 
pre-Petrine past, and that his account of the czar is devoid of any historical roots. 
Indeed, Voltaire’s work does not suffer from the complete absence of such a pre-
history, but from the fact that this pre-history is all too often not rooted in Russia’s 
past, but in the past of early medieval Europe as it was understood by Voltaire. Of 
course, the consequences of this are largely the ones Lortholary sets out: by 
basing his history on the idea that pre-Petrine Russia was beset by a set of 
problems whose solutions had been revealed in European history but had never 
been tackled in Russia itself, he could describe Peter – the czar who had 
enlightened himself about the nature of these problems and their appropriate 
solutions in Europe – as the single-handled creator of an entirely new civilisation, 
and the benign destructor of Russia’s previous history. 
 
However, on the level of political advocacy, the alignment of pre-Petrine history 
with that of feudal Europe might well have had quite a different motivation than 
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to simply extol the virtues of enlightened despotism. By means of this alignment, 
Voltaire could claim that Peter’s reforms and achievements are directly relevant in 
an European context. If Peter had emulated Europe in his successful attempt to 
civilise his own country, Voltaire in turn wanted to turn Peter’s Russia into an 
object of emulation for Europe, and especially France. Written at a time when 
Voltaire was very actively engaged in French politics and often frustrated by the 
lack of reform originating from the court,151
 
 the history of the czar who went 
further than Louis XIV in his religious reforms, and who showed much more zeal 
in improving his kingdom than Louis XV, could of course be usefully employed 
in attempts to spur the monarch into action. Indeed, the very last sentence of the 
Histoire de l’empire de Russie reveals just how much Voltaire had European 
sovereigns in mind when he wrote the work: 
Les souverains des Etats depuis longtemps policés se diront à eux-
mêmes, ‘Si dans les climats glacés de l’ancienne Scythie, un homme 
aidé de son seul génie a fait de si grandes choses, que devons-nous 
faire dans des royaumes où les travaux accumulés de plusieurs siècles 
nous ont rendu tout facile?152
 
 
Therefore, regarding the intended political message for home consumption, the 
Histoire de l’empire de Russie is not a simple defence of enlightened despotism, 
but rather an attempt to inspire the continuation and acceleration of the gradual 
and pragmatic reform project that Voltaire believed had defined Europe’s recent 
past. And yet, by writing this history with his mind directed towards Versailles 
rather than Siberia, Moscow or even St. Petersburg, Voltaire provided us with a 
skewed account of Peter's Russia. 
 
Crucially, however, this is not the end, but the beginning, of our story. The notion 
that Peter managed to Europeanise his country swiftly simply by imposing his will 
on a passive nation, far from ever becoming hegemonic in late 18th-century France 
as Lortholary alleges, was comprehensively refuted in subsequent scholarship. 
Voltaire is important for a historical investigation attempting to trace how late 
18th-century Europe conceived of Russian history, not because he gave an account 
                                                 
151 See, for instance, Gay, Voltaire's Politics, pp. 122-43, 310-15. 
152 Histoire de l'empire de Russie, OC, vol. 47, p. 942.  
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that was subsequently widely adopted, but because he framed the kind of 
questions that engaged subsequent thinkers. As we shall see in what follows, the 
idea from Voltaire’s Histoire de l’empire de Russie that was taken up in 
subsequent scholarship was that Russia’s history must be considered in its 
relationship to the history of Europe’s civilisation; the nature of the relationship 
and the role of Peter in fostering it, however, were to prove contentious until the 
end of the century. 
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2. Diderot: The history and politics of old Europe and the 
ambivalent emergence of youthful Russia 
 
Introduction 
 
Denis Diderot produced the first substantive response to Voltaire's claim that 
Peter I had managed to quickly civilise Russia by means of a simple imposition of 
European models. This response was articulated in three texts concerned with 
Russia, occasioned by Diderot’s six month stay at the court of Catherine II 
between October 1773 and March 1774: the Mélanges philosophiques, 
historiques, etc. pour Catherine II, the Observations sur le Nakaz, and the Plan 
d'une université.153
 
 On the surface these texts spell out a number of loosely 
connected proposals to the czarina on how to reform her country. And yet, 
underlying Diderot's discussion of specific reforming policies is a much more 
general concern with the historical process of civilisation and the role of the 
reforming sovereign within this process. It is this concern that gives coherence to 
the various proposals put forward, and that leads Diderot into a critical 
engagement with Voltaire’s Histoire de l'empire de Russie.  
This chapter will highlight Diderot's challenge to two core assumptions that 
underlie Voltaire's story of the czar. First, Diderot argues that the ability of 
reforming sovereigns to accelerate the march of history is subject to strict limits, 
which are constituted by the dependence of civilisation on slow bottom-up 
processes of development. Secondly, he denies that modern European history 
provides models of reform that can simply be emulated in Russia; on the contrary, 
in his view, the European experience supplies examples that are to be avoided in 
the Russian context. Diderot's advice to Catherine to shift away from a top-down 
model of development that is considerably dependent on external stimuli, to one 
where internal, bottom-up processes play a much larger part, is itself informed by 
his particular conception of philosophic history. According to Diderot, the history 
of civilisation is not an autonomous process, but one that is considerably 
                                                 
153 Versini, vol. 3. 
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determined by the more fundamental course of nature, which is conceived in 
cyclical fashion. It is ultimately nature, and more specifically Russia's and 
Europe's respective position within the naturalised historical cycle, that 
determines the scope for political intervention in either context, and that explains 
the complex relationship between the two regions. 
  
Diderot’s Russian writings thus certainly possess substantive political and 
historiographical depth. However this depth only comes to full light if they are 
considered in conjunction with another body of texts Diderot produced during the 
same period: his contributions to Guillaume-Thomas Raynal's Histoire 
philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des européens dans 
les deux Indes, written between 1770 and 1780.154
  
 It is in these contributions that 
Diderot conceptualises the relationship between nature, history, civilisation and 
politics in the context of a series of reflections upon the course of modern 
European history, thereby establishing the framework around which his Russian 
writings are implicitly structured. 
Given that the full extent of Diderot's contributions to Raynal's work was only 
established in the 1970s, it is unsurprising that his Russian writings have for a 
long time not received the attention they deserve.155
                                                 
154 See HDI and HDI-70. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations used in this chapter have been 
attributed to Diderot by Michèle Duchet, Diderot et l'histoire des deux Indes; ou l'écriture 
fragmentaire (Paris: Editions A.-G. Nizet, 1978). 
 Read in isolation from the 
political and historiographical substratum provided by the Histoire des deux 
Indes, these texts have traditionally been regarded as unimpressive ancillaries to 
Diderot's main interests and strengths - philosophy, natural sciences and 
155 There have been rumours that Diderot may have had a hand in the Histoire des deux Indes ever 
since its first publication. However, firm evidence about the extent, nature and content of these 
contributions only emerged with the re-discovery and cataloguing of the Fonds Vandeul by 
Herbert Dieckmann in 1951, and the subsequent work on the Fonds' manuscripts by Michèle 
Duchet in the 1970s. Duchet's work has provided us with tables precisely indicating all of 
Diderot's contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes. These tables also clearly demonstrate his 
ever increasing input into Raynal's collaborative work over the course of its three main editions: 
Diderot wrote 83 fragments comprising roughly 8% of the total text for the 1770 edition, 130 
fragments for the 1774 edition, and 270 fragments constituting almost a third of the work for the 
final edition of 1780. See Herbert Dieckmann, Inventaire du fonds Vandeul et inédits de Diderot 
(Genève: Libraire Droz, 1951), esp. pp. 87-157; Duchet, Diderot et l'histoire des deux Indes, esp. 
pp. 28-47. 
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aesthetics.156 However, the emergence of firm evidence about Diderot's 
substantial immersion in questions of a political and historiographical nature in 
the 1770s and 1780s that found expression in Raynal's work, has lead to renewed 
interest in his political thought and philosophy of history.157 This general 
reappraisal of Diderot's historical and political oeuvre has also had the effect of 
lifting his Russian writings out of the relative obscurity into which they had fallen, 
with a number of recent studies attempting to explore the relationship between 
those sections of the Histoire des deux Indes explicitly dealing with Russia,158 and 
Diderot's works inspired by his stay in St. Petersburg.159
 
 Whilst this is certainly a 
very fruitful approach, it benefits from a further widening of scope which will be 
provided here. Indeed, this chapter seeks to provide a reading of Diderot's Russian 
writings in relation to all of his contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes in so 
far as these contributions pertain to his conception of a naturalised history of 
civilisation, and to the specific application of this conception to the modern 
history of Europe. 
                                                 
156 On the traditionally dismissive attitude towards Diderot's Russian writings, see Georges Dulac, 
‘Dans quelle mesure Catherine II a-t-elle dialogué avec Diderot?’, in Catherine II & l'Europe, ed. 
Anita Davidenkoff. Collection historique de l'Institut d'études slaves (Paris: Institut d'études 
slaves, 1997), pp. 150-1. 
157 Works exploring Diderot's political thought by drawing extensively on the Histoire des deux 
Indes include: Yves Bénot, Diderot, de l'athéisme à l'anticolonialisme (Paris: François Maspero, 
1970); Anthony Strugnell, Diderot's Politics: A Study of the Evolution of Diderot's Political 
Thought after the Encyclopédie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); Sankar Muthu, 
Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 3. The most 
significant studies on Diderot's philosophy of history are: Michèle Duchet, Anthropologie et 
histoire au siècle des lumières (Paris: François Maspero, 1971), chap. 2.4; John Hope Mason, 
‘Materialism and History: Diderot and the Histoire des deux Indes’, European Review of History - 
Revue européenne d'histoire 3, no. 2 (1996); Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 4, pt. 4. 
158 The sections in question are HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, pp. 46-54 and vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, 
pp. 52-8. In addition, there already exists a passage on Russia in the first edition of the Histoire 
des deux Indes, see HDI-70, vol. 2, bk. 5, pp. 204-5. For the attribution of this latter passage to 
Diderot, see footnote 222 below. 
159 See, for instance, Bertrand Binoche, ‘Diderot et Catherine II ou les deux histoires’, in Sens du 
devenir et pensée de l'histoire, ed. Bertrand Binoche and Franck Tinland (Paris: Champ Vallon, 
2000); Georges Dulac, ‘Diderot et la "civilisation" de la Russie’, in Colloque international Diderot 
(1713-1784), ed. Anne-Marie Chouillet (Paris: Aux Amateurs de Livres, 1985); Dulac, ‘Dans 
quelle mesure Catherine II a-t-elle dialogué avec Diderot?’; Georges Dulac, ‘Diderot et le "mirage 
russe": quelques préliminaires à l'étude de son travail politique de Pétersbourg’, in Le mirage russe 
au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Sergueï Karp and Larry Wolff (Ferney: Centre international d'étude du XVIIIe 
siècle, 2001); Gianluigi Goggi, ‘Diderot et le concept de civilisation’, Dix-huitième siècle 29 
(1997); Gianluigi Goggi, ‘Diderot et la Russie: quelques remarques sur une page de la première 
édition de l'histoire des deux Indes’, in L'encyclopédie, Diderot, l'esthétique, ed. Sylvain Auroux, 
Dominique Bourel, and Charles Porset (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991); Gianluigi 
Goggi, ‘Civilisation et expérience de référence: à propos de la genèse du fragment politique Sur la 
Russie’, Studi Settecenteschi 14 (1994). 
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A comprehensive reading of Diderot's contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes 
will form the first section of this chapter. Particular attention will be paid to the 
complex relationship that exists between Diderot's account of the past, present and 
future of European civilisation and the one provided by Voltaire. We will see that 
despite the considerable agreement between the two thinkers in regard to the 
principal mechanisms that had enabled Europe to emerge from a period of 
barbarism following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Diderot arrived at a 
reading of the present state of this civilisation considerably at odds with the one 
emerging from the Essai sur les mœurs and the Siècle de Louis XIV. In particular, 
Voltaire's relative optimism about the stability of 18th-century Europe and his 
cautious hopes for the future progress of the continent give way to an account 
informed by historical pessimism, and to a conviction that European civilisation is 
declining and will ultimately fall. The source for this pessimism will be located in 
Diderot's cyclical account of the workings of nature, and specifically in his 
application of the organic life cycle to the course of history. 
 
The chapter's second part will analyse Diderot's Russian writings against the 
background provided by his contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes. I will 
argue that these writings must be understood as a counterpoint to his pessimism 
about the present state and likely future of Europe: if Europe is an old civilisation 
on the decline, Russia emerges as its young and vigorous opposite, ready to 
embark on a progressive history. Indeed, Diderot's criticism of Peter I, the 
rejection of Voltaire's portrayal of the czar, and his alternative programme of 
reform proposed to Catherine II, are all premised on the observation that Europe 
and Russia stand at opposite ends of the historical cycle. However, we shall see 
that Diderot's initial optimism about Russia's future ultimately collapsed and was 
replaced by a pessimism even more severe than the one encountered in his 
reflection about the future of Europe. An analysis of the causes for this shift will 
form the concluding part of this chapter. In the course of this analysis we will 
return to a problem that we have already encountered in Voltaire's Histoire de 
l’empire de Russie: the difficulty both thinkers encountered in arriving at a rich 
account of Russian history prior to the reign of Peter I. 
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The past, present and future of European civilisation: Natural 
cycles, historical pessimism and the politics of damage limitation 
 
The attempt to analyse Diderot’s contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes 
inevitably presents us with the methodological question of how to read them. 
Amounting in the final edition to 270 pieces of text scattered across the work’s 19 
books and ranging in size from a few lines to essays comprising more than 30 
pages of printed text, Diderot’s contributions were subjected in the Fonds 
Vandeul160 to a classification and a thematic arrangement under a number of 
headings, such as ‘du commerce’, ‘religion’, or ‘sur la guerre’, that bear little 
resemblance to the actual order in which they appeared in the volumes of the 
Histoire des deux Indes. Even though an analysis of the fragments that follows the 
Fonds’ thematic headings would undoubtedly be fruitful to arrive at an account of 
the philosophe’s reflections on a number of pressing political, economic and 
social questions of the day, such a strategy would inevitably lose sight of the fact 
that Diderot wrote these fragments when reading the historical narrative provided 
by Raynal and his other collaborators.161
 
 Or, to put it differently, such a strategy 
would focus our view on the fragments’ political and philosophical content, but 
would ultimately leave us unenlightened about their historiographical context. For 
the purpose of this chapter a mixture of strategies will be employed. Whilst it is 
often convenient to consider Diderot’s thought under schematic headings that are 
largely foreign to the work of Raynal, but proposed in the Fonds Vandeul, I will 
nevertheless endeavour to ground this thought within the overall historical 
narrative provided by the Histoire des deux Indes.  
                                                 
160 The Fonds Vandeul comprises the collection of manuscripts written by Diderot, or concerning 
Diderot, that his daughter - Angélique, married to Caroillon de Vandeul - brought together after 
the philosophe's death. Discovery of annotated copies of Raynal's Histoire des deux Indes within 
the Fonds Vandeul have been key to establishing Diderot's authorship of large parts of Raynal's 
work. See, Dieckmann, Inventaire du fonds Vandeul, introduction. On the ordering of Diderot’s 
contributions under schematic headings in the Fonds Vandeul, see Duchet, Diderot et l'histoire des 
deux Indes, esp. pp. 62-3. 
161 Diderot was by no means the only collaborator Raynal employed in the composition of the 
Histoire des deux Indes. For a list of other known collaborators, see A. Feugère, ‘Raynal, Diderot 
et quelques autres historiens des deux Indes’, Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France (1913). For 
the sake of convenience I will in the following attribute all the sections of the Histoire des deux 
Indes which were not written by Diderot to Raynal, notwithstanding the fact that a third author 
may well have supplied the text in question. 
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Reading the Histoire des deux Indes as a history allows us, among other things, to 
see the similarity of historiographical concerns that inform this work and 
Voltaire’s Essai sur les mœurs and Siècle de Louis XIV. If Voltaire aimed to write 
‘histoire en philosophe’,162
 
 Raynal’s work is, as its full title indicates, a history 
both ‘philosophique et politique’. It is, in other words, not merely a narration of 
events and deeds as they unfold diachronically, but additionally an interpretation 
of how modern European civilisation emerged historically, an analyse of how its 
political, economic, social and cultural mechanics operate, and an outline of a 
programme of reform fit to ensure the future prosperity and progress of the 
continent.  
There are, of course, important differences between the Histoire des deux Indes 
and Voltaire’s historical work. For instance, whilst the Essai sur les mœurs starts 
with the state of Europe during the reign of Charlemagne in the 8th century, and 
spends much time analysing the barbarity of, and the small steps of progress made 
during, the early medieval period, Raynal’s work commences in earnest with 
Columbus’ first travel of exploration to the Americas in 1492, and the Portuguese 
discovery of the passage to India via the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. The 
Histoire des deux Indes’ narrative takes off, in other words, at a time when Europe 
had already become civilised to such an extent that it was able to engage and 
undertake commerce with the ancient empires of the Orient, and to colonise, 
exploit and cultivate the newly discovered lands to the West. It is of course 
Europe’s subsequent engagement with the deux Indes that provides the thread 
around which the whole of Raynal’s narrative is structured, whereas Voltaire’s 
histories revolve mostly, if by no means exclusively, around the internal history of 
Europe.163
 
 
And yet, in the introduction Raynal provides us with a short history of Europe 
prior to its colonial expansion overseas. This account starts with a description of 
the civilisations of the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, then passes through a 
period of barbarism and superstition that depressed Europe after the fall of Rome, 
                                                 
162 ESM, vol. 1, p. 3. 
163 The voyages of discovery and European trade with the outside world are treated in the Essai sur 
les Mœurs, but remain marginal to the work as a whole. See ibid., vol. 2, chaps. 141-55, pp. 303-
99.  
 70  
 
 
 
and concludes with a relatively detailed analysis of how the continent developed 
out of this depression up to the point when it was able to look and move beyond 
its own borders. Significantly, the Histoire des deux Indes describes the process 
by which Europe moved from a state of barbarism to one of relative civilisation in 
terms which could well have been borrowed from Voltaire: if medieval Europe 
was poor, without industry, riches, arts and sciences, and oppressed both by 
feudalism and ecclesiastic pretensions to secular authority, the continent emerged 
from this sorry state of affairs through the enfranchisement of towns and serfs, the 
subjection of the unruly feudal nobility under impartial laws, and the gradual 
subjection of the church by more effective sovereigns.164
 
  
Whilst this Voltairian account of the pre-history of European civilisation was 
written by Raynal, a variety of contributions by Diderot scattered across the work 
demonstrate that he essentially agreed with it.165
 
 Moreover, in a highly significant 
contribution to the introduction, Diderot himself identified the principal engine 
responsible for advancing modern European history: 
Elevé au-dessus de toutes les considérations humaines, c'est alors 
qu'on plane au-dessus de l'atmosphere, & qu'on voit le globe au-
dessous de soi. … C'est là enfin que, voyant à mes pieds ces belles 
contrées où fleurissent les sciences & les arts, & que les ténebres de la 
barbarie avoient si long-tems occupées, je me suis demandé: qui est-ce 
qui a creusé ces canaux? qui est-ce qui a desséché ces plaines? qui est-
ce qui a fondé ces villes? qui est-ce qui a rassemblé, vêtu, civilisé ces 
peuples? & qu'alors toutes les voix des hommes éclairés qui sont 
parmi eux m'ont répondu: c'est le commerce, c'est le commerce.166
 
 
What Diderot alludes to here, and outlines in much more detail elsewhere, is a 
conception of commerce as an agent of civilisation. Commerce is civilising 
because of its propensity to create reciprocal relationships of demand and supply 
between states and individuals and its seemingly infinite ability to create new 
wants, needs and demands which act as engine for potentially unlimited material 
progress. It is a view that has a close resemblance to Voltaire’s discussion of the 
spirit of emulation which, as we have seen, acted as the prime motor for the 
                                                 
164 HDI, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 1, pp. 4-25. 
165 Ibid., vol. 5, chap. 24, pp. 270-3; vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, pp. 100-14.  
166 Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 1, pp. 3-4. 
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progress of European civilisation in the Essai sur les mœurs, but in Diderot’s case 
it might well have been inspired by Montesquieu’s discussion of the spirit of 
commerce as outlined in De l'esprit des lois.167 Indeed, similar to Montesquieu, 
Diderot conceived commerce to be inherently opposed to the spirit of conquest 
and religious prejudices, an agent of peace and, ultimately, a vehicle that has the 
potential to create a global society in which needs are universally communicated 
and satisfied; a system, in other words, in which the prosperity of all parts are 
reciprocally dependent on each other.168
 
 
Moreover, the spirit of commerce has not only the fortunate propensity to bind 
entire nations peacefully into reciprocal relationships, but also to strengthen the 
social ties within each nation. This is because commerce is based on a sort of 
sociability that is not dependent on virtuous or altruistic behaviour, but solely on 
the desire of each member to exchange the products of his own labour against the 
goods produced by his fellow citizen with the aim of increasing his own selfish 
interest of happiness and well-being. Commerce leads, in other words, to a society 
defined by free exchanges which all classes – from the agriculturist, via the artisan 
to the merchant, and ultimately the sovereign – have an interest to perpetuate and 
perfect.169
                                                 
167Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes, ed. Roger Caillois, 2 vols. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1949-1951), vol. 2. The relevant sections are: bk. 20, chaps. 1-2, pp. 584-6 
(commerce in relation to peace and religious prejudices); bk. 21, chaps. 5-6, pp. 604-10 
(commerce in relation to progress); and bk. 21, chap. 20, pp. 639-41 (commerce in relation to the 
regulation of the passions). For an analysis of Montesquieu’s view of commerce as an agent of 
civilisation, see Céline Spector, ‘Science des mœurs et théorie de la civilisation: De l'esprit des lois 
de Montesquieu à l'école historique écossaise’, in Les équivoques de la civilisation, ed. Bertrand 
Binoche (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2005). 
 Crucially, according to Diderot, this commerce-inspired desire to enjoy 
material goods and the global communication of products and needs can lead to 
an open-ended cycle of new desires, new products, techniques and ideas. By 
168 See HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 33, pp. 97-8. Very similar views are expressed across Diderot’s 
contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes, see especially, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 8, p. 65; vol. 3, bk. 
6, chap. 1, pp. 137-9; vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 6, p. 186.  
169 Ibid., vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 33, pp. 98-9. A very similar argument is set out in the Observations 
sur le Nakaz, where Diderot takes the physiocrats to task for suggesting that a good citizen and/or 
good sovereign should invest all surplus money into agricultural production. Diderot, by contrast, 
argued that in well-ordered societies all productive forces – agriculture, industry, commerce – are 
interlinked in such a way that purely self-interested spending would inevitably benefit society as a 
whole. See Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 73, pp. 544-6 and art. 130, pp. 569-71. 
On physiocracy and its analysis of large-scale agriculture as the main engine for economic growth, 
see T. J. Hochstrasser, 'Physiocracy and the Politics of laissez-faire', in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 429-30. 
 72  
 
 
 
constantly converting desires into needs and innovations into objects of 
emulation, commerce enables an unprecedented impetus to man’s activity, 
industry and genius, thereby facilitating a continuous increase in material wealth 
as well as the flourishing of the arts and sciences.170
 
  
And yet, if Diderot could thus contemplate the enormous benefits a global 
commerce could offer to mankind whilst planer au-dessus de l’atmosphère, as 
soon as he hit the hard ground of history much of his optimism dissipated. Indeed, 
the Histoire des deux Indes describes the chain of events that led to a reversal of 
commerce's promising potential into its often nightmarish opposite. This 
catastrophic history starts with the Spanish and Portuguese travels of explorations, 
reaches a first climax during the Seven Years’ War, and, provisionally, ends with 
the War of American Independence which was in full swing when the final 
edition of the Histoire des deux Indes was written. It is a history, moreover, that 
moves in two distinct directions. On the one hand, it recounts how a succession of 
European explorers, traders, missionaries and governments – Portuguese, Spanish, 
Dutch, English and French alike – ravaged the lands of ‘les deux Indes’ rather 
than integrating them into a mutually beneficial system of reciprocity. Diderot 
contributed much to the writing of this account and many of the most severe 
indictments against, for instance, the slave trade, the genocide of the indigenous 
population of the Americas, and the subversion and impoverishment of the 
Oriental empires at the hands of European colonisers were written by him.171
 
 At 
the same time, the Histoire des deux Indes attempted to analyse the damage that 
the Europeans had inflicted onto themselves and their civilisation in the course of 
this history. We must turn to Diderot’s contributions to this second project, if we 
are to understand his conception of history in general. 
The most striking analysis of the gap between the promise of commerce and the 
actual history of European colonial and commercial expansion is provided in 
Diderot’s account of the development of European inter-state relations. If the 
                                                 
170 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 33, pp. 96-7. 
171 See ibid., vol. 4, bk. 8, chap. 22, pp. 158-9 and vol. 5, bk., 2, chap. 24, pp. 267-89 (on the slave 
trade); vol. 4, bk. 8, chap. 32, pp. 195-7 and vol. 7, bk. 15, chap. 4, pp. 160-3 (on the genocide of 
indigenous population in Americas); vol. 2, bk. 3, chap. 38, pp. 64-9 (on the impoverishment of 
Oriental empires).  
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promotion of commercial reciprocity should, in theory, lead to a more peaceful 
and stable state system, history proved the opposite. Not only were all European 
overseas establishments founded by conquest rather than by a reciprocal exchange 
of needs and industry, but, and even more fatally, colonial expansion went hand in 
hand with a general deterioration of inter-state relations. Rather than ending the 
fury of conquest, and the Machiavellian desire of each state to expand its border 
and its sphere of influence at the expense of its neighbours, European powers have 
simply added ‘jalousie de commerce’ to their habitual ‘jalousie de puissance’; that 
is, a desire to expand their commerce and riches by any means, including warfare, 
and at the expense of their rivals.172 Diderot was convinced that modern history 
proves that ‘[i]l n’y a pas une seule nation qui ne soit jalouse de la prospérité 
d’une autre nation’,173 and he detected a fatal increase in state behaviour informed 
by jalousie de commerce from the 15th century onwards.174 This increase came to 
a head during the Seven Years’ War, which is described as a global, commercial 
conflict caused by England taking jalousie de commerce to its logical conclusion. 
According to Diderot, England’s behaviour during the war proved that it was no 
longer satisfied with being rich, but wanted to be exclusively rich; a pernicious 
ambition manifested in the attempt to monopolise all trade, and to defend 
monopolies by means of warfare. Thus, commercial reciprocity had effectively 
been turned into its diametrical opposite.175
 
  
Diderot further detected a reflection of the decline of reciprocity in inter-state 
relations within every commercial European society. Whilst commercial self-
interest should strengthen the social fabric and lead to increased production and 
emulation, he portrayed late 18th-century Holland, England and France as societies 
in which a destructive ‘soif d’or’ has become the only guiding principle and in 
which both social cohesion and productive economic activity have been fatally 
undermined.176
                                                 
172 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 6, p. 186. For a general discussion about the 18th-century debate on 
‘jealousy of trade’ and its relation to ‘jealousy of state’, see Hont, Jealousy of Trade, esp. chap. 
1.2. 
 When discussing the effects of soif d’or Diderot at times appears 
173 HDI, vol. 2, bk. 4, chap. 33, p. 249. 
174 See, for instance, ibid., vol. 2, bk. 5, chap. 4, pp. 274-5; vol. 6, bk. 13, chap. 41, pp. 236-8; vol. 
7, bk. 14, chap. 40, pp. 95-7; vol. 8, bk. 17, chap. 16, pp. 81-2.  
175 Ibid., vol. 5, bk. 10, chap. 13, p. 128; see also vol. 5, bk. 10, chap. 14, pp. 130-2. 
176 Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 27, pp. 301-6 (Holland); vol. 7, bk. 14, chap. 45, p. 108 (England); 
vol. 2, bk. 4, chap. 18, pp. 162-9 (France). 
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to use traditional republican arguments according to which commerce inevitably 
leads to luxury and luxury to corruption, and, therefore, that commerce should be 
avoided and luxury replaced by simplicity and relative poverty.177 However, he 
generally remained committed to the notion of commerce as an important 
civilising agent, and was adamant that the desirable peaks of civilisation – general 
prosperity, refined arts, perfected sciences – can only be climbed with the help of 
the wealth created through commercial activity. In actual fact, when Diderot 
deplored the social state of Holland, England and France, he did not attack 
commerce and luxury per se, but a certain kind of destructive luxury, which he 
termed ‘mauvais luxe’.178
 
 
Luxury is destructive if wealth has become the only mark of distinction in a 
society and has completely displaced merit, virtue and industriousness as vehicles 
for social advancement. In such a society reciprocal self-interest – which, for 
instance, demands that public offices should be occupied by, and recognition 
given to, the most worthy person, and thus be objects of general emulation - has 
been replaced by pure self-interest or greed in which wealth, no matter how 
acquired, opens all doors. This phenomenon is best exemplified by the widespread 
venality of parliamentary seats in late 18th-century England, but the victory of 
gold over virtue and merit is portrayed as being equally characteristic of French 
and Dutch society.179
 
 
Equally, in a society driven by soif d'or the reciprocal link between wealthy 
consumers and the nation’s productive forces has been disrupted: spending no 
longer trickles down the chain of production, thereby no longer providing 
encouragement for increased economic activity. The typical example of such a 
society is France, and although Diderot did not analyse how such a disruption may 
                                                 
177 See, for instance, Diderot’s warning to the Dutch that ‘la destinée de toute nation commerçante 
est d’être riche, lâche, corrompue & subjuguée’ and his concomitant advice to return to a state of 
virtue and poverty. Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 27, p. 306.  
178 On Diderot’s differentiation between good and bad luxury, see also Observations sur le Nakaz, 
Versini, vol. 3, art. 87, pp. 549-50; Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 26, pp 292-
303; Réfutation d’Helvétius, Versini, vol. 1, pp. 888-94; and Satire contre le luxe, appended to the 
Salon de 1767, DPV, vol. 16, pp. 551-7. 
179 HDI, vol. 7, bk. 14, chap. 45, p. 108 (venality of English parliament); vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 27, pp. 
301-3 (loss of virtue among Dutch); Salon de 1767, DPV, vol. 16, pp. 553-4 (‘soif d’or’ destroys 
French meritocracy).  
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have happened, its effects are clear to see: it produces a society of ‘deux classes 
de citoyens. Les uns, regorgeant de richesses, étalent un luxe qui indigne ceux 
qu’il ne corrompt pas; les autres, plongés dans l’indigence, l’accroissent encore 
par le masque d’une aisance qui leur manque.’180 Apart from creating 
unbridgeable social divisions, in a society in which social recognition is only to be 
gained through the flaunting of luxury there is the double danger that all classes 
continuously overspend in order to mask their relative poverty, thereby creating 
an economically disastrous cycle of bankruptcies, and that the quality of products 
decreases because appearance is valued higher than substance. In either case the 
effect is a depression of emulation and economic activity.181
 
 
Diderot argued that the increase in commercial warfare and the decline of merit 
and virtue as social norms also contributed to a third fatal trend in modern Europe: 
the gradual rise of despotism. On the one hand, ruinous warfare puts pressure on 
sovereigns to increase their tax intake, and, if tax rises are resisted by legitimate 
constitutional procedures, a sovereign may well employ arbitrary or despotic 
means to see his wish fulfilled.182 At the same time, a society devoid of virtue, 
corrupted by luxury and driven by a desire for pure enjoyment, will have taken on 
a slavish disposition and will not be able to marshal the necessary strength to 
resist despotic attacks on its liberties. 183
 
 
In the Histoire des deux Indes corrupted England and Holland were singled out as 
being in particular danger of losing their free constitutions in the near future.184
 
 
More prominently, however, the rise of despotism is described in general and, at 
times, almost prophetic language affecting the whole of commercial Europe, 
without reference to any particular context: 
Depuis deux siecles, tous les princes de l’Europe fabriquoient entr’eux 
… cette longue & pesante chaîne dont les peuples se sentent 
                                                 
180 HDI, vol. 2, bk. 4, chap. 8, p. 165. 
181 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 9, pp. 227-8. See also Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 
87, p. 549; Réfutation d’Helvétius, Versini, vol. 1, p. 889; Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, 
vol. 3, art. 26, pp. 293-5. 
182 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap 10, p. 232; vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 11, pp. 260-4. 
183 Ibid., vol. 8, bk. 18, chap. 42, p. 281. 
184 Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 27, p. 306 and vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 85 (Holland); vol. 7, bk. 14, 
chap. 43, p. 108 and vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 79 (England). 
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enveloppés de toutes parts. … . Les guerres ne tendoient pas à rendre 
les états plus grands, mais les sujets plus soumis, en substituant pas à 
pas le gouvernement militaire à l’influence douce & lente des loix & 
des mœurs. Tous les potentats se fortifioient également dans leur 
tyrannie, par leurs conquêtes ou par leurs pertes.185
 
 
There is little doubt that the country Diderot was most concerned about when 
writing these and similar lines was France. Indeed, in the Mélanges pour 
Catherine II, written during his stay in St. Petersburg, and thus at a time when he 
composed most of his contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes, Diderot wrote 
a detailed account of Maupeou’s coup d’état of 1771.186 The coup, hastened by 
the severe disorder of France’s finances following the Seven Years’ War and the 
conflict between king and magistrates that this financial crisis engendered, 
resulted in the dismissal of the French parlements, the only remaining 
constitutional restraint on the monarch’s power.187 Diderot was in no doubt that 
France, that used to have a moderate monarchical government in which the 
parlements acted as an intermediary body to regulate the sovereign’s will, had 
fallen under a despotic yoke.188
 
 The consequences of this yoke are severe. Indeed, 
if a commercial civilisation is underpinned by multiple reciprocal relations, 
continual communication of goods and ideas, innovation and continuous activity, 
the fall into despotism destroys its very basis and announces its end: 
L’expérience de tous les âges a prouvé que la tranquillité qui naît du 
pouvoir absolu, refroidit les esprits, abat le courage, rétrécit le génie, 
jette une nation entiere dans une léthargie universelle.  
… 
On pense peu, on ne parle point, & l'on craint de raisonner. … Le 
philosophe retient sa pensée, comme le riche cache sa fortune. … La 
méfiance & la terreur forment la base des mœurs générales. Les 
citoyens s’isolent; & toute une nation devient mélancolique, 
pusillanime, stupide & muette. Voilà les chaînes, les symptomes 
funestes, ou l’échelle de misere sur laquelle chaque peuple connoîtra 
le degré de la sienne.189
 
 
                                                 
185 Ibid., vol. 8, bk. 18, chap. 32, p. 233. 
186 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, pp. 203-27. 
187 On Diderot’s reaction to the Maupeou coup, see Hope Mason, ‘Materialism and History’, pp. 
153-4. On the coup’s influence on French political thought in general, see Gay, The 
Enlightenment, vol. 2, pp. 477-83. 
188 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, p. 221. 
189 HDI, vol. 7, bk. 14, chap. 2, pp. 7-9. 
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Diderot's contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes were not intended to merely 
illustrate how the promise of a benign commercial civilisation was reversed in 
Europe’s recent past by a combination of jalousie de commerce in international 
relations, a pernicious soif d’or within each commercial society, and the 
destruction of moderate government through the rise of despotism. In addition, he 
sought to analyse the root causes for this fatal history which was threatening to 
undermine the very basis of European civilisation. This analysis took two quite 
distinct forms. 
 
At times Diderot suggested that Europe’s ills were caused by mistakes or 
unfortunate historical circumstances. This strand of explanation was most 
prominently invoked in the discussion surrounding the problem of jalousie de 
commerce. Indeed, the authors of the Histoire des deux Indes were in no doubt 
that at the time when the journeys of discovery began, Europe in general, and 
Portugal and Spain in particular, had just about emerged from the worst abyss of 
barbarism. They remained, in other words, still in a state of semi-barbarity.190 
Raynal, for instance, argued that the first Portuguese journeys to Africa were 
nothing more than barbarian ‘pirateries’ and ‘brigandages’,191 and that the 
discoverers of the sea route to India were just not equipped to establish a real 
reciprocal commerce between the Orient and Europe. When the Portuguese started 
to penetrate into India, the world was, in Raynal’s words, yet little acquainted 
with ‘les principes politiques sur le commerce, sur la puissance réelle des états … 
sur la maniere d’établir & de conserver des colonies’.192
 
 It is little wonder that this 
nation, still feudal and half-barbarian, should be animated by a thirst for conquest 
rather than a spirit of commerce, and therefore found its empire on destructive 
plunder, theft and trade monopolies, rather than on a free, reciprocal trade which 
would have been beneficial to the world as a whole. 
Tragically, Spanish and Portuguese mistakes were perpetuated by subsequent 
colonisers, who, because much more civilised, should really have known better, 
but were restricted in their choices by the political and economic context created 
                                                 
190 For a similar argument, see also Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 4, esp. pp. 239, 265. 
191 HDI, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 3, pp. 31-2. 
192 Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 29, p. 173; see also vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 9, pp. 79-81. 
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in the first wave of colonisation. Diderot made this argument explicit in the 
context of his discussion of the first English incursions into India: 
 
La société [i.e. the Honourable East India Company] … fut 
déterminée … à former aux Indes des établissemens, mais à ne les 
former que du consentement des nations indigenes. Elle ne voulut pas 
débuter par des conquêtes. Ses expéditions ne furent que les 
entreprises de négocians humains & justes. Elle se fit aimer: mais cet 
amour … ne la mit pas en état de soutenir la concurrence des peuples 
qui se faisoient craindre. 
 
Les Portugais & les Hollandois possédoient de grandes provinces, des 
places bien fortifiées, & de bons ports. Ces avantages assuroient leur 
commerce contre les naturels du pays & contre de nouveaux 
concurrens … Les Anglois au contraire, dépendans du caprice des 
saisons & des peuples, sans forces & sans asyle, ne tirant leurs fonds 
que de l’Angleterre même, ne pouvoient, selon les idées alors reçues, 
faire un commerce avantageux. Ils penserent qu’on acquéroit 
difficilement de grandes richesses sans de grandes injustices, & que 
pour surpasser ou même balancer les nations qu’ils avoient censurées, 
il falloit imiter leur conduite. C’étoit une erreur qui les jeta dans de 
fausses routes.193
 
 
Thus the civilising spirit of commerce of the négocians humains & justes had 
become corrupted by the antithetical and barbaric spirit of conquest. From this 
moment onwards the spirit of jalousie de commerce could develop its historical 
dynamics, leading to the follies of commercial warfare and the destabilisation of 
Europe as a whole.  
 
This is, of course, a profoundly tragic vision of history, but one which ultimately 
offers some hope for redemption. If the sorry contemporary state of affairs was 
caused by past mistakes, Diderot maintained in the very last paragraph of the 
Histoire des deux Indes, then the spreading of knowledge and enlightenment 
might enable rectification of these in the future: 
 
Puissent des écrivains plus favorisés de la nature achever par leurs 
chefs-d’œuvres ce que mes essais ont commencé! Puisse, sous les 
auspices de la philosophie, s’étendre un jour d’un bout du monde à 
                                                 
193 Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 3, chap. 2, pp. 317-18. 
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l’autre cette chaîne d’union & de bienfaisance qui doit rapprocher 
toutes les nations policées!194
 
 
However, such optimism is generally over-shadowed by a profound pessimism. 
This pessimism takes its strength from the idea that Europe’s contemporary ills, 
rather than being caused by past mistakes, may have their roots in the very nature 
of the historical process itself. Indeed, Diderot’s contributions to the Histoire des 
deux Indes are shot through with a notion of the historical process as cyclical, 
which demands that any civilisation, no matter how sound the principles on which 
it was established, must ultimately fall.195
 
 It is nature itself which has ruled that 
man-made historical progress will always be limited and short-lived: 
Un Tartare brisera peut-être, d'un seul coup de hache, cette statue de 
Voltaire que Pigalle n'aura pas achevée en dix ans: & nous travaillons 
encore pour l'immortalité, vains atomes poussés les uns par les autres 
dans la nuit d'où nous venons! Peuples artistes ou soldats, qu'êtes-vous 
entre les mains de la nature, que le jouet de ses loix, destinés tour-à-
tour à mettre de la poussiere en œuvre, & cette œuvre en poussiere?196
 
 
Ainsi cette fatalité qui bouleverse la terre, les mers, les empires, les 
nations, qui jette successivement sur tous les points du globe la 
lumiere des arts & les ténebres de l'ignorance, qui transporte les 
hommes & les opinions, comme les vents & les courans poussent les 
productions marines sur les côtes … .197
 
 
By conceiving human beings as ‘vains atomes poussés les uns par les autres’, and 
by contending that human achievements only ever amount to temporarily putting 
dust into order – an order, which ultimately will be destroyed by nature herself - 
Diderot explicitly related history to his philosophy of nature as espoused most 
prominently in La Rêve de d’Alembert.198
                                                 
194 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 15, p. 311. 
 This view of nature is informed by a 
monistic materialism in which atoms themselves possess the potential for 
sensitivity and the capability of movement, and in which any organism is merely a 
temporary configuration of endless such atoms in random movement, and, 
195 The cyclical nature of Diderot’s philosophy of history has also been stressed by Hope Mason, 
‘Materialism and History’ and Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire, esp. pp. 367-90. However, it has 
been overlooked by Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 4, chaps. 15-17 and Binoche, 'Diderot et 
Catherine II ou les deux histoires'. 
196 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 278. 
197 Ibid., vol. 4, bk. 7, chap. 28, p. 63. 
198 La Rêve de d’Alembert, Versini, vol. 1. 
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therefore, inevitably subject to dissolution.199
 
 In a celebrated passage, Diderot 
explained to d’Alembert the history of the latter’s own life in purely materialistic 
terms: a history that starts with an infinite number of molecules scattered in the 
bodies of his father and mother, and proceeds via the sexual act which brings 
these molecules together into a new organism to the birth of d’Alembert. The 
mathematician’s subsequent life was again conceived materialistically – eating, 
digesting and secreting – and the conclusion provides a neat summery of 
Diderot’s conception of the cyclical nature of all organisms inevitably moving 
from birth via a period of youthful growth to old age, decline, and death: 
Et celui qui exposerait à l’Académie le progrès de la formation d’un 
homme ou d’un animal n’emploierait que des agents matériels dont les 
effets successifs seraient un être inerte, un être sentant, un être 
pensant, un être résolvant le problème de la précession des équinoxes, 
un être sublime, un être merveilleux, un être vieillissant, dépérissant, 
mourant, dissous et rendu à la terre végétale.200
 
 
Diderot explicitly denied that the kind of materialistic determinism that marked 
his conception of the physical and biological world could be directly applied to 
the realms of morality, politics or history, because the latter were held to be 
subject to the influences of particular circumstances which are hard to 
determine.201
 
 However, in the Histoire des deux Indes, he contended that if we 
neglect all fortuitous circumstances which may have moved history temporarily 
into an unnatural direction, we can detect similar cycles of birth and decay as in 
the material world: 
On a dit qu’il y avoit deux mondes, le physique et le moral. Plus on 
aura d’étendue dans l’esprit et d’expérience, plus on sera convaincu 
qu’il n’y en a qu’un, le physique qui mene tout, lorsqu’il n’est pas 
contrarié par des causes fortuites, sans lesquelles on eût constamment 
remarqué le même enchaînement dans les événements moraux les plus 
surprenans … .202
 
 
Indeed, immediately following the paragraph just quoted, he provides us with an 
account of how all governments pass through a cyclical history. The ascending 
                                                 
199 See also Hope Mason, ‘Materialism and History’, pp. 151-3. 
200 La Rêve de d’Alembert, Versini, vol. 1, p. 614. 
201 Ibid., p. 620. 
202 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 41. 
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slope of the cycle describes a process that moves from simplicity to complexity 
and increasing levels of reciprocity, exemplified by the emergence of complex 
democratic, monarchical or aristocratic governments out of simple, primordial 
forms of patriarchal governance. However, ultimately, complexity and reciprocity 
will be destroyed, and the cycle inevitably ends in the most simple regime 
imaginable - despotism:  
 
Malheureusement cet état de bonheur [as experienced during 
democratic rule] n’est que momentané. Par-tout les révolutions dans le 
gouvernement, se succedent avec une rapidité qu’on a peine à suivre. 
Il y a peu de contrées qui ne les aient toutes essuyées, & il n’en est 
aucune qui, avec le tems, n’acheve ce mouvement périodique. Toutes 
suivront plus ou moins souvent un cercle réglé de malheurs & de 
prospérités, de liberté & d’esclavage, de mœurs & de corruption, de 
lumiere & d’ignorance, de grandeur & de faiblesse; toutes parcourront 
tous les points de ce funeste horizon. La loi de la nature, qui veut que 
toutes les sociétés gravitent vers le despotisme & la dissolution, que 
les empires naissent & meurent, ne sera suspendue pour aucune.203
 
 
For our present concerns this cyclical conception of the succession of forms of 
governments is highly informative in at least two respects. First, the descent of 
European countries into despotism is no longer explained through a history of 
mistakes or unfortunate circumstances, but an inevitable outcome of the 
continent’s old age. Reflecting on Indian despotism Diderot wrote: 
 
Il n’est point de nation qui, en se poliçant, ne perde de sa vertu, de son 
courage, de son amour pour l'indépendance; & il est tout simple que 
les peuples du midi de l'Asie, s'étant les premiers assemblés en 
société, aient été les premiers exposés au despotisme. Telle a été, 
depuis l'origine du monde, la marche de toutes les associations.204
 
 
There was little doubt in his mind that Europe, even if not as old and decrepit as 
India, had passed its point of maturity and entered old age. For instance, 
comparing Europe to Tahiti in the Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, he 
remarked: 
 
                                                 
203 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Le Tahitien touche à l’origine du monde, et l’Européen touche à sa 
vieillesse. L’intervalle qui le sépare de nous est plus grand que la 
distance de l’enfant qui naît à l’homme décrépit. Il n’entend rien à nos 
usages, à nos lois, ou il n’y voit que des entraves déguisées sous cent 
formes diverses, entraves qui ne peuvent qu’exciter l’indignation et le 
mépris d’un être en qui le sentiment de la liberté est le plus profond 
des sentiments.205
 
 
Second, when contemplating the cycle of forms of government, Diderot returned 
to a paradox that we have already encountered in his discussion on commerce: the 
gulf between the end to which an institution such as commerce should guide 
human beings, and its actual, tragic effects as demonstrated in history. Indeed, he 
detected exactly the same chasm in his discussion of the formation of society and 
government. He explained the establishment of society as the natural outcome of 
the physical weakness of isolated individuals in the encounter with nature. 
Threatened by wild beasts, natural catastrophes and subject to an uncertain and 
always limited supply of subsistence, human beings gather and form social 
associations in order to combine and multiply their strength, and, therefore, to 
increase their chances of attaining the ends nature has assigned to them: survival, 
propagation and, ultimately, attainment of happiness through an assured 
existence.206
 
 Crucially, nature herself has provided human beings with the means 
by which association can be achieved: the physical similarity between human 
beings induces them to regard the suffering of their fellow creatures with 
compassion; a seed of sociability which is ultimately self-interested, but which, 
nevertheless, leads to social virtues and cohesion: 
Ils [i.e. human beings] devoient la paix dont ils jouissoient, à cette 
pitié innée qui précede toute réflexion, & d’où découlent les vertus 
sociales. Cette douce compassion prend sa source dans l’organisation 
de l’homme, auquel il suffit de s’aimer lui-même pour haïr le mal de 
ses semblables.207
 
 
The establishment of government is, according to Diderot, secondary to the 
institution of society as it merely reflects the need to establish laws and the means 
to administer these laws once a human association has attained a certain degree of 
                                                 
205 Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, PHI, p. 464. 
206 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 14, pp. 292-3; see also, Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, 
art. 71, p. 544. 
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complexity, and, therefore, the aims of government should be the same as those of 
society: to prolong life, to increase propagation and to ensure the happiness of the 
majority of citizens.208
 
 However, as seen, all governments ultimately degenerate 
into despotism and the paradox between the natural aims and the actual outcomes 
of human institutions re-emerges with full force: 
Vivre et peupler étant la destination de toutes les especes vivantes, il 
semble que la sociabilité … devroit concourir à cette double fin de la 
nature, & que l’instinct qui le conduit à l’état social, devroit diriger 
nécessairement toutes les loix morales & politiques, au résultat d’une 
existence plus longue & plus heureuse pour la pluralité des hommes. 
Cependant, à ne considérer que l’effet, on diroit que toutes les sociétés 
n’ont pour principe ou pour suprême loi, que la sûreté de la puissance 
dominante. D’où vient ce contraste singulier entre la fin & les 
moyens, entre les loix de la nature & celles de la politique?209
 
 
We already know Diderot's answer to this persistent question: the natural 
propensity of everything that exists in the universe to degenerate and ultimately 
dissolve. When discussing the formation of societies, he expanded on this answer, 
thereby putting the relationship between man and nature into sharp focus. 
 
Diderot conceived the establishment of society as a fight against nature. As 
already seen, we can undertake such a fight because we are naturally sociable 
which allows us to survive in a hostile natural environment by means of 
association and mutual assistance. However, if nature has thus endowed us with 
the means by which we can fight her effectively and carve out an assured and 
happy existence, she has not set any limits how far this fight should be taken. 
Thereby she has placed a seed of destruction within the very mechanism which 
should ensure our survival: 
 
… c’est la nécessité de lutter contre l’ennemi commun, toujours 
subsistant, la nature, qui a rassemblé les hommes. Ils ont senti qu’ils 
luttaient plus avantageusement avec des forces réunies qu’avec des 
forces séparées. Le mal est qu’ils ont passé le but. Ils ne sont pas 
contentés de vaincre, ils ont voulu triompher; ils ne se sont pas 
                                                 
208 Ibid., vol. 8, bk. 18, chap. 42, p. 274. 
209 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 10, chap. 2, p. 40. Emphasis in original.  
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contentés de terrasser l’ennemi, ils ont voulu le fouler aux pieds; de là 
la multitude des besoins artificiels.210
 
 
The reason why our institutions consistently fail lies in human beings’ unlimited 
ambition, in their propensity not only to fight but to dominate, setting them on a 
historical course in which their institutions’ ends gradually, but inevitably, get 
perverted. If society was instituted to attain subsistence and happiness for all, it 
historically manifests itself as a mechanism capable of generating unlimited 
besoins artificiels and thus soif d’or, mauvais luxe, unbridgeable social divisions 
and, ultimately, the dissolution of society itself. The same cycle could of course 
also be drawn for commerce which ends in jalousie de commerce and the 
concomitant will of one nation to be the only prosperous one, or, indeed, for 
government and its inevitable decline into despotism. 
 
Crucially, Diderot considered man’s unlimited ambitions as natural, and therefore 
unavoidable. Despite the fact that he at times invoked the ideal of a society which 
is half-savage and half-civilised – a society, in other words, which had 
successfully stopped its historical development at a point where all the benefits of 
association are present, but in which the destructive forces of limitless ambitions 
have not yet been generated211
 
 - he fundamentally believed that instituting such a 
society by means of forcefully halting the historical process would involve doing 
violence to human nature itself: 
Mais exiger que la raison nous persuade de rejeter ce que nous 
pourrions ajouter à ce que nous possédons, c’est contredire la nature, 
c’est anéantir peut-être les premiers principes de la sociabilité, c’est 
transformer l’univers en un vaste monastere, & les hommes en autant 
d’oiseux & tristes anachoretes. … 
 
… Comment fixer les limites du nécessaire, qui varie avec sa 
situation, ses connoissances & ses desirs? A peine eut-il simplifié par 
son industrie les moyens de se procurer la subsistance, qu’il employa 
le tems qu’il venoit de gagner, à étendre les bornes de ses facultés & 
le domaine de ses jouissances. De là naquirent tous les besoins 
factices. La découverte d’un nouveau genre de sensations excita le 
                                                 
210 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol 3, art. 71, p. 544. 
211 See especially Diderot’s description of the Inca civilisation of Peru, HDI, vol. 3, bk. 7, chap. 6, 
pp. 309-10. For the importance of this ideal of a half-savage and half-civilised society for 
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desir de les conserver, & la curiosité d’en imaginer d’une autre 
espèce. La perfection d’un art introduisit la connoissance de 
plusieurs.212
 
 
An insistence that human activity and ambitions cannot – or in any case should 
not – be restricted can be found across most of Diderot’s late writings. Diderot 
thus not only called into question his own ideal of a half-savage and half-civilised 
society, but also took issue with all those contemporary writers, who, worried by 
the contemporary state of Europe, advocated a curbing of its civilisation’s 
progress, or a fundamental alteration in the mechanisms by which it operates. 
Indeed, Diderot’s defence of human beings’ tragic, because ultimately self-
defeating, drive to dominate nature and thereby to continuously improve their 
material condition and their cultural achievements went hand-in-hand with 
arguments directed against Rousseau’s criticism of luxury and artificiality, the 
physiocrats’ depreciation of modern, global commerce, and Helvétius whom 
Diderot understands as having argued in favour of a mediocre civilisation, similar 
to his own idea of a society which is half-savage and half-civilised.213
 
 The 
objections directed against the latter’s ideal are highly instructive, as they lead us 
back to the inevitability of historical decline and dissolution, and give us an 
indication of the considerable extent to which Diderot’s conception of cyclical 
history imposed clear limits on what can be achieved by politics: 
Helvétius a placé le bonheur de l’homme social dans la médiocrité; et 
je crois qu’il y a pareillement un terme dans la civilisation, un terme 
plus conforme à la félicité de l’homme en général, et bien moins 
éloigné de la condition sauvage qu’on ne l’imagine; mais comment y 
revenir, quand on s’en est écarté, comment y rester, quand on y serait? 
Je l’ignore. Hélas! l’état social s’est peut-être acheminé à cette 
perfection funeste dont nous jouissons, presque aussi nécessairement 
que les cheveux blancs nous couronnent dans la vieillesse.214
 
 
Clearly, according to Diderot, history can neither be arrested nor undone by 
politics. Once a civilisation has ascended beyond its climax on the historical cycle 
and starts its descent, the only political strategy left is pragmatic and severely 
                                                 
212 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 33, pp. 96-7. 
213 See especially, Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 73, pp. 544-6; art. 97, pp. 554-6; 
art. 130, pp. 569-71; and Réfutation d’Helvétius, Versini, vol. 1, pp. 901-3. 
214 Réfutation d’Helvétius, Versini, vol. 1, p. 903. 
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limited. Despite the urgency with which he painted the ills and misfortunes of 
modern Europe, his concrete political proposals for reform are restricted to 
attempts to mitigate the worst effects of Europe’s illness and to shore up, as far as 
this is possible, the continent’s remaining defences against the fall. In the case of 
France, for instance, he was far from advocating a violent, political revolution, as 
has sometimes been claimed,215 but attempted to convince the country’s new 
monarch, Louis XVI, to curb public expenses, continue the reform of the 
country’s feudal tax system, and to stop the nation’s slide toward despotism by 
reconvening the estates general in an attempt to arrive at a new constitutional 
settlement.216
 
  
The limitations history imposes on politics are put into even sharper focus in 
Diderot’s support for the continuation of European trade with the East Indies, 
even if such a trade can only be undertaken by means of monopoly companies. As 
a matter of principle, he was of course opposed to all trade monopolies as they 
always imply a weakening of commerce’s potential to freely create multiple and 
mutually beneficial ties of reciprocity and, as such, are always a dangerous first 
step into the direction of jalousie de commerce.217 However, surveying the present 
state of Europe, both Raynal and Diderot were convinced that a completely free 
trade with India was not possible – mainly because of the high risks and costs 
involved in this trade, preventing free, private merchants from ever being able to 
amass the necessary capital to undertake it.218
                                                 
215 See, for instance, Bénot, Diderot, de l'athéisme à l'anticolonialisme, esp. pp. 172-8, 256-8. 
Likewise, Strugnell argues that the contributions to the final edition of the HDI indicate that 
Diderot had given up any hope in political reformism in the late 1770s and had transformed 
himself into the ‘first effective advocate in the modern world of social and political reconstruction 
through violent revolution’; see Strugnell, Diderot's Politics, p. 228. 
 In Diderot’s final analysis 
monopolistic trade with India was an inevitable evil, because Europeans had 
become accustomed to the consumption of Asian luxury goods to such an extent 
that to prevent importation and hence consumption of such goods would involve 
erecting unnatural limits to the needs of the continent’s population; needs, which 
through a long historical process of increasing satisfaction had themselves become 
216 See, HDI, vol. 2, bk. 4, chap. 18, pp. 162-9. For a similar argument, see also Hope Mason, 
‘Materialism and History’, pp. 153-5.  
217 For instance, HDI, vol. 2, bk. 3, chap. 41, pp. 77-9. 
218 In the Histoire des deux Indes this argument was made by Raynal; see HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 
35, pp. 121-35. Diderot, however, repeated it in his Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 
95, p. 553. 
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naturalised.219
 
 Of course there is scope to partially reform this trade – such as 
allowing private merchants to trade alongside monopoly companies as suggested 
by Raynal – but to root it out altogether would be an act of violence directed 
against both history and nature. 
If Diderot was profoundly pessimistic about the likely future of Europe, and could 
not conceive of a politics that could reverse its decline, this of course did not 
imply that the history of mankind was on the wane as a whole, or that a politics 
going beyond damage limitation was impossible by definition. On the contrary, he 
was capable of considerable optimism when comparing young, emerging societies 
ready to start their historical cycle with old and terminally ill Europe. One such 
society was formed by the American colonies that were declaring their 
independence from England when Diderot wrote his final contributions to the 
Histoire des deux Indes. His advice to the colonists shows his hope that new 
civilisations will emerge from the ruins left by fallen Europe: 
 
Peuples de l’Amérique septentrionale, que l'exemple de toutes les 
nations qui vous ont précédés, & sur-tout que celui de la mere-patrie 
vous instruise. Craignez l'affluence de l'or, qui apporte avec le luxe la 
corruption des mœurs, le mépris des loix; craignez une trop inégale 
répartition des richesses, qui montre un petit nombre de citoyens 
opulens & une multitude de citoyens dans la misere; d'où naissent 
l'insolence des uns & l'avilissement des autres. Garantissez-vous de 
l'esprit de conquête. … Faites prospérer les sciences & les arts, qui 
distinguent l'homme policé de l'homme sauvage. Sur-tout, veillez à 
l'éducation de vos enfans. ... Partout où l'on voit la jeunesse se 
dépraver, la nation est sur son déclin. Que la liberté ait une base 
inébranlable dans la sagesse de vos constitutions, & qu'elle soit 
l'indestructible ciment qui lie vos provinces entr'elles.  
... 
Puisse ce vœu s'accomplir, & consoler la génération expirante, par 
l'espoir d'une meilleure! 220
 
 
We shall see in the next section that Russia was another, if more ambivalent, 
example of such a young, emerging civilisation, that should, just like the 
American colonies, learn from the historical examples provided by the decline of 
Europe. 
                                                 
219 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 33, pp. 95-8. 
220 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 18, chap. 52, p. 26. 
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The present and future of Russia: From the hope of a new 
beginning to terminal despair 
 
Unlike Voltaire, who had written about Russia and Russian history throughout 
most of his career, Diderot only developed an interest in the country relatively late 
in his life. His main writings on Russia – the Mélanges pour Catherine II, the 
Observations sur le Nakaz, the Plan d’une université,221 as well as the fragments 
dealing with Russia destined for Histoire des deux Indes222 – were all composed 
between ca. 1770 and 1780. This late curiosity about Russia was undoubtedly 
kindled by one landmark event. In 1765 Catherine II, who had ascended to the 
Russian throne three years earlier, bought his considerable library and thereby 
became his principal benefactor. With the Encyclopédie accomplished and in need 
of money in order to pay for his daughter’s dowry, Diderot had for some time 
been looking for a buyer for his book collection, and the conditions offered by 
Catherine were extremely favourable: apart from paying a large sum upfront for 
the library itself, she also left him in possession of his books until the end of his 
life, and, additionally, granted him an annual lifetime stipend. Diderot, grateful for 
this generosity, resolved in 1766 to undertake a trip to St. Petersburg to personally 
show his gratitude to his imperial benefactor. However, citing an array of personal 
and health problems, he kept on postponing the journey until June 1773, when he 
finally embarked onto his Russian journey. He arrived in St. Petersburg on 8 
October 1773 and stayed there until March 1774. 223
 
 
                                                 
221 These three works will be quoted according to the Versini edition of Diderot’s work; see 
Versini, vol. 3. 
222 There exist two substantial pieces of text on Russia in the final (1780) edition of the Histoire 
des deux Indes, which have been firmly attributed to Diderot by Duchet. One, entitled ‘Sur la 
Russie’ in the Fonds Vandeul, was first introduced into the second (1774) edition of the Histoire 
and its text was slightly altered in the final (1780) edition (see HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, pp. 46-
54); the second was only introduced into the final (1780) edition (see HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, 
pp. 52-8). However, there already exists a passage on Russia in the first (1770) edition which was 
replaced in subsequent editions by Diderot’s fragments ‘Sur la Russie’ (see HDI-70, vol. 2, bk. 5, 
pp. 204-5). Whilst the Fonds Vandeul does not provide direct evidence about the authorship of this 
passage, Goggi has convincingly argued that it was written by Diderot himself. See Goggi, 
‘Diderot et la Russie’, pp. 100-2. Given that the main arguments of this passage – criticism of 
Peter’s attempt to civilise Russia, the need to establish a third estate in Russia and to move the 
capital from the periphery of the empire to the centre – are repeated across all of Diderot’s 
subsequent writings on Russia, this attribution seems very likely, and, following Goggi, I will 
assume that this passage was indeed written by Diderot.  
223 For an account of Catherine and Diderot’s relationship in general, see von Mohrenschildt, 
Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth-Century France, pp. 74-83. 
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While in the Russian capital, Diderot had frequent personal meetings with 
Catherine during which they discussed a wide range of philosophical, political, 
historical, economic and cultural subjects. Before every meeting, Diderot 
suggested a topic of conversation and wrote up his reflections on their discussions 
afterwards. Before his departure from Russia, he handed a manuscript copy of 
these reflections to Catherine. This manuscript was first published in the Assézat-
Tourneux edition of Diderot’s work in 1899 under the title Diderot et Catherine 
II, and has since been republished several times under the title Mélanges 
philosophiques, historiques, etc., pour Catherine II. Whilst the Mélanges pour 
Catherine II were in their origin conversations, the work’s only voice is in fact the 
one of the philosophe: indeed, taken as a whole, they can be considered as his 
critical commentary on Catherine’s wide-ranging reform project to modernise and 
civilise Russia. 
 
Although the Mélanges pour Catherine is thus without doubt Diderot’s central 
text on Russia, it is by no means the only product of his visit to St. Petersburg. 
Whilst staying in Holland during his return journey back to France in spring 1774, 
he composed the Observations sur le Nakaz. The Nakaz itself, or the Instruction 
de l’impératrice de Russie aux députés pour la confection des lois to give it its full 
French title, was written by Catherine and published in 1767, and was to serve as 
a basis for a completely new code of law to be established throughout the 
Empire.224 Catherine conceived her instructions as broad guidelines for the All-
Russian Legislative Commission – first convened in 1767, but indefinitely 
suspended in 1769 after the outbreak of the Turkish-Russian war – composed of 
deputies from all of Russia's provinces and charged with drawing up the code.225
                                                 
224 Catherine composed her Nakaz in French and had the work translated into Russian, German 
and Latin. An English translation of the whole Nakaz was first published in 1931. See Empress of 
Russia Catherine, Documents of Catherine the Great, ed. W. F. Reddaway (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1931). 
 
Already in the Mélanges pour Catherine II, Diderot had singled out the 
establishment of a new law code and a new constitutional arrangement as the most 
pressing and important of Catherine’s reform projects. A call to action repeated in 
the Observations sur le Nakaz where he commented on some 145 of the czarina’s 
225 For a good, general analysis of Catherine’s Nakaz and of the workings of the Legislative 
Commission and its suspension, see de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, 
chaps. 9-11. 
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526 articles, at times concurring with her guidelines, but more often than not, 
proposing alternatives and thereby advocating a legislative project considerably at 
odds with Catherine’s. The Observations sur le Nakaz remained unpublished 
during Diderot’s lifetime, but one manuscript was sent together with his library to 
Catherine posthumously. The czarina reacted unkindly to the philosophe's advice 
and probably had the manuscript destroyed.226
 
 
Shortly after his return to France Diderot also composed the Plan d’une 
université; a work commissioned by Catherine, and which, as the name implies, 
was conceived as a blueprint for a new university to be established in Russia.227 
As such it was part of Catherine’s considerable efforts to reform the Empire’s 
education system: an effort which included the establishment of the Imperial 
Foundling Hospital in Moscow, the Smol’nyy Institute for Noble Girls, the 
Novodevich’ye Institute for Girls of the Third Estate as well as the reform of the 
Corps des Cadets originally founded by czarina Elisabeth. Diderot had already 
commented on the importance of these educational reforms in the Mélanges pour 
Catherine II, and, apart from writing the Plan d’une université, also helped 
Catherine to publish the French translation of General Betsky’s Systeme complet 
d'éducation publique, physique et morale, pour l'un & l'autre sexe, & pour les 
diverses conditions, which provided in detail documentation about all Catherine’s 
educational establishments.228
 
 
Modern scholarship has often severely criticised Diderot’s wrings on Russia, and 
the circumstances of their composition – i.e. his sense of obligation to show 
gratitude to Catherine which sparked the trip to St. Petersburg - is typically seen 
                                                 
226 See Versini, vol. 3, pp. 503-5. Fortunately, four other manuscript copies of Diderot’s 
Observations sur le Nakaz were preserved in the Fonds Vandeul. 
227 On the origin of the Plan d'une université, see Roland Mortier, ‘L'instruction publique. Des 
Mélanges pour Catherine II au Plan d'une université’, in L'édition du dernier Diderot. Pour un 
Diderot électronique, ed. Gianluigi Goggi and Didier Kahn (Paris: Hermann, 2007). 
228 M. Betzky, Systeme complet d'éducation publique, physique et morale, pour l'un & l'autre sexe, 
& pour les diverses conditions. Exécutés dans les différens etablissemens ordonnés par Sa Majesté 
Impériale Catherine II, pour l'éducation de la jeunesse, & l'utilité de son empire, ed. D**** [i.e. 
Denis Diderot], trans. M. Clerc (Neuchâtel: De l'Imprimerie de la Société Typographique, 1777). 
For a good overview of Catherine’s educational reforms, see also de Madariaga, Russia in the Age 
of Catherine the Great, chap. 31. 
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as the prime reason for their perceived inadequacies.229 For Lortholary, for 
instance, the voyage to Russia is nothing other than a pilgrimage of the philosophe 
to his benefactor, in which Diderot, prostrating himself before Catherine, plays the 
unsuitable role of the courtier.230 According to this reading, the Mélanges pour 
Catherine II suffer from a double defect. On the one hand, it is alleged, none of 
the work’s reflections are based upon any understanding of Russian history, 
society and culture, in which Diderot apparently had no interest, but are instead 
fantastic and naïve daydreams amounting to a rational project of civilisation 
which is to be implemented by the enlightened despot Catherine.231 However, 
apart from betraying a naïve optimism about the means by which Russia could 
become civilised, Diderot’s writings on Russia are also said to reveal his 
dishonesty. Indeed, whilst in Russia the committed anti-despot apparently 
conveniently forgot his political principles. Therefore, his praise for Catherine and 
his optimism that her programme of reform could genuinely advance Russia are 
not to be regarded as expressing his true opinions, but are simply the deceitful 
flattery of the courtier. A courtier who took on the mantle of the critical 
philosophe again as soon as he reached Holland, and was able to express his true 
feelings in the unpublished Observations sur le Nakaz; a work, in which Catherine 
is criticised and in which a historically and politically uninformed optimism about 
Russia’s future is allegedly turned into an equally ignorant pessimism.232
 
 
It is beyond doubt that Diderot’s attitude towards Russia shifted from the 
Mélanges pour Catherine II to the Observations sur le Nakaz, and from his early 
contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes to the later ones. But the reason for 
this shift is not primarily to be found in a disenchantment with Catherine or in the 
anti-despotic philosophe getting the better of the base courtier. We will see that 
the writings on Russia are highly ambivalent as a whole, and that the shift from 
relative optimism to pessimism is caused by Diderot’s cyclical conception of 
history; or, more precisely, by his inability to ever firmly determine the position 
of late 18th-century Russia within the historical cycle. 
                                                 
229 For a general outline of the hostile reception of Diderot’s Russian writings see also Dulac, 
‘Diderot et la "civilisation" de la Russie’, pp. 161-2. 
230 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, chap. 3.2. 
231 Ibid., pp. 220-7. For a similar argument see also Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, pp. 223-32. 
232 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, esp. pp. 231-6. 
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A first indication that Diderot’s reflections on Russia are intimately bound up with 
his conception of history is provided by the fact that his first substantial writing on 
the country was undertaken as a contribution to the first edition of the Histoire des 
deux Indes.233
 
 Significantly, he therein engaged with one of the principal 
historiographical problems that Russia posed to enlightened historians: the 
question whether Peter I had managed to civilise his Empire and align its history 
with that of modern Europe. We know the answer Voltaire gave to this question, 
and Diderot, without ever making direct reference to the Histoire de l’empire de 
Russie, clearly disagreed with its argument by insisting that Peter’s reform project 
had been both ill conceived and, ultimately, utterly unsuccessful: 
L’enthousiasme qu’on a conçu, qu’on a dû concevoir pour Pierre le 
Grand, a accoutumé l’Europe à se former de son empire une opinion 
exagérée. Les bons observateurs qui cherchent les résultats dans les 
faits, n’ont pas tardé à démêler au travers de tant de brillantes erreurs 
que ces vastes contrées étoient sans loix, sans liberté, sans richesses, 
sans population & sans industrie. Ils ont été plus loin. Ils ont osé 
affirmer qu’on n’établiroit jamais une police, des mœurs, un 
gouvernement dans ces déserts, sans rapprocher les peuples les uns 
des autres.234
 
 
The most important reform Peter should have undertaken in order to strengthen 
the social ties within the Russian population and to genuinely advance the 
building of a rich civilisation, but failed to do, would have been the emancipation 
of the crown serfs. Diderot continued that a wise sovereign of Russia would  
 
rompra les fers des esclaves de la couronne, & invitera, forcera s’il le 
faut, la noblesse à suivre cet exemple. On verra sortir de cet 
arrangement un tiers état sans lequel in n’y eût jamais chez aucun 
peuple ni arts, ni lumieres, ni liberté. Les Russes qu’on a voulu rendre 
précipitamment Allemands, Anglois, François, ne seront plus 
étrangers dans leur patrie. Ils seront Russes & auront un caractere 
national, mais différent de celui qu’ils avoient.235
 
  
Whilst Voltaire’s eulogy of Peter as the builder of Russia’s civilisation is 
undoubtedly the main target of the insistence that post-Petrine Russia was without 
                                                 
233 See footnote 222 above for the attribution of this text to Diderot. 
234 HDI-70, vol. 2, bk. 5, p. 204. 
235 Ibid., p. 205. 
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laws, liberty, riches, population and industry, the above quote also engages with a 
passage of Rousseau’s Du contrat social. In this passage Rousseau completely 
ridiculed Voltaire’s notion of Peter as a great legislator or as a builder of a new 
civilisation. On the contrary, Rousseau insisted, Peter by simply imitating modern 
Europe had prevented Russia from ever becoming civilised:  
 
Les Russes ne seront jamais vraiment policés, parce qu’ils l’ont été 
trop tôt. Pierre avoit le génie imitatif; il n’avoit pas le vrai génie, celui 
qui crée et fait tout de rien. Quelques unes des choses qu’il fit étoient 
bien, la plupart étoient déplacées. Il a vu que son peuple étoit barbare, 
il n’a point vu qu’il n’étoit pas mûr pour la police; il l’a voulu civiliser 
quand il ne faloit que l’agguerrir [sic.]. Il a d’abord voulu faire des 
Allemands, des Anglois, quand il faloit commencer par faire des 
Russes; il a empêché ses sujets de jamais devenir ce qu’ils pourroient 
être, en leur persuadant qu’ils étoient ce qu’ils ne sont pas. … 
L’Empire de Russie voudra subjuguer l’Europe et sera subjugué lui-
même. Les Tartares ses sujets ou ses voisions deviendront ses maitres 
et les notres: Cette révolution me paroit infaillible. 236
 
 
Diderot’s claim that Peter was wrong to attempt to prematurely create 
‘Allemands, Anglois, François’ rather than Russians seems of course strikingly 
close to Rousseau’s argument just quoted. However, it would be wrong to 
consider Diderot siding with the citoyen de Genève against the patriarch de 
Ferney, as his arguably most important claim is directed against both fellow 
philosophes. As seen, his principal point was that Russia simply did not change 
much during Peter’s reign – it remained a desert without laws, liberty, riches, 
industry, mores and government despite the czar’s reform programme – whereas 
Voltaire and Rousseau both believed that Peter had fundamentally altered the face 
of his empire, but presented this alteration in a completely different light. 
According to the former, the czar had successfully propelled his country into the 
orbit of European civilisation and provided Russian history with a progressive 
turn leading to increased strength and riches. For the latter, however, Peter had 
thus simply pushed Russia into a state of general decadence that also marked 
Europe – a decadence which will ultimately end through a barbarian invasion and 
the concomitant extinction of both Russia and Europe.237
                                                 
236 Du contrat social, see Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, bk. 2, chap. 8, p. 386. 
 
237 The fact that both Voltaire and Rousseau agreed on the efficacy of Peter’s reform has also been 
stressed by Wilberger, Peter the Great, p. 52. Goggi, moreover, makes a very similar argument 
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Moreover, Diderot essentially agreed with Voltaire, in a way that Rousseau of 
course never did, that Peter was right to attempt to create the kind of civilisation 
that Europe possessed; a civilisation marked by riches, luxury and the cultivation 
of the sciences and the fine arts. The fundamental disagreement between the two 
thinkers only concerned the means employed by the czar to attain this end. 
Indeed, we shall see that Diderot’s writing on Russia as a whole reveal that the 
problem was not that the czar tried to create Allemands, Anglois, François – and 
all the things these people stood for – per se, but that he went about doing it in the 
wrong way. 
 
In a fragment written for the second edition of the Histoire des deux Indes, 
Diderot repeated his attack on Peter by claiming that the latter simply did not 
know how to improve his country. Here the most pointed criticism pertains to the 
czar’s attempt to civilise the Russians by either sending them to Europe for 
instruction or by inviting European teachers, scientists and artists into Russia. 
This project was doomed to fail from the start, because Russia was simply not yet 
historically ready to receive the most elevated fruits of European civilisation:  
 
Ces jeunes gens [i.e. Russians returning home after their instruction in 
Europe], au retour de leur voyage, seront forcés d'abandonner leur 
talent, pour se jeter dans des conditions subalternes qui les nourrissent. 
En tout, il faut commencer par le commencement, & le 
commencement est de mettre en vigueur les arts méchaniques & les 
classes basses. Sachez cultiver la terre, travailler des peaux, fabriquer 
des laines; & vous verrez s'élever rapidement des familles riches. De 
leur sein sortiront des enfans qui, dégoûtés de la profession pénible de 
leurs peres, se mettront à penser, à discourir, à arranger des syllabes, à 
imiter la nature; & alors vous aurez des poëtes, des philosophes, des 
orateurs, des statuaires & des peintres. Leurs productions deviendront 
nécessaires aux hommes opulens, & ils les acheteront.238
 
 
According to Diderot, Peter committed two fundamental mistakes. First, he 
attempted to create a new Russia by introducing the chronologically latest 
achievements of European civilisation – the fine arts – without first creating the 
                                                                                                                                     
about the relationship between Voltaire’s, Rousseau’s and Diderot’s portrayal of Peter as is 
presented here. See Goggi, ‘Diderot et le concept de civilisation’, pp. 354-9. 
238 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, pp. 51-2. Exactly the same argument is repeated in the Mélanges 
pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 42, pp. 330-2. 
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necessary economic and social infrastructure – the useful arts and agriculture – 
without which these achievements can never survive and flourish. But the 
insistence that one must commencer par le commencement also implies a criticism 
of Peter’s means of reform, which Voltaire of course celebrated. Diderot, by 
contrast, denied that the sovereign will would be enough to rapidly set a whole 
country on the historical journey towards civilisation. Instead, he affirmed that 
any civilisation must be based on the activity of the ‘classes basses’, and be 
carried and moved forward by the nation as a whole. 
 
However, this does not imply that a sovereign cannot support the birth, and 
accelerate the progress, of a civilisation. We have seen that Diderot did not 
believe that politics can stop or undo history; but he did claim that political action 
can kick-start the historical process. In fact one key aim of his writings on Russia 
was to show Catherine how to genuinely put Russia onto the historical path of 
civilisation. And yet, any well-conceived project of civilisation has to follow 
certain parameters which must not be overridden by the sovereign, and Catherine 
was frequently reminded of the most important one: 
 
Suivez la marche constante de la nature; aussi bien cherchiez-vous 
inutilement à vous en écarter. Vous verrez vos efforts & vos dépenses 
s'épuiser sans fruit; vous verrez tout périr autour de vous; vous vous 
retrouverez presqu'au même point de barbarie dont vous avez voulu 
vous tirer …239
 
 
Unsurprisingly, given Diderot’s philosophy of history, to the extent that the 
sovereign will is effective in its attempt to civilise, it must be regulated by an 
understanding of nature. Therefore, it is of course of utmost importance for 
Catherine to first establish the exact position of Russia within the historical cycle, 
which is itself only a consequence of la marche constante de la nature, before 
formulating an appropriate programme of reform. As shown above, Diderot 
believed that the Russia Catherine had inherited was barbarian, and by this he 
meant a young country, that has not yet embarked on its journey up the ascending 
slope of the historical cycle. At times he even came close to suggest that Russia 
might be savage: 
                                                 
239 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, p. 52. 
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il y a entre les deux nations [i.e. Russia and France] la différence d’un 
homme vigoureux et sauvage qui naît et d’un homme délicat et 
maniéré attaqué d’une maladie presque incurable.240
 
  
This is a surprising usage of terminology, as Diderot otherwise never used the 
word savage in a continental Eurasian context, but usually reserved it to denote 
the hunter-gatherer tribes of the Americas which he regarded as the most primitive 
forms of human association, and therefore as the closest possible approximation to 
a pure state of nature.241 Whether savage or barbarian, Russia was, properly 
speaking, in a pre-, or at best, semi-social state, lacking firm social, economic and 
political ties of reciprocity which bind a nation together and in which members 
assist each other mutually by communicating their needs, wants and industry.242
 
 
Given the actual state of Russia, Catherine’s task was to do what Peter never did: 
to start the civilising process at the beginning; that is to say to establish from 
scratch the political, social and economic infrastructure which stand at the very 
basis of any civilisation. Once this is accomplished, a history of progress can take 
place which will, in the first instance, inevitably lead to material well-being, 
luxury and the perfection of the fine arts, but which will, equally inevitably, 
ultimately also lead to decline and dissolution. 
 
If Catherine’s task seems immense, it is exactly the barbarity of her country that 
offers hope that she might succeed. Indeed, Diderot frequently invoked the notion 
that the sovereign of a youthful, emerging nation has opportunities for political 
intervention that simply do not exist in an old, declining one. In the Histoire des 
deux Indes, for instance, he remarked: 
 
                                                 
240 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 12, p. 245. 
241 On Diderot’s conception of American savagery, see HDI, bk. 17, chap. 4, pp. 21-7. For a 
general discussion on the usage of the terms ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ in the 18th century, see 
Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 4, chaps. 1, 9. On the etymology of both words more 
generally, Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of 
Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. chaps. 1-3. 
242 Throughout his writings on Russia Diderot stresses that it is precisely a lack of communication 
and exchanges between Russia’s different provinces as well as between its citizens that keeps the 
empire in an uncivilised state. See, for instance, HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 55; Mélanges pour 
Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 7, p. 239, art. 11, p. 243, art. 37, pp. 325-6; Observations sur le 
Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 4, pp. 511-2. 
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Les grands hommes qui peuvent former & mûrir une nation naissante, 
ne sauroient rajeunir une nation vieillie & tombée. 
… 
Le fondateur s’adresse à un homme neuf, qui sent son malheur, dont la 
leçon continue le dispose à la docilité: il n’a qu’à présenter le visage 
& le caractere de la bienfaisance, pour se faire écouter, obéir & chérir; 
l’expérience journaliere donne de la confiance en sa personne & de la 
force à ses conseils. On est bientôt forcé de lui reconnoître une grande 
supériorité des lumieres. … . La condition du restaurateur d’une 
nation corrompue est bien différente. C’est un architecte qui se 
propose de bâtir sur une aire couverte de ruines. C’est un médecin qui 
tente la guérison d’un cadavre gangrené. C’est un sage qui prêche la 
réforme à des endurcis.243
 
 
Even though fundamental reform is impossible once the basic building blocks of a 
given society have become corrupted and the process towards ultimate dissolution 
has set in, deliberate political action can be effective in giving form to a new, 
emerging society. This idea of a nation naissante as a kind of tabula rasa on 
which the founder can built without much interference from the ruins left by 
history is central to Diderot’s writings on Russia. Taken as a whole, these texts 
can be seen as his advice to Catherine on how to plan and build solid foundations 
for a future Russian civilisation. They thereby amount to a general plan of how 
the historical passage from barbarism to civilisation can be accelerated through 
the political activity of an enlightened sovereign; a plan which is itself crucially 
dependent on three interrelated parts: legislation, education and colonisation. 
 
Uppermost in Diderot’s mind was the question of legislation, and he regarded the 
publication of the Nakaz and the concomitant establishment of the All-Russian 
Legislative Commission as one of Catherine’s most important reforms. It is also 
when reflecting on the Nakaz that Diderot rendered the disjunction between the 
historical states of Russia and Europe explicit. Indeed, the first essay of the 
Mélanges pour Catherine II contained a short constitutional history of France, 
starting with Charlemagne and ending with the Maupeou coup and the country’s 
descent into despotism.244
                                                 
243 HDI, vol. 5, bk. 11, chap. 4, pp. 169-70. Very similar arguments are also set out in vol. 9, bk. 
19, chap. 14, p. 298 and vol. 7, bk. 15, chap. 12, p. 210. 
 In the course of this history Diderot referred to a 
pamphlet entitled Le parlement justifié par l’impératrice de Russie written in 
244 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, pp. 203-25. 
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1771 by André Blonde.245 Blonde’s booklet is premised on the observation that 
just at the time when Maupeou was subverting France’s moderate government 
through the destruction of the parlements, Russia followed an opposite policy by 
establishing institutions and laws designed to moderate the power of its despotic 
rulers. 246 Blonde argued that Catherine’s aim was to establish a government on 
the French model – in which her commission will ultimately act as a permanent 
intermediary body between the sovereign and the population just as the French 
parlements had been – and employed Catherine’s Nakaz as a means to justify this 
model and thereby attack Maupeou.247 Diderot, however, whilst agreeing that 
France and Russia were travelling into very different historical directions, turned 
Blonde’s thesis on its head: it is not France that should learn from Russia, but the 
other way round. The aim of his short history of the French parlements was to 
show to Catherine that they had been instituted on the wrong premises from the 
very beginning: the magistrates had always fatally depended on the monarch and 
had never enjoyed sufficient independence, and the totality of French laws were 
not based on any coherent plan of legislation but developed through a series of 
fortuitous historical accidents and as such were shot through with 
contradictions.248
 
  
The lesson of this history was of course that France is a model to be avoided 
rather than copied.249
 
 When reflecting on the Maupeou coup, Diderot reiterated 
his conviction that any constitutional arrangement will ultimately be destroyed 
and that the fall into despotism is unavoidable on the one hand, but at the same 
time also reminded Catherine that she could delay the fall for centuries, if she was 
willing to learn the lessons provided by French history:  
                                                 
245 André Blonde, Le parlement justifié par l'impératrice de Russie, ou lettre à M*** dans laquelle 
on répond aux différents écrits que M. Le Ch[ancelier, i.e. R. N. C. A. de Maupeou] fait distribuer 
dans Paris (n.p: n.d.). For Diderot’s discussion of Blonde, see Mélanges pour Catherine II, 
Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, p. 224-5, Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art.15, p. 519. 
246 Blonde, Le parlement justifié par l’impératrice de Russie, pp. 69-70: ‘Comparez, Monsieur, la 
conduite du Chancelier avec celle de la Czarinne. Cette auguste Princesse a rassemblé des Députés 
de toutes les villes de son vaste Empire; elle leur a dit: mes enfants, pesez avec moi l’intérêt de la 
Nation; formons ensemble un Corps des Loix qui établisse solidement la félicité publique.’ 
247 Ibid., pp. 12-17 
248 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol 3, art. 1, pp. 203-27. 
249 Binoch has equally stressed that Diderot employed his account of French constitutional history 
as a counter-model to what Catherine II should attempt to achieve in Russia; see Binoche, ‘Diderot 
et Catherine II ou les deux histoires’, pp. 151-2. 
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Je présente à Votre Majesté un spectacle grand, mais affligeant; que 
son âme tendre et humaine en soit touchée, mais non découragée. 
Cependant il a fallu des siècles pour amener notre instant fatal [i.e. the 
Maupeou coup d’état]; et cet instant pouvait être retardé par des lois et 
des institutions sages, si nous en avions eu. Songez, madame, que je 
vous présente l’éboulement d’un grand amas de grains de sable que 
des circonstances fortuites avaient entassés, au lieu qu’il dépend de 
Votre Majesté de placer la base de votre pyramide sur le roc, et d’en 
lier les différentes parties par des crampons de fer. Le roc s’affaisse, il 
est vrai, les crampons de fer se relâchent, les pierres se disjoignent, et 
l’édifice s’écroule à la longue; mais il a duré cent siècles; cent siècles 
d’un bonheur continu et procuré par les travaux et le génie étonnant de 
Votre Majesté …250
 
 
If ultimate dissolution of all human institutions is inevitable, we can nevertheless 
erect defences against the natural tendency towards destruction, by taking serious 
the lessons offered by past experience when undertaking the construction of new 
edifices. And Diderot duly provided Catherine with an outline of the most 
important steps she must take, if her legislative edifice is to be rationally erected 
on stone, rather than on a fortuitously ordered heap of sand, as had been the case 
in France. 
 
The most urgent task prescribed by Diderot was for Catherine to give up her 
unlimited political power by fundamentally re-conceiving the function of the All-
Russian Legislative Commission. Rather than instituting the commission as a 
mere trustee of the laws, charged with communicating the sovereign will to the 
people at large and invested with only limited powers to make representations 
against sovereign edicts, Diderot wanted Catherine to recognise that her authority 
ultimately derives its legitimacy from popular consent and to consider the 
commission as the embodiment of the general will of the nation.251
                                                 
250 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, p. 217. For the same argument see also 
Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 15, pp. 519-20. 
 As such, it 
would be invested with legitimacy entirely independent of the czar, and be the 
centrepiece of a constitutional arrangement in which the latter’s powers are 
subject to limits which are to be prescribed in the land’s fundamental laws and to 
251 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 9, p. 516: ‘Il me semble que c’est le 
consentement de la nation, représentée par des députés ou assemblée en corps, qui est la source de 
tout pouvoir politique et civil.’ 
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be guarded by the commission itself.252 Whilst Diderot was not particularly 
prescriptive about the precise limits of sovereign authority, nor indeed about how 
exactly the commission should be constituted in order to be able to express the 
general will of the nation, the ultimate aim of such a constitution was clear: 
‘d’élever contre le despotisme à venir une autorité insurmontable.’253
 
  
By permanently alienating a part of her authority to the commission, Catherine 
would establish an entirely new kind of relationship between the Russian czars 
and their subjects. Russia would henceforward possess a political system in which 
not the will of the ruler but the one of the nation as represented by the commission 
would constitute the supreme guiding principle, and in which constant 
communication between nation and rulers would replace the top-down imposition 
of the sovereign will: 
 
Qu’au lieu que notre Parlement enregistrait les volontés du souverain, 
il faudrait au contraire que ce fût le souverain qui enregistrât les 
représentations de la commission. Nos magistrats disaient: Nous 
voulons aussi ce que le roi veut; c’est Votre Majesté et ses successeurs 
qui diront: Nous acquiesçons aussi à ce que notre nation nous 
demande par la voie de notre commission; ce qui est fort différent.254
 
 
In this way the commission would ensure that the kind of excessive voluntarism 
which Diderot deplored in Peter’s reign could no longer be practical in the future 
– it would henceforward be the citizens themselves, having consulted one another 
about their needs and desires, who would give direction to Russia’s future.255
 
 
Moreover, if Catherine succeeded in establishing the commission on as solid a 
basis as is possible, it would constitute the best guarantee available that the true 
ends that should inform any association would not get as easily get perverted in 
Russia as they had been in France: future Russian governments would, in other 
words, have the happiness and well-being of the population as a whole as their 
guiding principle rather than the security of the dominant power. 
                                                 
252 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, p. 207; Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, 
vol. 3, art. 11, pp. 516-7. 
253 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, p. 208. 
254 Ibid., art. 24, p. 280. 
255 See ibid., p. 274; Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, pp. 507-8, art. 14, p. 518. 
 101  
 
 
 
And yet, Diderot was in no doubt that at present it was above all Catherine, rather 
than the commission, who had to take the initiative in order to create the legal 
code that was thus far lacking. Despite the fact that he frequently invoked the 
notion that the commission should be a truly legislative body,256 he nevertheless 
was convinced that the first legislator of Russia had to be Catherine herself.257 
The general vision that emerges form the pages of the Mélanges pour Catherine II 
and the Observations sur le Nakaz is one of Catherine as the first and last 
enlightened despot of Russia. A despot, who in a single act establishes a new code 
of law, which is merely to be revised and approved by the commission, and, at the 
same time, destroys for good the very basis of Russian despotism by permanently 
giving away a substantial part of her authority.258 The reason for this somewhat 
paradoxical vision is, of course, that Diderot believed Russia to be utterly 
barbarian and as such incapable of formulating the kind of coherent code of law 
needed.259
 
 Therefore, the country needs the guidance of enlightened Catherine 
and, by implication, of Diderot himself. However, by lifting Russia out of its 
barbarian youthfulness through her legislative project in particular, and her reform 
programme as whole in general, the czarina would, Diderot hoped, bring her 
subjects to a point of maturity which allows – indeed demands - a considerable 
reduction of parental guidance. 
The main principles which Diderot urged Catherine to follow are unsurprising: the 
new code should ensure the equality of all citizen before the law, and 
consequently abolish all legal preferences due to rank;260 guarantee the right to, 
and security of, property for everyone;261 establish liberty of profession and 
freedom of trade;262
                                                 
256 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 1, p. 507: ‘Il n’y a point de vrai souverain que la 
nation; il ne peut y avoir de vrai législateur que le peuple…’. 
 and institute a regime of low and fair, because equal, 
257 See, for instance, Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 24, p. 279. 
258 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 7, p. 515: ‘L’action héroïque d’un bon despote, 
c’est de lier un bras à son successeur; et c’était là la première question à proposer à la 
commission.’ 
259 Diderot frequently claimed that Catherine lacked all indigenous support for her reform 
programme. See, for instance, Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 15, p. 252. 
260 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 20, pp. 521-3; art. 42, pp. 529-30. Mélanges 
pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 11, pp. 243-4. 
261 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, arts. 76 and 78, pp. 546-7. 
262 Ibid., arts. 92, 95, pp. 552-3 (free trade); art. 116, p. 562 (against all guilds); Mélanges pour 
Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 56, pp. 357-8 (general freedom of profession). 
 102  
 
 
 
taxation.263 One effect of Diderot’s proposed code would of course be the legal 
abolition of serfdom,264 and thereby achieve what Peter never attempted. More 
generally, it would be a first important step towards the building of a civilisation 
par le commencement as it would create a legal, social and economic framework 
designed to foster the flourishing of agriculture and the mechanical arts by 
removing barriers to increased economic activity.265
 
 As such it would, over time, 
help to generate the level of general prosperity needed for luxury the fine arts and 
sciences to develop. 
However, Diderot never believed that a purely legalistic approach would be 
sufficient to lead Russia onto the road of civilisation. In his opinion the Empire 
not only lacked an adequate constitutional framework that guaranteed legal 
equality between all citizens and established institutions designed to moderate the 
exercise of sovereign power, but also an array of wider mechanisms that enabled 
social mobility and economic improvement. According to Diderot, one promising 
way to establish such mechanisms is through tightly regulated state education, 
and, therefore his repeated calls to Catherine to continue and widen her 
educational reform programme. Indeed, in the Plan d’une université he contended 
that ‘[i]nstruire une nation, c’est la civiliser’,266 and elsewhere predicted that if the 
czarina would establish as good educational establishments for boys and she had 
done for girls,267 she could ‘abréger des trois quarts l’attente de la révolution dans 
les mœurs’ in Russia.268
 
 Again, the historic situation of the Empire was seen as 
being highly promising for a successful educational drive: 
Je me contenterai d’observer ici que le moment où Sa Majesté 
Impériale forme le projet d’une université est très favorable. … La 
futilité des études scolastiques est reconnue. La fureur systématique 
est tombée. Il n’est plus question ni d’aristotélisme, ni de 
cartésianisme, ni de malebranchisme, ni de leibnizianisme. … Les 
connaissances en tout genre ont été portées à un très haut degré de 
perfection. Point de vieilles institutions qui s’opposent à ses vues. Elle 
                                                 
263 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 109, pp. 560-1 and arts. 131-2, pp. 571-2.  
264 Ibid., art. 80, p. 547. 
265 Ibid., art. 87, pp. 549-50; art. 145, p. 578. 
266 Plan d’une université, Versini, vol. 3, p. 415. 
267 A reference to the Smol’nyy Institute for Noble Girls and the Novodevich’ye Institut for Girls 
of the Third Estate; establishments founded by Catherine and greatly admired by Diderot. 
268 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 12, p. 245. 
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a devant elle un champ vaste, un espace libre de tout obstacle sur 
lequel elle peut édifier à son gré. Je ne la flatte point; je parle avec 
sincérité, lorsque j’assure que sous ce point de vue sa position est plus 
avantageuse que la nôtre.269
 
 
As with its legislation, the future of Russia’s educational establishments is bright 
because the mistakes committed in their European counterparts can be avoided by 
their enlightened institutor Catherine on the one hand, and because Russia is a 
tabula rasa with no old, rooted institutions on the other.  
 
The broad guidelines Diderot advocated for the reform of Russia’s education 
system again emphasise the main concerns we have already encountered in his 
contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes: the natural propensity of moderate 
governments to default into despotism, the need of building a new civilisation par 
le commencement, and the necessity to promote merit, rather than riches, as the 
only appropriate vehicle for social advancement. 
 
Accordingly, the first aim of education has to be the forming of good, because 
politically aware, citizens. In order to achieve this aim, the inculcation of the 
nation’s fundamental laws as expressed in its legal code and guarded by 
commission, must constitute a fundamental part of the syllabus at all levels of 
schooling.270 This would not only foster the development of a reliable, because 
law-abiding, population, but also erect yet another barrier against the dissolution 
of moderate government into despotism, because citizens aware of their rights and 
duties will ever keep a watchful eye on the activities of their sovereign.271
 
 
Apart from instructing citizens, education must also develop a workforce 
equipped with the necessary skills to accelerate Russia’s economic 
development.272
                                                 
269 Plan d’une université, Versini, vol. 3, p. 425. 
 For this purpose, Diderot proposed in his Plan d’une université a 
syllabus with eight subsequent classes moving from the economically most useful 
fields of knowledge, such as arithmetic, algebra and calculus to the more obscure 
ones: most particularly, Greek, Latin, eloquence and poetry. Crucially, the plan 
270 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 25, p. 289. 
271 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 13, p. 518. 
272 Plan d’une université, Versini, vol. 3, p. 421. 
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stipulates that only a very small minority of pupils progress through all eight 
stages before entering the three higher faculties – medicine, jurisprudence, 
theology - responsible for creating highly skilled specialists. The large majority of 
pupils are obliged to leave the university as soon as they have acquired all the 
essential knowledge needed for their future metier.273 The principal aim of this 
syllabus is, of course, to start the civilising process par le commencement. It is not 
poets, orators and philosophers that the country needs, but a large pool of 
adequately skilled workers, artisans and merchants; the classes, in other words, 
that form the vital substructure of any civilisation.274
  
 
Education, finally, must lead to increased emulation, and the principle to which all 
of Catherine’s establishments should adhere is that of competition. By granting 
stipends on a competitive basis and by instituting frequent public exams in which 
the best pupils are to be praised, and the worst shamed, these establishments 
should firmly inculcate the norms of industriousness and merit as the only 
appropriate vehicles for social advancement across the Empire’s emerging 
population.275 If successfully implemented this will lead to a future flowering of 
talent and achievements in all possible fields by creating a socially mobile and 
economically active third estate.276 Moreover, the consistent promotion of such 
norms will of course also create a solid barrier against future soif d’or and its 
pernicious effects once Russia has developed material wealth and a taste of 
luxury.277
 
 
If legislation and education are thus the most promising mechanisms Catherine 
can employ to accelerate, and create a solid basis for, the process of civilisation in 
Russia, Diderot additionally proposed a programme of colonisation. This 
programme is to be designed in such a way as to gradually bring progress to 
Russia’s far-flung provinces: 
 
                                                 
273 Ibid., pp. 423-6. 
274 Ibid., pp. 427, 486-7. 
275 See, for instance, Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 25, p. 287; art. 43, pp. 338-9. 
276 Mélanges pour Catherine II, Versini, vol. 3, art. 4, pp. 235-6; art. 49, p. 352. 
277 Ibid., art. 27, esp. pp. 305-9. 
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Si j’avais à civiliser des sauvages, que ferais-je? Je ferais des choses 
utiles en leur présence, sans leur rien ni dire, ni prescrire. J’aurais l’air 
de travailler pour ma seule famille et pour moi. 
 
Si j’avais à créer une nation à la liberté, que ferais-je? Je planterais au 
milieu d’elle une colonie d’hommes libres, très libres, tels, par 
exemple, que les Suisses, à qui je conserverais bien strictement ses 
privilèges, et j’abandonnerais le reste au temps et à l’exemple. 
.. 
Peu à peu, les femmes et les hommes de mon empire s’engageraient 
dans cette colonie. 
 
Peu à peu, ce levain précieux changerait toute la masse, et son esprit 
deviendrait l’esprit général.278
 
 
For our present concerns the advocacy of a Swiss colony in Russia is highly 
informative in a number of respects. Most importantly, it is when reflecting on 
this colony that Diderot most conspicuously drew the analogy between the 
civilisation of savages and of Russians, and thereby also established an explicit 
linkage between his contributions to Histoire des deux Indes and his reflections on 
Russia.279 Indeed, the Histoire des deux Indes abounds with projects and advice of 
how to colonise well; that is to say of how to convert hunter-gather tribes to a 
settled way of life and to inspire in them a taste for regular, useful work, 
cultivation of the earth and trade.280
 
 The methods to be employed to achieve this 
are exactly the same as the ones outlined in the passage just quoted: rather than 
attempting to force savages to settle and to work, as has been the usual practice 
among European colonisers, civilisation, should, according to Diderot, happen 
voluntarily. By providing savages with direct, sensible evidence of the material 
advantages of a civilised life in society, they will, without being forced, chose this 
way of life themselves. 
Transposed to the context of Russia, the advocacy of such a method of civilising 
again implies a criticism of Peter’s attempt to reform Russia, and Voltaire’s 
                                                 
278 Ibid., art. 38, pp. 326-7. On the same idea, see also Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, 
art. 4, p. 512; HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, pp. 49-50, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 54. 
279 See also Goggi, ‘Civilisation et expérience de référencée’, esp. pp. 330-80. Goggi provides a 
very detailed account of Diderot’s plan for a Swiss colony in Russia, and shows that this plan must 
be understood as a specific application of the Histoire des deux Indes’ general project of re-
conceptualising the relation between colonising and civilising. 
280 See, most prominently, HDI, vol. 4, bk. 9, chap. 1, pp. 233-5; vol. 4, bk. 9, chap. 6, p. 253; vol. 
6, bk. 12, chap. 7, pp. 17-18.  
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apology of his reign. It is not by brute force, but through soft persuasion that a 
people should change its habits. Moreover, by advocating that the colony should 
be peopled by Swiss, Diderot re-iterated his underlying conviction that Russian 
civilisation must be built par le commencement. In the Observations sur le Nakaz, 
for instance, where the advocacy of a colony in Russia is repeated, the choice of 
the Swiss is explained by the fact that they are free, independent soldiers and 
agriculturists.281 More specifically, Switzerland is portrayed in the Histoire des 
deux Indes as one of the few European countries that has neither climbed any of 
the great peaks of civilisation, nor been partaking in the general historical process 
of European decline.282
 
 It is, in other words, a country at a relatively early stage of 
historical development. As such importation of free Swiss agriculturists and 
soldiers into Russia is a much more appropriate strategy to advance the country 
than inviting highly civilised French, English, Dutch or Italian artists and men of 
letters as has been done by Peter. If Europe can directly support the civilisation of 
Russia, in other words, it must be through the relatively undeveloped Swiss, 
because they can help to create the kind of economic substructure needed for the 
higher arts and the sciences to develop and thrive. 
But Diderot’s discussion of the Swiss colony also reveals a tension which can be 
traced across his writings on Russia. As seen, the programme proposed to 
Catherine to civilise her country only works because Russia is in a state of 
youthful barbarity or savagery. Reforms are likely to succeed because no deep-
rooted institutions which are almost impossible to alter exist, and because the 
voice of the enlightened sovereign Catherine is likely to find a receptive ear 
among hommes neufs, who, like children, have yet to develop inveterate habits 
that would constitute an insurmountable barrier to a radical reform project.283
                                                 
281 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, p. 512. 
 
However, when he contemplated the establishment of a Swiss colony, Diderot did 
not claim that 18th-century Russia was savage as such. He merely claimed that the 
operation of civilising savages is similar to the one of bringing an enslaved nation 
into a free state. When advocating the colonisation of Russian provinces by the 
Swiss in the Histoire des deux Indes, he attempted to bridge the gulf between the 
282 The relevant passage on Switzerland was not written by Diderot. See, HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 
2, pp. 96-100.  
283 Ibid., vol. 5, bk. 11, chap. 4, pp. 169-70. 
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two operations even further: here he argued that the enfranchisement and the 
civilisation of an empire are the same things under different names.284 And yet, 
thereby the tension was not solved but actually accentuated. Indeed, the 
contributions to Raynal’s work as a whole are of course premised on exactly the 
opposite claim: that to enter society and to civilise always involves a certain loss 
of liberty and ultimately, that any civilisation ends through the fall into despotism, 
and, therefore, in slavery.285
 
 
The most troubling phenomenon underlying Diderot’s problem is of course the 
existence of Russian despotism, which, according to his own philosophy of 
history, points to a country which does not stand at the beginning of the historical 
cycle but at its end. In his early writings on Russia – especially the Mélanges pour 
Catherine II and his first two contributions to the Histoire des deux Indes, Diderot 
did not probe deeply into this problem: the fact that Russians are both slaves and 
savages remained largely unanalysed. However, there are very good indications 
that Diderot was always aware of its existence. In a letter to Falconet, for instance, 
written in 1768 and thus five years before he departed to Russia, he wrote: 
 
Le païs où il y aura moins de choses faites sera le plus avancé. 
J’aimerais mieux avoir à policer des sauvages que des russes, et des 
russes que des anglais, des français, des espagnols ou des portugais. Je 
trouverais chez les premiers l’aire à peu près nettoyée.286
 
 
This notion that Russia might not be a perfectly savage tabula rasa re-emerges in 
a passage written for the Observations sur le Nakaz with even more force: 
 
Il y a bien de la différence entre la condition d’un peuple sous la 
barbarie, et la condition d’un peuple sous la tyrannie. Sous la barbarie, 
les âmes sont féroces; sous la tyrannie, elle sont lâches. 
 
L’impératrice de Russie Catherine II regrettait les premiers Russes, et 
je crois qu’elle avait raison. 
 
Tempérez la férocité et vous aurez des âmes grandes, nobles, fortes et 
généreuses. On ne sait comment ranimer, agrandir, fortifier des âmes 
une fois avilies. 
                                                 
284 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 54. 
285 See, especially, ibid., vol. 8, bk. 18, chap. 27, p. 217 and vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 34, p. 108. 
286 Corr, vol. 8, 6 September 1768, no. 490, p. 117.  
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Au moral ainsi qu’au physique, il est plus facile de descendre que de 
remonter. Le corps qui descend suit sa pente naturelle, et c’est contre 
sa nature, par l’effet d’un choc accidentel et violent, qu’il remonte 
pour un moment.287
 
 
In this passage Diderot’s habitual optimism about Russia’s future is thrown into 
fundamental doubt. The youthful ‘premiers Russes’, so essential for the success of 
his proposed programme of civilisation, simply do not exist anymore. Indeed, 
Catherine does not have to deal with ‘féroce’ but free barbarians, but with ‘lâches’ 
slaves. The implication of this is, of course, that Russians might not be in a state 
of youth, as are the hunter-gatherer tribes of the Americas, but already in old age 
and thus similar to India. In fact, Russia might well be descending on the 
historical cycle rather than rising, and there is very little a sovereign can do to 
reverse this direction.  
 
A similar pessimism about the Empire’s future also permeates Diderot’s last 
writing on Russia, written for the third edition of the Histoire des deux Indes in 
1780.288 Whilst he repeated therein the main contours of his reform programme, 
he also expressed considerable doubt whether Catherine could ever succeed in 
implementing it. The main obstacles to reform stressed are instructive. First, the 
fact that Russia is despotic is described as constituting a formidable, and 
potentially insurmountable, barrier to future Russian progress.289
 
 Second, Diderot 
indicated another major impediment opposing itself to Catherine’s efforts: 
L’immense étendue de l’empire qui embrasse tous les climats, depuis 
le plus froid jusqu’au plus chaud, n’oppose-t-elle pas un puissant 
obstacle au législateur? Un même code pourroit-il convenir à tant de 
régions diverses; et la nécessité de plusieurs codes n’est-elle pas la 
même chose que l’impossibilité d’un seul? Conçoit-on le moyen 
d’assujettir à une même regle des peuples qui ne s’entendent pas, qui 
parlent dix-sept à dix-huit langues différentes, et qui gardent de tems 
immémorial des coutumes et des superstitions auxquelles ils sont plus 
attachés qu’à leur vie même.290
 
 
                                                 
287 Observations sur le Nakaz, Versini, vol. 3, art. 69, p. 543. 
288 HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, pp. 52-8. 
289 Ibid., p. 52. 
290 Ibid., p. 53. 
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Again, as with despotism, if we follow Diderot’s own philosophy of history, the 
existence of a large, multi-cultural empire of course points to an old, declining 
nation, rather than a young emerging one.291
 
 Moreover, the claim that the peoples 
converging on Russia’s territory all possess deep-seated customs and superstitions 
of course stands in stark contrast to the earlier idea that Russians are hommes 
neufs. In such a historical context, a civilising programme structured around 
legislation, education and colonisation simply does not work anymore. Indeed, 
Russia might need a much more violent and unpredictable revolution than the one 
Diderot had hitherto proposed to Catherine: 
Dans cet état de choses, le plus grand bonheur qui pût arriver à une 
contrée énormément étendue, ne seroit-ce pas d’être démembrée par 
quelque grande révolution, & d’être partagée en plusieurs petites 
souverainetés contiguës, d’où l’ordre introduit dans quelques-unes, se 
répandroit dans les autres? S’il est très-difficile de bien gouverner un 
grand empire civilisé, ne l’est-il pas davantage de civiliser un grand 
empire barbare?292
 
 
However, we also note that Diderot never completely gave up the notion that 
Russia is barbarian as the country is now described as ‘un grand empire barbare’. 
But it would seem that such a ‘grand empire barbare’ cannot be meaningfully 
understood as a savage tabula rasa anymore. Clearly to understand such a 
country, to be able to locate it precisely within the historical cycle, and to 
formulate a historically sensitive programme of political reform, we would have 
to know how it had developed, that is to say how it historically arrived at this 
paradoxical state. And yet, despite at times implying that Russia might already 
have had a history prior to Peter’s and Catherine’s efforts to reform and civilise 
their country, Diderot never provided us with a possible account of such a history. 
In the Histoire des deux Indes Russia is introduced into the narrative in book five, 
which deals with Danish, Prussian, Swedish, Spanish and Russian incursions into 
the East Indies. Significantly, Russia is the only commercial country that is not 
provided with a pre-history to its colonial expansion: it just emerges out of 
nowhere when Peter I attempted to strengthen Russia’s commercial ties with the 
                                                 
291 In the Histoire des deux Indes territorial over-extension is presented as a prime indication that 
man’s fight against nature has been taken too far, and, therefore, announces a civilisation’s 
imminent fall. See, for instance, ibid., vol. 6, bk. 13, chap. 1, p. 111.  
292 Ibid., vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 2, p. 55. 
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outside world in the late 17th century.293
 
 Moreover, this omission is never rectified 
in any of Diderot’s writings on Russia at large. Reading Diderot we simply do not 
know why 18th-century Russia has a despotic government or why a significant 
part of its population live in serfdom, we are not provided with an account that 
would enlighten us how it expanded its borders over time, and we do not learn 
anything about its pre-Catherinean institutions, laws and mores. 
In the final analysis, therefore, Diderot’s writings on Russia are beset with a 
similar problem to Voltaire’s Histoire de l’empire de Russie: both thinkers 
struggled to provide Russia with a satisfying history prior to the accession of 
either Peter I or Catherine II. Whilst Voltaire unconvincingly argued that the state 
of pre-Petrine Russia was essentially the same as the one of feudal Europe, 
Diderot ultimately vacillated between two extreme and highly problematic 
positions: he gradually moved from an assessment of the state of pre-Catherinean 
Russia as a savage tabula rasa, to a notion that the country Catherine had 
inherited might already be old and declining. Or, to put it more starkly, Diderot 
was never entirely sure whether Russian history was about to start, or whether it 
had already happened. 
 
As with Voltaire, it is this historiographical problem that explains the 
contradictions plaguing Diderot’s political project. The shift from optimism to 
pessimism about Russia’s future cannot be explained with reference to shifting 
attitudes towards the enlightened despot Catherine II as is, for instance, claimed 
by Lortholary: Diderot consistently deplored any form of despotism, and in all his 
writings urged Catherine to give up her unlimited power. The move from hope to 
despair about the chances of Catherine succeeding in reforming and civilising her 
country, simply follows the shift in Diderot’s answer to the all important question 
of Russia’s exact position within the historical cycle. 
                                                 
293 Ibid., vol. 3, bk. 5, chaps. 18-23, pp. 27-53. 
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3. Pierre Charles Levesque: The discovery of Russia’s 
distant past and the politics of gradual reform 
 
Introduction 
 
Voltaire’s and Diderot’s omission of a pre-history from their respective accounts 
of Peter I and Catherine II did not go unnoticed among their contemporaries. 
Commenting on previous French scholarship on Russia, Pierre Charles Levesque 
remarked in his Histoire de Russie of 1782: ‘[o]n a beaucoup parlé de la Russie, 
sans en connaître l’histoire’.294
 
 The reason Levesque provided for the soaring 
interest in Russia was, unsurprisingly, the reign of Peter I, who had seemingly 
propelled the Empire into the orbit of European civilisation through his military 
exploits and his programme of economic, social, political and cultural 
modernisation. And yet, writing more than twenty years after the first publication 
of Voltaire’s Histoire de l’empire de Russie, he could nevertheless contend that 
the various conflicting interpretations of Peter had not resulted in any adequate 
account of the country’s pre-Petrine past, and, by implication, remained 
historically woefully uninformed. In Levesque’s view, the question of how 
Russia’s distant past connects with the present, and the wider problem of how this 
history as a whole relates to the history of European civilisation, remained 
unresolved.  
This chapter aims to assess Levesque’s contribution to the resolution of these 
questions through a close analysis of his magnum opus: the Histoire de Russie. 
Tracing the history of Russia from the perspective of the longue durée – starting 
with the institution of the state by Rurik in 862 and ending with the reign of 
Catherine II295
                                                 
294 HDR, vol. 4, pp. 146-7. 
 – enabled him to arrive at a reading of this history which was 
highly original: he was arguably the first French thinker to provide Russia with a 
progressive history without needing recourse to exceptional figures such as Peter I 
295 Levesque continuously extended his description of Catherine’s reign across the work’s four 
main editions. In the work’s last edition, he also included a chapter on the reign of Catherine’s 
successor: Paul I. See HDR-12, vol. 5 p. 441 – vol. 6 p. 122. 
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or Catherine II. According to Levesque, Russia had been slowly moving towards 
civilisation from its very beginning. Therefore, it simply did not require the 
importation of all the building blocks of civilisation from without through Peter in 
order to catch up with Europe’s development, as Voltaire argued, nor was there 
any need for Catherine II to execute a rational programme of reform in order to 
civilise her country, as Diderot suggested. We will see that the guiding idea 
underlying Levesque’s re-interpretation was that of normalising Russian history – 
that is to say to undermine any notion that Russia’s history might be qualitatively 
different to that of Europe, or, indeed, any other history. This is an endeavour with 
clear political implications as this normalisation was bound up with a fundamental 
critique of the efficacy of despotism. 
 
Both these concerns - the universality of the historical process and the related 
critique of despotism - were further elaborated upon by Levesque in a series of 
more theoretical works, most prominently his L'homme moral, ou l'homme 
considéré tant dans l'état de pure nature, que dans la société and L'homme 
pensant, ou essai sur l'histoire de l'esprit humain.296
 
 These works will be 
considered alongside the Histoire de Russie throughout this chapter, and will fully 
flesh out Levesque’s conception of history in general, its relation to politics, as 
well as make explicit his moderately optimistic outlook about the future progress 
of civilisation both in its European and Russian guises.  
However, given that Levesque is an almost unknown thinker today, a few 
introductory words about his life and work are in order before plunging into a 
detailed analysis of parts of this work.297
                                                 
296 Referred to here as HM and HP, respectively. See also Pierre Charles Levesque, 
‘Considérations sur l'homme. Observé dans la vie sauvage, dans la vie pastorale, et dans la vie 
policée’, Mémoires de l'institut national des sciences et arts. Sciences morales et politiques 1 
(Thermidor an VI [ca. 1794]). 
 Born in Paris in 1736 into a bourgeois 
297 Not much is known about Levesque’s biography. His own papers and letters, having been 
conserved by his descendants until the beginning of the 20th century, have since disappeared. See 
Vladimir A. Somov, ‘Pierre-Charles Levesque, protégé de Diderot et historien de la Russie’, 
Cahiers du Monde Russe 43, no. 2-3 (2002), p. 276. However, a small number of surviving 
documents relating to Levesque have been published recently, see André Mazon, ‘Pierre-Charles 
Levesque: humaniste, historien et moraliste’, Revue des études slaves 42, no. 1-4 (1963). Pierre 
Charles Levesque, ‘Annexes: Lettres inédites de Pierre-Charles Levesque’, Cahiers du Monde 
russe 43, no. 2-3 (2002). In addition to these few manuscript sources, there exist three published 
contemporary sources that shed some light on his life. These are: 
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family, Levesque enjoyed a good education first at the collège des Quatre-Nations 
and later at the Jesuit institution whose former pupils include Voltaire and 
Diderot: the collège Louis-le-Grand. Whilst he was still being educated, financial 
problems required his family to leave the capital. Unwilling to abandon his 
studies, and having learned the art of engraving which supplied him with a modest 
income, Levesque decided to stay in Paris on his own.298 It is during this time that 
he wrote his first literary work, Les rêves d’Aristobule,299 which seems to have 
caught the eye of Diderot.300 It is due to the latter that Levesque’s life was to take 
a decisive turn. Diderot, in his capacity as recruitment agent for Catherine II in 
France, supplied his new acquaintance with a position as governor at the Corps 
des cadets in St. Petersburg in 1773.301
 
 
Levesque thus spent the next seven years in the Russian capital. Apart from 
instructing his pupils in French and logic, he also found enough time to perfect his 
knowledge of modern Russian and to learn old Slavonic. This skill enabled him to 
read the old Russian chronicles, annals and documents; sources which had just 
recently begun to be collected, published and analysed.302
                                                                                                                                     
- A short appreciation of his life and work written by Conrad Malte-Brun, editor of the 4th 
(posthumous) edition of Levesque’s Histoire de Russie: Conrad Malte-Brun, ‘Éloge de feu Mr 
Levesque, Membre de l'Institut et de la Légion d'honneur, Professeur d'histoire au Collège de 
France’, in HDR-12, vol. 1, pp. v-xxx. 
 The Histoire de Russie, 
first published soon after his return to France in 1780, was the main product of his 
engagement with these sources. Apart from studying Russian history, Levesque 
also wrote his two works concerned with the historical process in general whilst in 
- A funeral oration pronounced by Antoine Quatremère de Quincy, Vice-President of the classe 
d’histoire et de littérature ancienne of the Institut impérial de France: Antoine Chrysostôme 
Quatremère de Quincy, Institut Impérial de France. Funérailles de M. Levesque ([Paris]: De 
l'Imprimerie de Firmin Didot, 1812). 
- A funeral oration pronounced by Bon Joseph Dacier, perpetual Secretary of the Académie des 
inscriptions et belles-lettres: Bon Joseph Dacier, ‘Notice historique sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. 
Lévesque’, in Mémoires de l'Institut royal de France. Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. 
Vol. 5 (Paris: Chez Firmin Didot 1821). 
298 Dacier, ‘Notice historique’, pp. 162-3. Malte-Brun, ‘Éloge de feu Mr Levesque’, pp. vi-ix. 
299 [Levesque, Pierre Charles], Les rêves d'Aristobule, philosophe grec, suivis d'un abrégé de la vie 
de Formose philosophe français (Paris: 1762). 
300 Maurice Prou, ‘Levesque, Pierre Charles’, in La grande encyclopédie. Inventaire raisonné des 
sciences, des lettres et des arts. Par une société de savants et de gens de lettres, ed. Pierre Eugène 
Marcelin Berthelot, Hartwig Derenbourg, and Ferdinand Camille Dreyfus, (Paris: 1887), vol. 22, 
p. 138. 
301 The contract signed by Levesque and Diderot, outlining the terms and conditions under which 
the former was to be employed, is still extant and has been reproduced by Mazon, ‘Pierre-Charles 
Levesque’, pp. 18-23. 
302 Malte-Brun, ‘Éloge de feu Mr Levesque’, pp. xi-xii; Somov, ‘Pierre-Charles Levesque’, pp. 
276-8. 
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St. Petersburg: L'homme moral and L'homme pensant. It is through the former 
work that Levesque again crossed paths with Diderot. Either unwilling or unable 
to print L’homme moral in Russia, he handed a manuscript copy to Diderot during 
the latter’s stay at Catherine’s court in 1773-1774 and asked him to oversee its 
publication in Holland.303 Diderot not only fulfilled this task – L’homme moral 
was first published by Marc-Michel Rey in Amsterdam in 1775 – but we actually 
know that he read the book with some interest. Indeed, in the preface of a revised 
edition of 1784, Levesque complained bitterly that Raynal had plagiarised two 
parts of his work in the third edition of the Histoire des deux Indes without due 
acknowledgment.304 Probably unknown to Levesque, the most substantial passage 
of the Histoire des deux Indes which he himself had identified as being 
plagiarised was not actually written by Raynal but by his own acquaintance 
Diderot.305
 
  
After having returned to France in 1780, Levesque continued his historical 
research, but shifted his focus from Russia to his own country. His next major 
work was a history of France during the reign of the first five Valois kings in the 
14th and 15th century, preceded by a lengthy introduction which traced the history 
of the French monarchy from the reign of Pepin in the 8th century until the 
accession of Philippe de Valois.306 It was originally conceived as only the first 
part of a general history of the French monarchy to cover the whole period from 
the Frankish conquest of Gaul up until the present; a work which was never 
completed, however. La France sous les cinq premiers Valois, first published in 
1788, was well received among the scholars of the Académie des inscriptions et 
belles-lettres. It was this work together with a prize-winning essay on the abbé de 
Mably,307 which secured Levesque’s election to the Académie in 1789.308
                                                 
303 See Somov, ‘Pierre-Charles Levesque’, p. 278. HM-84, p. v.  
 This 
304 HM-84, pp. vii-xix. 
305 The plagiarised section in question is HDI, vol. 9, bk. 19, chap. 14, pp. 294-5. This section has 
been firmly attributed to Diderot by Duchet, Diderot et l'histoire des deux Indes. 
306 Pierre Charles Levesque, La France sous les cinq premiers Valois; ou histoire de France 
depuis l'avénement de Philippe-de-Valois, jusqu'à la mort de Charles VII. Précédée d'une 
introduction dans laquelle on suit les révolutions & les progrès de la monarchie, depuis le regne 
de Pepin jusqu'à la mort de Charles-le-Bel, 4 vols. (Paris: Chez de Bure l'aîné, 1788). 
307 Pierre Charles Levesque, ‘L'éloge historique de l'abbé de Mably’, in Esprit de Mably et de 
Condillac, relativement à la morale et à la politique, ed. Laurent Pierre Bérenger, 2 vols., vol. 1 
(Grenoble: 1789). 
308 Dacier, ‘Notice historique’, pp. 171-3. Malte-Brun, ‘Éloge de feu Mr Levesque’, p. xviii-xix. 
 115  
 
 
 
honour was soon followed by his elevation to the chair of history and moral 
philosophy at the Collège de France in 1791, and, in 1795, Levesque was among 
the first to be invited into the new Institut national des sciences et des arts, 
established as replacement for the old academies which had been abolished during 
the revolution.309
 
 
We only have very limited information about his activity during the revolutionary 
period, but it would appear that the politically moderate Levesque was appalled 
by the political upheaval and kept a low profile. He certainly shifted his interests 
once again: away from the politically sensitive and potentially dangerous study of 
French history to classical antiquity. Most of the papers he read at the Academy 
and at the Institute dealt with the history and art of ancient Greece and Rome,310 
and his three main published works during this period are a translation of 
Thucydides’ history, a critical study of early Roman history, and a collection of 
essays concerned with the history of ancient Greece.311 But he never completely 
lost his interest in either French or Russian history. There are good indications 
that he worked until his death on the continuation of his history of the French 
monarchy,312 and, apart from acting as the editor of the Histoire de l’empire de 
Russie for the Palissot edition of Voltaire’s work,313
 
 he also completed two new, 
and considerably augmented, editions of his own Histoire de Russie: the first 
published in Hamburg in 1800, and the second posthumously in Paris in 1812. 
Levesque died in Paris on 12 May 1812, aged 76. 
                                                 
309 Mazon, ‘Pierre-Charles Levesque’, pp. 50-1; Dacier, ‘Notice historique’, p. 173. 
310 A list of some of the papers Levesque read at the Institute can be found in J. M. Quérard, ed., 
La France littéraire ou dictionnaire bibiliographique des savants, historiens et gens de lettres de 
la France, 12 vols., (Paris: Didot, 1827-64), vol. 5, pp. 276-7. 
311 Pierre Charles Levesque, Histoire de Thucydide, fils d'Olorus, traduite du Grec par Pierre-
Charles Levesque (Paris: J.B Gail, 1795); Pierre Charles Levesque, Études de l'histoire ancienne 
et de celle de la Grèce; de la constitution de la république d'Athènes et de celle de Lacédémone; 
de la législation, des tribunaux, des mœurs et usages des Athéniens; de la poésie, de la philosophie 
et des arts chez les Grecs (Paris: Chez Fournier Frères, Libraires, 1811); Pierre Charles Levesque, 
Histoire critique de la république Romaine. Ouvrage dans lequel on s'est proposé de détruire des 
préjugés invétérés sur l'histoire des premiers siècles de la république, sur la morale des Romains, 
leurs vertus, leur politique extérieure, leur constitution et le caractère de leurs hommes célèbres, 4 
vols. (Paris: Dentu, 1812). 
312 Dacier, ‘Notice historique’, p. 177. 
313 Levesque corrected many factual mistakes in Voltaire’s text by means of editorial footnotes. 
See François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Œuvres, ed. Charles Palissot de Montenoy, 55 vols., vol. 
26 (Paris: 1792). 
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It is without doubt the Histoire de Russie which was most responsible for 
Levesque’s relative fame during his own lifetime, and the only work for which he 
is still, albeit to a limited extent, remembered today. It was widely read during the 
18th century, going through four main French editions, and quickly translated into 
Italian and Russian.314 Moreover, it enjoyed substantive critical acclaim. In 
France, it was the subject of lengthy review articles in the Correspondance 
littéraire, L’année littéraire, Le journal des sçavans, L’esprit des journaux and 
Mercure de France.315 All of these reviews, with the notable exception of the one 
published in the Mercure de France, were positive.316 The consensus of the other 
journals was that Levesque had considerably heightened the standard of French 
historical scholarship on Russia, and that the endeavour to write a continuous 
account of the history of the Empire from its very beginning to the present had, 
effectively, opened up a whole new field of historical scholarship. The L’année 
littéraire concluded: ‘[C]ette Histoire de Russie est ce que nous avons de mieux 
fait en ce genre’; a sentiment almost literally repeated in the Correspondance 
littéraire, which regarded the work as ‘la meilleure Histoire connue de cet 
empire.’317
 
 
The positive appraisal was not restricted to France. Conrad Malte-Brun, the editor 
of the fourth edition of the Histoire de Russie, highlighted the positive reception 
of the work among the German Russian specialists:  
                                                 
314 On the Italian edition and its reception, see Venturi, The End of the Old Regime in Europe, vol. 
2, pp. 807-12. On the Russian edition, see S. N. Valk, ‘Un mémoire de Pierre-Charles Levesque 
sur la Russkaja Prava’, Revue des Etudes Slaves 41, no. 1-4 (1962), p. 8. An English version of the 
Histoire de Russie was planned, but never executed. See A. G. Cross, ‘From Hull to Petersburg: 
Levesque's History of Russia Printed by George Prince’, Factotum 33 (1991). 
315 Friedrich Grimm et al., eds., Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique, 16 vols. 
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1877) vol. 14, Février 1782, pp. 70-6; Anonymous, ‘Histoire de Russie tirée 
des chroniques originales des piecès authentiques, & des meilleurs historiens de la nation ...Par M. 
L'Evesque’, L'année littéraire, no. 8 (1781); J. L. Geoffroy, ‘Histoire des différens peuples soumis 
à la domination des russes, ou suite de l'Histoire de Russie, par M. L'Evêque’, L'année littéraire, 
no. 6 (1783); [Joseph de] Guignes, ‘Histoire de Russie, tirée des chroniques originales, des pièces 
authentiques & des meilleurs historiens de la nation. Par M. Leveque’, Le journal des sçavans, no. 
1-2 (1782); Anonymous, ‘Histoire de Russie, tirée des chroniques originales, des piecès 
authentiques, & des meilleurs historiens de la nation; par M. Levesque’, L'esprit des journaux Juin 
- Juillet (1782); Anonymous, ‘Réflexions sur l'Histoire de Russie, par M. Lévesque’, Mercure de 
France 25 Janvier (1783). 
316 The review in the Mercure de France deals exclusively with Levesque’s treatment of Peter I. It 
is a straightforward defence of Voltaire’s account of Peter’s history, and a polemical attack on 
Levesque’s attempt to revise this account.  
317 Anonymous, ‘Histoire de Russie’, p. 325. Grimm et al., eds., Correspondance littéraire, vol. 
14, p. 70. 
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En Allemagne le mérite scientifique de l’Histoire de Russie pouvait 
d’autant mieux être apprécié que les recherches sur lesquelles elle se 
fondait, étaient communes à plusieurs savans allemands ... . Il fut 
glorieux pour l’historien français de n’éprouver, de la part de ces juges 
sévères, aucune critique sérieuse, et d’en recevoir au contraire des 
éloges motivés et sincères.318
 
 
A well-justified assessment, given that August Ludwig Schlözer, undoubtedly one 
of the most severe critics of French historical scholarship, regarded Levesque’s 
work as the only tolerable history of Russia produced in the 18th century.319
 
  
A faint echo of the acclaim accorded to Levesque’s Histoire de Russie by his 
contemporaries can still be heard in modern scholarship. Most studies concerned 
with French scholarship on Russia in the 18th century include some discussion of 
Levesque’s work, and typically arrive at a favourable assessment. For von 
Mohrenschildt, for instance, Levesque was the ‘first serious [French] scholar of 
Russian history and culture’.320 This is an assessment not only shared by 
Wilberger,321 but also by scholars usually fiercely critical of 18th-century France’s 
intellectual engagement with Russia. Lortholary, for instance, mentions in passing 
that Levesque, very much unlike Voltaire and Diderot, demonstrated a real 
interest in Russian history and culture, whilst Wolff regards the Histoire de Russie 
as a ‘historical masterpiece’ of the French Enlightenment which ‘held the field 
into the nineteenth century’.322
 
 
Despite such token recognition, however, no detailed reading of the Histoire de 
Russie exists to date. More often than not, Levesque’s name is used to signify an 
alternative, and somehow more appropriate, 18th-century reading of Russian 
history to the ones supplied by better known thinkers, without much analysis to 
support such a claim. Given the considerable esteem accorded to the Histoire de 
Russie by its contemporary readers, and given the indication by its French 
reviewers that the work opened up a novel way of approaching the history of 
                                                 
318 Malte-Brun, ‘Éloge de feu Mr Levesque’, p. xiii. 
319 Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 109-10. 
320 von Mohrenschildt, Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth-Century France, p. 102. 
321 Wilberger, Peter the Great, p. 109. 
322 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, p. 270; Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 289. 
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Russia, an analysis that endeavours to define with some precision how Levesque 
responded to the late 18th-century debate about the history of Russian civilisation 
therefore seems imperative. 
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The writing of Russian history: Érudits, philosophes and 
Montesquieu 
 
For Levesque himself, the answer to the question of how he primarily contributed 
to the historiography of Russia is evident. In the prospectus announcing the 
Histoire de Russie to prospective buyers in St. Petersburg, as well as in the work’s 
preface, he emphasised the gulf separating his own endeavour to write the history 
of the Empire from previous attempts by his compatriots: 
 
Les auteurs français n’ont presque rien écrit d’exact sur l’ancienne 
histoire de Russie. On peut même dire qu’ils l’ont absolument ignorée, 
ils n’ont pas eu la prudence de se taire. S’ils ont appris des étrangers 
ou des voyageurs quelques faits conformes à la vérité, il n’en ont fait 
usage que pour défigurer les noms des hommes des lieux, au point 
qu’il est impossible de les reconnaître.323
 
  
Lacking any credible source material regarding the ancient history of Russia, 
French historians had so far either ignored the Empire’s distant past altogether, or 
had produced uncritical accounts based on data of very dubious veracity. 
According to Levesque, such an approach was deplorable, since Russia actually 
possessed a wealth of sources far more congenial to a reliable historical account 
than foreign travel writings. Indeed, in a ‘catalogue raisonné’ appended to the 
Histoire de Russie, he presented in detail his own sources and outlined the long 
tradition of chronicle writing in Russia.324 This tradition starts with the account 
written by the Kievan monk Nestor in the 11th century. Nestor’s own chronicle 
reaches back into the earliest time, and continued by a host of successors, offers 
an uninterrupted record of Russian history from the institution of the state by 
Rurik in Novgorod in the 9th to the accession of Tsar Alexei in the 17th century.325
 
  
Levesque deemed his compatriots’ failure to exploit this rich material 
unsurprising for two reasons: first of all, he acknowledged that his own 
undertaking would have been impossible a few decades earlier, simply because 
                                                 
323 Pierre Charles Levesque, ‘Prospectus de "L'histoire de Russie" de Pierre-Charles Lévesque’, in 
Le livre et l'historien: études offertes en l'honneur du Professeur Henri-Jean Martin, ed. Frédéric 
Barbier, et al. (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1997), p. 356. 
324 HDR-12, vol. 6, pp. 456-76. 
325 Ibid., 456-8. 
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his sources had not been readily available then.326 For a long time hidden away in 
manuscript form in monasteries, these sources had only recently been 
systematically collected, collated, edited and published by some Russians – and 
Mikhail Lomonosov, V. N. Tatiscev and M. M. Scerbatov are specifically 
mentioned – and, especially, by a group of German scholars associated with the 
St. Petersburg Academy: Gerhardt Friedrich Müller, Gottlieb Siegfried Bayer, and 
Johann Gotthelf Stritter; savants who had not only collected relevant source 
material, but also started to apply the rules of philological criticism in order to 
assess, compare and verify them.327
 
 
However, even once these sources had become available, French scholars were ill-
prepared to use them, simply because of linguistic incompetence: 
 
Mais en vain un Français se promettrait d’écrire l’histoire de Russie, 
en restant à Paris dans son cabinet ... . Il faut aller en Russie, s’y livrer 
pendant plusieurs années à une étude sèche et opiniâtre, apprendre 
non-seulement le russe moderne, mais encore l’ancien dialecte slavon-
russe, dans lequel sont écrites toutes les chroniques ... .328
 
  
One of the prime targets of the injunction against Frenchmen writing the history 
of Russia from their studies was, of course, Voltaire. According to Levesque, the 
few disparaging remarks about Russia’s medieval history in the Essai sur les 
mœurs – all premised on the notion that the country was then in a state of 
complete barbarism and ignorance – simply proved that Voltaire did not know 
anything about Russian medieval history.329 In regard to the Histoire de l’empire 
de Russie, he acknowledged that its author had made a genuine effort to assemble 
good source material. However, being dependent on translations and extracts of 
sources produced at the St. Petersburg Academy, and without any means to verify 
the quality and accuracy of the supplied material, it was almost inevitable that he 
committed a host of factual errors.330
                                                 
326 HDR, vol. 1, pp. vii-xi. 
 
327 Ibid., p. viii. See also HDR-12, vol. 6, pp. 456-74. 
328 HDR, vol. 1, pp. viii-ix. 
329 Ibid., p. 164; vol. 2, pp. 125, 322. See also Levesque, ‘Prospectus de "L'histoire de Russie" de 
Pierre-Charles Lévesque’, p. 356. 
330 HDR-12, vol. 6, pp. 470-1. See also Levesque’s account of Peter’s reign in which Voltaire is 
frequently criticised for factual inaccuracies stemming either from simple errors in translation, or 
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Levesque’s criticism of previous French historiography of Russia is, among other 
things, of course also an instance of the general 18th-century tension between a 
traditional erudite approach to the writing of history and the new attempt to write 
history en philosophe, which we have already encountered in the previous chapter 
on Voltaire. Prima facie, one might be tempted to regard Levesque’s intervention 
as a simple defence of the traditional approach of the érudits, and a straight-
forward attack on the philosophes: his censure of Voltaire’s factual inaccuracies 
and his insistence on the need to establish a sound empirical basis through the 
laborious compilation and collation of ancient manuscripts and documents 
seemingly point in this direction. Levesque’s association with the Académie des 
inscriptions et belles-lettres – the citadel of French erudition331 - after his return 
from Russia may further strengthen such a supposition.332
 
  
And yet, such a portrayal of Levesque’s position would be an over-simplification. 
A first indication that he was far from straight forwardly adopting an erudite 
standpoint can be found in the reception of the Histoire de Russie in France. 
Whilst all reviews of the work were generally positive, the quality of Levesque’s 
erudition and the merit of his project in painstakingly reconstructing Russia’s 
early history from the old chronicles were assessed very differently. 
 
On the one hand, the reviewer of the Correspondance littéraire, remarked: 
 
On comprend aisément que l’histoire ancienne de Russie ne pouvait 
pas être susceptible d’un grand intérêt; ces premiers temps n’offrent 
que des monuments de guerre et de mœurs sauvages; il est même 
                                                                                                                                     
from purposeful falsification of the historical record through his collaborators: for instance, HDR, 
vol. 4, pp. 204-5, 244, 303, 363, 378; vol. 5, p. 158. 
331 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 1, chap. 7. 
332 An association, moreover, which was partly the outcome of another challenge by 
Levesque to the works of a historian who had neglected the duties of erudition in order to 
support a philosophical system, albeit a very different one from Voltaire: the abbé de 
Mably. In both L'éloge historique de M. l'abbé de Mably and La France sous les cinq 
premiers Valois, the two works that led to Levesque’s election to the Academy, Mably is 
taken to task for a cavalier handling of evidence in order to find in history proof that a 
republican political system is the most congenial to man’s happiness. See Levesque, 
‘L'éloge historique de l'abbé de Mably’, esp. pp. 26-8 and 71-81; Levesque, La France sous 
les cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. x-xv. 
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assez pénible de suivre la liaison du petit nombre de faits et 
d’événements dont on est parvenu à retrouver la trace.333
 
  
Such doubt about the worth of Levesque’s undertaking was repeated in L’année 
littéraire. After having praised the endeavour to ‘débrouiller un véritable chaos’334
 
 
– i.e. Russia’s early history – the correspondent proceeded to criticise Levesque’s 
long discussions of some minor points in regard to this history, and finished by 
questioning whether the effort to provide Russia with a detailed pre-Petrine 
history was really worth the effort at all: 
Si les premiers volumes sont dénués d’intérêt, & n’offrent que des 
images révoltantes, nous montrant toujours une arène ensanglantée par 
des bêtes féroces qui s’entredéchirent, n’accusons que le sujet & non 
M. L’Evêque; je crois qu’il eût pu s’appesantir moins sur tout ce qui a 
précédé le règne de Pierre I, & développer davantage tout ce qui suit 
l’Histoire de ce Souverain, si célèbre à tant d’égards.335
 
 
On the other hand, however, the reviewer for Le journal des sçavans, Joseph de 
Guignes, one of France’s foremost erudite orientalists, flatly contradicted the 
notion that Levesque had given too much space to Russia’s distant past or that this 
period is devoid of interest. On the contrary, de Guignes contended that the 
account of Russia’s early rulers ‘n’est pas aussi étendue ni aussi développée que 
nous l’esperions; sans doute parce que M. Levesque n’a pas trouvé plus de 
monumens.’336 Whilst acknowledging that Levesque had assembled a 
considerable amount of relevant sources, de Guignes was convinced that much 
more material could have been employed and censured the author several times 
for an uncritical and naïve approach when interpreting his raw data, and for 
inserting anachronistic reflections into his factual account.337
 
 
It is beyond doubt that de Guignes’ criticism has some validity. Despite the fact 
that Levesque’s command of the old Russian chronicles was unprecedented for a 
                                                 
333 Grimm et al., eds., Correspondance littéraire, vol. 14, p. 75. 
334 Anonymous, ‘Histoire de Russie’, p. 217. This idea that the ancient history of Russia is a chaos, 
which may not be worth disentangling, is of course taken from Voltaire. Indeed, Voltaire had 
justified his passing over the ancient history of Russia in his Histoire de l'empire the Russie with 
the following words: ‘Mon dessein est de faire voir ce que le czar Pierre a crée, plutôt que de 
débrouiller inutilement l'ancien chaos.’ See OC, vol. 46, p. 424. 
335 Anonymous, ‘Histoire de Russie’, p. 325. Emphasis in the original. 
336 Guignes, ‘Histoire de Russie’, p. 824. 
337 Ibid., p. 824-6. 
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French historian, it pales in comparison with the work undertaken by 
contemporary German scholars, and especially with the source criticism of these 
chronicles carried out by Schlözer. Indeed, the latter deplored Levesque’s lack of 
critical approach in the analysis of the chronicles, the failure to assess and 
compare different variants of the same passage in different manuscripts, a rush to 
judgment, and, at one point, alleged that his history was inspired as much by the 
'Muse der DichtKunst' as by his proper sources.338
 
  
But we would miss the main analytical thrust of the Histoire de Russie and arrive 
at a very skewed assessment of the work, if we considered it exclusively as a work 
of erudition. Levesque was not an erudite in the narrow meaning of the term: his 
primary aim was never to establish beyond doubt the authenticity of individual 
documents and facts – there are in actual fact only very few learned dissertations 
about details so deplored by the reviewer of L’Année littéraire in the Histoire de 
Russie - nor is there any sense that he found the study of Russia’s distant past 
inherently fascinating, or even worthwhile. On the contrary, he can sound very 
similar to Voltaire, or indeed his own reviewer in the Correspondance littéraire, 
when reflecting on the first few volumes of his own work: 
 
Enfin l’histoire ancienne de Russie n’excite quelque intérêt que 
lorsqu’un Souverain réunit sous sa domination presque toutes les 
parties de l’Etat, comme sous le règne du premier Vladimir et sous 
celui d’Iaroslaf, son fils; ou quand lui seul attire sur lui toute 
l’attention, comme a fait André … .339
 
 
Clearly, a preoccupation with Russia’s medieval past for its own sake and on its 
own terms in order to carefully reconstruct its former state of being in all its 
individuality by means of erudition had little appeal to Levesque. Instead, as we 
shall see, his goal was very much to write history en philosophe: his primary 
interest was to trace the process of civilisation in Russia, which is merely a 
specific example of the progress of mankind itself. The reconstruction of Russia’s 
distant past with the help of erudition was only a means to get to this higher end: 
we must know what Russia was, in order to understand what it is at present, and 
                                                 
338 Nestor, vol. 3, p. 63. 
339 HDR, vol. 1, p. xiii. 
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what it might become in the future. In this respect there is a close analogy 
between the Histoire de Russie and Voltaire’s Essai sur les mœurs. Whereas the 
latter work enquired into the means that had enabled Europe to emerge from a 
period of barbarism, Levesque attempted to analyse the same process for Russia. 
Accordingly, his arguments with Voltaire were not about how history should be 
studied and written per se, but merely a reminder that Voltaire was never 
equipped to write the history of Russia’s civilisation, simply because he knew 
nothing about what Russia was like prior to the reign of Peter I. 
 
To write the history of Russia’s civilisation required Levesque to engage in the 
debate about the role of Peter I. The structure of the Histoire de Russie suggests 
that the work should be read as a long, detailed and learned contribution to this 
debate. In its final edition of 1812, the work consists of eight volumes, out of 
which two are dedicated to an ethnographic exploration of the various peoples 
converging on the Empire’s territory. Of the remaining six volumes, only the first 
three deal with Russia’s history from the 9th century to the beginning of the 17th 
century. The 17th and 18th century are thus given an equal amount of space to the 
nine preceding ones, and the reign of Peter takes up more than a third of the pages 
devoted to these last two centuries.340
 
  
There are even more direct indications about the centrality of the reign of Peter for 
the work as a whole. It commences with four introductory chapters concerned 
with the language, religion and history of the ancient Slavic tribes prior to the 9th 
century. After these short dissertations and before starting the historical narrative 
with the reign of Rurik in earnest, Levesque included a short interlude in which he 
squarely positioned his work within the debate about Peter’s contribution to the 
civilisation of Russia.341
 
 
After having noted that Russia was hardly known in Europe a generation ago, 
Levesque contended that this general ignorance ceased due to Peter’s reign, but 
that the newly generated interest never led to a more profound appreciation of its 
history: 
                                                 
340 See HDR-12. 
341 HDR, vol. 1, pp. 55-6. 
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Les rares talens d’un grand homme, une qualité plus rare encore, sa 
ferme et constante volonté de faire le bien, ses voyages, ses conquêtes, 
et peut-être encore la singularité frappante et la grandeur sauvage de 
son caractère, ont attiré sur le pays qu’il gouvernait les regards de 
l’Europe. 
 
La Russie, dès-lors, est devenue célèbre; mais son histoire n’en était 
guère mieux connue. 342
 
 
Rather than placing the czar’s reign into a historical narrative, French writers had 
invented the myth that Russia had no history at all prior to Peter taking over the 
reins of government: 
  
On croit assez généralement que Pierre I, en montant sur le trône, ne 
vit autour de lui qu’un désert peuplé de quelques animaux sauvages 
dont il sut faire des hommes. Montesquieu, qui cependant manquait de 
bons mémoires sur la Russie, eut seul le génie de soupçonner que la 
nation était disposée d’avance à seconder les travaux du 
réformateur.343
 
 
This is a comprehensive rejection of all interpretations of pre-Petrine Russia we 
have so far encountered. Despite the significant differences in Voltaire’s, 
Diderot’s and Rousseau’s accounts of the efficacy of Peter’s reforms, all three au 
fonds concurred that the country he had inherited was in a decisively primitive 
state, lacking all the essential civilising mechanisms. The reference to 
Montesquieu as a source for an alternative reading of Peter to the one prevalent in 
France is intriguing, however, simply because Montesquieu had not much to say 
about Russia at all. And yet, if we study Montesquieu’s few references to Russia 
more closely, we can see emerging a conception of the country’s past and present 
that is highly original in a late 18th-century context, and that could provide 
Levesque with important clues for his own project. 
 
In Montesquieu’s early Lettres persanes, Russia is mentioned just twice. Once its 
name is included in a reflection on the Tatars who had subjugated China, 
Muscovy and Turkey.344
                                                 
342 Ibid., p. 55. 
 The second, and longer discussion, revolves around Peter 
343 Ibid., p. 56. 
344 Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes, vol. 1, letter 81, p. 254. 
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I. In this passage, Nargum – Montesquieu’s interlocutor – mentions the country’s 
dreadful climate, and presents Russia as a paradigmatic case of an Oriental 
despotism. However, despite this unlimited despotic power, Nargum also notes 
the trouble the present czar – i.e. Peter – has with modernising his empire by 
relating how his subjects have resisted the imperial command to Europeanise by 
trimming their beards.345
 
 
In his later De l’esprit des lois, Russia only gets marginally more space. But the 
four elements noted above – the Tatar conquest, Russia’s climate, its despotism, 
and Peter’s attempts at modernisation – are now inter-connected much more 
closely than they were in the Lettres persanes. It is exactly this inter-connection 
that must have caught Levesque’s eye, because it allows for a genuine historical 
account of Peter’s reign. 
 
The crucial discussion of Russia in the De l’esprit des lois is undertaken in the 
fourteenth chapter of book nineteen which is concerned with the best means 
available to a sovereign to change the mores and manners of his nation.346
 
 The 
maxim Montesquieu tried to defend in this chapter is that manners and mores – 
being institutions of the nation as a whole rather than the work of the legislator – 
should never be changed by laws since this would be a tyrannical infringement on 
the nation by the legislator, but only through the provision of alternative 
examples. Peter’s attempt to outlaw the wearing of beards in Russia is given as a 
prime example of such a tyrannical way of proceeding. 
Apart from defending a political maxim, Montesquieu also attempted to solve a 
wider problem that Russia causes in his system. As outlined above, in the Lettres 
persanes Montesquieu conceived Russia as having a ‘dreadful’ climate – and it is 
safe to assume that he thereby meant a very cold climate – and as being governed 
despotically. According to the taxonomy of political regimes developed in the De 
l’esprit des lois, this combination is problematic. The principle underlying 
despotic regimes – fear – is associated with hot climates, and geographically 
located in the East - the Oriental empires of China, Persia, India and Turkey - 
                                                 
345 Ibid., letter 51, pp. 204-6. 
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whilst Europe is portrayed as having cold and moderate climates which give rise 
to republican or monarchical regimes regulated by the principles of virtue and 
honour, respectively. 347
 
 
Russia is, in other words, a deeply paradoxical case for Montesquieu: its climate 
is European but its regime is Asiatic. Peter’s reign simply adds another layer of 
contradictions: he attempted to Europeanise his country but did this in an Asiatic 
manner (and the attempt to change his subjects’ liking for beards by legislative 
fiat is, of course, only a striking instance of this wider project). However, 
Montesquieu was not content with just leaving the argument at this paradoxical 
impasse, which would have subverted the stability of his system as a whole, but 
tried to give an explanation resolving all contradictions. It is here that the Tatars 
and their conquest of Muscovy enter the picture once again. 
 
Whilst Montesquieu had noted the resistance in Russia to Peter’s reform in the 
Lettres persanes, he now contended that the czar’s project had been successful. 
And yet, this success is not explainable by the choice of methods of reform on 
Peter’s part, but by the fact that the czar had inadvertently resolved Russia’s 
paradox that had itself been caused by the Tatar invasion: 
 
La facilité et la promptitude avec laquelle cette nation s’est policée, a 
bien montré que ce prince avoit trop mauvaise opinion d’elle, et que 
ces peuples n’étoient pas des bêtes, comme il le disoit. Les moyens 
violents qu’il employa étoient inutiles; il seroit arrivé tout de même à 
son but par la douceur. 
... 
Ce qui rendit le changement plus aisé, c’est que les mœurs d’alors 
étoient étrangères au climat, et y avoient été apportées par le mélange 
des nations et par les conquêtes. Pierre Ier, donnant les mœurs et les 
manières de l’Europe à une nation d’Europe, trouva des facilités qu’il 
n’attendoit pas lui-même. L’empire du climat est le premier de tous 
les empires.348
 
 
We can easily see that it was this passage that Levesque had in mind when he 
wrote that of all the commentators of Peter’s reign it was only Montesquieu who 
had appreciated that ‘la nation était disposée d’avance à seconder les travaux du 
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réformateur’, and that a historical explanation was needed to explain the 
seemingly rapid progress Russia experienced during his reign. To put it 
differently, Montesquieu provided Levesque with the important idea that pre-
Petrine history matters a great deal if we are to make sense of the country at all. 
However, whilst taking this important clue from the De l’esprit des lois, he was 
far from adopting the other elements that enabled Montesquieu to resolve the 
paradox presented by Russia. Levesque had very little time for climatic 
determinism and never believed that moderate governance, or indeed civilisation, 
is dependent on geography. Neither was he as sanguine as the author of the De 
l’esprit des lois that Peter had, paradoxically, managed to destroy despotism by 
despotic means. Furthermore, unlike Montesquieu, who had lacked detailed 
sources about Russia and whose pre-Petrine history was restricted to the vague, 
but crucial, invocation of the Tatar conquest, Levesque, who had spent his time in 
St. Petersburg reading the Russian chronicles, proceeded to provide his readers 
with a detailed and complex account of this history. 
 
In fact, rather than adopting Montesquieu’s scheme of history according to which 
a European nation’s mores were subverted through the Tatar conquest and then 
rapidly restored by Peter, Levesque proposed a historical account of slow, 
gradual, but intermittently interrupted development. This account traces the 
intricate history of a nation that was travelling in the direction of civilisation since 
its very beginning, but whose journey never followed a straight, linear path: 
 
On [i.e. previous French writers on Russia] ignorait qu’il fut un temps 
où cette contrée, par l’étendue de sa domination, par son commerce, 
par ses richesses, était supérieure à la plupart des Etats de l’Europe 
dans le même temps; que l’imprudence de ses Souverains affaiblit 
cette puissance en la partageant; que, minée par leurs interminables 
querelles, et presque abattue par les généraux de Tchinguis-Khan, elle 
offrit à ses successeurs une conquête facile; qu’après deux siècles 
d’esclavage, délivrée enfin de ce joug, elle le fit, à son tour, porter à 
ses vainqueurs; … et qu’enfin rétablie, elle vit préparer sa splendeur 
par l’aïeul, le père et le frère du héros [i.e. Peter I] auquel on attribue 
toute sa gloire.349
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In order to fully understand Levesque’s conception of Russian history, we have to 
follow him along the path proposed above; a path which can be divided into three 
parts. The first part is concerned with the history of Russia from its very 
beginning until the Tatar conquest in the 13th century and is marked by the relative 
flowering of society, economy and culture on the one hand, but also by systemic 
political instability, on the other. It is this instability which causes the sudden end 
of this period through the Tatar invasion, resulting in Russia becoming dependent 
on the Golden Horde in 1238. The second part is marked by stagnation and misery 
and only comes to an end through the defeat of the Tatars in the late 15th and early 
16th century, leading to the restoration of full Russian independence: an event 
marking the beginning of the third period which leads all the way to the reign of 
Peter I and beyond. We shall see that in Levesque’s account this is again a highly 
ambivalent period, characterised by benign reforms and progress, but also by 
political mistakes, strife and despotism.  
 
Surveying this history, we need to enquire into the causes and criteria Levesque 
presented to account for progress, stagnation and decline, and we need to be alert 
to the frequent comparison the author makes to contemporaneous processes in 
Europe. Moreover, interweaving our reading of the Histoire de Russie with an 
analysis of Levesque’s writings on the historical process in general, will enable us 
to assess how the relationship between Russian and European history is 
conceived, and the extent to which Levesque managed to normalise the history of 
Russia. 
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The history of medieval Russia: Emulative communication, feudal 
fragmentation and a barbarian invasion 
 
Levesque’s narrative of Russian history starts with Rurik taking over the 
sovereignty of Novgorod in 862, but already the circumstances of Rurik’s 
ascendancy indicate that there exists a rich history prior to this event. Following 
Nestor, Levesque contended that Novgorod and Kiev – the two principal loci of 
Russia’s early history – were both founded as early as the 5th century by people 
speaking a Slavonic language. Acknowledging that we can know only very little 
about the histories of these towns prior to the 9th century, he still found enough 
evidence to suggest that Novgorod had by then already become powerful and rich, 
holding other towns tributary and engaging in considerable commerce with the 
peoples living along the Baltic coast and, possibly, even with Constantinople.350
 
 
Politically, this flourishing city was a free republic; a constitution favourable to its 
commercial and enterprising spirit but inherently unstable and liable to default 
into anarchy. 
It was internal dissensions and the concomitant threat of foreign domination that 
led the citizens of Novgorod to send a delegation to the Varangian Rus’ across the 
Baltic Sea to plea for a force capable of offering protection against their enemies. 
The Varangian Rurik responded to the call and came to Novgorod in 862 with a 
considerable army. Even though initially only called as a general and charged 
with defending and extending the republic’s frontiers, Rurik soon usurped 
sovereign power. Thereby, he initiated a throne remaining in his family until the 
16th century, and, by giving the name of his people – Rus’ – to the Slavic lands he 
was about to govern, effectively stands at the beginning of Russian history.351
 
 
The survey of the pre-history of Russia up to the reign of Rurik in Novgorod 
already contains all the themes that will guide Levesque all the way to the Tatar 
conquest in the 13th century: the political question about the location of sovereign 
authority in the state and the potential for disastrous turmoil this question entails; 
                                                 
350 Ibid., pp. 44-6, 56-60. See also Pierre Charles Levesque, ‘Mémoire sur la Pravda Russkaja 
publié par André Mazon et Michel Laran’, Revue des Etudes Slaves 41, no. 1-4 (1962), p. 31. 
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the gradual expansion of Russia’s borders and its commerce; and the existence of 
ancient relations between Russia and its neighbours and the considerable potential 
such relations possess to act as engines for material and cultural progress. 
 
The expansion of Russia’s territory by means of conquest already commenced 
with Rurik, but got underway in earnest under his immediate successors. Oleg, 
acting as regent to Rurik’s filial successor, was the first in a long succession of 
early Russian rulers engaged in aggressive wars that led to the gradual acquisition 
of many towns and lands: especially of Kiev and large parts of the Ukraine in the 
South, Belarus in the West and towards the Black Sea in the South.352 Even 
though Levesque rejected the notion that military prowess was a quality a 
historian should judge commendable,353 he nevertheless admitted that warfare and 
conquest have considerable potential to lead to progress. In fact, the conquest of 
new lands went hand-in-hand in Russia’s early history with the construction of 
new towns, increases in population, the colonisation and fertilisation of formerly 
uncultivated land; activities that rendered the state richer and stronger.354
 
 
Levesque’s discussion of early Russian conquests also reveals a second and much 
more important method by which warfare can contribute to development. This 
method operates if a relatively undeveloped, barbarian people engages in armed 
conflict with a much more civilised opponent. In the context of Russia’s early 
history it was exemplified by the various Russian raids on Constantinople – the 
last remnant of the great Roman civilisation. Although initially only undertaken as 
a form of barbarian brigandage with the aim of bringing rich spoils back home, 
simple plunder and warfare was soon supplemented, if not completely replaced, 
by reciprocal and peaceful means of communication.355
 
  
Levesque illustrated the process of this transition most succinctly in the course of 
his discussion of the reign of Vladimir I, who converted Russia to Greek 
Christianity in 988. Dissatisfied with the primitive cult so far followed by his 
people, he sent delegations to the Bulgares (Islam), Germany (Latin Christianity) 
                                                 
352 See, for instance, ibid., pp. 67-73, 102-5, 116-21, 155-7, 294-8.  
353 Ibid., pp. 113-4. 
354 Ibid., pp. 134-5, 288-90, 298. 
355 Ibid., pp. 72-9, 83-9. 
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and Constantinople (Greek Christianity) to learn about the different religions 
followed by his neighbours.356 Having been impressed by the pomp of the Greek 
ritual, he decided to convert his country to the religion of Constantinople. 
However, still a barbarian he did this in a barbarian way: too fierce to ask the 
Greek emperor for any favours, he attacked Constantinople in order to extort the 
priests, books and religious images needed to effect the conversion.357 If the 
methods employed to plant Christianity in Russia were in Levesque’s eyes 
barbarian, Vladimir’s reign constitutes nevertheless the starting point of a fruitful 
and non-violent process of diffusion of civilised Byzantine culture in Russia. 
Already Vladimir himself followed up the barbarian conversion by much softer 
means of civilisation by inviting Greek architects, artisans and teachers into his 
own country in order to embellish towns, palaces and churches, and to start the 
process of enlightenment by planting the seeds of Greek learning in his country.358 
This project was emulated by his successors, and especially by Yaroslav I whose 
educational establishments, efforts to translate Greek books into Russian, and 
promotion of the fine arts through the importation of Greek painters find 
Levesque’s unqualified approval. 359
 
 
This switch from the zero-sum game of warfare and plunder to a state of mutually 
beneficial reciprocity generated through treaties and the continuous exchange of 
products and ideas is central to Levesque’s conception of history. It is not only 
responsible for moving forward medieval Russian history, but constitutes the 
principal agent of progress in any history; an argument made explicit in his two 
theoretical works on the historical process: L’homme moral and L’homme 
pensant.360 Both works are principally concerned with providing a conjectural 
explanation for human beings’ passage from a state of pure nature, or savagery, to 
one of civilisation, and engage closely, if only implicitly, with the account 
Rousseau provided of this transition in his Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens 
de l’inégalité.361
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Indeed, Levesque’s conception of the initial savage state is identical to 
Rousseau’s. Just as Rousseau had done, he described primordial human beings as 
living in complete isolation and in habitual inactivity unless pressed by hunger or, 
periodically, by an impetuous desire to procreate. If not activated by such needs of 
primary necessity, savage man has no interests, desires or appetites and peacefully 
languishes in a state in which neither language, ideas nor industry exist.362 
Levesque further concurred with Rousseau that man’s savage existence may have 
lasted for a very long time and came only to an end through fortuitous accidents – 
some natural catastrophe which enclosed a sufficient number of savages in a small 
space thereby rendering social contact more probable. Without such a natural 
revolution, Levesque argued, human beings would never have developed: 
propagating only very slowly and with no need or desire for interaction, human 
beings could have lived in brutish isolation forever.363
 
 
Levesque’s account of the transformations human beings undergo once they begin 
to socialise, was again taken from Rousseau: pressed closer together and with 
subsistence becoming sparse, primordial man’s complete independence is 
replaced by a need to co-operate and communicate. The invention of a language is 
the first result of this need, which itself produces a psychological revolution with 
dramatic consequences: being able to communicate with his fellow human beings, 
primordial man’s amour de soi, which is exclusively directed towards the self and 
its preservation, is supplemented by a feeling of amour-propre, directing man’s 
concerns towards the outside world and the goal of attaining social recognition.364
                                                 
362 HM, pp. 5-15; HP, pp. 6-12. Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, esp. pp. 134-44.  
 
Whilst Levesque continued to follow Rousseau’s account of the principal stages 
of development after the birth of the feeling of amour de soi, he arrived at a very 
different assessment: whilst Rousseau went on to show how an increasingly over-
blown sense of amour-propre unleashes in social man a will to dominate over 
others, leading to a history of increasing corruption and dehumanisation, 
Levesque joined Voltaire and Diderot and sought to demonstrate how the 
363 HM, pp. 15-16, 22-4. Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, esp. p. 162.  
364 HM, pp. 17-19, 202-22; HP, pp. 20-9, 146-7. Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, esp. pp. 146-
51 (development of language), 173-7 (development of amour-propre).  
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ambitions generated through amour-propre stand at the basis of all human 
progress. 
 
Most importantly, social man increases his needs, thereby developing new desires. 
Given that savage man only knows the needs of first necessity - subsistence and 
procreation – his desires are strictly limited. Social man, on the contrary, 
surrounded by his fellows and in communication with them, increases his 
potential needs dramatically. Driven by his amour-propre, all the possessions of 
his neighbours become targets of his own desires and thereby objects of 
emulation. Therefore, once an increase in population and related scarcity have 
driven one man to invent a new means of subsistence – and Levesque thought that 
savage hunter-gathering was first supplemented by husbandry and later 
agriculture - this invention is rapidly imitated by his fellow human.365 Pastoralism 
and agriculture, in turn, herald the beginning of personal property, which provides 
another imperious spur to human ambitions, activity and emulation: to the desire 
to satisfy the needs of first necessity is added an ambition to satisfy a potentially 
unlimited number of artificial ones. In order to be able to procure superficialities, 
man needs to accumulate riches, which, once accomplished, allows for the 
division of labour, and from thence luxury, the fine arts and the sciences are 
born.366 The institution of a system of commerce is the last step in this process, 
and the one most responsible for the acceleration of historical progress. As we can 
never desire what we do not know, indigenous development within one single 
community will always be very slow, and, unless some accident suddenly 
produces new needs, will sooner or later grind to a halt. Commerce, by enabling 
the communication of needs, desires and industry across communities provides 
the mechanism by which this limitation can be overcome and, as such, constitutes, 
the most important engine for historical progress.367
 
 
According to Levesque, the Russia of Vladimir I had long left a savage state, 
without having become fully civilised yet. Indeed, parallel to the process by which 
human beings become richer and more industrious runs a gradual cultural 
                                                 
365 HP, pp. 105-11. See also Levesque, ‘Considérations sur l'homme’, pp. 220-4. 
366 HM, pp. 24-6, 192-8; HP, pp. 59-62. 
367 HP, pp. 146-8. Levesque, ‘Considérations sur l'homme’, p. 243-4. 
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transformation by which they become softer and less warlike. It is not Vladimir 
I’s selfish desire to get the religion and riches of Constantinople which make him 
a barbarian in Levesque’s estimation, but the means he employed to achieve it. 
The means chosen by Vladimir – force - is the response of primitive man to 
unfulfilled desires; establishing ties of reciprocity, which satisfy the self-interest 
of both parties, is that of the fully civilised one. It is of course the question of 
whether this kind of selfish reciprocity works without leading to inhuman 
domination that fundamentally separates Levesque from Rousseau. Unlike the 
latter, but similar to Voltaire and, to an extent, Diderot, Levesque answered the 
question in the affirmative. Increased communication and social interaction will 
ultimately not only polish people, but also, so he hoped, increase their 
appreciation of the fact that their own well-being is irrevocably related to the one 
of their neighbours.368
 
 Vladimir I exemplifies the process by which pure self-
interest is at least partly transformed into enlightened self interest: as seen, 
Vladimir I supplemented his initial, barbarian desire for stealing the riches and 
pomp of civilised Constantinople with an enlightened interest to start a regular 
commerce and to build up Russian industry by emulating the Greeks, thereby 
creating the conditions that could potentially enable the perpetual enjoyment of 
such riches. 
Levesque suggested that the principal mechanism driving early medieval Russian 
history was that which Voltaire had identified as defining Europe since the 
Renaissance: emulative communication. Because of its proximity to Byzantium, 
Russia experienced an activation of this mechanism almost four centuries earlier 
than Europe, and, as a consequence, quickly started to outpace the continent in 
terms of economic, social and cultural development. Indeed, the Histoire de 
Russie is shot through with comparisons between the respective states of Russia 
and European nations during the early medieval period that are consistently in the 
former’s favour. For instance, a description of the pompous reception an embassy 
of the German emperor Henri IV received at the court of Sviatoslav II in Kiev in 
the 11th century, is commented on by Levesque in the following manner: 
 
                                                 
368 HM, pp. 16, 26-33; HP, pp. 79-84, 95-7. 
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Une telle magnificence répandit l’étonnement dans la cour peu 
fortunée de Henri IV. Les princes russes devaient étaler un luxe 
inconnu à l’Allemagne, parce que depuis long-temps ils entretenaient 
du commerce avec les Grecs, parce qu’ils leur avaient fait la guerre, 
parce qu’ils leur avaient vendu des secours ... .369
 
 
One objective of such comparisons was, of course, to counter the widespread 
perception that medieval Russia was in a state of utter barbarism, and that its 
history was not worth writing or studying. Whilst such a perception undoubtedly 
predates Voltaire,370 Levesque’s target was very specifically the Essai sur les 
mœurs. The first significant mention that Russia received in this work is when 
Henri I of France married the daughter of the Russian ruler Yaroslav. Voltaire 
judged this event as remarkable, but almost impossible to explain, because he 
believed that barbarian Russia had at that time no relations whatsoever with 
Europe. However, rather than attempting to arrive at an explanation by 
questioning his own preconception about Russia’s barbarian isolation, Voltaire 
just dismissed the whole story with a pithy remark: ‘Quoi qu’il en soit, Anne, fille 
d’un Jaraslau, duc inconnu d’une Russie alors ignorée, fut reine de France.’371
 
 
For Levesque, there is nothing remarkable nor inexplicable about the marriage. In 
an explicit rebuke to Voltaire, he recalled the relative military strength and riches 
of Russia during Yaroslav’s reign and proceeded to show that the country was far 
from isolated, but had by then already established blood relations with the courts 
in Constantinople, Poland, Germany, Norway and Hungary, and was integrated 
into diplomatic ties spreading from Constantinople to England.372
 
 It was not 
Russia, in other words, that was ignored then, but Voltaire who was ignorant 
about what Russia was like in the 12th century. 
Moreover, the relatively civilised state of medieval Russia is not only 
demonstrated by its commerce and conduct of foreign politics, but also reflected 
in its laws. Levesque found some evidence about the existence of a body of 
                                                 
369 HDR, vol. 1, p. 182. 
370 See, for instance, Mervaud and Roberti, Une infinie brutalité, pp. 124-5. Roberti contends that 
in 17th century French literature, Russia was typically perceived as having existed in a static, pre-
historic state at least until the reign of Ivan IV in the 15th century.  
371 ESM, vol. 1, p. 450. 
372 HDR, vol. 1, pp. 163-4. 
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Russian law as early as the peace treaty signed with Constantinople in 912,373 but 
his crucial discussion of medieval law occurred in the context of the reign of 
Yaroslav I, who published a new code of law – the Russkaja Pravda - in 1017, 
which was subsequently revised and extended by his grandson Vladimir II 
Monomakh.374
 
 
The first thing that struck Levesque when reflecting on the Russkaja Pravda was 
that the society receiving the code must have already travelled a long way along 
the historical road to civilisation.375
 
 Laws only become necessary once social 
interactions have reached a certain complexity, and the content of the Russkaja 
Pravda proves, Levesque argued, that 11th century Russia was already close to the 
last societal state: the one of commerce. By constantly drawing comparisons 
between Yaroslav’s legislation and the law of the Franks, Levesque further 
illustrated medieval Europe’s underdevelopment when compared to Russia. 
The sophisticated commercial nature of Russia is first of all evident in Yaroslav’s 
criminal code. As murder was punished either by means of vengeance by the 
injured family or by a pecuniary fine, Levesque could employ the diverging fines 
stipulated for the murder of members of different classes to arrive at an outline of 
early medieval Russia’s social stratification. Merchants and foreigners comprised 
the second class right after the high nobility, which provided commerce with a 
legal protection it did not enjoy in the context of Salic law: 
 
Ce qui distingue la loi d’Iaroslaf de celle des Francs, c’est la faveur 
que la premiere accorde au commerce, et encore, pour l’utilité du 
commerce, aux étrangers. Immédiatement après la premier classe, 
venaient les officiers du prince et des boiars, les marchands et 
les étrangers. .... Les Francs, uniquement guerriers, ne connaissaient 
pas ou méprisaient le commerce, et c’était sur le commerce qu’était 
fondée la fortune de Novgorod. Les habitans offraient un appas 
aux étrangers pour les attirer dans leur ville, parce que ceux-ci 
                                                 
373 Ibid., pp. 77-8. 
374 Ibid., pp. 167-70. In the Histoire de Russie itself the discussion of Yaroslav’s legislation 
remains somewhat short and general, probably because Levesque was only familiar with it to the 
extent that it is mentioned in the Russian chronicles. However, after he had been made aware of an 
edition of the whole code first published in St. Petersburg in 1772, he undertook a much more 
detailed exposition in a paper read at the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres in 1804. See 
Levesque, ‘Mémoire sur la Pravda Russkaja’. 
375 Levesque, ‘Mémoire sur la Pravda Russkaja’, pp. 31-2. 
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apportaient avec eux leurs capitaux, leurs correspondances et leur 
industries.376
 
 
Moreover, the relatively high social standing of artisans, the preference given to 
the testimony of foreign witnesses at courts of law, and the special protection 
afforded to foreigners lending money to natives, all provide further evidence that 
Russia was then an increasingly urban society keen to promote commerce and 
industry, and always prepared to absorb, and profit from, external influences.377
  
  
Despite the commendable legislation introduced for the promotion of industry and 
commerce, Levesque deplored the low esteem in which agriculture and especially 
the Russian peasants were held.378 In fact, the Russian situation appears to 
precisely mirror the one of feudal France:379 with agricultural work held in 
general contempt, and with many peasants kept in serfdom, the Russian 
countryside remained in a state of oppression and poverty. However, even in 
regard to the social and legal standing of the serfs, Levesque found some 
alleviating features in the Russian context: unlike their French counterparts, 
Russian serfs remained under the protection of the law. He argued that up until the 
17th century, they were at least de jure not attached to the glebe, and that all 
servile labour in medieval Russia was contractual and restricted to a stipulated 
amount of time after which contracted persons recovered their full liberty.380
 
  
With commerce and industry protected and encouraged legally, culturally and 
socially and a regular communication with civilised Constantinople in place, 11th-
century Russia as perceived by Levesque is significantly advanced in comparison 
with the state of Europe at the same time as presented in Voltaire’s Essai sur les 
mœurs. And yet, in one respect the two accounts coincide: just as Voltaire had 
done in the European context, Levesque outlined in great detail how a succession 
of early Russian rulers fatally undermined their own authority through the 
                                                 
376 Ibid., p. 35. 
377 Ibid., pp. 41-2, 51-2. 
378 Ibid., p. 57. 
379 For Levesque’s assessment of French serfdom, see especially Levesque, La France sous les 
cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. 42-57. 
380 Levesque, ‘Mémoire sur la Pravda Russkaja’, pp. 53-5. See also HDR, vol. 3, pp. 192-4. The 
only exceptions to contractual serfdom relate to captives made in war and to slaves bought from 
foreigners. In these cases, Levesque admitted, full, unmitigated, slavery ensued. 
 139  
 
 
 
granting of fiefs, and how they thereby weakened Russia to such an extent that its 
emerging civilisation tumbled as soon as it faced its first major military challenge: 
the Mongol and Tatar incursions occurring from the early 13th century onwards. 
 
According to Levesque’s account, the roots of Russian feudalism reach back to 
the very beginning of the state. After Rurik had taken over the sovereignty of 
Novgorod and extended its territory, he was in need of support to secure his new 
dominions against internal opposition and external threats. The solution he found 
to this problem is the same that the Frankish barbarians employed to manage and 
fortify their conquest of Europe:381 the parcelling up of the conquered territory 
into fiefs and the distribution of these fiefs among the warrior nobility in 
exchange for military services.382
 
 
Rurik thereby set an example which was followed by all of his early successors, 
albeit with one important alteration. According to Levesque, there never 
developed a feudal warrior nobility in Russia, as the heirs of Rurik’s throne 
divided their dominion among their own princely offspring as appanages in return 
for military services and homage. Through the further subdivision of the 
distributed land among the various male heirs to appanaged princes, Russia soon 
became divided into a host of little quasi-sovereign entities, each headed by a 
prince from the house of Rurik, leading to a situation where grand prince of Kiev 
– the formal suzerain over all appanaged territory – soon only held very tenuous 
authority over the lands outside his own personal demesne.383
 
 
Levesque focused his discussion of Russian feudalism almost exclusively on its 
military and political implications. We have seen that for Voltaire feudalism also 
stood at the root of a host of essentially legal, social and economic ills – most 
prominently all the problems associated with serfdom and lordly justice – and 
                                                 
381 Levesque described the establishment of Frankish feudalism in a lot of detail in Levesque, La 
France sous les cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. 35-74. On the same subject, see also HP, p. 316. 
For Levesque’s understanding of the source of feudal governance, which he found among the 
barbarians of the Central-Asian steppe, see HDR, vol. 7, pp. 112-13. 
382 HDR, vol. 1, pp. 63-4. 
383 Ibid., pp. 107-8, 136, 171. 
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Levesque himself agreed with this analysis in the French context.384 However, as 
has already been indicated above, Levesque did not think that Russian feudalism 
ever resulted in full-blown serfdom, nor did he find any evidence of systematic 
usurpation of judicial functions by the appanaged princes. Whilst no explicit 
reason for such a difference is given in the Histoire de Russie, it might well be 
that Levesque thought that Russia – whose roots, we remember, must be found in 
commercial and republican Novgorod – had too strong a tradition of municipal 
self-governance385
 
 and of commercial and contractual reciprocity for such 
perversions to succeed. 
And yet, in the final analysis, feudalism was more fatal in Russia than it ever was 
in France. It was fatal because it weakened the Russian state militarily and 
politically at a time when the geopolitical situation demanded strong and vigorous 
state action. In Levesque’s account, feudalism’s propensity to undermine the state 
is in a sense paradoxical and is framed in the language of interest. On the one 
hand, feudalism was instituted as a means to secure the state by getting the 
principal members interested in its survival by granting them large, dependent 
fiefs as military benefits.386 And yet, feudalism generated forces turning a vassal’s 
interest away from the promotion of the good of the whole to the protection of his 
own particular fief. The more the land becomes parcelled out into small semi-
independent fiefs, the smaller the authority and power of the principal suzerain, 
and therefore, the bigger the temptation for a vassal to attempt to increase the size, 
power and standing of his own domain even if this should happen at the expense 
of the strength of the whole.387
                                                 
384 Levesque, La France sous les cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. 90-115; Levesque, ‘L'éloge 
historique de l'abbé de Mably’, p. 37. 
 This is exactly what Levesque saw happening in 
early medieval Russia: rather than helping to protect Russia’s borders against 
external threats, the appanaged princes soon started an endless series of petty wars 
among themselves as well as against the grand prince of Kiev, in attempts to 
extend their respective spheres of influence. Even worse, they invited Russia’s 
neighbours to take part in their internal quarrels as allies, thereby providing 
385 On Russia’s system of municipal government, see especially, HDR, vol. 3, p. 185-6.  
386 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 63-4. See also Levesque, La France sous les cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. 
40-1, 68. 
387 HDR, vol. 1, pp. 174-7. See also Levesque, La France sous les cinq premiers Valois, vol. 1, pp. 
64-6, 71-4.  
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ultimate proof that the interest for which feudalism was instituted – to secure 
Russia militarily against external threats – had become perverted.388
 
 
Apart from outlining how Russia was gradually getting richer and more civilised 
during the early medieval period, Levesque thus also offered a parallel narrative 
showing how the constant wars between the appanaged princes gradually 
destroyed the very basis which enabled progress in the first place. Indeed, if 
civilisation is dependent on interaction and communication leading to a reciprocal 
arrangement of interests, feudalism inevitably leads to fragmentation and to the 
clash of interests. Ultimately, Levesque argued, the centrifugal forces generated 
by feudalism were stronger than the unifying ones and ruined the state.  
 
The moment of fatal crisis for the Russian state came in 1237 when a part of the 
enormous Mongol-Tatar army assembled by Genghis-Khan – the Golden Horde 
commanded by Bati - invaded Southern Russia. Levesque was in no doubt that 
had Russia been united under one strong sovereign, it could have stemmed back 
the barbarian incursions. However, divided into multiple parts all following their 
own interests, Russia became easy prey for the invaders, who, after a succession 
of devastating incursions erected their capital in Sarai on Russia’s southern 
frontier. From here the Golden Horde was able to keep Russia in submission for 
the next two and a half centuries.389
 
 
The period of Tatar domination was described by Levesque as one of Russian 
depression. Whilst the Golden Horde never formally conquered Russia nor settled 
widely in its territory, it effectively put the country under a form of vassalage 
requiring its princes to pay homage and tributes to the reigning khan at Sarai. 
Crucially, the Tatars further contributed to Russia’s fragmentation. Securing 
Russian dependence through a politics of divide and rule, the khans were 
successful in keeping the flames of discord between the princes burning, thereby 
preventing Russia from ever assembling the required strength to shake off its 
yoke.390
                                                 
388 HDR, vol. 1, pp. 214-15, 228-32. 
 The loss of independence, and the concomitant state of military and 
389 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 88-110. 
390 Ibid., pp. 105, 112, 159.  
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political weakness, also put a sudden halt on the civilising mechanisms that had 
hitherto been in operation in Russia. Cut off from any communication with the 
disintegrating Byzantine Empire in the South by the Golden Horde, and 
increasingly losing its Western territories to Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the 
Teutonic Knights – a crumbling process most graphically illustrated by the loss of 
Russia’s old capital Kiev to Lithuania in 1320 - Russia was left isolated from any 
civilising outside influences. 391
 
  
The way Levesque conceived the Tatar subjection of Russia was highly original 
as it did not match any established conceptions of what happens when a barbarian 
people subjugates a more civilised one. Enlightenment thought offered two main 
models to explain the historical effects of barbarian invasions, both of which were 
employed in Voltaire’s Essai sur les mœurs. The first model is based on the 
experience of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. It recounts how a declining 
civilisation is overrun and completely destroyed by a barbarian influx and outlines 
how the barbarians themselves subsequently become civilised. The second model 
is based on the Chinese experience and the frequent invasions and subjugations of 
the Empire by nomadic tribes of the Central Asian steppe. In the Chinese context, 
Voltaire believed, the ancient civilisation was never destroyed, but the invading 
barbarians were themselves quickly civilised by becoming Sinicised.392
 
 The first 
model attempts to explain the historical dynamics of rapid cultural destruction 
followed by slow development; the second accounts for perceived Chinese 
historical stasis in which an unchanging civilisation is constantly reconstructed in 
its original form even after the shock of a barbarian conquest.  
Whilst Levesque adopted both models himself to explain aspects of European and 
Chinese history,393
                                                 
391 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 165-6; vol. 3, pp. 161-2. 
 he did not consider either appropriate to explain the Tatar 
conquest of Russia: in his account, the emerging Russian civilisation was neither 
destroyed by the barbarians nor did the barbarians themselves become civilised. 
Likewise, the conquest did not herald a new period of historical dynamism nor 
392 On Voltaire’s perception of the interaction between Chinese and Tatar history, see ESM, vol. 2, 
pp. 394-6, 785-91. On the same question in 18th-century thought more generally, see Pocock, 
Barbarism and Religion, vol. 4, esp. pp. 100-1.  
393 See esp., HP, pp. 314-15. 
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prolong eternal stasis: according to Levesque, Russia had already been historically 
dynamic before the conquest and stasis only persisted as long as the subjugation 
lasted. In his eyes, therefore, the Tatar conquest of Russia points to a third 
possible model: one in which a civilising country’s development is temporarily 
put on hold through a barbarian incursion, and taken up again as soon as this 
external impediment to progress has been removed. 
 
Such an account of the conquest also constitutes a break with Montesquieu’s view 
of Russian history, which, as we have seen, Levesque found at least partly 
appealing. The fundamental disagreement lay with Montesquieu’s contention that 
Russia had taken on the manners and mores of its conquerors during the time of 
the subjugation; a claim which of course strongly implied that Russia had become 
Orientalised, which in turn meant for Montesquieu that it had taken on some of 
the cultural characteristics of despotism. According to Levesque, however, not 
much happened at all during the time of Russia’s subjugation. He of course 
admitted that there was some cultural exchange between the Tatar masters and 
their Russian subjects, and that the latter did take on some habits and customs of 
the former.394
 
 But he generally described such cultural transformations as being 
limited, accidental, and, fundamentally, unimportant. The time of the subjugation 
really was one of temporary historical stasis: of course there were internal 
dissension, petty wars and the loss of territory to neighbours – events described in 
much detail in the Histoire de Russie – but culturally, economically and socially 
Russia just stagnated. 
The idea that the Tatar conquest brought about a period of temporarily arrested 
development allowed Levesque to account for Russia’s relative underdevelopment 
when compared to Europe from the 14th century onwards. In fact, the period of 
Russian stagnation was almost exactly synchronous with the time when European 
progress was accelerated significantly. Levesque regarded the crusades as the 
crucial, if paradoxical, turning point in European history; an event marking the 
end of the period of unmitigated barbarism and the beginning of the gradual 
civilisation of the continent. Following arguments we have already found in 
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Voltaire, Levesque contended that the crusades led to the crumbling of European 
feudalism as many crusading nobles had to sell their domains back to their kings. 
This process coincided with the establishment of free towns and, importantly, 
increased communication and commerce with civilised Constantinople and with 
the Arabs in Spain and in the holy land.395
 
 Subjugated Russia, however, did not 
share any of those developments. As seen, feudal fragmentation increased during 
the Tatar period, and the country’s only open channel of communication was with 
its barbarian masters in the South, and with underdeveloped Lithuania and Poland 
to the West.  
At the same time, this conception of the conquest also enabled Levesque to 
establish a historical framework allowing him to normatively judge post-Tatar 
Russian history. Most importantly, it implied that Russian despotism was a truly 
modern phenomenon, taking root at the time when the country emerged from the 
yoke, rather than having been introduced by the conquerors themselves or having 
been established in Russia’s pre-Tatar past. Moreover, given that all the building 
blocks for civilisation were already in place before the conquest, and given that 
the conquest only temporally interrupted the flowering of Russian civilisation 
rather than having substantially subverted it, Levesque was in a position to 
condemn all manifestations of modern despotism as unnecessary for Russia’s 
development. Indeed, we will encounter in Levesque’s account of post-Tatar 
Russian history a narrative of reform and civilisation which has no need for 
enlightened despots such as Peter I and Catherine II, thereby constituting a more 
consistent attack on the politics of despotism than we have encountered in either 
Diderot’s or even Montesquieu’s writings on Russia. 
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The history of modern Russia: The despotic and the moderate 
road to civilisation 
 
This history of the renaissance of Russian progress commences with a role-
reversal between the Russians and the Tatars. Whilst the conquest had been made 
possible through Tatar unification vis-à-vis Russian fragmentation, the end of the 
yoke was prepared by an ever-increasing disunity within the Golden Horde. 
Dissensions among the Tatars about the question of succession started as early as 
the mid-13th century, reached a climax a century later when the Golden Horde was 
effectively split into four semi-independent Khanates, and came to a fatal 
conclusion when Tamerlane defeated the Horde in 1395; a shock from which it 
would never recover.396
 
 
In Levesque’s account, the fragmentation and decline of the Golden Horde was 
matched by simultaneous attempts by a series of Russian grand princes to increase 
their own power. A process started by Dmitri IV who successfully enlarged his 
own dominion through negotiation and warfare and, in turn, reduced the number, 
and the influence, of appanaged princes.397 His example was vigorously followed 
by three of his successors: Ivan III, Vasily IV and Ivan IV.398 For all these grand 
princes, such a centralisation of power was merely a means to an end: to focus the 
strength of Russia against its common Tatar over-lord. A project soon put into 
practice with Dmitri defeating a Tatar army in 1380, followed by Ivan III 
completely destroying the Golden Horde in Sarai, and Ivan IV breaking the last 
remnants of Tatar power by forcing the Khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the 
Crimea into submission. 399
 
 
With full independence restored, and the power of the appanged princes broken, 
Russia was again put into a situation in which the grand princes could promote the 
common good of the country rather than having to devote all their energy to fight 
the particularised pretensions of the appanaged princes. Levesque could turn, 
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397 Ibid., pp. 230-8. 
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therefore, to a narrative of progress in which reforming sovereigns protect and 
encourage commerce, industry and the arts and increase the power, strength and 
riches of the state. This narrative spans the whole of Russian history from Dmitri 
IV via Peter I to the reign of Catherine II.  
 
The aim of the grand princes’ reforming activities is uniform throughout the 
period: to enable Russia to catch up with the development of Europe by getting 
the engine of civilisation running again. As soon as Ivan III had destroyed the 
Golden Horde, Levesque argued, he successfully attempted to open Russia’s 
channel of communication with the outside world. However, with Constantinople 
having fallen to the Turks, he turned principally to the West rather than to the 
South as had been usual in Russia’s past. His first act in this respect was to re-
establish diplomatic relations with the German Empire, the papacy, Poland, 
Venice and Denmark. Ivan III supplemented this endeavour with a conscious 
policy of importing the fruits of Europe’s recent progress into Russia, thereby 
sowing the seeds for a renaissance of Russian industry, sciences and arts.400
 
 
Ivan III’s project was followed by all his successors, and Levesque outlined in 
detail how Russia’s temporary isolation was gradually broken from the early 16th 
century onwards. The various efforts to recruit foreign officers to accelerate the 
professionalisation of the army, Ivan IV’s promotion of commerce with the main 
European powers by means of opening a new port and market in Archangelsk, his 
efforts to import English artisans, doctors and teachers into Russia, and Alexei 
translating various foreign books on the sciences and the arts and kick-starting a 
new trading relationship with China, are only a few examples Levesque offered to 
indicate the post-Tatar czars’ desire to get the virtuous cycle of communication 
and emulation started again.401
  
 
Thereby, Levesque of course attempted to counter the perception that Peter I’s 
opening up towards Europe was an unprecedented event in modern Russian 
history; an argument made explicit in his reflection on Boris Godunov’s policy of 
                                                 
400 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 364. 
401 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 73, 254, vol. 4, pp. 26, 105 (recruitment of foreign officers); vol. 3, pp. 154-5, 
161-2 (Ivan IV); vol. 4, 103-6 (Alexei). 
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sending young Russian nobles to Sweden and Germany for their education during 
the early 17th century: 
 
Animé pour les connaissances utiles et agréables, du même zèle que 
marqua depuis Pierre I, il fit partir pour les pays étrangers seize jeunes 
gens d’une bonne noblesse, pour y faire des études encore inconnues 
dans leur pays.402
 
 
However, Peter had not only a host of predecessors in regard to the promotion of 
commercial and cultural exchanges with European neighbours, but also in regard 
to internal reforms and modernisation. Interwoven with the description of how 
Russia opened up to the outside world, the Histoire de Russie related how the pre-
Petrine reforming czars endeavoured to modernise their country’s social, 
economic and legal infrastructure, thus attempting to ensure that the assorted 
imports fell onto a fertile indigenous ground. A short consideration of the kind of 
reforms Levesque specifically emphasised is instructive, as it reveals his 
conviction that most of Peter’s own reforming activities were far from 
unprecedented in Russia. Ivan IV’s and Alexei I’s legislative projects; the 
establishment of new industries across Russia throughout the period; the 
construction of a merchant fleet under Alexei; or Ivan IV’s and Feodor III’s 
attempts to establish a meritocracy by making social distinction dependent on 
service rendered to the state rather than on birth, all stand witness to the fact that 
Peter, far from being a creator ex nihilo, could emulate models of reform already 
firmly established in Russia.403
 
 
Whilst these czars all pursued the same end – the civilisation of Russia – they 
followed divergent models of reform. Indeed, Levesque argued that throughout 
modern Russian history two very different approaches to political reform are in 
operation, which are distinguished both in regard to the agents involved in the 
articulation of the reforming project as well as in their modes of implementation. 
One approach, labelled by Levesque as ‘despotic’ or ‘tyrannical’, is exclusively 
driven by the sovereign. It is the ruler’s will alone that determines the content of 
reform, and once he has made up his mind, he proceeds towards swift execution. 
                                                 
402 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 239-40. 
403 Ibid., pp. 152-3, vol. 4, p. 45-6 (legislation); vol. 3, p. 157, vol. 4, pp. 106-7 (establishment of 
industries); vol. 4, p. 106 (merchant fleet); vol. 4, pp. 125-7 (service nobility). 
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Any resistance to the ruler’s reforming will, which, because unregulated, may 
well aim at a radical overhaul of existing states of affairs, is typically answered by 
a violent response. By contrast, rulers following a moderate or gradual approach, 
involve the nation in the formulation of reforming policies. Their reforming wills 
are moderated through continuous efforts to communicate with their people by 
means of councillors or assemblies. Their reforms typically proceed at a slower 
pace than the ones of the despots, because they will only act once they are 
satisfied that the proposed alterations have been understood to be beneficial by the 
nation at large. Rather than quickly and comprehensively altering existing 
institutions, they will change them gradually, and almost imperceptibly, so as to 
avoid violent upheaval. According to Levesque, only the latter approach can ever 
lead to substantive and sustainable progress, and his history of modern Russia is 
to a large extent devised to prove this proposition. 
 
In the Histoire de Russie the moderate approach is most firmly associated with the 
pre-Petrine Romanov czars, ruling Russia from 1613 until Peter I’s ascendancy in 
1689. It is particularly the reign of Alexei that provided Levesque with a 
paradigmatic case study in the politics of moderate reforms. Levesque was 
particularly impressed by Alexei’s attempt to update Ivan IV’s code of law. 
Tellingly, he did not give any details about the content of the new legislation, but 
focused his discussion almost exclusively on the mechanisms the czar employed 
to pass the new laws: 
 
Il fit concourir à leur rédaction [i.e. the new laws] une assemblée des 
hommes les plus considérables de ses Etats. Sans doute on peut 
relever bien des fautes dans ce corps de législation. Mais ne refusons 
pas un sentiment d’amour et de respect à la mémoire d’un prince qui, 
lorsque les lumières de l’esprit pénétraient à peine dans ses Etats, 
voulut donner à ses peuples des lois fondées sur leur situation, sur 
leurs idées religieuses, sur leurs mœurs, sur leurs usages, sur la forme 
de leur gouvernement ... .404
 
 
By commending Alexei’s attempt to legislate via a national assembly, Levesque 
did not primarily make a constitutional argument. Although he believed that 
Russia had a long tradition of national interventions in the legislative and 
                                                 
404 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 45. 
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executive functions of government reaching as far back as 9th century republican 
Novgorod, he never portrayed such interventions as constituting a fundamental 
law limiting the power of the czars. The relative power of the czars had vacillated 
throughout Russian history, and by the time Alexei took over the reins of 
government it was absolute. Since the end of the Tatar yoke, the czars had 
increasingly amassed authority by breaking the power of the appanaged princes, 
limiting the privileges of towns such as Novgorod, and increasing the service 
obligations of the boyar nobility. Levesque generally approved of this process of 
centralisation of power.405 In his view, Alexei’s method of legislation was not 
commendable because it followed constitutional precedent, but because it was 
politically prudent.406
 
 
There are two main reasons why such a way of proceeding is advantageous. First, 
by engaging the nation in major reforms, the potential for resistance is 
considerably lessened. As long as people believe that they have a say in decisions 
that affect their lives – even if their say is, in actual fact, more symbolic rather 
than substantive – they are far less likely to revolt.407 Secondly, and more 
importantly, ruling through assemblies or councils provides sovereigns with an 
important feedback mechanism, ensuring that their reforms are appropriate to the 
country’s situation and will be understood as a salutary improvement by the 
nation at large.408
 
 Indeed, we shall see in the following, that Levesque approved 
of Alexei’s project to introduce a code of law that was founded on the country’s 
situation, mores, habits and ideas, because he fundamentally believed that radical 
reform projects leading to unprecedented historical departures cannot work. 
It is precisely this idea that only slow and gradual reforms lead to desired ends 
which Levesque stresses when comparing Alexei’s reign with the one of Peter I: 
 
                                                 
405 Ibid., pp. 167-70. 
406 See also Levesque’s criticism of the abbé de Mably who is taken to task for suggesting that a 
historian should always assess political regimes and historical events according to their conformity 
with certain fundamental, natural and unchanging principles. Levesque argued that this amounts to 
injecting a highly speculative metaphysics into history and prevents a historian from undertaking 
his proper task: to narrate and pragmatically assess events as they unfold historically. Levesque, 
‘L'éloge historique de l'abbé de Mably’, p. 72. 
407 HDR, vol. 4, pp. 60-1, 167-8. 
408 Ibid., p. 45-6. 
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Enfin, Alexis a commencé à lever un coin du voile qui tenait ses sujets 
dans les ténèbres. Pierre I, son fils, a voulu le déchirer d’un seul coup. 
C’était le moyen d’être plus ébloui qu’éclairé de la lumière dont ses 
yeux et ceux de ses peuples n’étaient pas encore préparés à soutenir 
l’éclat.409
 
 
Peter, in other words, should have followed the path traced by his father. 
However, rather than gradually enlightening and civilising Russia as Alexei did, 
he emulated a very different kind of ruler: Ivan IV. 
 
It is important to stress that in Levesque’s account moderates such as Alexei and 
despots such as Ivan and Peter share the same intentions: both types of rulers want 
the good of their country, and, as seen above, the kind of reforms undertaken by 
all modern Russian czars are in fact very similar, and, in terms of their 
motivations, praise-worthy. The problem with the latter type of ruler arises from 
their ill-informed belief that it is possible to rule well by consulting their own 
wills only:  
 
Il [i.e. Peter I] avait l’amour de tout ce qui est bien: mais trop souvent 
emporté par l’impétuosité de son caractère, il fit mal le bien, parce 
qu’il voulut le faire trop vîte; trop souvent il rendit le bien même 
odieux, en employant, pour l’opérer, des moyens violens réservés à la 
tyrannie. Il s’est acquis l’estime de ceux qui n’ont considéré que ses 
intentions, et le blâme de ceux qui ne se sont arrêté qu’à ses moyens 
d’exécution. Il est approuvé de ceux à qui ne déplaisent pas les 
grandes secousses et les réformes rapides: il a pour censeurs ceux qui 
sont persuadés qu’elles sont toujours du mal, et que le bien qu’elles 
opèrent manque de solidité, parce qu’on n’a pas eu le temps d’en 
préparer et d’en affermir les fondemens.410
 
 
Rulers like Peter and Ivan ‘fit mal le bien’ because they were too convinced that 
they themselves knew the remedies to all the ills of their country, and rejecting all 
advice or moderating influences, imposed them on the nation violently and 
impetuously against all difficulties or opposition.411
                                                 
409 Ibid., p. 108. 
 This, according to Levesque, 
410 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 194. 
411 The similarity between Peter I and Ivan IV in regard to their desire to impose their will on their 
nation whatever the cost and against all opposition, is maybe best illustrated in Levesque’s 
description of the fate of their respective sons: Alexei and Dmitri. Indeed, both rulers effectively 
killed their sons and Levesque pointed to the same motive for their actions: both believed their 
sons to be in league with parties opposing their own reforms. Too proud to be able to accept that 
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almost inevitably results in two sets of problems – resistance and mistakes – 
which, ultimately, meant that the ends for which the reforms were undertaken in 
the first place, were never attained. 
 
Both these problems are neatly exemplified in Levesque’s account of Peter’s 
attempt to impose European clothing fashion and his related endeavour to ban his 
subjects from wearing beards. Like Voltaire and Montesquieu, Levesque believed 
that this reform was undertaken in order to increase communication between 
Russians and Europeans by decreasing cultural differences.412
 
 However, he found 
at least three faults in the manner Peter went about achieving this goal. The first 
objection is Montesquieuian: indeed, Levesque concurred with the author of the 
De l’esprit des lois, that it is bad policy to change manners and mores through 
laws: 
Il est des usages qu’un prince doit abandonner aux caprices de ses 
sujets, ou ne changer que par l’influence que ses goûts, ses mœurs, ses 
manières ont sur les manières, les mœurs, les goûts de ses peuples: tels 
sont les usages qui ne portent que sur la forme des vêtemens, sur celle 
de la barbe ou de la chevelure; et c’est pour réformer de tels usages 
que Pierre I employa tout la rigueur de la puissance absolue.413
 
 
Moreover, this particular instance of the deployment of absolute power to change 
manners was all the more deplorable, since there was simply no need for a reform 
at all. Completely detached from his own people, and surrounded by an assorted 
group of foreigners, rather than the representatives of the nation that had advised 
his father Alexei, Peter naïvely believed that everything that is progressive comes 
from Europe and, conversely, that everything that is backward is Russian.414
                                                                                                                                     
there might be cause for discontentment, and unable to bear the idea that their respective 
successors might deviate from the path they had chosen, they employed ultimate violence against 
their own offspring, to see their will fulfilled. See ibid., vol. 3, pp. 110-14; vol. 5, pp. 1-69. 
 
Therefore, he failed to notice that clothing habits and similar usages have simply 
no effect on the quality and quantity of cross-cultural communication. Interaction 
with foreigners may or may not happen, independently from whether people wear 
robes or grow long beards. In fact Levesque argued that in Catherinean Russia, 
foreign merchants deal by preference with Raskolniki – old believers who, among 
412 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 142-3. 
413 Ibid., p. 143. 
414 Ibid., pp. 141, 158-9. 
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other things, have successfully resisted Peter’s reform – because of their integrity 
and honesty and in spite of their beards.415
 
 
However, the argument that customs such as clothing habits do not matter much at 
all, does not mean that the reform was pointless but otherwise neutral in the sense 
that an indifferent custom was exchanged for an equally indifferent one. On the 
contrary, for Levesque it was a telling instance of Peter’s wider project of radical 
and rapid reform; a project that led to a cultural, social, and political 
transformation of such magnitude and swiftness that Russia was in danger of 
losing all its moorings that provide for a measure of stability. Indeed, Levesque 
provided his readers with many more examples of the czar rapidly abolishing 
traditional institutions without prior enquiry whether a change was in fact needed 
and without consideration of likely outcomes. For instance, he attacked Peter’s 
institution of the senate as a replacement for the traditional council of boyars, and, 
particularly, for giving members of the new senate new, Europeanised titles. 
Although such a change of titles is in itself indifferent, two consequences ensued: 
first of all it alienated the nobles who were jealous of their old titles. Secondly, 
and more importantly, it destroyed the respect of the nation as a whole for the 
institution, because, Levesque claimed, people always have a superstitious respect 
for old things and like to examine and censure what is new.416 Likewise, the 
abolition of the office of the patriarch, and its replacement with the religious 
synod was in Levesque’s eyes another instance of Peter ruthlessly and foolishly 
abolishing an ancient institution and replacing it with a new structure whose 
authority and role was simply not understood by the population at large.417
  
 The 
cumulative outcome of such and similar reforms was disastrous: 
Le prince aurait-il dû toucher si légérement aux anciennes coutumes? 
Ne devait-il pas craindre le danger de faire connaître à ses sujets 
l’inconstance? Les nations sont gouvernées non-seulement par les lois, 
mais par des usages qui tiennent lieu de lois et qui sont encore plus 
sacrés, parce qu’étant l’ouvrage de la nation entière qui tend sans 
cesse à les maintenir, ils lui sont plus chers que les ouvrages des 
législateurs. Oter brusquement à un peuple ses usages, c’est lui ôter 
ses lois mêmes; c’est faire que rien n’est plus respectable pour lui, que 
                                                 
415 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 469. 
416 Ibid., pp. 421-2. 
417 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 94-7. 
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rien n’a plus sur lui d’empire, si ce n’est la crainte. Dès-lors, il n’est 
plus rien de solide, rien de fondamental; les lois ne dureront qu’un 
jour, et, au lieu de coutumes, on n’aura que des caprices.418
 
 
The language Levesque employs here – i.e. that the Russia Peter left behind was 
predominantly governed by ‘fear’ and ‘caprice’ – is adopted from Montesquieu’s 
critique of despotism.419 Using absolute power wrongly, Peter had helped to 
create a despotic regime, in which a sovereign’s will, which may well be 
capricious, is directly imposed on the population. With all moderating institutions 
abolished or replaced by rootless and therefore toothless ones, only fear of 
punishment can be employed to keep the population in check. However, constant 
and ruthless attacks on habits and institutions that the people hold sacred will 
inevitably lead to popular discontent, which, in the absence of any channels of 
communication between the sovereign and the people, can only be expressed by 
violent resistance. Despotism, in other words, constantly threatens to default into 
anarchy.420
 
 
And yet, it would be wrong to believe that Levesque exclusively blamed Peter for 
having created a despotic regime in Russia. In actual fact, he believed that Peter 
had simply intensified a trend in Russian history that had been set in motion 
during the reign of Ivan IV. And he outlined how a second defining element of 
despotism – the servile disposition of the population – was the unintended 
outcome of a whole series of political mistakes, caused by the imperious desire to 
reform too quickly and by too violent means. 
 
Levesque’s account of how contractual serfdom was transformed into a system in 
which peasants are eternally attached to the glebe with no hope of ever improving 
their status, is particularly revealing in this respect. The transformation happened 
during the reign of Feodor I, but its causes must be found in the previous reign of 
Ivan IV. The latter’s ambitious project to quickly modernise his country, and 
especially the violent means he employed to squash any opposition to this quest, 
led to turmoil and upheaval, resulting in many peasants leaving their traditional 
                                                 
418 Ibid., pp. 144-5. 
419 This critique is most prominently articulated in De l’esprit des lois, see Montesquieu, Œuvres 
complètes, vol. 2, esp. pt. 1, bk. 3, chaps. 8-9, pp. 258-9. 
420 HDR, vol. 4, pp. 333-4, vol. 5, pp. 94-6. 
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abodes and therefore in a general depopulation of the Russian countryside. In 
order to stem this process, Levesque contended, Feodor found no other means 
than to legally attach the Russian peasants to their glebe.421 This loss of liberty on 
the part of the peasants was further exacerbated by Peter’s tax reform. By taxing 
noble landowners according to the number of serfs they possess, Peter effectively 
introduced a form of chattel slavery.422
 
 
The enslavement of the peasants was for Levesque merely the most dramatic 
example of a more general trend discernible in modern Russian history: the 
spreading of a servile mentality across all social strata, and Ivan and Peter were 
again portrayed as the major, if unintentional, authors of this phenomenon. As 
seen, in Levesque’s view historical progress is fuelled by free exchanges and 
communication between people that can lead to competition and thereby to 
potentially unlimited emulative cycles. He also believed that both Ivan and Peter 
aimed to accelerate the operation of such cycles. Hence, the opening up towards 
Europe, and hence the attempt to increase internal emulation by creating 
meritocratic institutions such as Peter’s table of ranks, designed to ensure that 
talent and service to the state rather than birth were rewarded.  
 
And yet at the same time, both czars’ style of rule actively undermined the 
attainment of such ends. Both tried to command emulation and the flowering of 
talent, not realising that these are essentially free and voluntary activities. By 
using excessive force to punish any opposition to their respective wills or to 
castigate the slightest mistakes, and by constantly increasing the service 
obligations of the population, they instituted a slavish climate of fear and 
compulsion. Such a climate is, of course, diametrically opposed to a situation 
susceptible to a flourishing of talent and genius through voluntary interactions and 
competition. Put differently, rather than providing individuals with the liberty to 
follow their inclination, and thereby with an opportunity to release their potential, 
which in turn might provide a spur to others, they shackled their subjects with 
                                                 
421 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 106-7, 281-2. 
422 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 91-2, and esp., 154-5. 
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terror, fear and obligations, thereby rendering them less active, communicative 
and emulative.423
 
 
It is exactly this contradiction between end – liberty – and means – command - 
that Levesque stressed in his final, very negative, assessment of Peter’s reign. 
Rather than having furthered the civilisation of Russia, Peter, by following 
erroneous means of reform, may well have undermined progress: 
 
Il [i.e. Peter I] aggravait leur [i.e. Russians] servitude, en leur 
ordonnant de ressembler à des hommes libres; il les chargeait de 
chaînes, et voulait les voir voler dans la carrière des sciences et des 
arts. On est étonné de leurs progrès, et l’on dit qu’ils ont été civilisés 
par Pierre I: je dirais plutôt qu’il leur a montré la route, et qu’ils y sont 
entrés d’eux-mêmes malgré le gouvernement de ce prince. Les talens 
doivent être encouragés; on les détruit quand on leur commande.424
 
 
Apart from deploring Peter’s despotic approach to political reform, Levesque 
returned here to a concern we have encountered throughout the Histoire de 
Russie: the idea that Russia had been gradually moving towards civilisation for a 
long time. Consequently, the story of its civilisation cannot be reduced to the 
reign of Peter as Voltaire had done in the Histoire de l’empire de Russie, but 
instead needs to be carefully reconstructed from the perspective of the longue 
durée. If this is done, Levesque showed, a complex history emerges marked by 
both similarities and differences to the ones of Europe in general, and France in 
particular; histories which Levesque invoked frequently in order to gain a 
comparative viewpoint on his Russian story. That there should exist marked 
affinities between these histories is of course to be expected. After all, Levesque 
conceived all concrete civilising histories as particular instances of the general 
conjectural process by which natural, savage man is transformed into social, 
civilised man. This process, we have seen, is primarily driven by the unfolding 
over time of human beings’ communicative potential that acts as the engine for 
both material progress as well as for the strengthening and softening of social 
relationships. Differences emerge because of particular historical circumstances 
that considerably influence the way this generic process unfolds. In order to 
                                                 
423 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 17-18, 74-6, 85-8, 181 (Ivan IV); vol. 4, p. 248, vol. 5, pp. 142-3, 155, 162 
(Peter). 
424 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 137. 
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explain variations in the histories of civilisation in Europe and Russia, Levesque 
pointed to divergences in regard to the emergence of feudalism in either context, 
and more importantly, to the interaction of Russian history with Byzantine and 
Tatar history; interactions which in turn both accelerated and retarded its 
progression from isolation to emulative communication when compared to 
Europe. 
 
According to Levesque, far from being the principal agent in the civilisation of 
Russia as Voltaire argued, Peter had endangered the further development of his 
country by his despotic approach to reform. The question remains, however, how 
Levesque assessed the legacy of Peter’s rule. For all we have been told so far, 
Peter had fatally undermined the potential for emulative communication to occur 
in Russia, and his reign could potentially be seen as similarly catastrophic as the 
earlier Tatar conquest – a reign, in other words, with the potential to push Russia 
from a naturally progressive historical trajectory into yet another period of stasis. 
However, we shall see that Levesque remained cautiously optimistic about 
Russia’s future despite Peter. In order to be able to fully understand this optimism, 
we have to turn once again to Levesque’s conception of the historical process in 
general. In particular, we need to look at the role reform plays in this process, and 
especially how political mistakes and their consequences are conceptualised 
therein.  
 
The question of political reform is prominently treated both in L’homme morale 
and in L’homme pensant.425
                                                 
425 HM, HP. 
 Its prominence partly derives from its absolute 
necessity in the context of a progressive historical process. When a society 
develops by means of communication and emulation, some of its traditional laws, 
institutions and habits, which may have been perfectly adequate in the past, will 
gradually become anachronistic, thereby no longer fulfilling their intended 
function in the present. Even worse, by becoming ossified traditions, they stand in 
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contradiction to the present developmental state of a society, and may prevent 
future progress.426
 
 
Whilst periodic reform of ossified traditions, laws and institutions is thus 
absolutely crucial for development, Levesque stressed throughout the difficulties 
of reforming well. In particular he was concerned with the ultimate danger 
inherent in any reform project:  
 
Un tems de réforme est un tems de crise; toute crise est dangereuse, on 
ne sait pas quelle en sera la fin. Le corps souffre par un changement 
de régime; on veut augmenter sa force & l’on risque de lui donner la 
mort. Toute loi ancienne est sacrée; on ne peut y toucher que d’une 
main tremblante. Elle peut être défectueuse, & cependant être 
analogue à la constitution du Corps qui l’a reçue.427
 
 
A period of reform is a period of crisis because there always exists the danger that 
we might actually worsen a given situation rather than improving it. At its most 
extreme, by interfering with some of the institutions, laws and habits by which 
people structure their lives and which provide for stability, we might cure a 
particular illness by universal death, that is to say, completely break a society 
rather than improving its strength and vigour. The political lessons Levesque 
derived from this danger were, of course, the ones we have already encountered in 
his discussion of reform in the Histoire de Russie. Reform must always be 
undertaken with a trembling hand: changes must be implemented slowly and 
gradually, and only after due deliberation in councils and after having prepared 
the nation to the impeding alterations.428
 
 However, in L’homme morale and 
L’homme pensant he additionally endeavoured an analysis of the root causes that 
render good reform difficult. 
Levesque’s most succinct illustration of the problems inherent in reform is 
provided by means of a reference to Michel de Montaigne. After a short 
                                                 
426 See, for instance, Levesque's discussion of trial by duel in France - an institution initially well 
suited to a barbarous, warrior people with little capacity to gather and to assess evidence, but 
which became actively harmful once France had become more enlightened. HM, pp. 235-48. 
427 Ibid., p. 66. 
428 HM-84, pp. 72-3. 
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discussion of various proposals for a radical and swift root-and-branch reform of 
French society, Levesque rejected such a project by invoking Montaigne: 
 
Qu’ils [advocats of radical reform] écoutent ce que Montaigne semble 
leur avoir adressé. ... 
 
"Il est bien aisé, dit-il, d’accuser d’imperfections une police, car toutes 
choses humaines en sont pleines. Il est bien aisé d’engendrer à un 
peuple le mépris de ses anciennes observances. ... Mais d’y rétablir un 
meilleur état en la place de celui qu’on a ruiné, à ceci plusieurs se sont 
morfondus qui l’avaient entreprins."429
 
 
The quote is taken from the essay De la Praesumption in which Montaigne 
reflected on our presumptuous nature which constantly asserts itself in spite of the 
uncertainty of our knowledge.430 Knowledge is based on experience, Montaigne 
asserted, but experience is itself infinite and contradictory, and therefore most of 
our knowledge is only probable rather than certain. Politics in particular is a 
domain almost exclusively concerned with probabilities. Even worse, it is often 
impossible to decide which political opinion is the most probable when presented 
with conflicting views. Therefore, to attempt to completely restructure a society 
from scratch is vainglorious in the extreme, ultimately based on a dangerous 
overestimation of our capacity to generate sufficient knowledge: we may see what 
is wrong when we contemplate a given society, but to know for certain what 
would be better in its place is often above our reasoning powers.431
 
 
It is a scepticism very similar to Montaigne’s that Levesque employed time and 
time again in his discussion of reform. Reflecting on the qualities that a good 
prince should possess, he, for instance remarked: ‘il ne suffit pas qu’il aime, qu'il 
veuille le bien; il faut qu’il le connaisse’.432
                                                 
429 HM, p. 67. Levesque invoked a similar argument from Montaigne to counter the idea of rapidly 
changing the form of government. See, HM, pp. 51-3. 
 However, to know the good and to 
430 Michel de Montaigne, Essais, ed. Alexandre Micha, 3 vols. (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1969), 
vol. 2, bk. 2, chap. 17, pp. 295-324. 
431 Ibid., esp. 316-20. For an analysis of Montaigne’s sceptical rejection of radical change imposed 
from above and his concomitant advocacy of improving communication between ruler and ruled, 
see Biancamaria Fontana, ‘Accounting for Human Actions: Individual Agency and Political 
Judgment in Montaigne's Essais’, in Political Judgment. Essays for John Dunn, ed. Richard 
Bourke and Raymond Geuss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 238-53. 
432 HM-84, p. 77. 
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devise appropriate means to bring it about, he freely admitted, was difficult and 
often, almost impossible: 
 
Hélas! tous les hommes pensent différemment. Leurs idées sont aussi 
variées que leurs traits. Quel est celui qui a raison? Que les bornes de 
notre esprit sont étroites! Que notre raison est faible! Quelle est 
l’obscurité de nos lumieres! Il semble que nos bouches ne soient que 
des organes d’erreurs. Nous ne savons riens, hors de nous, en nous-
mêmes. Nous nous sommes tous trompés, nous nous tromperons 
encore: & nous avons de l’orgueil!433
 
 
According to Levesque, our knowledge is partial because, knowing nothing by 
ourselves, we are dependent on sense impressions from the outside world to form 
any ideas. But sense impressions are potentially infinite, whilst we only have a 
finite existence, and hence our direct knowledge of the world will always be 
strictly limited. The only possible solution to this limitation is provided through 
tradition or communication. By exchanging our impressions and ideas with others, 
and by learning from past experiences through books, we can extend ourselves in 
time and space and thereby significantly increase our capacity for knowledge. 
And yet, such an extension is as much a danger as an opportunity as it might well 
lead us to copying and perpetuating mistakes committed by others.434
 
 
We are seemingly, therefore, in a no-win situation. Unable to generate much new 
knowledge without recourse to traditions and others, but in danger of preventing 
real new knowledge from occurring if we do not shed ourselves of all received 
ideas which may be mistaken, we are caught up in a potentially unsolvable 
conflict between innovation and tradition. It is exactly this conflict which renders 
political reform hazardous: 
 
Un homme, placé dans les circonstances les plus favorables, ne peut 
connaître que peu de choses par lui-même. Nous devons nos 
connaissances à nos livres, à ce que nous entendons de tout côté. ... 
 
Accablés sous le joug de l’autorité, il ne nous reste que peu de moyens 
de le secouer, puisque le plus souvent nous ne pouvons la combattre 
                                                 
433 HM, p. 82. 
434 HP, pp. 31-4. 
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que par l’autorité même. Et qui nous assurera que nous n’opposons 
pas le mensonge au mensonge?435
 
 
The only way we can fight the authority provided by tradition is through asserting 
the superiority of our own, present knowledge. But such an assertion, Montaigne 
had shown, and Levesque agreed, may well be presumptuous, and our attempted 
reform may make things worse rather than better. And yet, despite such 
scepticism about our ability ever to be able to precisely know the ends and means 
of reforms, Levesque did not end his discussion in a fatalistic mood. In his view, 
the problem of the insufficiency of knowledge is not only one of politics, but also, 
and maybe even more importantly, one of history; and it is history that provides a 
partial solution to the problem.  
 
Levesque traced the history of human knowledge in L’homme pensant. Whilst the 
first part of the work deals with the factors that enabled the first steps in the 
development of the human mind – the formation of big societies with flourishing 
industry and commerce, providing a part of the population with enough leisure to 
think rather than to work - the second part is entitled ‘Progrès & égarements de 
l’esprit humain’. The history of the human mind and its productions is, in other 
words, an integral part of the history of civilisation, happening alongside and 
interacting with the historical development of industry and material inventions, 
which are themselves a consequence of increasing levels of socialisation. And yet, 
it is not a history of linear progress tracing an ever increasing sophistication of the 
human mind and a consequential accumulation of knowledge, but a complex one, 
in which progress is constantly checked and thrown off course by mistakes. 
Nevertheless, it offers a qualified optimistic assessment about our potential to 
increase our knowledge over time, thereby also implying that the political 
problem of reform is a solvable one. 
 
However, much of Levesque’s account is written in a highly sceptical mode, and 
traces a history in which the perpetuation of errors, rather than the generation of 
real knowledge, is the main subject matter. This history starts in ancient India – 
                                                 
435 Ibid., p. 33. 
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according to Levesque, the first big society and also the cradle of philosophy436
 
 – 
and, to a considerable extent, explores how a host of errors committed by the early 
Indian philosophers have been copied and plagiarised throughout much of human 
history. 
Levesque argued that Indian philosophy was mistaken both in its method and in 
its subject matter. Methodologically, the Indians attempted to generate knowledge 
through meditation, thereby arriving at purely intellectual constructions, rather 
than by means of observing the material world through their senses and of 
forming ideas inductively from the data provided. Rather than slowly and 
empirically increasing certain knowledge about nature, they attempted to answer 
everything at once by means of a pure rationalism. This erroneous way of 
proceeding, Levesque contended, also induced Indian philosophers to ask the 
wrong kind of questions: rather than enquiring into how nature operates, they 
wanted to know why nature exists. In other words, they started to theorise about 
domains of which, Levesque was convinced, we can never have any knowledge 
such as final causes and the essence of divinity.437
 
 
Such a philosophy is deplorable for a number of reasons in Levesque’s view. 
First, completely detached from the material world, it cannot provide any support 
to mundane human concerns, offering, for instance, no help or spur to agriculture 
and industry. Secondly, Indian philosophy is inherently unsociable both in its 
mode of production and transmission of knowledge. According to Levesque, the 
Brahmins constructed their metaphysical systems by means of ascetic mediation 
rather than through sociable co-operation, and the products of such austere 
attempts to grasp transcendence are socially corrosive rather than integrative. 
Indeed, because the Brahmins’ systems are pure intellectual speculations that 
cannot be verified by means of empirical data, philosophical debate is reduced to 
petty and unintelligible conflicts about the meaning of words and definitions. 
Since such conflicts are essentially irresolvable, they necessarily lead to 
dogmatism and the establishment of irrevocably opposed sects.438
                                                 
436 Ibid., pp. 149-52. 
 Rather than 
437 Ibid., pp. 149-50, 163. 
438 Ibid., pp. 175-80. 
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supporting progressive economic development, and assisting socialisation, the 
history of the human mind as it manifested itself in India, Levesque implied, 
undermined both processes.  
 
Moreover, Levesque’s discussion of the égaremens of the human mind is by no 
means restricted to his account of ancient Indian philosophy. Indeed, Levesque 
sought to show how through a long history of uncritical adoptions, the erroneous 
doctrines of the Brahmins travelled from 5th century BC India to classical Greece 
and Rome via Chaldean, Phoenician and especially Egyptian intermediaries, 
before being taken up again in Christian Scholasticism in medieval Europe.439
 
 
Large parts of L’homme pensant thereby underline human beings’ considerable 
capacity for fatal error, and the difficulties involved in correcting errors that have 
become ossified through long intellectual traditions. But the work’s fundamental 
aim is to show that despite difficulties, such errors can and will be rectified over 
time. In fact, interspersed with the account of how errors have been perpetuated 
are descriptions of attempts to reform philosophy: the Egyptian physicists, 
Anaxagoras and Epicurus being the most prominent examples.440
 
 And he outlined 
how the erroneous assumptions of Indian philosophy were finally defeated for 
good in modern European history. The beginning of the end for these doctrines 
must be found in the reformation. Whilst it started as yet another dogmatic and 
essentially fruitless controversy over unintelligible subtleties, it lead to an 
intellectual fermentation which ultimately heralded a new dawn for philosophy: 
Mais enfin on avait franchi le pas le plus difficile. Après avoir ébranlé 
l’autel d’un bras audacieux, il en coutait peu de renverser des opinions 
profanes, que la vanité seule rendait cheres à leurs défenseurs.  
 
D’ailleurs les querelles de controverse aiguiserent les esprits. On 
voulait attaquer, on voulait se défendre: il fallait étudier. De nouvelles 
difficultés se proposaient & entraînaient à de nouvelles études. 
L’impulsion une fois donnée aux esprits, ils ne purent plus goûter le 
repos; & les premieres connaissances acquises leurs firent avidement 
rechercher les connaissances qui leur manquaient encore. 441
 
 
                                                 
439 Ibid., pp. 155, 160, 180-2, 185-8, 207-8, 224-5, 310, 324-5. 
440 Ibid., pp. 180, 248-50, 296-8. 
441 Ibid., p. 329. 
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Indeed, the account of the reformation is immediately followed by chapters on 
Gassendi, renewing the philosophy of Epicurus, and Descartes, breaking 
decisively with Christian Scholasticism. Levesque admitted that Descartes 
committed a host of mistakes himself: by starting his enquiry with the cogito 
rather than with external sensations, he came close to re-establishing a system of 
spiritual rationalism, and thus to losing himself in idle, meaningless speculation. 
However, the intellectual fermentation gripping Europe prevented Cartesian 
rationalism from ever becoming another ossified tradition. Already some of his 
early followers, Levesque argued, corrected mistakes committed by their master. 
And he ended his short history of modern European philosophy with a chapter on 
Locke who, by instituting a new method of philosophical enquiry firmly based on 
empiricism and on a clear conception of the limits of human knowledge, was 
portrayed as standing at the source of many of the philosophical advances made 
during Levesque’s own time.442
 
 
Locke, therefore, stands at the end of a long history which is marked by processes 
of trial, error and rectification. Whilst Levesque is at times agonised by the 
slowness of this process, wishing, for instance, that Locke had been born 2000 
years earlier, thereby preventing the Greeks from foolishly following Indian 
mistakes, he ultimately conceded that the weakness of the human mind is such 
that it can only develop slowly and via the by-way of mistakes and rectification 
rather than the highway of instantly discovering truths: 
 
La vérité semble avoir écrit l’ouvrage de Locke sous la dictée de la 
raison. Si ce grand homme eût pu naître dans les beaux siecles de la 
Grece, on peut croire que l’esprit humain n’eût pas été si longtems 
égaré dans le labyrinthe de l’erreur. Mais il fallait peut-être que le 
siecle qui produisit ce génie profond, fût préparé par tous les siecles 
qui l’ont précédé.443
 
 
A sentiment that is repeated in Levesque’s survey of his history of philosophy 
from its Indian beginning to its enlightened present as a whole: 
 
                                                 
442 Ibid., pp. 329-38. 
443 Ibid., pp. 336-7. 
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De grandes sociétés sont formées: elles permettent à l’industrie de 
s’accroître; & elle seule peut développer l’esprit humain, qui d’abord 
consiste tout en industrie. Un tems bien long s’est écoulé jusqu’à cette 
époque: mais, dans une durée immense, les siecles sont des momens. 
Nous pouvons suivre à présent les progrès de l’esprit & ses erreurs qui 
sont les suites de ces progrès même & qui doivent être détruites par 
des progrès nouveaux.444
 
 
There are, Levesque argued, certain strategies that can be employed to decrease 
the chances of errors occurring, and to increase the possibilities that old errors are 
recognised and rectified. These strategies bear a close resemblance to the ones 
which we have already encountered in his discussion of how to reform well. This 
is unsurprising, because the art of the philosopher is in fact very similar to the one 
of the political reformer: both have to be able to carefully assess which traditions 
work and are worth keeping, and which ones are in need of innovation. Such an 
operation requires a moderately sceptical disposition capable of doubting all 
received traditions on the one hand, without falling into the presumptuous trap of 
believing that it is in any man’s power to erect a completely new system of either 
knowledge or society from scratch, on the other. Rather than pretending that they 
know everything, philosophers and sovereigns alike should recognise that they 
can only know very little by themselves.445 Hence the need for constant 
communication both in philosophy and politics. The dogmatic assertion of a 
philosophical position is as likely to lead to the creation of new, or perpetuation of 
old, errors as is the despotic implementation of radical political reform against all 
opposition. Therefore, the rapid exchange of ideas and observations among 
thinkers fulfils the same function as governance by council: both provide means to 
verify new propositions and speed up the process of mistake detection.446
 
 
Returning to the Histoire de Russie, and particularly Levesque’s assessment of 
Ivan IV’s and Peter I’s reforms, we can easily see that neither sovereign fulfilled 
the criteria Levesque laid down. Reforming despotically, impetuously and without 
due consultation and deliberation, many of their projects inevitably ended in 
mistakes and unintentional consequences. Moreover, from the background of 
Levesque’s theoretical discussion of political reform in which knowledge on the 
                                                 
444 Ibid., p. 148. 
445 Ibid., pp. 240-5. 
446 Ibid., pp. 327-8. 
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part of the reformer is the single most limiting factor, it also becomes clear that he 
regarded Voltaire’s account of Peter as a historical impossibility. According to 
Levesque, a reform project in which one man attempts to build a completely new 
civilisation by breaking sharply with all the traditions and habits of the past could 
never have succeeded. The generation of the new knowledge required that such a 
project could succeed without ending in fatal errors could simply never have 
happened quickly enough. Indeed, Levesque implied, Peter failed miserably to the 
extent that he tried to do what Voltaire claimed he had achieved: to break his 
country’s connection to its own past. 
 
However, Levesque did not deem this failure fatal. Even though deeply concerned 
about the turmoil created by the czar’s misguided reforms, he did not believe that 
Russia had thereby been thrown off its normal historical track of gradual progress. 
On the contrary, Peter’s mistakes provided post-Petrine history with much of its 
subject matter. In fact, one of the key themes running through Levesque’s account 
of this history is the gradual rectification of problems created during Peter’s reign. 
In particular, its most harmful legacy – the servile disposition of the Russian 
population – Levesque argued, was being reversed since Peter’s death: Anna’s 
endeavour to govern through mild generosity rather than fear,447 Peter III reducing 
the strict service obligations of the nobility448 and, especially, Catherine II’s 
project to break despotic power in Russia through her programme of legislation 
and education,449
 
 all bear witness that the lessons of Peter’s reign had been learnt. 
Indeed, far from having fallen into yet another period of stasis, Levesque 
concluded, Russia was again moving forward. 
 
                                                 
447 HDR, vol. 5, p. 252. 
448 Ibid., pp. 289-91.  
449 Ibid., pp. 389-406. 
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4. August Ludwig Schlözer: From the erudite 
reconstruction of the past towards the marrying of 
scholarship and politics in the present 
 
Introduction 
 
Levesque, whilst stressing the entirely novel character of his undertaking of 
writing a critically astute and continuous history of Russia from its very beginning 
to the present, freely admitted that his work was only rendered possible by the 
recently increased availability of source material in regard to the country’s past. 
As outlined in the last chapter, he gave due credit to a group of Russian and 
German scholars associated with the St. Petersburg Academy for having thus 
prepared the ground for his own work. Arguably the most important of those 
scholars was August Ludwig Schlözer, who had entered into Russian service in 
1761 and worked at the Academy for 8 years before returning to Germany to 
pursue an academic career at his alma mater – the University of Göttingen.450 
Indeed, Schlözer, never given to undue modesty, regarded himself as the first real 
scholar of Russian history;451 a characterisation often repeated in subsequent 
scholarship with Wesendonck for instance declaring him the ‘Vater und Schöpfer 
der rußischen Geschichte’.452
 
 
Given that Schlözer reciprocated this expression of respect in regard to 
Levesque’s own Histoire de Russie, which he considered the only tolerable 
                                                 
450 There exists a good deal of literature on Schlözer’s biography. The most important source is his 
own, unfinished autobiography that deals with the period from 1761 to 1765; see Leben. Other 
good overviews of his life include Adolf Bock, Schlözer. Ein Beitrag zur Litteraturgeschichte des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Hannover: C. F. Kius, 1844), chap. 2; Johann Michael Heinrich 
Doering, Leben A. L. v. Schlözer's. Nach seinen Briefen und andern Mittheilungen. (Zeitz: 
Immanuel Webel, 1836); Friederike Fürst, August Ludwig von Schlözer, ein deutscher Aufklärer 
im 18. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg: Winter, 1928), chap. 1. For a good biographical overview of his 
time in Russia see E. Winter, ed., August Ludwig v. Schlözer und Russland, vol. 9, Quellen und 
Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas (Berlin: Akadamie Verlag, 1961), introduction. 
451 Leben, pp. 77, 206.  
452 Hermann Wesendonck, Die Begründung der neueren deutschen Geschichtsschreibung durch 
Gatterer und Schlözer, nebst Einleitung über Gang und Stand derselben vor diesen (Leipzig: Joh. 
Wilh. Krüger, 1876), p. 77. 
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narrative of Russian history produced in the 18th century,453
 
 it comes as little 
surprise that there should be very striking similarities in their respective careers 
and approaches to history. At the most general level, Russia was for both a 
genuine starting point: both left for St. Petersburg at a young age, and their 
historical works on Russia gained them a scholarly reputation that served as 
launching pads for successful academic careers. Similarly, Levesque and Schlözer 
alike, and here in sharp contrast to Voltaire and Diderot, had immersed 
themselves very deeply in the study of Russia, mastering its language both in its 
ancient and modern guises, and possessing a commanding knowledge of its 
historical sources. It is from this erudite basis, moreover, that both of them 
attacked the factual inaccuracies of contemporary historical scholarship on Russia 
in general, and of Voltaire’s Histoire de l’empire de Russie in particular. 
And yet, their respective erudite reactions ultimately took very different paths, 
indicating the complexity involved in the 18th-century debate between erudites 
and philosophes. As outlined in the last chapter, for Levesque the erudite 
reconstruction of Russia’s ancient history was merely a means to a philosophical 
end – to uncover the slow, gradual march of Russian civilisation and thus to 
firmly reject Voltaire’s claim that Peter swiftly created an entirely new civilisation 
ex nihilo as historically implausible and, indeed, impossible. For Schlözer, by 
contrast, the writing of Russia’s pre-Petrine history was a task of such magnitude 
and complexity that he was convinced that it could never be completed within his 
lifetime. As a consequence, he never undertook the writing of a narrative history 
of Russia, but concentrated his energy on the establishment of a firm empirical 
basis for the writing of such a history in the future. At first glance, it might thus 
well appear that, in the case of Schlözer, the erudite means have taken over and 
become an end in itself. 
 
However, this intense and seemingly purely antiquarian preoccupation with 
Russia’s ancient past did not prevent Schlözer from engaging actively in debates 
central to the country’s contemporary politics. First, during his sojourn in St. 
                                                 
453 Nestor, vol. 1, p. 110. See also a letter by Schlözer to Karl Julius Schütz (Göttingen, 13 April 
1802) in which Schlözer singled out Levesque's Histoire de Russie, apart from his own Russica, as 
the best available account of Russia's past. In G. Ziegengeist, ‘Ungedruckte Briefe von und an 
Schlözer aus den Jahren 1761-1809’, Zeitschrift für Slawistik 30, no. 4 (1985), pp. 512-13.  
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Petersburg he consistently stressed that the time needed to cultivate Russia’s 
ancient history could be shortened, if his methodical plans were properly 
implemented. Moreover, this claim was always coupled with the assertion that the 
adoption of his plan would, by itself, make a significant contribution to the future 
improvement of Russia as a whole. Second, Schlözer additionally wrote a work 
about the contemporary state of Russia - entitled Von der Unschädlichkeit der 
Pocken in Rußland und von Rußlands Bevölkerung überhaupt – which he 
considered an important guideline for Catherine in the context of her reforming 
efforts.454
 
 Again, he believed that the advice offered, if heeded, would ensure a 
very marked increase in the efficiency of Catherine’s quest to improve her 
country. 
The key argument of this chapter is that there exists a very strong connection 
between Schlözer’s commitment to the detailed and laborious reconstruction of 
Russia’s ancient past and his belief in the efficacy of rapid and historically 
unprecedented development through the imposition of Catherine’s enlightened 
will in the present. This double commitment, which Levesque would have judged 
incompatible, is made possible by Schlözer turning his attention significantly, if 
by no means exclusively, away from the content, that is to say the events and 
deeds of the past, to the method of how we should study and write history. To put 
it differently, the aim of this chapter is to show that for Schlözer history never 
legitimises certain structures and institutions on account of their historicity as it 
did, to an extent, for Levesque, nor is the erudite study of history an end in itself. 
For Schlözer, history, if written and studied properly, provides its practitioners 
first and foremost with a certain outlook and a certain set of skills that render 
rational reform in the present possible by enabling them to deal with complexity. 
History, in other words, provides an education in complexity and thereby becomes 
the school of politics. 
 
In providing this reading of Schlözer, I will pursue, and further elaborate upon, an 
argument running through this thesis as a whole: namely that the Enlightenment’s 
engagement with Russia was more intricate than has hitherto been appreciated. As 
                                                 
454 See Pocken. 
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we have seen, Lortholary argues that the philosophes’ writings on Russia 
amounted to a mirage of utopianism generated through an exaggerated believe in 
the efficacy of radical reform based on the imposition of the enlightened will of 
Russia’s rulers, and a concomitant neglect and disrespect for the complex 
empirical realities of the country’s past and present.455 However, Schlözer 
complicates this antithesis between erudite realism and philosophic utopianism by 
combining both – a fact that may have troubled Lortholary if he had ventured 
beyond the French context, and that has certainly disquieted and at times 
embarrassed scholars of Schlözer. Indeed, whilst the quality of his research into 
Russia’s history is without exception lauded in the relevant secondary 
literature,456 there is frequent concern about what is perceived as his facile, 
uninformed praise for the enlightened despots Peter I and Catherine II.457
 
  
In order to unravel the complex relationship between erudition, political reform 
and despotism as conceived by Schlözer, this chapter will first of all focus on his 
engagement with Russian history. Here, particular attention will be paid to 
Schlözer’s attempt to sketch a history of Russian historiography and to situate his 
own work within an erudite tradition; a tradition with a pedigree reaching back to 
the 11th century, but which subsequently became superseded by what Schlözer 
described as unscholarly – ungelehrte - approaches to the past, and which was 
only re-established through the combined efforts of Peter I and Catherine II. The 
remainder of the chapter will then investigate Schlözer’s central claim that these 
two rulers should be regarded as enlightened, precisely because of their respective 
attempts to give erudition a new life in Russia. In the course of this investigation 
we will see that Schlözer’s praise for Peter and Catherine, far from being a facile 
nod towards enlightened despotism in general, is of a very specific nature: 
                                                 
455 Lortholary, Le mirage russe, esp. p. 7. 
456 See esp., Wesendonck, Die Begründung der neueren deutschen Geschichtsschreibung, pp. 77-
88, 199-205; E. Donnert, ‘Schlözer als Russlandhistoriker’, Zeitschrift für Slawistik 30, no. 4 
(1985); J. Harney and G. Sturm, ‘Schlözers Texttreue’, Zeitschrift für Slawistik 30, no. 4 (1985); 
Heinz Pohrt, ‘August Ludwig v. Schlözer Beitrag zur deutschen Slawistik und Russlandkunde’, in 
Gesellschaft und Kultur Russlands in der 2. Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Erich Donnert, 2 
vols., vol. 2 (Halle (Saale): Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1983). 
457 See, for instance, Hans Hecker, ‘Russland und die deutsche Historiographie des 18. 
Jahrhunderts’, in Russen und Russland aus deutscher Sicht. 18. Jahrhundert: Aufklärung, ed. 
Mechthild Keller (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1987), esp. pp. 209-10; Werner Hennies, Die 
politische Theorie August Ludwig von Schlözers zwischen Aufklärung und Liberalismus 
(München: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985). p. 146; Fürst, August Ludwig von Schlözer, p. 146. 
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according to Schlözer, despotism can only ever become enlightened through a 
marriage of power and erudite scholarship; a marriage which both enables 
government to engage in rational reform and which in itself imposes limits to 
despotic abuses of power. 
 
 171  
 
 
 
The history of Russian historiography: The struggle over 
erudition from Nestor to Voltaire 
 
 
Schlözer arrived in Russia in October 1761 in order to take up a position in the 
house of Gerhard Friedrich Müller, the imperial historiographer at the St. 
Petersburg Academy. Even though Schlözer was at the outset merely employed to 
tutor Müller’s children, the latter had from the outset more elevated plans for his 
young compatriot. Müller had been looking for some time for a suitably skilled 
scholar who could initially assist him in his historical works, and ultimately take 
over for good his responsibilities. Schlözer, who had been highly recommended 
by the eminent Göttingen orientalist Johann David Michaelis under whom he had 
previously studied, seemed to fit the bill perfectly. In the event, Schlözer did gain 
employment at the Academy – first as an adjunct (1762), later as a professor 
(1765) – but, having comprehensively fallen out with Müller, suffering from ill 
health, and having been offered a position at his alma mater in Göttingen, decided 
to retire from his position at the Academy in 1769.458
 
 
Looking back towards the end of his life over the prospects Russia offered him as 
a young scholar in the pursuit of future academic glory, Schlözer singled out the 
old Russian annals as having particularly fired his imagination: 
 
Doch mer, als alles Andre, lagen mir, ..., die russischen Annalen am 
Herzen. Von diesen hatt ich eine hohe Idee mit ins Land gebracht:.... 
Noch glaub ich nicht, daß ich mich dieser Schwärmerei zu schämen 
habe. So viele Ausländer seufzten laut nach der Publication dieser 
Annalen ... 
 
Und war mir denn nicht auch ein wenig Schwärmen zu verzeihen? In 
nicht ser weiter Ferne sah ich eine volle Erndte vor mir, in die noch 
keine Sichel gekommen war, und in welche keine, außer der 
meinigen, so bald einschneiden konnte. Zwar mußt ich vorher, ein 
noch völlig wüstes Feld, erst mit Schweis urbar machen? aber desto 
besser, desto mer Ehre! Und, der erste Herausgeber, der erste 
Ausleger, der Annalen, des in Größe, Macht, und Furchtbarkeit ersten 
Volks in Europa, zu seyn, war dann das eine Kleinigkeit?459
                                                 
458 Leben, pp. 1-11.  
 
459 Ibid., pp. 50-1.  
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Schlözer’s recollection of his first impressions of arriving in St. Petersburg 
encapsulates one of the central preoccupations that unites all thinkers discussed in 
this thesis: Russia, despite the power, influence and importance it has assumed in 
European affairs since Peter I, still lacks a satisfying history. The terminology 
Schlözer employs to describe the contemporary state of Russian historiography - 
ein noch völlig wüstes Feld - which can, however, be readily cultivated through 
the application of his sickle - a metaphor for the skills he had acquired during his 
studies in Göttingen and which had gained him his employment in Russia - of 
course is also reminiscent of Voltaire's and Diderot's characterisation of pre-
Petrine Russia as constituting a tabula rasa on which its subsequent enlightened 
sovereigns could build without interference from the past. And yet, there exists of 
course a crucial difference between the Russian tabula rasa as perceived by the 
two French philosophes and Schlözer's völlig wüstes Feld. According to Schlözer, 
pre-Petrine Russia does not lack a history as such - it is after all the existence of 
the old Russian annals that fired his imagination - but its rich history had so far, 
for reasons which we shall discuss below, not been sufficiently cultivated both 
within and outside Russia. 
 
Schlözer's starting point was, in other words, similar to the one adopted by 
Levesque: namely that there exists an under-appreciated history of Russia 
reaching back into antiquity which demands consideration. However, we can 
already see that Schlözer's ambitions were severely limited when compared to 
Levesque's. Indeed, during his spell at the St. Petersburg Academy, Schlözer 
repeatedly urged caution against undue expectations in regard to the timescale 
needed to achieve the thus far missing history by asserting that it could under no 
circumstances be written with any authority or precision before the end of the 
century.460
 
 This stance is still reflected in his later assessment about his time in 
Russia, where he claimed that his intention had solely been to establish the 
empirical basis needed for the writing of Russia’s pre-Petrine history, most 
particularly through a critical edition of the old Russian annals. 
                                                 
460 See, for instance, PRA, n.p.  
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Moreover, Schlözer did not even fully achieve these limited aims. During his time 
at St. Petersburg and the first five years at Göttingen, when he was still very much 
preoccupied with Russian history, he merely oversaw the printing of one extant 
manuscript copy of the Nestor chronicle without critical commentary,461 a number 
of detailed enquiries into questions of factual details,462 two short chronological 
overviews of Russia’s history as a whole,463 as well as a variety of methodical 
plans and proposals of how Russia's ancient history should be cultivated, and 
specifically how its sources should be critically edited and published.464 The 
publication of a critical edition of the whole Nestor eluded him until the very last 
years of his life. Indeed, it was only from 1802 onwards that Schlözer was finally 
in a position to send the first five volumes of his Nestor edition - including the 
text both in its Slavonic original and in German translation and enhanced by 
extensive critical annotations - to the press. In the last volume of 1809 - the year 
of his death - he had reached the year 980 of the annals, still almost seven 
centuries short of the time span covered by Nestor and his successors.465
 
 
Despite Schlözer's limited, and prima facie, purely antiquarian aims, he 
nevertheless engaged with the full range of debates we have traced throughout this 
thesis - most importantly the question of the relationship between the history of 
Russian and European civilisation and the role Peter I and Catherine II played in 
fostering such a relationship. In order to uncover Schlözer's contribution to these 
debates, we need, however, to turn away from the immediate content of his 
erudite investigations into Russia's remote past. Instead we need to, first of all, 
pay close attention to Schlözer’s endeavour to situate his own work within a 
                                                 
461 For a German translation of Schlözer's Russian introduction to this edition, see August Ludwig 
Schlözer, ‘Hrn. Schlözer's Vorrede zum ersten Bande seiner Ausgabe der Rußischen Annalen. Aus 
dem Rußischen übersetzt’, Allgemeine Historische Bibliothek 5 (1768). 
462 August Ludwig Schlözer, Oskold und Dir: eine Russische Geschichte. Erste Probe Russischer 
Annalen. Zugleich eine Beilage zu Hrn. Schmidts Versuch einer Russischen Geschichte, und Hrn. 
Büschings Wöchentlichen Nachrichten St. 27. (Göttingen und Gotha: Johann Christian Dietrich, 
1773); August Ludwig Schlözer, Historische Untersuchung über Rußlands Reichsgrundgesetze 
(Gotha: Carl Willhelm Ettinger, 1777).  
463 August Ludwig Schlözer, Geschichte von Rußland. Erster Theil: biss auf die Erbauung von 
Moskau im Jahr 1147, vol. 2, August Ludwig Schlözers Kleine Weltgeschichte (Göttingen: Ioh. 
Christ. Dietrich, 1769); August Ludwig Schlözer, Tableau de l'histoire de Russie (Gotha & 
Göttingue: J. C. Dieterich, 1769). 
464 PRA; August Ludwig Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu 
traktieren’, in August Ludwig v. Schlözer und Russland, ed. E. Winter (Berlin: Akadamie Verlag, 
1961). 
465 Nestor.  
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comprehensive history of Russian historiography; and, second, we need to 
consider in detail his methodological proposals outlining how Russian history 
should be cultivated in the future. 
 
Even though Schlözer's history of Russian historiography was only fully 
developed in the introductory part of his Nestor edition,466 the main contours of 
this history are already implicit in two early works: the Gedanken über die Art, 
die russische Historie zu traktieren (1764)467 - a submission by Schlözer to the St. 
Petersburg Academy in which he sketched the work he envisaged to undertake if 
appointed professor - and the Probe Rußischer Annalen (1768)468 - a much 
extended and published version of the same plan. The rationale for sketching a 
history of Russian historiography was, according to Schlözer, to provide an 
outline of how it came about that he found a völlig wüstes Feld in regard to the 
study of history when he first arrived in St. Petersburg.469
                                                 
466 Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 74-115.  
 In the introduction to 
his Nestor edition, for instance, the chapter devoted to this history is entitled 
Seltsame Schicksale der russischen Geschichte - whereby the strange fate to be 
explained is the absence of any satisfying history of Russia despite the fact that 
the country could look back to a long tradition of chronicle writing, and despite 
the fact that both Peter I and Catherine II, Schlözer alleged, had invested 
considerable money and energy into the promotion of historical scholarship. 
Indeed, the reign of Peter constitutes an important turning point in Schlözer's 
story: up to that point he is mainly, if not exclusively, concerned with tracing the 
history of the recording of contemporary events by Russian annalists and 
contextualises their activities with both the general history of the Russian state 
and synchronous processes taking place in Europe. With the ascendancy of the 
Romanov czars in general, and Peter in particular, his focus shifts from annalists 
towards efforts by historians to employ the annals as sources for the crafting of a 
history of Russia. 
467 Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu traktieren’. 
468 PRA, esp. pt. 1 and 3.  
469 Given the originality of Schlözer's history of Russian historiography, it is surprising how little 
this aspect of his historical works has been considered so far. To my knowledge, only Butterfield 
has noted the close connection Schlözer established between the general history of Russia and the 
history of Russian historiography. See Herbert Butterfield, Man on his Past: the Study of the 
History of Historical Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), pp. 6-7. 
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The first part of Schlözer's account - the history of the writing of annals in Russia 
from the 9th to the 17th century - mirrors to a large extent Levesque's narrative of 
Russian history as a whole. Indeed, Schlözer closely interwove his history of 
historiography with a general history of the Russian state, and his rough, general 
characterisation and periodisation of this latter history shares many features that 
would mark Levesque’s later, detailed analysis. Underlying both Levesque's and 
Schlözer's account is the notion of Russian history exemplifying the phenomenon 
of uneven development: rapid progress during the first 300 years after the 
institution of the state was soon followed by a period of stagnation and decline 
brought about by the fragmentation of political power and the concomitant 
conquest by the Mongols; a downward spiral in the first instance reversed through 
Russian military victories over their Mongol overlords in the 15th and 16th 
centuries, leading, ultimately, to a period of unprecedented growth and expansion 
since the 17th century.470
 
  
In regard to historiography, the first period for Schlözer is exemplified by the 
Kievan monk Nestor - the first recorded annalist of Russia who lived in the 
second half of the 11th century. Nestor’s work is described as a product of the 
intense cultural and religious communication Russia then enjoyed with 
Byzantium. It was with the spread of Greek Christianity in the 11th century that 
the art of writing first entered Russia, thereby creating the precondition for the 
development of rudimentary scholarship and a learned culture. Indeed, in terms of 
language, structure and presentation, Schlözer characterised Nestor's chronicle as 
thoroughly Byzantine, and as such far superior to anything that was produced in 
Europe around the same time.471
                                                 
470 PRA, pp. 91-6.  
 Whilst his Greek models may not have been 
historians of the quality of a Thucydides, Schlözer argued they were nevertheless 
‘ernsthafte, ehrliche, Wahrheit liebende Chronikenschreiber, und nicht Possen- 
oder Sagenschreiber’. Nestor, following such models, produced a work very 
different from contemporaneous attempts at chronicle writing in Latin Europe, 
where the monkish historians, either through pure ignorance or in order to 
471 Ibid., pp. 165-7; Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 10-15.  
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legitimise the spiritual power of the pope, littered their works with inaccuracies, 
lies and fables.472
 
  
The factual purity of Nestor’s chronicle was kept up by his immediate successors 
who truthfully copied his account and supplemented it by recording the 
remarkable events of their own times. And yet, this golden period of Russian 
chronicle writing did not last for long, and its downfall was prepared by the 
fragmentation of sovereign authority in Russia caused by the increasing feudal 
distribution of its territory, and concluded by the Mongol invasion of the early 13th 
century. These events, Schlözer showed, resulted in a manifold corruption of the 
chronicles. First, with the division of political authority among an ever increasing 
number of appanaged princes occurred a similar division of the historical record: a 
myriad of annalists sprang up in the various centres of power in Russia. Whilst 
each still used Nestor’s all-Russian annals as the basis for the historical narrative 
before his own time, contemporary events were now recorded from a purely local 
perspective. The writing of a unified Russian history ceased to exist, and just like 
the state, Russia’s historical recorded fragmented into a plethora of hardly related 
little entities.473
 
  
More fatally yet, with the Mongol conquest, Russia lost all of its cultural links to 
Byzantium, and its culture, cut off from the rest of the world, underwent a period 
of profound decline. In the context of the writing of annals, this decline 
manifested itself above all in a deterioration of the factual accuracy and reliability 
of the recorded information. Far less educated than their predecessors, the 
historiographers of the Mongol period committed the double sin of carelessness in 
the recording of contemporary events, and, even more deplorable in Schlözer’s 
                                                 
472 Nestor, vol. 1, p. 12. See also PRA, pp. 7-12. Schlözer's very positive characterisation of the 
quality of Nestor's work, and especially the stark contrast he drew between Nestor's and 
contemporaneous European chronicles, did not go unchallenged. Indeed, two German reviews of 
the Probe Russischer Annalen, whilst generally very positive, criticised Schlözer explicitly for an 
over-enthusiastic account of Nestor's reliability and accurateness. See [Gatterer, Johann 
Christoph], ‘Rezension: Probe Rußischer Annalen von August Ludwig Schlözer, Rußisch-
Kayserlichen Professor der Histoire &c. Bremen und Göttingen, im Verlag Försters, 1768. 8. 15 
Bog. ohne dem Vorbericht’, Allgemeine Historische Bibliothek 10 (1769), esp. pp. 234-5; [Richter, 
A. G.], ‘Rezension: Probe Rußischer Annalen von August Ludwig Schlözer, Rußisch-
Kayserlichen Professor der Histoire &c. Bremen und Göttingen, im Verlag Försters, 1768. 8. 15 
Bog. ohne dem Vorbericht’, Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek 10 (1769), pp. 50-2.  
473 PRA, pp. 41-2; Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 18-20.  
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eyes, of vandalising the historical account they had inherited from Nestor. Not 
content to just reproduce the original chronicles, they freely altered and mutilated 
them; and given that no version of Nestor's original work or of his immediate 
predecessors survived, but only a multitude of unfaithful copies of these later 
writers, potentially caused irrevocable damage to Russia's historical record. In 
places where Nestor had wisely been quiet because he did not know the facts, they 
formed conjectures and inserted fables; where his language was archaic and, to 
their ears, unclear, they modernised it, thereby often changing the semantic 
content of the original text; and, worst of all, having the ambition of being authors 
rather than mere copyists they sprinkled Nestor's purely factual account with their 
own reasoning on the meaning of the recorded events.474
 
 
If the Mongol conquest had brought about a first revolution in Russian chronicle 
writing, the regaining of independence brought about a second, ultimately 
resulting in its termination. Indeed, coinciding with the reestablishment of an 
increasingly strong and unified czarist power over the whole of Russia, Schlözer 
outlined how central government agencies increasingly took over from the 
cloisters the task of recording contemporary events - a process starting with Ivan 
IV, and coming to a conclusion with the Romanov ascendancy in the early 17th 
century, and particularly with the reign of Peter I; the point in time at which the 
chronicles become silent and official governmental documents kept in state 
archives begin to speak.475
 
  
Schlözer did not analyse this process in any detail, but he provides us with strong 
hints that it must be understood in the context of the czars attempting to 
monopolise all power in their hands, and that it was accompanied by considerable 
violence.476
                                                 
474 PRA, pp. 198-205; Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 20-1. 
 Nor did he have much to say about the functioning of the newly 
475 PRA, pp. 47-9, 173; Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 22, 58, 65-6; vol. 4, pp. iv-vi.  
476 In the second volume of his Nestor, Schlözer had argued that the establishment of the secret 
chancellery under Peter I's predecessor, Alexei I, was the immediate reason for the end of 
chronicle writing in Russia. However, Karamzin challenged Schlözer's account by showing that 
Alexei's chancellery, far from being charged with policing and censoring historical writing, was 
merely an office overseeing the czar's domestic affairs. According to Karamzin, it was another 
chancellery set up by Peter I, the Viestnik Jevropy - specifically charged with punishing any 
slandering of the czar with utmost severity - that spelled the end of the Russian chroniclers. 
Schlözer accepted Karamzin's objection in the fourth volume of his Nestor as correct, without, 
 178  
 
 
 
established state archives. Schlözer's interest, we remember, lay with the history 
of the annalists in general, and with the question as to why their works of 
immense antiquity had not been duly appreciated in contemporary Russia and 
Europe. With the end of the tradition of chronicle writing, Schlözer turned his 
focus decidedly to the second part of the question: the history of the employment 
of the old chronicles in 18th-century historical scholarship both in Russia and in 
Europe.  
 
The central figure in this history is Peter I. Indeed, whilst Schlözer frequently 
made references to Peter in his Russian writings, and used epithets for the czar 
that could have flown straight from Voltaire's pen - the most usual Schlözerian 
designation for Peter is 'der große Mann', but the 'zweite Stifter [von Rußland]',477 
is also prominently employed - the czar’s only action described by Schlözer in 
any detail apart from the territorial expansion of Russia through warfare,478 is his 
promotion of scholarship in general, and of historiography in particular. In his 
autobiography, for instance, Schlözer credited Peter with having recognised 'daß 
die heutige Welt mit gelerten Kenntnissen regirt werden müsse', and elsewhere he 
summarised the czar's undertaking in the following manner: 'Peters großer 
Endzweck war, die Wissenschaften des übrigen aufgeklärten Europens in seinen 
neugeschaffenen Staat zu verpflanzen.'479
 
  
In the context of this general project of governing by means of learned 
knowledge, and of enabling such a method of government by means of importing 
                                                                                                                                     
however, assessing the methods employed by Peter. As we shall see below, Schlözer argued that 
Peter's main achievement was the introduction of European, critical scholarship into Russia, and it 
would appear as if he regarded the silencing of the chroniclers as negligible in comparison. See 
Nestor, vol. 1, p. 22; vol. 4, pp. iv-vi. Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin, ‘Über die Geheime Kanzlei 
in Rußland. Aus dem "Europäischen Anzeiger" des Hrn. Karamzin’, Neue Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, no. 2 (1803).  
477 See, for instance, [Jankovič-de-Mirievo, Fedor Ivanovič], Handbuch der Geschichte des 
Kaisertums Rußland vom Anfange des Stats, bis zum Tode Katharina II, trans. August Ludwig 
Schlözer (Göttingen: Philipp Georg Schröder, 1802), pp. ix, xiv-xv; Schlözer, Geschichte von 
Rußland, p. 34; PRA, p. 90; Johann Joseph [i.e. August Ludwig Schlözer] Haigold, 
Neuverändertes Rußland oder Leben Catharina der Zweyten Kayserinn von Rußland. Aus 
authentischen Nachrichten beschrieben, 3rd ed., 2 vols., (Riga und Mietau: Johann Friedrich 
Hartknoch, 1771), vol. 1, introduction (n.p.). 
478 See, for instance, Schlözer, Geschichte von Rußland, p. 34; PRA, p. 96.  
479 Leben, p. 279; Johann Joseph [i.e. August Ludwig Schlözer] Haigold, Beylagen zum 
Neuveränderten Rußland, 2 vols. (Riga und Mietau: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1769-1770), vol. 
1, introduction (n.p). 
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European knowledge into Russia, the promotion of historical scholarship assumes 
a particularly prominent place. Indeed, according to Schlözer, Peter's new creation 
- die zweite Stiftung von Rußland - was intimately bound up with a concern to 
study the past out of which this new creation emerged, and he detailed a variety of 
concrete steps taken by the czar to facilitate such a study: the ordering of a copy 
of a Nestor codice he himself had discovered in a Königsberg library during his 
first travel to Europe; the issuing of a decree ordering the cataloguing and 
collection of the various extant codices of the old chronicles hitherto dispersed 
across Russia at a central place; and, most importantly, the creation of the St. 
Petersburg Academy including the establishment of a historical class with its own 
professor of history and imperial historiographer at its helm.480
 
 Such institutions 
favourable towards the cultivation of historical scholarship, Schlözer argued, were 
continued by Peter's most notable successor: Catherine II. Indeed, if Peter is der 
große Mann, Catherine is die große Frau. The reason Schlözer offered for 
awarding Catherine this title of honour is the same as the one provided in regard 
to Peter: 
Jetzt erschien Katharina II. Sie selbst eine Gelerte, folglich beseelt 
von Ehrfurcht für das Wissenschaftliche, das sie als unerläßliches 
Bedürfnis bei ihren ungeheuern, woltätigen, und notwendigen 
Entwürfen, ansah.481
 
 
Again the study of the past was central to the concerns of the gelehrte czarina in 
her pursuit of continuing Peter's project to improve and reform Russia. Indeed, 
according to Schlözer, Catherine, sensing the importance of historical scholarship 
for her projects, did not merely wish for a critically astute and comprehensive 
history of her own country, but used all her available powers to actually order 
one.482
 
 
Before turning to the key question about the exact relationship between the study 
of the past and successful political reform in the present that is implied in the 
discussion of Peter and Catharine, we will first have to consider Schlözer's 
explanation as to why the promotion of historical scholarship since Peter did not 
                                                 
480 PRA, pp. 159-60; Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 88-93.  
481 Leben, p. 280. Emphasis in the original.  
482 PRA, introduction (n.p.); Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 108-9.  
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bear any fruits. Or, to put it differently, we have to investigate why he found ein 
völlig wüstes Feld when he first arrived in St. Petersburg, and we have to sketch 
the main contours of Schlözer's plan of how this situation could be rectified. Such 
a consideration will provide us with a clear idea of the kind of historiography that 
could, in Schlözer's eye, be instrumental in guiding the future development of 
Russia. 
 
The relative failure of Russian historiography is to a considerable extent 
explicable in terms of the enormity of the task to be performed, and by the 
unenviable situation in regard to learning in which Russia found itself at the 
beginning of Peter's reign. As seen, Schlözer had discovered an immense wealth 
of sources regarding Russia's past in the old chronicles, and he was adamant that 
these chronicles must provide the empirical basis for any Russian history. 
However, he had also shown that they had suffered considerable corruption during 
their long and complicated history, and, as a consequence, that the first step in the 
writing of a Russian history had to be a process of cleaning up the relevant 
sources: the many different extant codices of the Nestor chronicle had to be 
collected and compared; later interpolations and mutilations had to be identified 
and eliminated; all recorded facts had to be cross-checked with reference to other 
contemporaneous sources, most notably the Byzantine, Polish and Lithuanian 
chronicles; archaic expressions had to be understood and explained; fanciful and 
plainly wrong information had to be purged, etc.483
 
 
In order to achieve this feat, scholars versed in modern historical criticism were 
needed; however, historical criticism is, according to Schlözer, in many ways the 
most difficult of all sciences, as it is itself dependent on a variety of other fields of 
scholarship:  
 
Wenn eine Nation mit RiesenSchritten zur Cultur emporsteigt, wenn 
es bei ihr von Genien wimmelt: so werden unter ihr Maler, Bildhauer, 
TonKünstler, Dichter, Mathematiker, ScharenWeise auftreten; nur 
noch keine Historiker, die ihr ihre alte Chroniken und Denkmäler, 
falls sie dergleichen hat, richtig entziefern können. Chroniken wird sie 
                                                 
483 See, for instance, Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu traktieren’, 
pp. 54-6. 
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früh lesen; aber der Uebergang von ChronikenLeserei zum gelerten 
GeschichtStudium wird immer eine der späteren Erscheinungen seyn. 
Dies läßt sich leicht erklären. Alle Künste und Wissenschaften, bei 
denen das Genie das meiste wirkt, und höchstens nur durch 
vorliegende Muster geweckt zu werden braucht, werden in Flor 
kommen, und in wenigen Generationen ihre Muster einholen, wo 
nicht gar sie übertreffen: alle andre hingegen, wo das Genie allein 
nicht Schöpfer seyn, nicht alles aus sich selbst spinnen kan, wo ihm 
Materialien von außen, weit ausgeholte Vorrichtungen und 
Zurüstungen ... durchaus nötig sind, werden sich verspäten. Genie, 
Gelersamkeit, und Verstand ... sind rein verschiedene Dinge ... .484
 
 
Historical scholarship does not primarily require Genie (genius) or Verstand 
(reason) but Gelehrsamkeit (erudition, learning); a claim by which Schlözer of 
course positioned himself firmly on one side in the ongoing 18th-century debate 
between érudits and philosophes. Indeed, the tripartite division of the operations 
of the human mind into Verstand, Genie and Gelehrsamkeit mirrors the one 
established in the Encyclopédie's Discours préliminaire where raison, 
imagination and mémoire were identified as underlying philosophy, the belle 
lettres and history respectively.485 However, whilst for d'Alembert memory and 
history, solely concerned with probability and particularity, were subservient to 
philosophy as a provider of material for reflection and reasoning, ultimately aimed 
at certainty and generality, they have, for Schlözer, an autonomous and, as we 
shall see in the following, a highly elevated existence within the overall 
framework of human knowledge.486
 
 
In the context of the history of Russian historiography, Schlözer was in the first 
instance at pains to show that the attainment and operation of erudition is itself a 
historically slow process: erudition can never develop out of nothing, nor, once 
attained, can it produce results as quickly as cultural endeavours that are 
predominately dependent on mental processes that require genius or reason. 
Whilst a genius requiring nothing but his genius may quickly produce something 
                                                 
484 Nestor, vol 4, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.  
485 Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, eds., Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des 
sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres, 17 vols. (Paris: 1751-65), vol. 
1, esp. pp. xlvii-li. For a good interpretation of d’Alembert’s conception of erudition, see Jean 
Starobinski, ‘From the Decline of Erudition to the Decline of Nations: Gibbon's Response to 
French Thought’, Daedalus 105, no. 3 (1976), pp. 190-2. 
486 This concern to elevate the status of historical erudition within the system of scholarship was 
shared by many of his Göttingen colleagues; see, for instance, Ulrich Muhlack, ‘Histoire und 
Philologie’, in Aufklärung und Geschichte, esp. pp. 65-7. 
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ex nihilo, the historian needs materials – sources – and he needs a variety of 
techniques to make sense of his sources; techniques which need a long time of 
gestation to appear historically; and once they are available in a given culture, 
need to be painstakingly learned by each historian individually. 
 
Even though Peter’s Russia certainly possessed ample source material to stimulate 
the development of historical scholarship, it woefully lacked, according to 
Schlözer, the critical methods needed to make sense of these sources. The long 
period of Mongol oppression had put an end to learning and scholarship in Russia, 
and whilst the art of writing and reading chronicles may have survived this period, 
it had been impossible for an erudite study of history to emerge. However, Peter 
recognised the problem and took steps to rectify it: most importantly, the 
establishment of the St. Petersburg Academy and the staffing of this academy 
with foreign, principally German, scholars which in this combination could act as 
a catalyst for the development of Gelehrsamkeit in Russia.  
 
Schlözer’s discussion of Peter is premised on an observation that unites all 
thinkers considered in this thesis: what Peter keenly observed is the existence of a 
fundamental gap between the levels of development of Russia and the rest of 
Europe, and his reign must be assessed against his endeavour to bridge this gap. 
Schlözer's originality lies in the fact that he focused on an analysis of the cultural, 
or even more specifically, the scholarly dimensions of this gap, rather than the 
political, economical and social ones as had been done by Voltaire, Diderot and 
Levesque. Indeed, in the Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie of 1772, Schlözer 
started a new period of world history around the 15th century brought about by a 
number of interrelated events: the invention of the printing press, the transfer of 
scholarship from Greece to Europe caused by the sacking of Constantinople by 
the Turks and, finally, the reformation, breaking the cultural and political 
stranglehold the papacy had hitherto exerted over the continent. It is from this 
point in time onwards that the history of European Kultur (culture) and 
Aufklärung (enlightenment) starts in earnest, leading to a remarkable period of 
progress, and, ultimately, to contemporary Europe eclipsing all other past or 
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present cultures.487
 
 Russia, that, due to its ancient ties to Byzantium, had 
experienced an early flowering of scholarship supported by a religion far less 
corrupting than the one emanating from Rome, had been cut off from these 
developments. Only just emerging from the Mongol yoke when the European 
renaissance commenced, it had been recovering its military and political strength 
since the regaining of its independence in the 16th century, Schlözer argued, but 
had been stagnating culturally until the advent of Peter. 
And yet, despite Peter's efforts to import European Gelehrsamkeit into Russia, 
Schlözer contended that the actual results achieved were woefully 
disproportionate to the energy invested. In the context of historical scholarship, 
this was due, in the first instance, to the difficulties inherent in the project. The 
necessary critical cleaning of the old Russian annals - we remember, in Schlözer's 
eyes, the sine qua non for any progress in Russian historiography - required a 
combination of skills difficult to attain. It needed scholars both conversant in the 
full range of philological methods and techniques developed in Europe, as well as 
equipped with the ability to read and understand old Slavonic. The two German 
historians employed by the Academy discussed in detail by Schlözer - Gottfried 
Siegfried Bayer, professor of classical history at the Academy since 1726 until his 
death in 1739; and his first employer, Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705-1783), 
associated to the academy since its inception in 1725, first as an adjunct, since 
1747 as imperial historiographer - fell short of either the one or the other 
requirement.488 Bayer, was, according to Schlözer, one of the greatest critical 
scholars and humanists of his time, but never mastered modern Russian, let alone 
old Slavonic, and was, therefore, depended on translations of Russian annals of 
questionable accuracy and on Byzantine sources for his investigations into 
Russia's past.489
                                                 
487 UH, vol. 1, pp. 3, 73-7, 83-4. 
 Müller, on the other hand, who became completely Russified 
during his long stay in St. Petersburg, lost all connection to European scholarship. 
488 For biographical information on Bayer and Müller, see Historische Kommission bei der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., Neue Deutsche Biographie, 23 vols. (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 1953-), vol. 1, p. 678 (Bayer), vol. 18, pp. 394-5 (Müller). On Müller, see 
also Peter Hoffmann, ed., Geographie, Geschichte und Bildungswesen in Russland & Deutschland 
im 18. Jahrhundert: Briefwechsel Anton Friedrich Büsching - Gerhard Friedrich Müller, 1751 bis 
1783 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). 
489 PRA, pp. 151-3; Leben, pp. 52-3.  
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Ignorant of any modern European language apart from German, and, even worse, 
only having a substandard grasp of Latin, Müller, Schlözer alleged, simply lacked 
the necessary philological skills to Europeanise Russian historical scholarship, 
and thereby lift it into modernity.490
 
 
However, the technical difficulty of recruiting the right kind of historian by the 
Academy is only one part of the explanation for the slow progress of historical 
scholarship in Russia. The second, and in many ways more substantial, one is an 
increasing abandonment of Peter's central objective by his successors: to establish 
the Academy as the principal driver for the development of Gelehrsamkeit in 
Russia. Indeed, in the period between Peter's reign until the ascendancy of 
Catherine II, Schlözer detected an increasing corruption of the Academy's initial 
aims, caused by two interrelated developments. First, an ever increasing concern 
with the development of fields of knowledge that are of immediate practical use, 
especially mathematics and the natural sciences, and a corresponding loss of 
status for erudite history within the Academy.491 Second, ever increasing 
endeavours by the government to take direct control over the Academy. Both 
these developments came to a head, according to Schlözer, with the reformation 
of the Academy in 1747 under czarina Elisabeth which resulted in the cancellation 
of the historical class, and the institution of the academic chancellery as a 
governing body which, staffed by organisers rather than scholars, constituted a 
formidable barrier rather than a support to scholarship. Whilst the first 
development demonstrated the ascendancy of reason and genius over erudition, 
and the associated valuing of rapid cultural achievements over the slow 
development of Gelehrsamkeit, the second pointed to the supremacy of what 
Schlözer termed ‘ungelehrte’ over ‘gelehrte’.492
                                                 
490 Schlözer's criticism of Müller was, of course, guarded and implicit whilst he worked for the St. 
Petersburg Academy, and therefore was dependent on the imperial historiographer, and only 
became more explicit later in his life. See, for instance, Leben, pp. 53-5.  
 Both strands of development 
come together, in Schlözer's account, by the rise to power of Mikhail Lomonosov 
since the 1740s; a phenomenon which ultimately resulted in Russian historical 
491 PRA, p. 159. 
492 Leben, pp. 53, 76-7.  
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scholarship declining in quality after the first tentative steps made by Müller and 
Bayer to put it on a modern, European footing.493
 
 
Lomonosov, a polymath, but mostly renowned for his groundbreaking work in the 
natural sciences, became professor of chemistry at the Academy in 1745, and soon 
after became member of the academic chancellery. It is from this position of 
power, Schlözer argued, that Lomonosov launched his attacks against erudite 
historical scholarship. In the first instance, this attack involved a silencing of 
Müller. Müller, in a public lecture of 1749 entitled Origines gentis et nomine 
russorum, had upheld a thesis first developed by Bayer: namely that the founder 
of the Russian monarchy, Rurik, was of Norman, that is to say of German, origin. 
This proposition offended the patriotic sentiments of the Russian Lomonosov, 
who did not hesitate to use his power and influence to suppress the publication of 
the lecture and to achieve the temporary demotion of Müller within the Academy. 
This experience, Schlözer believed, traumatised Müller to such an extent that he 
did not dare to publish anything on Russian history for the next six years.494
 
 
Moreover, Lomonosov also opposed Schlözer’s professorial appointment to the 
Academy in 1764 under the pretext that the latter was only interested in smearing 
the good name of Russia with his historical research. This, ultimately 
unsuccessful, objection was commented on by Schlözer retrospectively in the 
following manner:  
Wenn beim Aufkeimen gelerter Cultur in einem Lande, dem didicisse 
artes das fideliter abgeht, und daher dessen seligste Folgen, das 
emollire mores nec sinere esse feros,495
                                                 
493 On Schlözer’s view of the St. Petersburg Academy before the reforms undertaken by Catherine 
II, see also Fürst, August Ludwig von Schlözer, pp. 39-41. 
 ausbleiben; wenn 
HalbGelerte, die dabei noch imme HalbBarbaren sind, an die Spitze 
der Leitung des GelertenWesens kommen ...: so zeigen sich 
Fänomene, die den meisten Lesern nicht nur neu, sondern kaum 
denkbar, seyn werden ... Nun frage man nicht mer, warum damals die 
Petersburger Akademie nicht das geworden ist, was sie in ihren 
sonstigen Verhältnissen hätte werden können und sollen, - die erste, 
494 Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 91-2; Leben, pp. 53-5. On the relationship between Müller and Lomonosov, 
see also Hoffmann, ed., Geographie, Geschichte und Bildungswesen, pp. 13-14.  
495 A reference to Ovid's adde quod ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes emollit mores nec sinit esse 
feros (add the fact that to have studied faithfully the liberal arts softens the manners, not allowing 
them to be barbarian). 
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die glänzendste, Akademie der Wissenschaften in unsrer ganzen 
LiterarWelt!496
 
 
However, Lomonosov did not only attempt to hamper the activities of the few 
German scholars possessing the requisite skills to work on Russia's history. On 
the contrary, he considered himself a historian and published a short chronological 
account of Russia in 1762, and, posthumously, a substantial history of the Russian 
monarchy since its inception up to the 11th century.497 Schlözer anonymously 
wrote scathing reviews of the German translations of both works – the first whilst 
on home leave from the Academy in 1768, the second after he had returned to 
Germany for good in 1771.498
 
 The first line of Schlözer’s attack is unsurprising. 
Lomonosov may be a man of genius and versed in the natural sciences, but an 
erudite historian he is definitely not: 
Freylich sieht dieses historische Werk eines Chymicus so aus, wie 
eine Chymie aussehen würde, die ein Geschichtsgelehrter schriebe.499
 
 
The cumulative result of the chemist dabbling in the field of history, without an 
understanding of his sources, and without ever having heard of the concept of 
historical criticism, was an unscholarly mishmash of inaccuracies and straight 
untruths, lifted randomly out of the untreated, corrupted annals. As such, Schlözer 
concluded, Lomonosov´s work must be considered as constituting a great leap 
backward in Russian historiography: 
 
Der College von Bayern ist um ein volles Jarhhundert in seiner 
Geschichtskunde zurück ... .500
 
 
                                                 
496 Leben, p. 214.  
497 Mikhail Lomonosov, Kurzgefaßtes Jahr-Buch der Rußischen Regenten, trans. Peter Stählin 
(Copenhagen und Leipzig: Pelt, 1765); Mikhail Lomonosov, Alte Rußische Geschichte, von dem 
Ursprung der Rußischen Nation bis auf den Tod des Großfürsten Jaroslaws des Ersten, oder bis 
auf das J. 1054., trans. Christian Bacmeister (Riga und Leipzig: Hartknoch, 1768). 
498 [Schlözer, August Ludwig], ‘Rezension: Kurzgefaßtes Jahr-Buch der Rußischen Regenten, aus 
dem Rußischen des Hrn. Staats-Raths Michaila Lomonossoff übersetzt durch Peter von Stählin, 
Ihro Kaiserl. Maj. von allen Reußen Legations-Secretair bey Allerhöchst Deroselben Gesandschaft 
am Königl. Dähnischen Hofe. Copenhagen und Leipzig. 1765. 70 Seiten: die Vorrede des 
Uebersetzers hat 8. Seiten’, Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek 8, no. 1 (1768); [Schlözer, August 
Ludwig], ‘Rezension: Alte Rußische Geschichte, von dem Ursprunge der Rußischen Nation bis 
auf den Tod des Großfürsten Jaroslaws des Ersten, oder bis auf das J. 1054. Abegaßt von Michael 
Lomonossow ...’, Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek Anhang Bd. 1-12, no. 1 (1771). 
499 [Schlözer], ‘Rezension: Kurzgefaßtes Jahr-Buch der Rußischen Regenten’, p. 101. 
500 Ibid., p. 103.  
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Solche Historien schrieb man einst vor 200 Jahren in Deutschland, ehe 
es noch historische Kritick und gelehrte Geschichtsforscher gab. Da 
fielen Pfarrherren, Stadtschreiber, und Schulmeister über alte 
Chronicken her ... . Trauriges Schicksal für Rußland noch im vorigen 
Jahrzehend. Doch der Verf. ist nun todt: sanfte ruhen seine Gebeine, 
weil er nicht mehr seine Nation entehren, und der Rußischen 
Geschichte schaden kann!501
 
 
It is the displacement of the at least proto-erudite historical method of Bayer and 
Müller by the anachronistic one of Lomonosov that serves Schlözer as 
explanation why he found a völlig wüstes Feld in regard to historical scholarship 
when he first arrived in Russia. It is this very internal failure of Russian 
historiography to fulfil Peter’s project of closing the gap between European and 
Russian Gelehrsamkeit, that equally elucidates the failing of European historians 
in regards to Russia’s past. Indeed, in the absence of critically cleaned sources, 
Schlözer argued, it was an a priori impossibility for any foreigner to write 
anything meaningful about its history. The mistake of European historiography is 
not that it has written so little about Russia, but that it has written about it at all.502 
In the absence of reliable source material, the field of Russian history became 
occupied, Schlözer claimed, not by professional erudite historians, but by 
uncritical polyhistorians on the one hand, simply randomly collecting pieces of 
available information with little concern about their authenticity or relevance, and, 
even worse, by philosophes such as Voltaire, masking their ignorance of the past 
with witticisms and reasoning, and producing histories littered with mistakes and 
qualitatively not dissimilar to the kind of accounts written by the ignorant 
medieval monks, or, indeed, Lomonosov.503
                                                 
501 [Schlözer], ‘Rezension: Alte Rußische Geschichte’, p. 231. See also Nestor, vol. 2, p. 284.  
 
502 Nestor, vol. 1, p. 90; PRA, p. 139; Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte 
zu traktieren’, p. 52.  
503 Nestor, vol. 1, pp. 103, 110-12; PRA, 33-5, 97, 145-53. See also Schlözer’s review of the 
German translation of Voltaire’s Histoire de l’empire de Russie, which is characterised as ‘dichte 
mit Faux-Brillans, mit historischen Fehlern, mit historischen Lügen ..... und mit falschen 
Raisonnemetis besäet .... mit einem Worte: alles Voltäirisch’. [Schlözer, August Ludwig], 
‘Rezension: Von Voltaire's Geschichte des Rußischen Reichs unter Peter dem Großen. Aus dem 
Französischen übersetzt. Zweyter Theil. Frankf. und Leipz. verlegts Heinrich Ludwig Brönner. 8. 
S. 310’, Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek 10, (1769), p. 254. 
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The cultivation of Russian history: The methodical steps towards 
a pragmatic history 
 
 
The primary purpose of Schlözer’s history of Russian historiography was to serve 
as an introduction to his own methodical plan of how Russian history should be 
cultivated in the future. Whereas the account since the foundation of the Russian 
state up until Peter I indicated the immense wealth of source material lying 
dormant in monasteries, as well as the challenges these sources presented to the 
critically aware historian, the failures of Russian historiography since the czar’s 
reign clearly demonstrated the pitfalls to be avoided if a truly erudite history is 
ever to be written. We have further observed that this history also provided an 
analysis of the relationship between Russia and Europe; most prominently by 
means of tracing the genesis of a fundamental gap between the two regions in 
regard to the status of learning. Schlözer’s plan addressed all these questions by 
outlining how its adoption would significantly shorten the time required to 
critically edit the sources, and how it would thereby contribute toward closing the 
gap. Moreover, a consideration of this plan will also provide us with a first 
indication of what an erudite history as conceived by Schlözer would look like, 
and, as such, will constitute an important point of departure for our final 
investigation into the relationship between the writing of history and successful 
political reform. 
 
Schlözer’s claim that Russian erudition may quickly catch up with its European 
counterpart is somewhat paradoxical, and is reminiscent of Diderot’s argument 
that Catherine could, if she adopted the right measures, swiftly build solid 
foundations for the civilisation of her country in general. Indeed, for both 
thinkers, Russia’s unenviable starting point – Schlözer’s völlig wüstes Feld, 
Diderot’s tabula rasa – provides a unique opportunity if the lessons of Europe’s 
past were duly considered in Russia, and if, therefore, the naturally slow process 
of civilisation (Diderot) or of the development of Gelehrsamkeit (Schlözer) were 
assisted by a historically informed rationality imposed from above. In his 1764 
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submission to the academic chancellery Gedanken über die Art, die russische 
Historie zu traktieren, Schlözer expressed this idea in the following manner: 
 
Ich folgere nicht daraus [i.e. from the fact that Russian historiography 
currently lags significanty behind European historiography], daß 
Rußland noch in 100 Jahren keine Geschichte wie Frankreich, wie 
Deutschland, wie England usw. haben könne. In allen diesen Reichen 
arbeitete bloß die Natur gleichsam sich selbst überlassen, ohne durch 
die Kunst erleuchtet und durch fremde Fehltritte gewitziget zu sein. 
Man arbeitete ohne System aufs Geratewohl, man schrieb aus 
Chroniken, die man nicht verstand, man gründete wichtige Sätze auf 
bloße Schreibfehler der Kopisten, man vermengte zuverlässige 
Nachrichten mit apokryphischen. .... 
 
Es müßte sehr unnatürlich zugehen, wenn ein methodischer Fleiß für 
die russische Geschichte in 20 Jahren nicht so viel täte, als für die 
Historie andrer Reiche in 100 Jahren geschehen ist.504
 
 
Just as it was for Diderot, the main lesson revealed by the European experience is 
the benefit of starting the work from its natural beginning, thereby enabling the 
execution of all the steps needed to achieve the desired end in an orderly and 
methodical fashion. In the context of historiography, starting from the beginning 
of course meant for Schlözer commencing with the critical cleaning of the sources 
and only to proceed to the writing of history once this has been done. It is in this 
respect that Russia holds a significant advantage over the rest of Europe: in 
France, Germany and England, the construction of what Schlözer termed 
complete historical systems had always been one step ahead of what should have 
been done before – source criticism – resulting in a situation where critical 
scholars not only need to clean their sources from inaccuracies and falsehoods, 
but also spend considerable time and energy to investigate and correct untruths 
that had become generally accepted knowledge due to the untimely activities of 
the constructors of systems.505
                                                 
504 Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu traktieren’, p. 53.  
 In Russia where historiography still presents a 
völlig wüstes Feld, only insignificantly littered by the works of chemists and poets 
such as Lomonosov and Voltaire, such an inefficient mode of proceeding, 
Schlözer endeavoured to show, is preventable. In order to achieve this, erudition, 
505 Ibid., pp. 53-4; PRA, pp. 222-4. 
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by its nature always the last branch of the arts and sciences to flourish, needs to be 
imported from Europe into Russia.506
 
 
At the time Schlözer was writing his methodical plans, he believed that the 
conjectures were promising for his proposals to be implemented, thereby ensuring 
that Russian historiography would in the future develop in the most methodical 
manner. First, Catherine II had become czarina in 1762, and Schlözer was 
convinced that she would resume Peter’s project of rendering the development of 
Russian erudition the central objective of her Academy.507 Thereby, the 
ascendancy of mathematics and natural sciences over history could be reversed, 
and thus the much needed institutional support for his project be achieved. 
Secondly, Schlözer was convinced that he was predestined to achieve the required 
fusion of skills needed for a particularly Russian historical criticism to develop.508 
Having studied at the University of Göttingen, the renowned German centre for 
historical erudition, under the guidance of what he considered the world 
authorities in classical and biblical philology – most prominently Michaelis – and 
having rapidly acquired the ability to read Old Slavonic, he had no doubt that he 
was far better equipped to tackle the challenges posed by the Russian sources than 
either Bayer or Müller had been.509
 
 
Moreover, Schlözer’s plan incorporated measures designed to lessen the reliance 
of its success on himself. The task to be performed, Schlözer argued, was too 
extensive to be undertaken by one person alone.510 He therefore advocated that a 
number of Russian students should be assigned to him in order to be instructed in 
the necessary critical skills and ultimately to assist him in his work.511
                                                 
506 See also a letter by Schlözer to Vladimir Grigorievich Orlov (Petersburg, 29 January 1767), 
published in Winter, ed., August Ludwig v. Schlözer und Russland, pp. 178-81. 
 Likewise, 
he endeavoured throughout his stay in Russia to convince the chancellery of the 
Academy to grant stipends to particularly promising young Russians to spend a 
507 PRA, p. 130.  
508 Leben, p. 77.  
509 On Schlözer’s education at the University of Göttingen in particular, and on Göttingen’s 
importance for the development of the critical method more generally, see, for instance, Muhlack, 
‘Histoire und Philologie’, pp. 66-74; Fürst, August Ludwig von Schlözer, esp. pp. 18-23; 
Wesendonck, Die Begründung der neueren deutschen Geschichtsschreibung, pp. 50-4, 73-7; 
Hennies, Die politische Theorie August Ludwig von Schlözers, pp. 10-27.  
510 PRA, p. 129.  
511 PRA, p. 227.  
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spell at the Universität of Göttingen, and offered to oversee their education 
there.512 The intention of both measures was of course to provide historical 
erudition with a much wider basis in Russia, and, in a sense, to nationalise it: if all 
his measures were adopted, reliance on German scholars such as himself would be 
significantly lessened in the future.513
 
 
Once equipped with a group of suitably skilled helpers, Schlözer was convinced 
that he could relatively swiftly establish the basis for what he called a corpus 
historiae Russicae; that is to say a systematised registry of all available facts 
pertaining to the history of Russia. The facts for this registry would be provided 
by two interrelated investigations – the studium monumentorum domesticoroum 
and the studium monumentorum extrariorum. The first investigation comprises the 
collection of all available Russian sources pertaining to its history, and the 
application of historical criticism on these sources in order to distil the factual 
from the false; the second, the methodical study of all foreign sources that may 
contain information relevant to Russia’s past, thereby gaining a wider empirical 
basis to be employed to further interrogate the accuracy of the information 
extracted during the first step, as well as to plug gaps that may exist in Russia’s 
internal historical record. 514
 
 
The resulting corpus historiae Russicae, would, according to Schlözer, possess a 
number of important characteristics. First, it would be as comprehensive as 
possible containing all available information on Russia’s past, and therfore be 
constituted very differently from the random collections of facts hitherto produced 
by polyhistorians. Secondly, it would be a collection of pure facts whose accuracy 
would be of the highest possible order, being devoid of both reasoning on the 
possible meaning of events, as well as of information of questionable truthfulness 
and, as such, of course very different from the kind of histories produced by, for 
                                                 
512 Winter, ed., August Ludwig v. Schlözer und Russland, pp. 11, 19; Doering, Leben A. L. v. 
Schlözer's, p. 133; Martin Peters, Altes Reich und Europa: Der Histoiker, Statistiker und Publizist 
August Ludwig (v.) Schlözer (1735-1809) (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2000), p. 79. 
513 On the idea that Russian historiography should primarily be cultivated by Russians in the 
future, and that the Academy should support the development of Russian erudition, see also a letter 
by Schlözer to Peter Stählin (Göttingen, 25 April 1768) in Winter, (ed.) August Ludwig v. Schlözer 
und Russland, pp. 217-19. 
514 Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu traktieren’, pp. 54-9. See also 
PRA, 226-31.  
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instance, Lomonosov and Voltaire. Third, it would be set up in such a way that it 
could be continuously expanded and improved: if new information should come 
to light, it could be easily incorporated into the corpus; likewise, all facts 
contained could be conveniently cross checked back to their sources, and, 
therefore, continuously re-verified in case of doubt.515
 
 
However, such a collection of pure facts was not considered by Schlözer a history, 
but merely a necessary, preliminary step toward what he called the writing of a 
pragmatic history of Russia – the ultimate end to which his methodical plan was 
geared.516
 
 In order to understand why Schlözer found it necessary to invest so 
much energy and time into the establishment of a corpus historiae Russicae – a 
work merely considered as a means to an higher end – and in order to understand 
why he awarded considerable political significance to the development of 
historical scholarship in Russia, we have to briefly investigate what such a 
pragmatic history would look like.  
In his Russian writings, Schlözer did not specify the nature of such a history. But 
he turned to a precise definition of pragmatic history in one of his first major 
works after he left Russia, and took up a professorship at the Universität of 
Göttingen: the Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie of 1772.517 Schlözer’s 
project of writing a pragmatic universal history was by no means an original one. 
To a very considerable extent, he merely followed his erstwhile teacher, and now 
colleague, Johann Christoph Gatterer, who had endeavoured to conceptualise such 
a history since the 1760s.518
                                                 
515 PRA, pp. 232-4. 
 In his essay Vom historischen Plan, und der darauf 
sich gründenden Zusammenfügung der Erzählungen of 1767, for instance, 
516 PRA, pp. 234-5; Schlözer, ‘Gedanken über die Art, die Russische Geschichte zu traktieren’, p. 
52. 
517 Schlözer revised this work throughout his life. A second edition of the work was published in 
1775; and the two versions of the WeltGeschichte of 1785/89 and 1792 are augmented versions of 
the original Universal-Historie. My discussion of Schlözer’s conception of universal history is 
derived from the first editions of his Universal-Historie and WeltGeschichte; see UH and WG. The 
later editions of both works are: August Ludwig Schlözer, Vorstellung der Universal-Historie, 2nd 
ed. (Göttingen: Johann Christian Dietrich, 1775); August Ludwig Schlözer, WeltGeschichte nach 
Ihren HauptTheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhange, 2nd ed., (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1792).  
518 For a good, brief overview of Gatterer’s historical works, see Peter Hanns Reill, ‘Johann 
Christoph Gatterer’, in Deutsche Historiker, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 9 vols., vol. 6 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980). 
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Gatterer defined the ultimate, if unachievable, goal of a pragmatic universal 
history in the following manner: 
 
Der höchste Grad des Pragmatischen in der Geschichte wäre die 
Vorstellung des allgemeinen Zusammenhangs der Dinge in der Welt 
(Nexus rerum universalis). Denn keine Begebenheit in der Welt ist, so 
zu sagen, insularisch. Alles hängt an einander, veranlaßt einander, 
zeugt einander, wird veranlaßt, wird gezeugt, und veranlaßt und zeugt 
wieder.519
 
 
Pragmatic history, according to Gatterer, is causal history, and, a universal 
pragmatic history would, by definition, reveal the causal relations between 
everything that has ever happened in the world.520 However, Gatterer also showed 
the impossibility of ever establishing such a Nexus rerum universalis: there 
simply have occurred too many events in world history brought about by too 
many causes and themselves causing too many subsequent events for such a feat 
ever to be possible. Therefore, the two main problems a historian has to confront 
are, first of all, to select all those events that are significant enough, either by 
themselves or as contributing causes to other events, to be included in a universal 
history; and, secondly, to arrange all selected events in such a way that the causal 
connection between them is rendered as clear to the reader as possible.521
 
 
Schlözer followed Gatterer very closely in defining both the goal and challenges 
of a pragmatic universal history: 
  
Wir wollen die Revolutionen des Erdbodens, den wir bewohnen, und 
des menschlichen Geschlechts, dem wir angehören, im Ganzen 
übersehen, um den heutigen Zustand von beiden aus Gründen zu 
erkennen. Wir wollen der Geschichte der Menschheit ... ihrer 
succeßiven Entstehung, Veredlung und Verschlimmerung auf allen 
ihren Wegen, von Ländern zu Ländern, von Volke zu Volke, von 
Zeitalter zu Zeitalter, nach ihren Ursachen und Wirkungen 
                                                 
519 Johann Christoph Gatterer, Vom historischen Plan, und der darauf sich gründenden 
Zusammenfügung der Erzählungen (1767), ed. Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer, 2 vols., vol. 2, 
Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 
1990), p. 659. 
520 On the usage of the term pragmatisch to denote a causal enquiry in 18th-century German 
scholarship in general, see Gudrun Kühne-Bertram, ‘Aspekte der Geschichte und der Bedeutungen 
des Begriffs "Pragmatisch" in den philosophischen Wissenschaften des ausgehenden 18. und des 
19. Jahrhunderts’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 27 (1983), esp. pp. 168-73. 
521 Gatterer, Vom historischen Plan, pp. 634-6. 
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nachspüren; und in dieser Absicht die grossen Weltbegebenheiten im 
Zusammenhange durchdenken. Mit einem Worte: wir wollen 
Universalhistorie studiren.522
 
 
The difficulty of grasping world historical events in their mutual causal 
connections arises from the fact that such events are often rooted in a puzzling 
multiplicity of, what are in themselves, very small causes – examples given by 
Schlözer of small but world historically relevant causes include, for instance, the 
arrival of smallpox, gypsies or tobacco in Europe; events, in his opinion, as 
pertinent to an understanding of universal history as is the battle of Zama, the 
destruction of Jerusalem or the peace of Westphalia.523 Furthermore, not only can 
small causes produce world historical effects, but there might often exist a vast 
temporal and/or spatial gap between first cause and final result to be explained, 
which needs to be filled by enumeration of all intermediate causes if the account 
is to be pragmatic.524
 
  
Schlözer’s solution to the problem of historical causation - which is of course 
most marked in the construction of a universal or world history simply because of 
the vastness of the subject matter to be covered, but which in essence needs to be 
addressed in any pragmatic history – is, again, the one Gatterer had proposed 
before him. Only the establishment of methodical rules for selection and ordering 
of events can enable the revelation of historical interconnections. In regards to 
selection for a pragmatic universal history, Schlözer proposed only to treat events 
pertaining to those peoples that have had a significant bearing on the course of 
history as a whole, either through conquests or through wisdom, inventions, trade 
or religion. Whilst this rule of selection of course greatly reduced universal 
history’s subject matter, a second rule led to a widening: for each selected 
universal historical people a wide range of material had to be considered in order 
to understand causally how it had developed and how it fitted into world history 
as a whole. Indeed, for each people relevant causal forces had to be discovered in 
                                                 
522 UH, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.  
523 WG, vol. 1, pp. 6-7; UH, vol. 1, pp. 29-30. See also Schlözer’s essay on Europe’s trade with the 
East Indies, in which he argued that this trade only came about because of a concatenation of 
minute causes but, once established, contributed significantly to world historical events. August 
Ludwig Schlözer, ‘Ueber den Ostindischen Handel’, Encyclopädisches Journal 1, no. 6 (1774), 
esp. pp. 483-7. 
524 WG, vol. 1, pp. 74-7.  
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its geographical positioning, its political, social and economic situation, as well as 
in its cultural and religious life.525 In terms of ordering the selected material, 
Schlözer proposed a two-pronged model according to which universal history had 
to be read twice: first a diachronic reading of the history of each selected people 
focusing on its causal development over time; second, a synchronic ordering of 
the same material, allowing at each point in time a horizontal cut through history, 
showing the interrelatedness of synchronous, but spatially removed, events.526
 
 
Schlözer never wrote such a pragmatic universal history. His writings in this 
respect were merely conceived as illustrated plans or models of such a history. It 
is of course doubtful whether implementation of this model could ever have led to 
a history that would approach the ideal of revealing the nexus rerum universalis; 
an ideal with strong religious root. Indeed, to approach the nexus rerum 
universalis was for Schlözer nothing less than to approach the ways of God on 
earth by revealing how everything human beings do and experience is ultimately 
interrelated, and by showing the existence of a unifying higher order and harmony 
despite the complex, intractable and seemingly random nature of these 
relations.527 However, if the ultimate phenomenon to be explained is the 
interconnection of all things that have ever existed or occurred, any process of 
selection and ordering will endanger such an explanation by either leaving out, or 
misplacing, relevant causes. It is exactly this attempt to approach God in history 
by means of selection and ordering mechanisms only, that led Johann Gottfried 
Herder to attack Schlözer’s Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie in a lengthy 
review.528 As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, what Herder found 
missing in Schlözer’s plan was a firm determination of human nature which 
would in turn allow an exact definition of what it is that humans are meant to 
achieve in history.529
                                                 
525 UH, vol. 1, pp. 20-2.  
 Only such a teleological determination, Herder argued, can 
provide us with a sufficient perspective to select and order; without it, all selection 
and ordering mechanisms will ultimately be purely arbitrary and super-imposed 
526 Ibid., pp. 46-50.  
527 Ibid., pp. 37-8.  
528 Herder, SWS, vol. 5, pp. 436-40. 
529 Ibid., esp. p. 438. 
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on history, thereby hindering rather than sharpening our ability to perceive causal 
relations, and, ultimately, the meaning of history. 
 
For our present concerns, however, more important than the ultimate practicability 
of Schlözer’s model of pragmatic history is the question of its precise relationship 
to the kind of purely erudite investigation he advocated in the case of Russia’s 
past. In this respect Schlözer was adamant that a comprehensive registry of 
critically verified facts of the domain to be studied such as the corpus historiae 
Russicae is a precondition for any attempt at writing a pragmatic history. The 
causal analysis the historian undertakes by means of selection and ordering must 
always happen after the due consideration of all available facts within the 
registry.530
 
 And if very small causes can produce enormous results, two 
consequences follow. First that any factual inaccuracy within this registry, no 
matter how small, can lead to catastrophic mistakes in the causal explanation; and, 
second, that no fact is by itself too small to be included in the registry: what is 
unimportant only becomes clear during the process of causal analysis. 
By repeating the absolute centrality of erudition to the project of a pragmatic 
history, Schlözer also renewed his attacks against polyhistorians on the one hand, 
and against philosophes such as Voltaire, on the other. The purely random 
compilations of facts by the former, Schlözer contended, will never lead to an 
appreciation of complex causes; the latter with their cavalier attitude towards 
factual accuracy, and, even worse, by substituting the empirical and inductive 
method Schlözer proposed with preconceived ideas and by filling gaps in this 
records by flights of genius and hypotheses, will never be able to differentiate 
between what is real and what is purely imagined.531
 
 
And yet, Schlözer’s ideal of pragmatic history also involves a considerable 
softening of the strict divide between reason, genius and erudition which he had 
maintained in his work on Russian history. The discovery of causal connections 
among the mass of information to be processed by the historian is, according to 
Schlözer, an operation that requires more than erudition: 
                                                 
530 UH, vol. 1, p. 13.  
531 UH, esp. pp. 3-4, 40-5.  
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Wer Facta verschmähen kan, die unsre Väter mühsam eintrugen, 
Facta, die sonst ihren guten Nutzen haben, hier aber zwecklos wären; 
wer dagegen gering scheinende Vorfälle bemerken, und in ihnen den 
Keim neuer Jahrhunderte erblicken kan; wer heterogene 
Begebenheiten, die gar keinen Bezug auf einander zu haben scheinen, 
zusammen zu knüpfen versteht, und bei allem diesem Denken doch 
nichts erdichte: der hat ächtes Welthistorisches Gefül, zu welchem 
aufblühende historische Genies zu gewönen, die stolzeste 
Beschäftigung des Lerers seyn muß.532
 
 
The practice of pragmatic history, in other words, requires genius which manifests 
itself as a world historical feeling. But this historical feeling is never allowed to 
operate independent of the available empirical evidence; on the contrary its 
function is to give form to the unwieldy historical facts dugout by erudition by 
establishing their interconnections. By closely intertwining the operations of 
reason, genius and erudition, the pragmatic historian creates a work which no 
longer merely appeals to the faculty of memory.533
 
 Instead by moving from 
disparate, individual facts to causal knowledge, pragmatic history becomes 
philosophical: 
Natürlich hört sie also auf, ein ödes GedächtnisWerk zu seyn, das 
Namen an Namen und Zalen reihet; sondern sie wird Philosophie, die 
immer Wirkungen an Ursachen kettet; sie wird Unterhaltung für jeden 
denkenden Kopf.534
 
 
Crucially, by combining erudition and philosophy, pragmatic history, unlike pure 
antiquarianism, becomes politically useful:  
 
Diese … Beschreibung [of what pragmatic history is] verspricht doch 
schon etwas sehr würdiges, und praktisches. Menschen und Länder 
umschaffen, ist doch in vielen Fällen das Höchste aller 
Regirungskunst: die Mittel dazu lert eben die Wissenschaft, die beider 
                                                 
532 WG, vol. 1, p. 73. Emphasis in the original. 
533 Reill shows that Schlözer’s project described here - to establish a historical methodology 
standing in sharp contrast to the aimless empirical compilations of the polyhistorians, without, 
however, falling into the trap of what he believed to be an over-reliance on hypothetical reasoning 
by the philosophes - can be generalised as being characteristic of 18th-century German professional 
historians. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, esp. pp. 31-43. 
534 WG, vol. 1, p. 8. Emphasis in the original. 
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bisherige (gute oder schlimme) Veränderungen aus Gründen 
beschreibt.535
 
 
Pragmatic history, as the science of the causes of historical change, Schlözer 
implied, is central to any attempt to wilfully transform the world. It is the science 
any reforming sovereign needs to consider to increase the chances of success. As 
such, we are of course provided with a first indication why Schlözer deemed 
Peter’s and Catherine’s support of historical erudition – always the first step 
towards a pragmatic history - as crucial to their respective political projects.   
 
                                                 
535 Ibid., pp. 4-5. Emphasis in the original. 
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From history to politics: Statistics, Gelehrte and the enlightened 
ruler 
 
Despite indicating the political function of history, Schlözer’s historical writings 
do not reveal in any detail how political reform informed by historical knowledge 
works in practice. The main reason for this is that Schlözer never actually wrote a 
pragmatic history. As seen, his works in regard to both Russian and universal 
history were merely conceived as plans of how such a history could be written in 
the future. Therefore, they only provide us with a characterisation of the political 
significance of historical knowledge in general, abstract terms and not in practical 
ones. Moreover, the focus of these works is very much on the relatively remote 
past: the period from the 9th-century institution of the Russian state to the 
Romanov ascendancy in the early 17th century in the former case; from the 
foundation of Rome in ca. 800 BC (or in later versions of his universal historical 
conception from the reign of Cyrus in ca. 550 BC) to the 15th century in the 
latter.536
 
 Given that Schlözer posited a radical break between what he termed 
ancient or old history on the one hand, and modern or new history, on the other, 
this absence in his historical oeuvre of any sustained engagement with modernity, 
again renders the explication of how he precisely conceived of political reform in 
the present difficult. 
And yet, a much more detailed consideration of political reform can be found in 
Schlözer’s work, if we turn our attention away from his explicitly historical 
writings to his contribution to another field of scholarship closely related to it: 
Statistik (statistics) or the systematic empirical description of the contemporary 
situation of a given state in all its aspects. Schlözer had been interested in 
statistics throughout his career. As a student in Göttingen, he attended the courses 
offered by the leading German statistician Gottfried Achenwall.537
                                                 
536 Schlözer changed the periodisation of universal history throughout the successive versions of 
the work; however the beginning of modern history is consistently located around 1500. There of 
course exists a prehistory to either the foundation of Rome or the reign of Cyrus, but, according to 
Schlözer, the dearth of sources in regard to this history do not allow us to study it pragmatically. 
See UH, vol. 1, pp. 67-73; WG, vol. 1, pp. 92-3.  
 While in 
537 On Achenwall's statistics, see Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Politisches und historisches Interesse: 
"Statistik" und historische Staatenlehre bei Gottfried Achenwall (1719 - 1772)’, in Aufklärung und 
Geschichte. 
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Russia he taught statistics to students at the educational institute of the Cossack 
hetman Kirill Razumovsky,538 and, when on leave in Germany, published two 
works concerned with the statistics of Russia: the Neuveränderte Rußland539 - a 
compilation of source material pertaining to Catherine's reform projects - and Von 
der Unschädlichkeit der Pocken in Rußland und von Rußlands Bevölkerung 
überhaupt540 - a statistical investigation into Russia's population, coupled with a 
reform project designed to quickly increase this population. Back in Göttingen, he 
took over the statistical courses of his erstwhile teacher Achenwall in 1772, and 
continued to teach and publish on the subject until his death: most notably through 
three statistical periodicals he edited between 1775 and 1783,541 and, towards the 
end of his life through a theoretical treatise on the subject – the Theorie der 
Statistik of 1804.542
 
 
Through these studies Schlözer fed into a distinctly German scholarly project, 
whose roots reach back to the early 17th century, but which had especially 
gathered momentum and importance since the mid-18th century, not least due to 
the efforts of Achenwall: to establish the basis for a new academic discipline of 
political learning whose main subject matter is provided by the modern state. The 
approach of statistics to the state was empirical: in sharp contrast to a kind of 
political philosophy based on abstraction or on a normative conception of the state 
as it ought to be as provided by natural law, statistics was firmly grounded on an 
empirical understanding of how states actually are and operate. If its empirical 
foundation was the most distinctive feature of this new discipline, practicality was 
its principal end: taught at universities, the principal target audience of statistics 
were future statesmen and government officials, and its importance derived from 
                                                 
538 Leben, chap. 7.  
539 Haigold, Neuverändertes Rußland; Haigold, Beylagen zum Neuveränderten Rußland. 
540 Referred to her as Pocken. 
541 The three periodicals are: August Ludwig Schlözer, Briefwechsel meist statistischen Inhalts. 
Gesammelt und zum Versuch herausgegeben von August Ludwig Schlözer (Göttingen: Johan 
Christian Dieterich, 1775); August Ludwig Schlözer, Briefwechsel, meist historischen und 
politischen Inhalts, 1776-82, 10 vols. (Göttingen: 1776-82); August Ludwig Schlözer, Stats-
Anzeigen, 18 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1782-93). 
542 Referred to here as Statistik.  
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its ability to inculcate a kind of political knowledge that would further directly 
what was termed Staatskunst, or the art to govern.543
 
 
If we are to fully understand Schlözer’s related claims that Peter's and Catherine's 
reigns must above all be understood as attempts to govern with learned 
knowledge, and that the promotion of historical scholarship is central to their 
endeavours, we have to investigate three aspects of his conception of statistics. 
First, we need to examine the nature of the relationship between history and 
statistics both in terms of their aims and methods. Second, we need to consider the 
nexus between statistics and the art to govern, which is based on an infusion of 
Gelehrsamkeit into government. In particular, we have to be attentive to 
Schlözer's contention that rational reform is critically dependent on such an 
infusion. Finally, we have to turn to Schlözer’s claim that princely support for 
statistics is not merely political useful, but legitimising, by providing a sufficient 
limit to the dangers of tyranny. 
 
In his Theorie of Statistik Schlözer took over his teacher's Achenwall's definition 
of statistics: 
 
Stat[istik] heißt der Inbegriff alles dessen, was in einer bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft und deren Lande wirkliches angetroffen wird. ... Der 
HauptNutzen unsrer Wissenschaft besteht darinn, daß man daraus 
einsehen lernt, wie glückselig oder unglückselig ein Reich sei ... . Also 
gehört nur das hieher, was die Wolfart eines Stats in einem merklichen 
Grade angeht, es mag nun solche hintern oder befördern; und dieses 
nennen wir mit Einem Worte, was merkwürdig ist. Dieses wollen wir 
aus Ursachen einsehen, also eine Wissenschaft davon erlangen. 
Demnach enthält Statistik eine "gründliche Kenntnis der wirklichen 
Merkwürdigkeiten eines Stats".544
 
 
                                                 
543 For general accounts of the development of statistics in 18th-century Germany, see Pasquino, 
‘Politisches und historisches Interesse’; Gabriella Valera, ‘Statistik, Staatengeschichte: Geschichte 
im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Aufklärung und Geschichte; Hans Erich Bödeker, ‘Das 
staatswissenschaftliche Fächersystem im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Wissenschaften im Zeitalter der 
Aufklärung, ed. Rudolf Vierhaus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985). On the 
increasingly important role played by university educated government officials in 18th-century 
German cultural and political life in general, see Rudolf Vierhaus, Germany in the Age of 
Absolutism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 55-8. 
544 Achenwall, quoted in Statistik, pp. 6-7. Emphasis in the original. 
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From this initial definition we can already discern a number of commonalities 
between statistics and the ideal of a pragmatic universal history as advocated by 
Schlözer. If universal history traces the improvement or deterioration of mankind 
across time and places, and seeks to uncover the causes for these successive 
revolutions, statistics provides a systematic, causal account of the present state of 
happiness or unhappiness of a given people. Schlözer himself expressed this 
intimate connection between the two fields of enquiry pithily: 'Geschichte ist eine 
fortlaufende Statistik; und Statistik ist eine stillstehende Geschichte'.545
 
 
Indeed, strictly speaking statistics is not a separate academic discipline at all, but 
part of history. History written in a modern fashion, Schlözer showed, no longer 
has biographies of kings, and accounts of wars and battles as its main subject 
matter, as had been the case with the monkish chroniclers of the past. On the 
contrary, it is concerned with tracing the manifold ways by which governments 
have transformed their countries, for better or worse, in all their dimensions - 
economically, culturally, socially and politically - and with assessing the impact 
of such reforms on the happiness of the people. Historians are therefore interested 
in Staatsmerkwürdigkeiten - the determinants of improvements/deteriorations, 
happiness/unhappiness - of the past, whilst statisticians are, essentially, historians 
of the present.546
 
 
Crucially, historians and statisticians face exactly the same kind of challenges, 
and are urged by Schlözer to use the same methodological apparatus to overcome 
them. Both are thoroughly non-speculative fields of enquiry, whose starting point 
must be the establishment of a firm empirical basis. Although their sources may 
be different - annals and historical documents in the case of history; travel 
accounts, newspapers, contemporary governmental records, and, if available, 
officially compiled lists and tables in the case of statistics - the twin enemies of 
either kind of investigation are insufficient evidence, or, even worse, 
unrecognised factual mistakes within the body of available empirical data. Hence, 
                                                 
545 Statistik, p. 86.  
546 Ibid., pp. 92-3.  
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both historian and statistician need to possess the same critical skills to compile, 
assess and verify their sources.547
 
  
Whilst knowledge of erudite criticism is therefore a prerequisite for the successful 
statistician, it is not sufficient. A random collection of facts, no matter how 
truthful, is useless. Just like the historian, therefore, the statistician needs to 
systematise his facts by means of rules of selection and ordering. Moreover, if he 
wants to produce a statistical work of the highest order - or, as Schlözer termed it 
a räisonnierte Statistik - selection and ordering must be carried out in such a way 
that causal connections between otherwise insignificant facts become apparent: 
 
Manches Datum scheint unbedeutend zu seyn, und wird übersehen; 
seine Wichtikgeit ist versteckt, und wird erst durch Combination 
gefunden. Hier zeige sich Genie und Gelersamkeit des Statistikers: je 
reicher er an Kenntnissen aller Art ist, desto öfter, und manchmal 
überraschend, wird er zwischen 2 Erscheinungen einen 
Zusammenhang, als zwischen Ursache und Wirkunge, finden.548
 
 
The methodological process of statistics, is the same as the one of history. Both 
types of enquiry are dependent, according to Schlözer, on the empirically 
controlled application of genius, in order to establish causal connections between 
potentially very heterogonous and disparate pieces of data. Thereby, a form of 
knowledge is produced which, because of its causal characteristic, speaks to the 
faculty of reason. 
 
It is this kind of knowledge that is indispensable to the art of government. By 
precisely establishing what concrete factors either hinder or further the happiness 
of a given population, the gelehrte statistician, employing the methods of 
pragmatic history on the data of the present, renders the effective manipulation of 
those factors possible. The statistician is, in other words, the most important ally 
for sovereigns trying to fulfil their duty: to increase the happiness of the 
population by engaging in the kind of reform that is most likely to advance this 
desired end. Indeed, as Schlözer put it: 
 
                                                 
547 Ibid., pp. 40-4.  
548 Ibid., pp. 45-6. Emphasis in the original. 
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[Statistik ist] gerade die Wissenschaft, die fast mer als jede andre, 
dazu geeignet ist, one Anmassung und Blödigkeit, Gelersamkeit und 
Regirung mit einander vertraulich zu machen.549
 
  
According to Schlözer, reform informed by statistical Gelehrsamkeit, is 
fundamentally different from reform based on the fanciful ideas of what he calls 
projectors (Projectenmacher). The projector is always a dangerous being, who 
should be avoided by the sovereign as much as the Gelehrte should be courted. 
The fundamental problem with projectors is that their proposals are not derived 
from sound knowledge of the specific circumstances of the society that is to be 
reformed, but instead emanate directly from their empirically uninformed 
geniuses. Following such an erroneous method, projectors envisage grand and 
abstract projects of reform, that typically aim at a swift and radical reconstitution 
of a given society. Such projects, Schlözer argued, either are not practicable at all, 
or if an attempt at implementation is undertaken, will by necessity end in failure, 
as they do not take account of existing complexities.550
 
 
Similar to Levesque, Schlözer regarded sound knowledge rather than the will of 
the sovereign as the crucial limiting factor in political reform. A sovereign may 
well have the will to do good, but without the knowledge of what exactly hinders 
or promotes the good in specific circumstances, this will is unlikely to ever be 
translated into a successful transformation of reality. And yet, Schlözer did not 
share Levesque’s principled scepticism of all forms of radical reform and 
conscious attempts at rapid development. Whilst Levesque cannot conceive of any 
situation in which sufficient knowledge for such a feat would be available, and 
therefore advocates the institution of a variety of defensive barriers to prevent an 
overenthusiastic will to act too swiftly and ruthlessly, the function of Schlözer's 
Gelehrte is not to hamper and temporise the energy of the reforming will, but to 
channel it into the most fruitful direction. Or, to put it differently, Schlözer was 
convinced that the kind of Gelehrsamkeit that underlies both history and statistics, 
with its ability to methodically organise enormous amounts of disparate data into 
                                                 
549 Ibid., introduction (n.p). Emphasis in the original. 
550 For Schlözer's criticism of Projectenmacher, see August Ludwig Schlözer, Allgemeines 
StatsRecht und StatsVerfassungsLere. Voran: Einleitung in alle StatsWissenschaften. 
Encyklopädie derselben. Metapolitik. Anhang: Prüfung der v. Moserschen Grundsätze des Allgem. 
StatsRechts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck- und Ruprechtschen Verlag, 1793), p. 11. See also, Leben, 
pp. 89-91, 146-7. 
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coherent, causal knowledge, can at least in principle render rapid development 
practicable. 
 
Schlözer made the practical case of how statistics can inform reform in the context 
of Russia. Indeed, whilst in St. Petersburg, Schlözer urged Catherine II to institute 
a regular compilation of statistical tables recording all births and deaths that had 
occurred across Russia. Schlözer’s proposals were transmitted to Catherine who 
agreed to partially implement them in 1764. Crucially, Schlözer regarded her 
support for statistics in the same light as her promotion of erudite historical 
scholarship: it was, in his eyes, a return to the principles of Peter I, who had 
already instituted a methodical regime for the periodic surveying of the 
development of Russia’s population; a regime, however, which fell into disuse 
under his immediate successors.551
 
 
In the Von der Unschädlichkeit der Pocken in Rußland und von Rußlands 
Bevölkerung überhaupt (1768), Schlözer presented his analysis of the data 
compiled in St. Petersburg during the first year of the new regime’s operation. His 
findings were stark: Russia is woefully under-populated, and the measures so far 
used to counter this – mainly to attract foreigners as colonists to the Empire’s 
remote parts; a measure, we have seen, that attracted the attention of Diderot – are 
unduly costly and inefficient.552
 
 Instead, he urged the czarina to adopt a 
completely different approach to transform Russia’s demography – an approach 
that would focus on the country’s existing, native population, rather than on 
foreigners. 
Schlözer’s alternative approach was based on the manipulation of two small 
causes significantly influencing the growth of Russia’s population. On the one 
hand, by carefully comparing the assembled empirical evidence in regard to 
causes for death between foreigners temporarily living in St. Petersburg and 
Russian nationals, he came to the conclusion that the latter are far less likely to die 
from smallpox than the former. Moreover, he found in the venerable Russian 
custom of frequently visiting public saunas the most likely cause for the relative 
                                                 
551 Leben, pp. 131-2; Pocken, pp. 65-7.  
552 Pocken, pp. 132-5.  
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harmlessness of a disease that elsewhere accounts for a significant proportion of 
premature deaths.553 If saunas are therefore highly beneficial to population 
growth, and should get as much governmental support as possible, their benign 
influence is more than countered by another, again particularly local, demographic 
determinant: the excessive consumption of spirits in which Russians habitually 
indulge, leading to disproportional death rates among adult males. Hence, the 
second part of Schlözer’s reform proposal: to start a comprehensive programme to 
decrease spirit consumption in Russia. 554
 
 
Schlözer was convinced that Russia’s flagging population - a central concern of 
Catherine, and seen as pivotal to Russia’s development - could easily be doubled 
during the lifetime of the czarina, if she were to act on his recommendations.555 
Importantly, he deemed these proposals as fundamentally different from the kind 
of reform advocated by projectors: rather then being informed by abstract, general 
theories about population growth that are taken out of thin air, his proposals were 
based on the manipulation of the real causes for demographic development in 
Russia.556 Furthermore, the discovery of these causes was of course only rendered 
possible through the rigorous following of the methodical steps Schlözer 
advocated across his historical and statistical writings. As seen, this methodology 
involved the application of a specific kind of learned genius, able to detect all the 
small, often hidden, and, to the untrained eye, apparently insignificant causes, 
when carefully surveying a comprehensive empirical collection of facts that cover 
all aspects of the phenomenon to be explained.557
 
  
We are now of course in a position to understand more fully why Schlözer 
deemed Peter I and Catherine II's support for erudition not solely important for the 
renaissance of Russian historiography, even though this undoubtedly had for 
Schlözer a value sui generis, but also as central to their politics. Realising that 
effective reform is only possible with the help of Gelehrsamkeit, Peter did what he 
could to kick-start its development within Russia, and Catherine, so Schlözer 
                                                 
553 Ibid., pp. 21-9, 77-112.  
554 Ibid., pp. 29-36.  
555 Ibid., pp. 15-16.  
556 Ibid., pp. 136-9; see also Leben, pp. 153-5.  
557 Pocken, p. 17.  
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thought, attempted to re-establish and re-strengthen its position after it had 
suffered decline at the hands of the czars in the intervening period. In particular, 
Schlözer's account of statistics explains why he deemed the establishment and 
maintenance of the St. Petersburg Academy, and its staffing with German 
scholars, the most important of Peter's institutions. Peter thereby effectively 
provided himself and his successors with the means absolutely necessary for his 
central end - the second foundation of Russia through rational reform - to succeed: 
a corps of Gelehrte possessing the requisite skills to produce the kind of 
knowledge without which this end could never be achieved.  
 
Moreover, considering Schlözer's assessment of Peter and Catherine from the 
perspective provided by his discussion of political reform, also clearly elucidates 
how he perceived their project of development through Europeanisation. Most 
importantly, Schlözer was not primarily interested in whether the reforming czars 
imported any specific political, economic, cultural or social policies from Europe 
– in fact, he has hardly anything to say about this. Instead, he draws our attention 
to their promotion of European Gelehrsamkeit within Russia, thereby enabling the 
indigenous formulation of reforming policies that are best suited to the particular 
circumstances of Russia. Schlözer's claim that Russia's complicated history needs 
to be painstakingly studied in all its individuality extends to the study of its 
contemporary situation, and specifically to the learned elucidation of those 
dimensions of this situation most in need of reform. What are universal and hence 
directly importable are merely the methods and tools by which these 
investigations are to be undertaken; the resulting history and reforming policies, 
however, may well turn out to have a distinctly Russian flavour. 
 
The most important outcome of the marriage of government and Gelehrsamkeit is 
undoubtedly the formulation of the most efficient and appropriate reforming 
policies, thereby enabling rapid development. And yet, in the context of a country 
such as Russia in which no formal constitutional limitations on sovereign 
authority exist, governmental support for statistical Gelehrsamkeit takes on a 
wider significance. Schlözer contended that a sovereign that actively promotes 
such a marriage – for instance by means of promoting the study of statistics at 
universities, by instituting the regular compilation of official statistical reports, 
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and, most importantly, by allowing the free circulation of publications concerned 
with the empirical description of the state – also imposes a powerful limit to his 
otherwise unbridled authority. In his Theorie der Statistik, Schlözer characterised 
this statistical bridle in the following manner: 
 
Statistik und Despotism vertragen sich nicht zusammen. Unzäliche 
Gebrechen des Landes sind Feler der StatsVerwaltung: die Statistik 
zeigt sie an, controlirt dadurch die Regirung, wird gar ihr Ankläger: 
das nimmt der Despot ungnädig, der in solchen Angaben sein 
SündenRegister liest. ... Wenn der Satrap Unwarheiten einberichtet, 
oder LandesGebrechen verschweigt, an denen er vielleicht selbst 
Schuld ist; wer mag dem aufgeklärteren Patrioten zumuten, seine 
Stimme dagegen zu erheben, so bald er den langen Arm des Satrapen 
zu befürchten hat? ... Offene hingegen, und Jar aus Jar ein fortgesetzte 
Statistik, ist, ... auch die unverdächtigste und urkundliche LobRede auf 
eine weise Reigierung. Unzäliches Gutes im Lande ist ihr Werk; der 
Bürger erfärt es nun actenmäßig und in Zalen ... welch süße Belonung 
für gute Regenten! Dies fangen daher an, sich aus den JaresBerichten 
über ihre Reiche ein Studium zu machen ... “So viel ists noch nie 
gewesen“, sagte einst Friedrich der Einzige auf den ersten Blick, als er 
in seiner KirchenListe die Summe aler Gebornen seines Reichs 
übersah.558
  
 
Whilst Schlözer juxtaposed here the Satrap, or the subaltern Persian despot, who 
consciously falsifies the statistics of his province, thereby depriving the citizen of 
the possibility of informing the government about existing afflictions, with 
Frederick II of Prussia, the latter can be legitimately substituted with either Peter I 
or Catherine II. Indeed, the beginning of the quote is directly lifted out of 
Schlözer’s earlier Öffentliches und privat-Leben where he explained the 
incompatibility of statistics with despotism in the context of Catherine’s support 
for his own proposals to introduce statistics into Russia.559
 
 
Despotism, according to Schlözer, is defined solely by the abuse of absolute 
power, and is therefore improperly applied to a regime that actively uses 
unlimited power to achieve its proper end: to increase the happiness of its 
population.560
                                                 
558 Statistik, pp. 51-2. Emphasis in the original. 
 Encouraging the production of the kind of knowledge that can 
559 Leben, p. 131.  
560 Schlözer, rather implausibly, thought that such a definition of despotism is supported by 
Montesquieu. See, Schlözer, Allgemeines StatsRecht, p. 114. 
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channel sovereign power towards the achievement of its desired end, and 
transparently giving account of the results of the application of sovereign power, 
thereby inviting subjects to critically scrutinise governmental activity and to 
participate in the production of statistical knowledge, are the hallmarks of an 
enlightened, rather than a despotic, regime. Enlightened governments - or 
government by means of learned knowledge - are geographically and historically 
specific: they have developed in modern Europe through the infusion of 
Gelehrsamkeit into government, and are fundamentally different from Oriental 
despotisms, where ignorant Satraps rule by power only,561 or from the regimes of 
antiquity which could not benefit from the immense capacity of knowledge 
production and organisation that defines modern Europe.562
 
  
According to Schlözer, it was the main achievement of Peter and Catherine to 
have propelled Russia into modernity by emulating European Gelehrsamkeit. 
Thus, they provided Russia with the most important means for rational reform 
and rapid development. However, their formally unlimited power has become 
subject to limits in the process. Just as Russian historiography has become the 
legitimate property of any scholar with the requisite critical skills, thereby 
curtailing the power of an unscholarly writer such as Lomonosov attempting to 
despotically distort uncomfortable truths, the political actions of Russian 
sovereigns could now be checked against existing evidence for their 
appropriateness and, if needed, criticised by the learned public both within and 
outside of Russia. 
 
                                                 
561 On this point see, for instance, Schlözer, Briefwechsel, meist historischen und politischen 
Inhalts, 1776-82 vol. 3, issue 16, pp. 254-5. In this small article Schlözer takes a Viennese 
professor – Heyrenbach - to task for having suggested that certain state affairs should be off-limit 
for learned investigations: ‘Alle RegierungsCabineter der Welt … sind von 2erlei Art. Entweder 
sie sprechen und handeln nach Einsicht und gelerter Kenntnis von Rechts- und Tatsätzen: oder sie 
sprechen und handeln blos nach Macht. Die erstern brauchen Litteratur, und ermuntern, ehren, und 
suchen sie; die letztern brauchen sie nicht, vielmehr ist sie ihnen im Wege, also scheuen und 
verscheuchen sie sie. – Danke doch Hr. H. mit mir dem Himmel, daß alle unsre europäischen 
Cabineter von der erstern Art sind! Und dringe er ihnen nicht wider ihren Dank und Willen ein 
Recht auf, das sie nicht haben, dessen sie nicht bedürfen, dessen Ausübung sie verschmähen, so 
lange sie christlich-europäische Cabineter, und nicht asiatische Divane und Serails, d. i. Stille 
düstere PolyphemusHölen, sind.’ 
562 Statistik, pp. 1, 110-12; Pocken, pp. 122-3.  
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5. Johann Gottfried Herder: Russia as the future of 
civilisation between Europe and Asia 
 
Introduction 
 
To finish a thesis on the European engagement with Russian history during the 
Enlightenment with a chapter on Johann Gottfried Herder might be seen as 
problematic for at least two reasons. First, Herder never engaged substantially 
with Russian history. Despite the fact that he intended to write a book on Russia’s 
civilisation early in his career, this project was never undertaken and, as a 
consequence, his reflections about Russia and its history remain fragmentary and 
cursory. Second, it is often questioned whether Herder should be included in the 
tradition of the Enlightenment at all, or whether his writings constitute a complete 
break with the French philosophes and the German Aufklärers.563
 
 
Much of the secondary literature on Herder's writings on Russia also focuses 
extensively on either the cursory nature of his relevant writings or his apparently 
troubled relationship to the Enlightenment. On the one hand, there is a tradition of 
scholarship claiming that his reflections on Russia should not be taken too 
seriously, because they are not based on sustained, reasoned argument, but find 
their source in Herder's creative imagination running wild.564
                                                 
563 The classic portrayal of Herder as a rebel against the Enlightenment is Isaiah Berlin, Three 
Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), pp.168-243. 
 On the other hand, 
however, the big impact of the same writings in 19th century Russia has also been 
noted, and Herder has been firmly established as a forerunner and source of 
inspiration for Slavophilism - a movement which, in its most radical form, wanted 
to completely break the Slavs' connections to Europe, resist cultural imposition 
564 See, for instance, Rudolf Haym, Herder, ed. Wolfgang Harich, 2 vols. (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 
1954) vol. 1, p. 360; Ernst Birke, ‘Herder und die Slawen’, in Schicksalswege deutscher 
Vergangenheit: Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Deutung der letzten hundertfünfzig Jahre; Festschrift 
für Siegfried A. Kaehler, ed. Walther Hubatsch (Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1993), esp. p. 95; B. 
Suphan, ‘Peter der Grosse, Herders Fürstenideal’, Altpreussische Monatsschrift 10 (1873), p. 108; 
Lubov Keefer, ‘Herder's Russian Utopia’, Modern Language Notes 51, no. 6 (1936), p. 358. 
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from the outside, and promote the development of a native culture instead.565
 
 In 
its extreme forms, Slavophilism constitutes a radical reaction to the 
Enlightenment discourse on Russia which we have traced so far, which was 
largely based on establishing links between Russia and Europe by indicating the 
ways in which their respective histories may relate and interact.  
This chapter seeks to show, however, that both views are based on an essentially 
de-contextualised and partial reading of Herder's reflections on Russia, which 
scarcely does justice to the richness and complexity of his thought. Whilst the 
accusation of a creative imagination running wild can certainly be supported if 
Herder's most famous piece on Russia - the chapter on the Slavs in the Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit566
                                                 
565 Mechthild Keller, ‘"Politische Seeträume": Herder und Russland’, in Russen und Russland aus 
deutscher Sicht. 18. Jahrhundert: Aufklärung, ed. Mechthild Keller (München: Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag, 1987), pp. 393-4; Peter Drews, Herder und die Slaven. Materialien zur 
Wirkungsgeschichte bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, (München: Verlag Otto Sager, 1990), pp. 
7-10; Birke, ‘Herder und die Slawen’; Wolfgang Gesemann, ‘Herder's Russia’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 26, no. 3 (1965), pp. 424-5. 
 - is read in isolation, it becomes 
apparent that the prophecy of the future of Russia contained therein, appears far 
less spectacularly imaginative if it is integrated within his reflections about Russia 
as a whole, and if these, in turn, are read in the context of his anthropology and 
philosophy of history. Such a comprehensive reading of Herder also reveals that 
the portrayal of Herder as an anti-Enlightenment figure needs serious 
qualification. In particular, and most important for our present concerns, the 
chapter will show that the project that has united all thinkers so far considered 
here, namely to find a relationship between the histories of Europe and Russia, 
also informs Herder. In seeking to establish such a relationship, Herder, far from 
rebelling against the Enlightenment discourse on Russia, largely stays within its 
boundary by critically engaging with a host of themes centred around the key 
Enlightenment problem of how to civilise Russia: What is the role of the will in 
history in general, and the one of the enlightened ruler when civilising in 
particular? Should civilisation happen from the bottom-up or be imposed top-
down? What is the role of cultural importation and imitation and how do these 
relate to internal development? Herder’s answers to such questions in the context 
of the debate about Russia reveals that neither his thought, nor the Enlightenment, 
566 Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 4, pp. 640-3.  
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can be properly understood, if we regard him as a rebel against an ostensibly 
monolithic Enlightenment tradition. 
  
In order to capture some of the richness and complexity of Herder's thought, this 
chapter's first section contains a comprehensive overview of his writings that 
touch upon Russia. The majority of these writings were written early in Herder’s 
life, during the late 1760s, with later remarks about the country to a considerable 
extent merely reinforcing arguments already contained during this first, most 
intense, phase of engagement. In subsequent sections, these fragmentary 
reflections will be considered within the context of Herder's conceptions of 
anthropology and the philosophy of history as they developed over the next three 
decades. By offering such a reading of the early fragments on Russia against the 
background provided by his later anthropology and philosophy of history, I am 
not seeking to make a substantive argument about the development of Herder’s 
thought as a whole. To put it differently, the argument pursued here is not that the 
Russian writings of the 1760s were already pregnant with a complete 
anthropology and philosophy of history that subsequently merely unfolded. Rather 
my claim is that the young Herder, when contemplating Russia, formulated a 
number of interrelated problems to which he continuously returned, and that the 
substantive engagement with such problems in his anthropological and historical 
writing in turn illuminates two important aspects of his Russian fragments. First, 
that the distinct elements of Herder's reflections on Russia, whilst appearing 
unconnected when read on their own, show a considerable degree of consistency 
and relatedness when integrated within Herder's total philosophy. Secondly, that 
the account of Russia that emerges from such a reading, whilst highly original, 
does not fall outside the Enlightenment discourse of Russia as traced throughout 
this thesis, but rather tries to mediate between rival conceptions already contained 
within it. 
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The Russian fragments: Peter, the Black Sea, and the question of 
true Bildung 
 
Herder showed an interest in Russia throughout his career, and reflections about 
the country’s recent past, present and future are scattered across his oeuvre. 
However, the most intense preoccupation with the country occurred early in his 
life, and, intriguingly, found written, if not published, expression just at the point 
in time when he was leaving Russia. Herder had lived and worked in Riga since 
1764 and left this town under Russian dominion in 1769 for Nantes. It is the 
Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769567 – conceived as a philosophical travel diary 
to be distributed among close friends, but never completed – and a host of smaller 
texts, written in France alongside the diary,568 that contain the fullest picture of his 
conception of Russia. Herder established three main topics relevant to Russia in 
these texts - an appraisal of Peter I; an outline for a comprehensive programme of 
reform to be implemented by Catherine II; and a prophecy about Russia’s near 
future – which structure his thought about the country throughout his life. Indeed, 
cursory reflections about Russia published later, most particularly in the Vom 
Einfluß der Regierung auf die Wissenschaften, und der Wissenschaften auf die 
Regierung (1780),569 the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
(1784-91)570 and the Adrastea (1801-1803),571
 
 are to a considerable extent mere 
elaborations upon arguments already contained in the Journal. The aim of this 
section is to trace the immediate content of Herder’s account in regard to all three 
topics across these writings. This will reveal the consistency and relatedness of 
Herder's Russian reflections despite their fragmentary nature, as well as indicate 
the considerable extent to which Herder explicitly engages therein with the wider 
Enlightenment discourse on Russia. 
The first theme of Herder’s Russian writings revolves around an appraisal of the 
historical role of Peter I in the civilisation of Russia. It is generally a very positive 
                                                 
567 Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 355-474.  
568 These are: Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen fremder Schriftsteller über die Bildung der 
Völker, SWS, vol. 4, pp. 469-78; Gedanken bei Lesung Montesquieus, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 468-73; 
Über die Bildung der Völker, SWS, vol. 32, pp. 231-4. 
569 SWS, vol. 9, pp. 307-408. 
570 Hanser, vol. 3. 
571 SWS, vols. 23-4. 
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portrayal, which led Suphan to declare and deplore that Peter was nothing less 
than Herder’s Fürstenideal (his ideal monarch).572
 
 However, we shall see in the 
course of this chapter that it might be misleading to impute any ideals of 
governance to Herder. Governments are in his philosophy only means and not 
ends, and, therefore, must be of a flexible and pragmatic disposition, rather than 
of a fixed or ideal one, in order to deliver constant ends in changing historical 
circumstances. If we are to understand Herder’s view of Peter, in other words, it is 
necessary to enquire precisely what he believed the czar achieved given pre-
Petrine Russia’s state of development. 
The textual context of the very first, fleeting reference to the czar is already highly 
instructive for Herder’s understanding of his achievements. In a short essay 
written for the Gelehrte Beyträge zu den Rigischen Anzeigen in 1764, which deals 
with the advantages and disadvantages of learning foreign languages, Peter is 
cited as an example of the benefits foreign influences can have on development: 
 
Alsdenn (i.e. through learning foreign languages) erhebe ich mich zu 
ihm (i.e. a genius speaking or writing in a foreign tongue), und gebe 
meiner Seele die Ausdehnung jedes Klimas. So ward Cicero an 
Demosthenes Schriften ein Redner: so weinte Alexander am Grabe 
Achills nach dem Ruhm des Ueberwinders, an Alexanders Bilde 
schuff sich Cäsar zum Helden, und Peter an der Säule des Richelieu 
zum Schöpfer von Rußland.573
 
 
Even though the essay advocated the learning of foreign tongues in order to widen 
the education of the individual, and to speed-up the process of the development of 
the arts and sciences through inter-communal communication, Herder qualified 
this argument in two important respects. First, he noted that cultivation through 
foreign influences is historically specific. In ancient history, spanning the period 
before the Roman Empire, individuals and nations generally developed in 
autarky, and there was simply no need to learn foreign languages or indeed have 
any communication with the outside world.574
                                                 
572 Suphan, ‘Peter der Grosse, Herders Fürstenideal’, p. 108. 
 It is therefore no coincidence that 
the passage just quoted starts with the example of Cicero successfully imitating 
Demosthenes. Secondly, Herder urged caution against the soaking up of foreign 
573 Über den Fleiß in mehreren gelehrten Sprachen, SWS, vol. 1, p. 5. 
574 Ibid., p. 3. 
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languages, arts and sciences in a unreflecting manner: we can only benefit from 
foreign influences if we approach them from the fixed starting point provided by 
our own cultural background. When entering into a foreign world, we have to 
carefully compare the foreign with the indigenous, and be conscious to only 
import influences that can be adapted to, and enrich, our own traditions.575
 
 Or, to 
put it differently, Cicero, by learning from Demosthenes, did not endeavour to 
become Greek, but to create a distinctly Latin oratorical tradition by adapting 
elements of the vocabulary and style of the Athenian statesman. Likewise, as we 
shall see in the following, Herder did not believe that Peter’s importation of 
certain elements of European culture – signified here by his tribute to Richelieu 
made during his second journey to Europe in 1716-1717 – was a sufficient cause 
for the creation of a new Russia. 
In this short early essay Herder has already established the main lines of argument 
that frame his assessment of Peter throughout his life. Most importantly, the essay 
clearly indicates that for Herder, just as for all thinkers considered in this thesis, 
Peter’s reign must be assessed in the context of an attempt to propel Russia into 
modernity by emulating Europe. However, the essay also highlights the 
complexity involved in processes of cultural imitation, and the subsequent 
writings dealing with Peter elaborate on such complexities, thereby arriving at a 
successively more distinct conception of the state of Russia prior to Peter, the 
achievements of his reign, and his legacy.  
 
In all his writings Herder was adamant that Peter was correct to attempt to civilise 
Russia by imitating Europe. In the Journal, for instance, Peter was lauded for 
having induced a passion for imitation and innovation in his subjects: 
 
Leichter nachzuahmen, zu arripieren ist keine Nation, als sie [i.e. 
Russia]; alsdenn aber, da sie alles zu wissen glaubt, forscht sie nie 
weiter und bleibt also immer und in allem stümperhaft. So ists; auf 
Reisen welche Nation nachahmender? in den Sitten und der 
französischen Sprache, welche leichter? in allen Handwerken, 
Fabriken, Künsten; aber alles nur bis auf einen gewissen Grad. Ich 
sehe in dieser Nachahmungsbegierde, in dieser kindischen 
Neuerungssucht nichts als gute Anlage einer Nation, die sich bildet, 
                                                 
575 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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und auf dem rechten Wege bildet: die überall lernt, nachahmt, 
sammlet ... .576
 
 
This defence of Russians’ passion for imitation was no doubt directed against 
Rousseau’s charge that Peter merely possessed a génie imitatif and not a real 
génie créative, and that, by turning his subjects into weak, degenerate copies of 
Europeans he had corrupted them in an untimely fashion.577
 
 For Herder, just as 
for Voltaire, starting the civilisation of Russia by means of imitation was entirely 
appropriate. 
Herder not only defended Peter against Rousseau, but also against Diderot. In his 
most comprehensive account of the czar, undertaken in an article dedicated to 
Peter in the Adrastea,578
 
 Herder implicitly engaged with Diderot’s argument that 
Peter, by only following his own will and not the laws of nature, had confused the 
natural order by which civilisation develops. Contrary to Diderot's contention that 
Peter was mistaken to start the civilisation of Russia by promoting the fine arts 
and higher sciences rather than first strengthening Russia's agricultural and 
industrial basis, Herder claimed that the czar's project involved all aspects of life 
at the same time and that this way of proceeding was entirely appropriate: 
An den Rand des Entwurfs einer Akademie der Wißenschaften 
bemerkte er Commißionen an seinen General in der Ukraine über 
Ochsen und Schaafe. Sämmtliche wahre Wissenschaften sah er als 
unentbehrlich in ihrer hohen Nutzbarkeit an; er betrachtete sie sowhol 
als Unterricht und Vervollkommung zu größerer Tüchtigkeit, als auch 
wie Werkzeuge zu unzähligen praktischen Vortheilen.579
 
 
Whilst invoking the simultaneity of the establishment of the St. Petersburg 
Academy and a concern with agricultural production in the Ukraine challenged 
Diderot's argument on empirical grounds, Herder equally denied the veracity of 
the philosophe’s wider point that the czar's reforms were directed against the 
normal course of nature. In a dialogue entitled Über die schnelle Kunstbildung 
                                                 
576 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 366-7. 
577 Du contrat social in Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 3, p. 386. 
578 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, pp. 436-42. 
579 Ibid., p. 439. Emphasis in the original. 
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der Völker that immediately follows the article on Peter in the Adrastea,580
 
 Herder 
tackled the question whether forced, rapid development such as the one attempted 
in Russia can ever succeed or whether such a method of civilisation necessarily 
collides with the rhythm of nature. 
One of the protagonists in the dialogue makes Diderot's point that nature imposes 
both an order and a rhythm on the process of civilisation that cannot be 
overridden by man: 
 
Eben wie die Natur bei jedem Gewächs seine, und eben damit ihre 
Zeit hält .... sollten die Menschen nicht auch bei dem feinsten Werk, 
das sie zu treiben haben [i.e. the civilisation of their country], indem 
sie die Natur nicht etwa nur nachahmen, sondern sie veredlen, sollten 
sie nicht auch mit jedem Gewächs seine Zeit halten? D.i. bei keinem 
Frucht vor der Blüthe, bei keinem Blüthe im Keim fodern? 
 
However, it is his opponent that wins the argument by means of a reference to 
Peter: 
 
Doch aber, wo es die Natur des Gewächses will, die Blüthe durch Ein 
befruchtendes Donnerwetter hervortreiben? Ich dachte eben an Peter 
den Großen, der seine Nation auf Einmal, und zwar mit Gewalt in 
Künsten blühend machte. 581
 
 
By indicating that Russia was in a situation which demanded that the process of 
civilisation be forcefully speeded-up,582 Herder of course needed to give an 
account of this situation. In his early writings he, just like Diderot, was 
ambivalent on this question. Indeed, he generally claimed that pre-Petrine Russia 
was in a youthful, savage state close to nature,583
                                                 
580 Ibid., pp. 442-55. 
 whilst at the same time also 
giving strong hints that Peter had inherited a complex country comprised of 
cultivated, semi-cultivated and savage provinces, whereby the cultivated 
provinces were described as having characteristics more akin to Oriental empires 
581 Ibid., p. 443-4. Emphasis in the original. 
582 See also Haben wir noch jetzt das Publikum und Vaterland der Alten? Abhandlung zur Feier 
der Beziehung des neuen Gerichtshauses, SWS, vol. 1, p. 25.  
583 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 418. See also Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, 
p. 476. 
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than of savage tribes.584 In the Adrastea, however, Herder unequivocally stressed 
the Oriental nature of Russia: far from having been confronted by a savage tabula 
rasa, Peter had inherited an Empire profoundly influenced by what he described 
as Asiatic and late Greek, read Byzantine, culture, and whose main characteristic 
was not ahistoricity but stasis. 585
 
 
Herder's precise conception of the role of an enlightened ruler faced with an inert 
country and his account of the historical nexus between Asia and stasis will be 
explored in much more detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Here it 
suffices to note that his defence of Peter against Rousseau and Diderot was based 
on a conviction that static 17th century Russia needed the imposition of Peter's 
will, expressing itself through the importation of European culture and inducing 
imitative behaviour in his subjects, in order to provide it with a source of 
dynamism previously lacking. 
 
This account of Peter as the creator and founder of a new civilisation through 
emulation of Europe is of course strikingly Voltairian. However, Herder departed 
from Voltaire's assessment of the czar in two important respects. First of all, he 
explicitly faulted Peter for having exclusively turned towards Europe. In 
particular, the building of St. Petersburg - the czars window to Europe in the 
North - was a mistake that had decentred Russia. According to Herder, the 
Empire's real centre did not lie at the Baltic coast in the Northwest, but at the 
shore of the Black Sea in the South. The contrast between Voltaire and Herder is 
best illustrated through their diverging assessments of Peter's actions after he had 
conquered Azov from the Turks in the course of his first major military campaign 
in 1696. As we have seen, for Voltaire this was a decisive moment in Peter's 
career, and he fully supported the czar's decision to turn his attention away from 
the Turks and the South and towards Sweden and the North, thereby starting his 
project of Europeanisation in earnest.586
 
 Herder, by contrast, judged this decision 
very differently: 
                                                 
584 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 412, 426-7. 
585 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, pp. 447-9. 
586 Histoire de l’empire de Russie, OC, vol. 46. p. 583.  
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Sonderbar ist der Gedanke, daß, wenn Peter die Wünsche, die er 
seinem Reich bei der Bestürmung Azows nöthig fand, nach dessen 
Eroberung dort bevestigt, und von dortaus seine Plane [sic.] zu See 
und zu Lande angelegt hätte; welch eine andre Gestalt hätte Rußland 
erhalten! Eine Residenz im schönsten Klima, am Ausfluße des Don, in 
der glücklichsten Mitte des Reichs, von da der Monarch seine 
Europäischen und Asiatischen Provinzen wie die rechte und linke 
Hand gebrauchen, dem Türkischen Reich hätte Trotzbieten, dem 
Handel der drei alten Welttheile, mithin auch des vierten, im Schoos 
seyn mögen!587
  
 
Secondly, in Herder's view, the emulation of Europe was only a necessary first 
step for Russia's development, and he consistently stressed that a second, equally 
necessary step, was still missing. In the Journal, for instance, Herder claimed that 
if Peter's main achievement had been to induce in Russians an appetite for 
imitation and a passion for innovation, his successors now needed to nationalise 
the imitations and innovations, thereby raising its culture to a state of 
perfection.588
 
 Likewise, in the Adrastea, Herder summed up Peter's achievements 
in the following manner: 
Fremde Künstler und Glaubensgenoßen mochte der große Kaiser 
einführen; sie cultivirten von innen seine Nation nicht. Der 
Nationalcharakter, die griechische Sitte und Lebensweise, endlich die 
griechische Kirche standen Felsenvest da; sie konnten weder, noch 
wollten bei einer andern, geschweige der Holländisch-Deutschen Sitte 
und Kirche zur Lehre gehen. Peter indeß erfüllte seinen Beruf; mit 
dem übersehendsten Geist diente er auch im Bau seines Staates von 
unten hinauf, so weit er kommen mochte; den Fortbau überließ er der 
Nachzeit.589
 
 
Peter's first step in the civilisation of Russia had been to import aspects of 
European culture, but he had not had sufficient time to provide these imports with 
strong roots; the cultivation of Russia from within, in other words, was still 
outstanding. Likewise, the imposition of Peter’s will on his previously static 
nation, Herder implied, is not the end, but the beginning of the story: this top-
down imposition is merely conceived as a beginning for building Russia from 
below. We can see that Herder took a mediating stance in the Voltaire-Diderot 
debate about Peter and Russia. Rather than presenting external, top-down 
                                                 
587 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, p. 439. Emphasis in the original.  
588 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 367. 
589 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, p. 451. Emphasis in the original. 
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civilisation (Voltaire) and internal, bottom-up development (Diderot) as mutually 
exclusive models, Herder sought to combine both by conceiving them in a 
temporal sequence. What Peter had started, his successors - and most notably 
Catherine II - had to bring to fruition, but not by following in the great czar's 
footsteps as Voltaire had suggested, but through a change of direction.590
 
  
When Herder wrote his Journal, he harboured high hopes that he himself could 
inspire this necessary change of direction by finding the ear of Catherine II with a 
number of proposals for reform.591 Indeed, the Journal, written at an important 
cross-roads in Herder's life after his sudden departure from Riga, contains a 
variety of plans for future possible career moves.592 One such move involves 
participating by word and deed in Catherine's efforts to improve Russia. Herder 
sketched two related options of how he could contribute to the development of 
Russia. On the one hand, he contemplated at length an eventual return to Riga in 
order to continue his previous career as a priest and educator.593 At the same time, 
the Journal, as well as a number of concept notes and letters written in Nantes 
and Paris in 1769-1770, contain a draft for a book entitled Über die wahre Kultur 
eines Volks und insonderheit Rußlands which he hoped to send to the czarina in 
order to directly influence the direction of her reform programme.594
 
 
Underlying both these options is one unifying idea: Peter's imposed cultural 
imports need to be assimilated or nationalised through reforms to be undertaken 
by Catherine, and thereby the new civilisation, which had so far been an external, 
                                                 
590 To my knowledge only Keller has noted how closely Herder engaged with Voltaire and Diderot 
in his appraisal of Peter and Catherine. According to Keller, Herder's assessment of these two 
rulers indicates the extent to which Herder shared with Voltaire and Diderot an alleged general 
Enlightenment hope about the efficacy of reform from above. However, such a monolithic frame 
of reference can neither capture the differences between Voltaire's and Diderot's conception of the 
enlightened ruler of Russia, nor, indeed, Herder's attempt to synthesise the two. See Keller, 
‘"Politische Seeträume": Herder und Russland’, pp. 365-7. 
591 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 410-1. The idea that Catherine was destined to be the ruler to bring 
Peter's reforms to their conclusion predates the Journal. See, for instance, Herder's Predigt am 
Namensfest der Monarchin (1768), SWS, vol. 31, p. 45, and his Ode auf Katherinens 
Thronbesteigung (1765), SWS, vol. 29, pp. 24-7. 
592 For an account of the biographical context of the Journal, see Haym, Herder, vol. 1, pp. 337-80 
and LB, vol. 1, pp. xxxviii-xliii. 
593 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 373-7, 380-409.  
594 See ibid., 410-12. Two letters by Herder written whilst in Nantes touch upon the planned work 
on Russia: To J. F. Hartknoch, Briefe, vol. 1, Nantes, October 1769, Nr. 72, pp. 166-71; to 
Begrow, Briefe, vol. 1, Nantes, November 1769, Nr. 73, pp. 172-4. For references to the three 
drafts closely related to the projected work on Russia, see footnote 568 above.  
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European veneer artificially imposed on the country's static and Asiatic core, 
could be internalised. The concept Herder employed to denote this idea is 
Bildung. For instance, working as a priest, Herder hoped to improve the souls of 
Riga's population 'nicht schriftlich, nicht durch Federkriege, sondern lebendig, 
durch Bildung'595, and the aim of his theoretical work dedicated to Catherine was 
to investigate 'Zeiten der Bildung, Wege der Bildung, Mittel [und] Folgen'.596
 
  
Bildung, which emerged as a central concept in German discourse at the time 
Herder was writing, and to whose emergence he contributed significantly, is, 
notoriously, virtually untranslatable.597
 
 Used as a noun it is in Herder's usage 
almost indistinguishable from both Kultur and Zivilisation, which are themselves 
used inter-changeably. All three terms denote the result of a historical process 
during which human beings' increasingly learn to master nature through the co-
operative development of their inherent faculties. As we shall see in the next 
section on Herder's anthropology, there exist stages of Kultur, Zivilisation and 
Bildung, leading to the highest possible actualisation of human faculties; a final 
stage Herder increasingly came to term Humanität. 
For our present concern, however, Herder's employment of Bildung as a verb 
(bilden) - that is, as a means to reach the goal of Kultur, Zivilisation, and, 
ultimately, Humanität is more important. In its active sense, Herder generally 
distinguished Bildung from yet another semantically close term, namely 
Erziehung or education. Even though Bildung like Erziehung has in Herder's 
usage strong pedagogic elements, it is nevertheless used to denote a very distinct 
kind of pedagogy. Indeed, whereas erziehen has a connotation of an active teacher 
imposing norms or knowledge on a passive pupil, bilden, according to Herder, 
signifies an iterative process between teacher and pupil, which emphasises the 
active absorption of the norms or knowledge by the latter by means of reappraisal 
and adaptation.598
                                                 
595 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 374. 
 When applied to a whole people rather than an individual, 
596 Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, p. 478. Emphasis in the original. 
597 See Raymond Geuss, Morality, Culture, and History: Essays on German Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 29-50; Rudolf Vierhaus, ‘Bildung’, in 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 1, pp. 508-23   
598 Vierhaus, ‘Bildung’, pp. 515-17; Frederick M. Barnard, Herder on Social and Political Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 32. 
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Bildung, thereby describes a process which can negotiate between external 
importation and internal assimilation as well as between top-down imposition and 
bottom-up development. 
 
By exhorting Catherine to start a comprehensive programme of Bildung, Herder 
re-iterated his conviction that Russia was in need of a second, distinct phase of 
development after the initial impetus provided by Peter: if Peter had imposed his 
will on a passive, static nation, and had thereby managed to influence its external 
behavioural patterns, Catherine's task was to change the nation's core from within. 
Even though Herder never wrote his book Über die wahre Kultur eines Volks und 
insonderheit Rußlands, which would no doubt have provided us with more detail 
about what such a programme of Bildung might look like in practice, his various 
drafts and notes written in preparation of the work still offer us some clues about 
its modus operandi. 
 
First of all, the Bildung of a nation needs to be guided by the sovereign. Indeed, 
Herder explicitly denied that completely spontaneous bottom-up development 
could achieve the desired results. In a draft for his Über die wahre Kultur eines 
Volk, he noted: 
 
Der Fluß der Zeit, der Fortgang der Regierung bilden weiter, können 
aber auch zurückbilden. Häufige Beispiele von beiden aus der 
Geschichte. Hier das wahre Verdienst des Monarchen. Gegen die 
Einwendungen derer, die da sagen, alles bilde sich von selbst. Ja aber 
auch zurück. Hier muß ein Monarch den Fluß leiten.599
 
 
Despite such guidance, Herder was equally adamant that the aim and direction of 
Bildung must never be based on the will or the insights of the sovereign alone; on 
the contrary its aim must be to foster and strengthen what Herder called a 
Nationalgefühl or Nationalgeist, which will itself, as the expression of the will of 
the nation, influence the direction of Bildung.  
 
                                                 
599 Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, pp. 473-4. See also the draft Über die 
Bildung der Völker, SWS, vol. 32, pp. 231-3. In this draft Herder proposed four different means of 
Bildung - religion, poetry, belle esprit, philosophy - but concluded that none is sufficient by itself, 
and that all of those means need to be combined with a fifth one: government.  
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Bildung, driven by the nation but guided by the sovereign, was termed by Herder 
‘Bildung einer Nation durch sich’. Such an ideal of development, however, does 
not preclude imitations of other nations. Without such imitation, Herder argued, a 
nation will never fully actualise its potential; and, therefore indigenous 
development must be supplemented through outside influences, or through 
‘Bildung einer Nation nach andern’.600
 
 However, as with guidance through the 
sovereign, such imitations must be undertaken with utmost care. All nations are 
different in mores and character, Herder claimed, and such differences must be 
respected and not stifled: 
Grosser Artikel von der Bildung einer Nation nach andern, daß sie 
nichts an sich verliere. Er setzt voraus, daß jede Nation ihre 
Reichthümer und Eigenheiten des Geistes, des Charakters, wie des 
Landes hat. Diese sind aufzusuchen: und zu cultiviren. Kein Mensch, 
kein Land, kein Volk, keine Geschichte des Volks, kein Staat ist dem 
andern gleich, folglich auch das Wahre, Schöne und Gute in ihnen 
nicht gleich. Wird dies nicht gesucht, wird blindlings eine andre 
Nation zum Muster genommen, so [sic.] Alles erstickt.601
 
  
The lessons for Catherine were clear. No other nation could be taken as an 
exclusive model for the reform of Russia: indeed, to the extent that Peter simply 
tried to substitute Russia's Greek-Asiatic character with a German-Dutch one, he 
was mistaken. On the contrary, Catherine's task was to assimilate and nationalise 
Peter’s cultural imports, thereby synthesising external and internal Bildung. 
 
Herder illustrated the need to negotiate between external and internal as well as 
between bottom-up and top-down Bildung most succinctly with reference to the 
St. Petersburg Academy. As we have seen throughout this thesis, Peter’s 
Academy was invariably invoked to underline the relative virtues and weaknesses 
of Peter’s project of civilisation through Europeanisation. In Schlözer’s view, it 
was Peter’s most important establishment as it provided him with the means 
needed to close the gap between Europe and Russia. According to Voltaire, its 
establishment and the related ability to join the other European nations in the 
emulative pursuit of the higher arts and sciences stood as proof that Russia had 
                                                 
600 See Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, p. 477. 
601 Ibid., p. 472. 
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caught up with Europe.602 For Diderot, by contrast, the Academy symbolised all 
that was wrong with Peter’s project: mainly staffed by foreigners, and serving the 
glory of Russian sovereigns rather than the needs of the nation at large, its 
existence symbolised the need for radically different indigenous educational 
institutions exclusively focusing on the basic arts and sciences.603
 
 Herder, 
characteristically, combined these diverging views: 
Peters Akademie hat noch keinen Nationalgeist: sie lebt noch nicht 
für, durch und in der Nation. Sie dient niedrig dem Hof, und schläft. 
Aber eine zu schaffen, aus und für die Nation, aus ihrem Geist und der 
ihn fortleite.604
 
 
A reformed Academy that would henceforward operate for and through and in the 
nation is only one of several concrete institution Herder planned to suggest to 
Catherine. Regarding how such nationalised institutions could be set up in 
practice, Herder turned sharply against Catherine's Nakaz and its programme to 
drive forward Russia's development through legislation.  
 
The criticism of the Nakaz is two-fold. Firstly, Herder, like Diderot, was 
concerned by the extent to which Catherine's guidelines to the Russian All-
Legislative Commission were influenced by Montesquieu's De l’esprit des lois. 
But unlike Diderot, for Herder the problem was not that Catherine proposed to 
institute a system of government similar to the French monarchy as conceived by 
Montesquieu because he believed it is defective as such, but because he 
considered such an imitation as being inappropriate for Russia. Indeed, one of the 
core lessons he wanted to teach Catherine II was 
 
Daß weder Englands noch Frankreichs noch Deutschlands 
gesetzgeberische Köpfe es in Rußland sein können.605
 
  
Apart from repeating his caution against blind imitation, Herder's criticism of the 
Nakaz, and of Montesquieu, has a second, more substantive, dimension. 
Montesquieu is in Herder's opinion, a too abstract and legalistic head to be taken 
                                                 
602 Histoire de l’empire de Russie, OC, vol. 47, p. 931.  
603 HDI, vol. 3, bk. 5, chap. 23, p. 51.  
604 Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, p. 474. Emphasis in the original. 
605 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 412. 
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as a guide in the Bildung of a nation such as Russia. His three principles - fear, 
virtue and honour - underlying the different forms of governments and laws are 
pure abstractions pulled from a small empirical sample,606 and then 
inappropriately applied across the globe. As these principles are too general and 
too abstract, they are, Herder argued, not applicable anywhere in particular.607
 
 
Related to this criticism is Herder's claim that Montesquieu, despite his desire to 
study the spirit behind the laws, only really investigated the legalistic aspects of 
governments and the socio-cultural mechanics of courts and capitals, without ever 
getting to the manners, mores and spirit of a nation at large. De l'esprit des lois is, 
in Herder's view, only a 'Metaphysik für ein totes Gesetzbuch ..., [a] Metaphysik 
zur Bildung der Völker ists nicht'.608
 
 
Legal abstractions and court culture can never be the starting point for a 
metaphysics of Bildung such as the one Herder planned to write for Catherine. On 
the contrary, it must start with an in-depth investigation into the cultural and 
social milieu in which people live. Likewise, the reforming sovereign is ill-
advised to overly rely on centrally imposed laws or on the cultural prestige of the 
court in order to guide and influence the direction of Bildung. Instead, Catherine 
needs to start her reforms at the micro-level in order to effect the required internal 
transformation of her nation; an idea neatly encapsulated in Herder’s sketch of an 
alternative approach to reform to a Montesquieu-inspired legalistic one: 
 
Worinn die wahre Cultur bestehe? nicht bloß im Gesetze geben, 
sondern Sitten bilden .... Vortrefflichkeit guter Anordnung, die über 
Gesetze und Hofbeispiele geht. Einrichtung des Ackerbaues, der 
Familien, der Haushaltungen. Der Dependenz der Untertanen, der 
Abgaben, ihrer Lebensart. .... Daß das Exempel des Hofes nur an Hofe 
gelte, und da auch große Vorteile aber auch Nachteile habe. Daß viele 
                                                 
606 Herder alleged that Montesquieu only ever studied and knew Rome, Sparta, Crete, Rome, 
France, Venice and Turkey in any detail. See Gedanken bei Lesung Montesquieues, Hanser, vol. 1, 
p. 465. 
607 See also Herder’s criticism of Montesquieu in the Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur 
Bildung der Menschheit, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 665: 'Durchs Werk [i.e. De l’Esprit des lois] also ein 
Taumel aller Zeiten, Nationen und Sprachen, wie um den Turm der Verwirrung, daß jedweder 
seinen Bettel, Reichtum und Ranzen, an drei schwache Nägel hange – Geschichte aller Völker und 
Zeiten, dies große lebendige Werk Gottes auch in seiner Folge, ein Ruinenhaufen von drei Spitzen 
und Kapseln – aber freilich auch sehr edler, würdiger Materialien – Montesquieu!'  
608 Gedanken bei Lesung Montesquieus, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 470. 
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einzelne Exempel in einzelnen Provinzen mehr tun; und noch mehr 
einzelne Beispiele in einzelnen Familien.609
  
  
If Herder was thus convinced that Catherine should start the formation of mores 
and manners in Russia by means of many decentralised institutions offering 
beneficial examples, he was equally adamant that such a process of Bildung could 
be further facilitated if the czarina corrected Peter’s mistake, and moved Russia’s 
capital to the shores of the Black Sea. During the time that the Journal was 
written, the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 was under way, and Herder fully 
supported Catherine’s war efforts. He feverishly anticipated the chasing of the 
Turks from Constantinople, and Russia becoming master of the Black Sea and the 
Eastern Mediterranean.610 Crucially, Herder explicitly established a connection 
between his proposed programme of reform and the extension of Russia’s 
territory towards the South. In the Journal, for instance, he mentioned two 
conjectures providing him with optimism that the proposals to be outlined in his 
Über die wahre Kultur eines Volkes could be implemented in Russia: the 
weakness of Catherine’s Nakaz which he set out to demonstrate, and the 
opportunities afforded by the Russian successes in the present war.611
 
 
Herder held on to the notion that Russia could only become truly civilised if its 
centre and capital were moved throughout his life.612 Calls to Russian rulers to 
develop the Ukraine, to liberate the various Slavic peoples living under Turkish 
dominion, to incorporate Greece, and to move the Empire’s capital to the Black 
Sea were repeated in Vom Einfluß der Regierung auf die Wissenschaften 
(1780),613 in the fourth part of the Ideen (1791)614 and in the third volume of the 
Adrastea (1802).615 Although there are notable differences in Herder’s account of 
such a Southern expansion of Russia across his writings,616
                                                 
609 Journal, Hanser vol. 1, p. 411. Emphasis in the original. 
 two salient elements 
610 Ibid., p. 411. See also, Sammlung von Gedanken und Beispielen, SWS, vol. 4, p. 473, and a 
letter to Begrow, Briefe, vol. 1, Nantes, November 1769, Nr. 73, pp. 172-4. 
611 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 411. 
612 See also Kurt Stavenhagen, ‘Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichtsprophetie’, 
Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 1, no. 1 (1952), pp. 28-30. 
613 SWS, vol. 9, p. 363. 
614 Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 4, pp. 642-3. 
615 SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, pp. 449-50. 
616 Especially the chapter on the Slavs in the Ideen differs markedly from Herder’s other accounts 
about the Black Sea region, and it is on this chapter that much of the secondary literature has 
focused. Most importantly, the story told in the Ideen is not principally concerned with Russia, but 
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remain largely unchanged. First, whilst his starting point was generally with the 
civilisation or Bildung of Russia, and thus with the desirability of taking full 
commercial and agricultural advantage of this region endowed with an excellent 
climate and a strategically favourable position, Herder invariably moved far 
beyond this initial concern. The Russian-led development of the Black Sea area 
was ultimately not solely important for the future civilisation of Russia, but for 
human civilisation tout court. In the Adrastea, for instance, Herder painted the 
following glowing picture of the future, if his proposals were followed: 
 
Rußland hätte seinen Mittelpunct am schwarzen Meer gefunden; seine 
Asiatischen sowohl als Europäischen Provinzen hätte es fruchtbar, 
nutzbar, urbar gemacht, und alle seine Völker, jedes nach seinem Maß, 
in seinen Sitten cultivirt. Aus dem unzugänglichen Herzen Asiens 
wäre die Aorta aller Handelswege geöffnet; die Osmannische Pforte 
wäre nicht mehr; das mittelländische Meer wäre, was es seyn sollte, in 
                                                                                                                                     
with the Slavs as a whole. Moreover, Herder bases his very optimistic account of the Slavs’ future 
on an argument that is not taken up elsewhere: indeed, here his optimism is derived from the 
allegedly peaceful and industrious national character of the Slavs; a character which is favourably 
compared to the destructive and warlike Germanic one. However, it appears justifiable not to 
overly concentrate on this unusual argument for a number of reasons. First, the concern with the 
Slavs rather than with Russia is explicable by the structure of the Ideen: the sixteenth book of the 
fourth part of the Ideen that contains the chapter on the Slavs is concerned with a summary 
ethnographic description of European peoples rather than with states. A chapter on the history of 
the Russian state is missing in the Ideen, but was projected for the unachieved fifth part of the 
work. Secondly, and more importantly, Herder is likely to have partly followed a polemical, rather 
than a substantive, goal in his chapter on the Slavs. Indeed, in 1790, and thus one year before the 
appearance of the fourth part of the Ideen, the Göttingen philosopher Meiners wrote an article on 
the Slavs in which he endeavoured to demonstrate their natural inferiority when compared to 
peoples of Germanic stock, concluding with the argument that no purely Slavic nation could ever 
become fully civilised on its own accord, and that the Slavs’ best hope for improvement was 
through intermarriage with Germans. It is hard not to read the stark characterisation of the Slavs 
and the Germans in the Ideen as a polemical reversal of Meiners’ position, whose racial typologies 
Herder abhorred. Nevertheless, there certainly exists a substantive core beneath Herder’s polemic, 
namely his conviction that the future of civilisation will be played out on territory at least partly 
inhabited by Slavic peoples. This conviction was, however, not generally based on an argument 
about a certain determinate character of the Slavs, but, as we shall see in the following, on a 
confluence of climatic determinism and a conjecture about the future of the historical process as a 
whole. See Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 4, pp. 640-3; Christoph Meiners, ‘Über die 
Natur der Slawischen Völker in Europa’, Göttingisches Historisches Magazin 7, no. 4 (1790). On 
Herder’s quarrels with Meiners in general, and the ‘race’ debate that ensued in late 18th-century 
Germany partly in response to Meiners’ writings, see Luigi Marino, Praeceptores Germaniae - 
Göttingen 1770-1820, trans. B. Szabo-Bechstein, revised ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1995) pp. 90-110; Thomas Strack, ‘Philosophical Anthropology on the Eve of 
Biological Determinism’, Central European History 29, no. 3 (1996). For accounts on Herder’s 
portrayals of the Slavs and Germans, see Konrad Bittner, Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und die 
Slawen, ed. Franz Spina and Gerhard Gesemann, vol. 6, Veröffentlichungen der Slavistischen 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft an der Deutschen Universität in Prag (Reichenberg: Verlag Gebürder Stipel, 
1929), pp. 57-165; Birke, ‘Herder und die Slawen’; Drews, Herder und die Slaven. Materialien 
zur Wirkungsgeschichte bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, chap. 2. On the projected continuation 
of the Ideen, see Hanser, vol. 3/1, pp. 1157-8. 
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allen seinen Küsten und Häfen ein Freihafen der Welt, das Mittelmeer 
aller Nationen des östlichen Welthandels, welch ein ungeheures, 
reiches, mächtiges, arbeitsames, Gewerbevolles Reich wäre Rußland. 
... In seiner prächtigen Mitte zwischen Europa und Asien geböte es der 
Welt friedlich.617
 
 
Similarly, in the Vom Einfluß der Regierung auf die Wissenschaften Herder 
speculated that after the arts and sciences had declined in Europe, they would 
either migrate to the English colonies in the Americas or to a reformed Russia 
with its centre at the Black Sea.618 Furthermore, he consistently predicted that this 
migrant culture would ultimately radiate out from this new epicentre across Asia 
and Europe, thereby leading to a global cultural regeneration.619
 
 
Secondly, Herder always framed this prophecy in language of inevitability, but at 
the same time conceived its actualisation as being contingent on certain actions 
being carried out. In the Journal, for instance, he remarked that the Ukraine 
would inevitably become the centre of a global culture in the future, but equally 
insisted that for this to happen it was necessary that his proposed reforms were 
implemented by Catherine.620 Similarly, in the Adrastea, he conceded that even if 
Peter had been committed to move his capital to the Black Sea, he may have been 
unable to do so because of historical conjectures – especially the military power 
of the Ottoman Empire – but concluded by insisting that his glowing picture of 
Russia’s future would become reality through a future happy confluence of 
contingent circumstances, wilful human actions and historical necessity.621
 
 
The above summary of the content of Herder’s writings on Russia should already 
allow us to appreciate the scope and depth of his conception of the country, its 
history and future. Indeed, Herder moved from an assessment of the role of Peter 
I to the sketching of a comprehensive programme of further reform to be 
                                                 
617 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, p. 449. Emphasis in the original. 
618 SWS, vol. 9, p. 363.  
619 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, p. 450. See also Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 410: 'Was für ein 
Blick überhaupt auf diese Gegenden von West-Norden, wenn einmal der Geist der Kultur sie 
besuchen wird! Die Ukraine wird ein neues Griechenland werden .... aus so vielen kleinen wilden 
Völkern, wie es die Griechen vormals auch waren, wird eine gesittete Nation werden: ihre 
Gränzen werden sich bis zum schwarzen Meer hin erstrecken und von dahinaus durch die Welt.' 
620 Journal, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 410. See also, Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 4, pp. 642-
3. 
621 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 5, pp. 450-1. 
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undertaken by Catherine II on the one hand, as well as from an initial concern 
with the recent history of the civilisation of Russia to a vision about a Russian-
centred global culture of the future, on the other. Such moves, we have seen, are 
characterised by an attempt to negotiate a number of apparent dichotomies: 
internal versus external development; civilising through bottom-up versus top-
down processes; the inevitability of the historical process versus the role of 
contingent circumstances and conscious human actions.  
 
A refusal to consider such dichotomies as exclusive categories is, of course, not 
only a feature of Herder’s writings on Russia, but characteristic of his philosophy 
in general. We have already had occasion to note that the notion of Bildung was 
prominently employed to connect opposing categories. In the next section, we 
will see Bildung emerging as a central concept of Herder’s anthropology, which, 
itself, lies at the heart of his philosophy of history. As such, a consideration of this 
anthropology will enable us to define with some more precision the nature of the 
connection. Thereby it will provide us with a clearer understanding of the way his 
account of Peter and his proposal for reforms are related to each other. Sketching 
the main contours of Herder’s anthropology will also prepare the ground for a 
reading of his philosophy of history, and specifically for a consideration of the 
place of his Russian prophecy within this philosophy, which will form the 
concluding part of this chapter.  
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Anthropology: Man as an animal striving for Bildung 
 
It is arguably impossible to overestimate the importance of anthropology for an 
understanding of Herder’s philosophy in general, and his philosophy of history in 
particular.622 Herder himself stressed the centrality of anthropological knowledge 
for any philosophical enquiry already early in his career. In a fragment of 1764 
entitled Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volkes allgemeiner und nützlicher 
werden kann, he remarked: ‘wenn man den Gesichtspunkt der Weltweisheit in der 
Art ändert, wie aus dem Ptolomäischen das Kopernikanische System ward, 
welche neue fruchtbare Entwicklungen müssen sich hier nicht zeigen, wenn 
unsere ganze Philosophie Anthropologie wird’.623
 
 
This early programmatic aim to contribute to a Copernican revolution in 
philosophy by approaching it from an anthropological point of view was put into 
practice by Herder throughout his writings, but most particularly in the 
Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache (1772),624 Vom Erkennen und 
Empfinden, den zwo Hauptkräften der menschlichen Seele (1775)625 and the first 
two parts of the Ideen (1784-1785),626
                                                 
622 This has also been consistently stressed in recent Herder scholarship. For good accounts of 
Herder’s anthropological conceptions in general, see Hans Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Grundfrage der 
Geschichtsphilosophie Herders bis 1774’, in Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried 
Herder 1983, ed. Brigitte Poschmann (Rinteln: Bösendahl, 1984), pp. 28-32; John H. Zammito, 
Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), ch. 8; 
Hugh Barr Nisbet, ‘Herders Anthropologische Anschauungen in den "Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit"’, in Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800, ed. Jürgen Barkhoff and 
Eda Sagarra (München: Iudicium-Verl., 1992). 
 containing enquiries into the nature of the 
universe, the globe and its inhabitants which act as the basis from which a 
philosophy of history is developed. If we are to understand Herder’s concept of 
Bildung, and its capacity to mediate between apparently opposing tendencies, we 
have to be alert to the solution offered in these anthropological writings to two 
related problems. The first such problem is to give an account of human freedom 
and a related capacity for progress (or Fortbildung), whilst at the same time 
firmly integrating human beings into a comprehensively deterministic conception 
623 SWS, vol. 32, p. 61. 
624 Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 251-399.  
625 Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 543-723. 
626 Hanser, vol. 3/1.  
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of nature and the universe. The second one is to derive a normative account of 
human sociability and to tease out its political implications. 
 
Herder’s resolution of the first problem is in the first instance dependent on a 
move we have already encountered in Diderot: to completely collapse the world 
of nature and the world of human endeavours. Thereby, man is completely 
integrated within the order of nature, and its deterministic laws equally apply to 
him. Indeed, one chief target of the Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache was 
the theory of a supernatural, godly origin of language; a position which had 
recently been put forward by Johann Peter Süßmilch in his Versuch eines 
Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vom Menschen, sondern 
allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe.627 Such a theory of course implied that human 
beings, by virtue of their godly gift of language, must at least in part be 
considered as being qualitatively different from the rest of the universe. For 
Herder, by contrast, the origins of language are explicable with reference to 
natural causes only. Likewise, in the Ideen, he denied the validity of any sharp 
dualism between physical matter and spiritual mind,628 thereby preparing the 
ground for establishing a unitary frame of reference equally applicable to the 
analysis of human history (conceived as the unfolding of the productions of the 
human mind over time) and of the natural world (concerned with the explanation 
of physical, chemical and biological processes). 629
                                                 
627 Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 257-60, 346-7, 354-7. Johann Peter 
Süßmilch, Versuch eines Beweises dass die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vom Menschen, 
sondern allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe (Berlin: 1766). On Süßmilch’s argument, see also 
Hans Aarsleff, ‘The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the 
Eighteenth Century and the Debate in the Berlin Academy before Herder’, in Studies in the 
History of Linguistics: Traditions and Paradigms, ed. Dell Hymes (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1974), pp. 131-4. 
 
628 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 2, pp. 158-62. For a similar argument, see also 
Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 271-2. 
629 Berlin’s claim that Herder advocated completely different methods for the study of physical 
nature and the study of the human mind seems wrongly conceived. It appears as if Berlin 
anachronistically reads the 19th century separation of the Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenschaften advocated by the German historicists – of whom Herder is often portrayed 
as a spiritual father – back into the 18th century. However, especially in the Ideen, Herder is 
explicit about the intimate connection between nature and man, and matter and mind. Indeed, such 
a connection is already in evidence by the very structure of the work, which begins with a 
description of the universe and then moves in successive steps to a consideration of the nature of 
the earth, plants, animals, before reaching human beings and their history. And far from there 
either implicitly or explicitly occurring a change of methodology along this path, Herder stressed 
throughout that the process of history is best explained by means of drawing analogies to 
processes of nature. Much more convincing than Berlin's is therefore Reill’s contention that 
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Unlike Diderot, however, Herder did not believe that natural processes are driven 
by atoms in essentially random movement. In his view, the elementary building 
blocks of nature are not atoms, but forces (Kräfte), whose operations are 
determined by a plan, which ultimately is of a godly and teleological nature.630 
God, or the source and result of all operating forces, however, was not conceived 
as a transcendental being above nature, but, inspired by Baruch Spinoza’s 
pantheism, as being itself part of nature. Indeed, it has been convincingly 
demonstrated that Herder’s conception of the universe, and man’s place therein, 
was intimately connected to the German reception of Spinoza in general, and the 
Pantheismus-Streit which erupted in the early 1780s in particular.631 This quarrel 
that pitted, among others, the Spinozists Lessing, Goethe and Herder against 
Jacobi632 and Kant633 was centred around the question whether Spinoza’s 
philosophy leads by necessity to fatalism and atheism. Herder’s position on this 
question was directed both against Christian orthodoxy and its notion of a 
transcendental, personal God who has revealed himself through scripture, as well 
as against the atheist and decidedly non-teleological implications of a radical 
atomist position such as the one espoused by Diderot.634
                                                                                                                                     
Herder belonged to a whole tradition of Enlightenment thought – labelled as Enlightenment 
vitalism – that attempted to bridge the gulf between mind and matter, thereby attempting to 
establish a unitary method capable of both explaining nature and culture. See Berlin, Three Critics 
of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, p. 170; Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the 
Enlightenment, esp. introduction and pp. 186-91; Reill, ‘Anti-Mechanism, Vitalism and their 
Political Implications in late Enlightened Scientific Thought‘, Francia, no. 1612 (1989). See also 
Herder’s Plan zum Unterricht des jungen Herrn von Zeschau (1772), where the intimate 
connection between nature and history, which is fully developed in the Ideen, is already 
announced. Hanser, vol. 3/1, pp. 1087-8. 
 By equating God with 
630 See Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 1, pp. 154-8, pt. 2, bk. 7, chap. 4, pp. 245-53.  
631 Emil Adler, ‘Pantheismus-Humanität-Promethie. Ein Beitrag zur Humanitätsphilosophie 
Herders’, in Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried Herder: 1971, ed. Johann Gottfried 
Maltusch (Bückeburg: Grimme, 1973), pp. 77-80; John H. Zammito, ‘Herder, Kant, Spinoza und 
die Ursprünge des deutschen Idealismus’, in Herder und die Philosophie des deutschen 
Idealismus, ed. Marion Heinz (Amsterdam u.a.: Rodopi, 1997). 
632 See letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Briefe, vol. 5, Weimar, 20 December 1784, Nr. 73, pp. 
88-91. This letter contains an impassioned plea by Herder to Jacobi to re-read Spinoza and 
reconsider his position in the ongoing quarrel.  
633 Indeed, Kant's ill tempered review of the first part of the Ideen - and especially the attack on 
Herder's theory of forces, usage of analogies, and his conception of the relationship between mind 
and matter - must at least partly be read in the context of the two author's different reading of 
Spinoza's philosophy. See Immanuel Kant, Werke in sechs Bänden, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 6 
vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1964), vol. 6, pp. 781-94. See also Wolfgang Pross, ‘Ein 
Reich unsichtbarer Kräfte - Was kritisiert Kant an Herder?’, Scientia Poetica 1 (1997); Zammito, 
‘Herder, Kant, Spinoza und die Ursprünge des deutschen Idealismus’.  
634 See, for instance, Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 2, pp. 158-62; see also Herder’s 
objection to blind Epicurean atomism in the Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 6, p. 512-14. Herder’s 
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nature, and thereby by moving him from transcendence to immanence, Herder’s 
pantheism, explicitly grounded on Spinoza’s deus sive natura, was calibrated to 
safeguard an ordered and purposeful universe: 
 
Dem sinnlichen Betrachter der Geschichte, der in ihr Gott verlor und 
an der Vorsehung zu zweifeln anfing, geschah dies Unglück nur 
daher, weil er die Geschichte zu flach ansah oder von der Vorsehung 
keinen rechten Begriff hatte. Denn wenn er diese für ein Gespenst 
hält, das ihm auf allen Straßen begegnen und den Lauf menschlicher 
Handlungen unaufhörlich unterbrechen soll, um nur diesen oder jenen 
particularen Endzweck seiner Phantasie und Willkür zu erreichen: so 
gestehe ich, daß die Geschichte das Grab einer solchen Vorstellung 
sei, gewiß aber ein Grab zum Besten der Wahrheit. ... Der Gott, den 
ich in der Geschichte suche, muß derselbe sein, der er in der Natur ist: 
denn der Mensch ist nur ein kleiner Teil des Ganzen und seine 
Geschichte ist wie die Geschichte des Wurms mit dem Gewebe, das er 
bewohnt, innig verwerbt.635
 
 
Even though Herder did not believe that God’s plan or purpose could ever be 
fully grasped by human beings, he did contend that through a combination of 
observing the natural world and drawing analogies, aspects of this plan could be 
divined.636
                                                                                                                                     
attempt to banish any notion of a transcendent God who has revealed himself through scripture 
and. indeed, to deny the validity of any metaphysics that is not based on an empirical study of 
nature, without, however, endorsing a fully deterministic, monistic materialism has also been 
stressed by Martin Bollacher, ‘"Natur" und "Vernunft" in Herders Entwurf einer Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit’, in Johann Gottfried Herder: 1744 - 1803, ed. Gerhard Sauder 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), pp. 115-18, and Hugh Barr Nisbet, ‘Herder und Lukrez’, in Johann 
Gottfried Herder: 1744 - 1803, ed. Gerhard Sauder (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), pp. 79-82. Pross, by 
contrast, suggests that Herder’s view of natural philosophy and history is informed, like Diderot’s, 
by a complete materialistic fatalism. However, as we shall see in the following, there are important 
differences between Diderot’s and Herder’s positions; most importantly, whilst Diderot’s nature 
operates according to laws that are completely blind to human concerns, Herder’s God/nature 
reveals a purpose that, far from being antagonistic to man, has distinctly humanistic tendencies. 
See Wolfgang Pross, ‘Die Begründung der Geschichte aus der Natur: Herders Konzept von 
"Gesetzen" in der Geschichte’, in Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis: 1750 - 1900, ed. Hans Erich 
Bödeker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), pp. 188-91; Wolfgang Pross, ‘Diversité des 
faits et unité de vue. Herder et la construction de la philosophie de l'histoire au siècle des 
lumières’, Revue germanique internationale 20 (2003), pp. 64-71. 
 Indeed, in the introduction to the Ideen, Herder defined the main aim 
635 Ideen, pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 5, Hanser vol. 3/1, p. 612. See also Ideen, Vorrede, Hanser, vol. 3/1, 
pp. 14-15 (emphasis in the original): 'Niemand irre sich daher auch daran, daß ich zuweilen den 
Namen der Natur personificiert gebrauche. Die Natur ist kein selbständiges Wesen; sondern Gott 
ist Alles in seinen Werken .... Wem der Name “Natur“ durch manche Schriften unsres Zeitalters 
sinnlos und niedrig geworden ist, der denke sich statt dessen jene allmächtige Kraft, Güte und 
Weisheit, und nenne in seiner Seele das unsichtbare Wesen, das keine Erdensprache zu nennen 
vermag.'  
636 For the centrality of analogical reasoning in late Enlightenment conceptions of nature in 
general, see Peter Hanns Reill, ‘Science and the science of history in the Spätaufklärung’, in 
Aufklärung und Geschichte, pp. 439-40. 
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of a philosophy of history to reveal the ultimate meaning behind the hurly-burly 
of events.637 However, he insisted that such a revelation cannot be achieved by 
means of metaphysical speculation, but must be based on empirical investigation 
and analogical reasoning.638
 
 
The analogy employed by Herder to determine man’s place and purpose within 
the order of nature, and to account for both his limited freedom and his capacity 
to progress, is based on the observation of an ascending ladder of ever higher 
forms within nature. Lurking behind visible forms are invisible forces or impulses 
which through their various configurations give raise to organised forms: 
 
Vom Stein zum Krystall, vom Krystall zu den Metallen, von diesen 
zur Pflanzenschöpfung, von den Pflanzen zum Tier, von diesen zum 
Menschen sahen wir die Form der Organisation steigen, mit ihr auch 
die Kräfte und Triebe des Geschöpfs vielartiger werden und sich 
endlich alle, in der Gestalt des Menschen, sofern diese sie fassen 
konnte, vereinen. Bei dem Menschen stand die Reihe still; wir kennen 
kein Geschöpf über ihm, das vielartiger und künstlicher organisiert 
sei: er scheint das höchste, wozu eine Erdorganisation gebildet werden 
konnte. 639
 
 
According to Herder, the heightened artificiality and complexity in the 
combination of the forces that constitute higher organisations manifests itself 
predominantly in decreased specialisation and concentration, which, by the same 
token, increases indeterminability and thereby freedom. Or, to put it differently, 
the higher up we travel on the chain, the bigger an organism’s potential sphere of 
activity and existence, the less concentrated its sensuality toward this particular 
sphere, and the less instinctive its responses to external stimuli.640
                                                 
637 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, Vorrede, p. 13. This idea is already developed in Herder’s earlier Auch 
eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 619-20. 
 Although there 
exist no sharp breaks within the chain – all transition form one node to the next is 
gradual not categorical – man, standing at its apex, has an organisation quite 
638 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, Vorrede p. 14: 'Wer bloß metaphysische Spekulationen will, hat sie auf 
kürzerem Wege; ich glaube aber, daß sie, abgetrennt von Erfahrungen und Analogien der Natur, 
eine Luftfahrt sind, die selten zum Ziel führet. Gang Gottes in der Natur, die Gedanken, die der 
Ewige uns in der Reihe seiner Werke tätlich dargelegt hat: sie sind das heilige Buch, an dessen 
Charakteren ich zwar minder als ein Lehrling aber wenigstens mit Treue und Eifer buchstabiert 
habe und buchstabieren werden.' 
639 Ibid., Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 1, p. 154. 
640 Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 270-4, 320-2; Ideen, Hanser vol. 
3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, pp. 132-6. 
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distinct from any animal.641 In particular, human beings’ nature is indeterminate, 
because of their weak instincts. Whilst an animal can never fail to act in a certain 
way and thereby successfully fulfil the pre-determinate purpose of its existence – 
mainly vegetation and procreation –642 human beings, if left to their weak lower 
animal instincts, would, in Herder’s view, literally be without a raison d’être and 
quite possibly be unable to survive, simply because they would hardly be 
compelled to act at all.643 However, human beings compensate for their weak 
instincts by means of a capacity Herder termed Besonnenheit – conscious 
reflection – that allows them to discover and model the scope and nature of their 
purpose themselves. The vital medium by which Besonnenheit can be put to use is 
human language, which in itself is the medium necessary for the development of 
reason.644
 
 
So far Herder’s account is by no means original. The notion of man’s instinctual 
weakness and of the existence of a compensating capacity for reflection, leading, 
ultimately, to the development of reason, had been frequently invoked in the 18th-
century debate about the origins of human language and knowledge, notably by 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Hermann Samuel Reimarus and Jean Henry Samuel 
Formey.645
 
 However, the consequences Herder derives from this account arguably 
are. 
 Most importantly for our present concerns, Herder’s concept of Bildung is 
intimately related to this account of the emergence of language. According to 
Herder, what Besonnenheit, language and reason enable man to do is not only to 
develop knowledge and technologies to enable him to master nature, even though 
this is an important aspect, but also to form (bilden) a complete image of the 
universe and their own place therein within themselves. Bildung, in this sense, is 
                                                 
641 See esp. Herder’s differentiation between man and ape and his discussion on the question of 
human races. Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 1, pp. 111-21; pt. 2, bk. 7, chap. 1, pp. 230-
1. See also Nisbet, ‘Herders Anthropologische Anschauungen’, p. 8. 
642 See especially, Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 3, chap. 4, pp. 91-6. 
643 Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, p. 270. 
644 Ibid., pp. 276-87; Ideen, Hanser vol 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 2, pp. 314-24. 
645 For a good account of the intellectual context of Herder’s Abhandlung vom Ursprung der 
Sprache, see Aarsleff, ‘The Tradition of Condillac’. On Herder’s substantial, but mostly 
unacknowledged, borrowing from Reimarus’ work, see Günther Buck, ‘Selbsterhaltung und 
Historizität’, in Geschichte - Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter 
Stempel, Poetik und Hermeneutik (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), esp. pp. 32-4. 
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the creation of a cultural, as opposed to a natural whole, which is, according to 
Herder, a free, conscious and creative exercise, which in itself governs man’s 
reaction to external stimuli and sense impression: 
 
Jeder Gedanke ist nicht ein unmittelbares Werk der Natur, aber eben 
damit kanns sein [i.e. man’s] eigenes Werk werden. ...  
 
Wenn also hiermit der Instinkt wegfallen muß, der bloß aus der 
Organisation der Sinne und dem Bezirk der Vorstellungen folgte, und 
eine blinde Determination war; so bekommt eben hiemit der Mensch, 
mehrere Helle. Da er auf keinen Punkt blind fällt, und blind 
liegenbleibt: so wird er freistehend, kann sich eine Sphäre der 
Bespiegelung suchen, kann sich in sich bespiegeln. Nicht mehr eine 
unfehlbare Maschine in den Händen der Natur, wird er sich selbst 
Zweck und Ziel der Bearbeitung.646
  
 
Rather than just reacting to sense impressions instinctively, human beings can 
assimilate them internally by integrating them into their own ‘sphere of reflection’ 
or Bildung before embarking on a reaction.647 The ultimate end behind this 
process is happiness, which is the sense of satisfaction human beings experience 
by assuring themselves about the meaning and purpose of their existence through 
the free and creative use of their own forces.648
 
 
Even though such a self-fashioning of happiness is ultimately a free and non-
determinate activity, Bildung is nevertheless strictly bounded for Herder by at 
least four factors. First, Bildung is influenced by climate. The cultural whole 
human beings construct will always be dependent on the kind of sense 
impressions they receive, which are themselves to a large extent determined by 
climate, which is, for Herder, the sum total of the physical circumstances of a 
given locality.649
 
 
                                                 
646 Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, p. 271; see also Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, 
pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, p. 135. 
647 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, pp. 131-5; pt. 1, bk. 5, chap. 4, pp. 169-70. 
648 Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 6, pp. 150-1; pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 5, pp. 298-305. 
649 Ibid., pt. 2, bk. 7, chap. 3, pp. 238-45; pt. 2, bk. 8, chaps. 1-2, 259-84. Abhandlung vom 
Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, p. 340. On Herder's conception of climate, and its 
relationship to contemporary theories, see also Gonthier-Louis Fink, ‘Von Winckelmann bis 
Herder. Die deutsche Klimatheorie in europäischer Perspektive’, in Johann Gottfried Herder: 
1744 - 1803, ed. Gerhard Sauder (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987).  
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Second, the use of language, or the outward expression and communication, of 
man's cultural achievements, is an inherently social process. Even though Herder 
is adamant that every individual human being constructs its own distinct view of 
the world,650 they will by means of communication coalesce in important respects. 
Such a socially, rather than individually, constructed cultural whole secures the 
individual by organically integrating him into an entity greater than himself: a 
community bound together by a shared set of norms and beliefs, that are 
expressed in a shared language; a phenomenon Herder termed the Bildung of a 
Familien-, or after a community has expanded over time, a Nationaldenkart, 
which itself stands at the basis of a distinct Nationalgeist.651
 
 
Third and related, Bildung is not only a social, but also a historical process, as it is 
subject to inter-generational transmission. Every new generation does not start 
their cultural constructions from scratch but will be decisively influenced by 
tradition.652 The transmission of tradition from one generation to the next is in 
itself a process of Bildung: it is not simply a process by which the old generation 
imposes its world view onto its children, nor one in which the new generation 
unconsciously imitates the old world view. On the contrary, it is a complex 
process of active learning involving both passive reception and creative 
production in which the old and the new are constantly merged by means of 
organic assimilation of the traditions to changing circumstances.653
 
 
Fourth, Bildung is a directional historical process, and the direction of its 
development is determined by man's place in nature. Whilst inter-generational 
transmission of culture opens up the possibility of progress, Herder posited an end 
                                                 
650 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 5, p. 298; pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 1, 307.  
651 See especially, Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 334-47. See also, 
Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 4, pp. 284-97. 
652 Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 348-52; Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 
2, bk. 9, chap. 1, pp. 306-14. 
653 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 1, p. 309: 'Alle Erziehung kann nur durch 
Nachahmung und Übung, also durch Übergang des Vorbildes ins Nachbild werden: und wie 
können wir dies besser als Überlieferung nennen? der Nachahmende muß Kräfte haben, das 
Mitgeteilte und Mitteilbare aufzunehmen und es, wie die Speise, durch die er lebt, in seine Natur 
zu verwandeln.' 
For a good, general account of Herder's conception of innovation and tradition, see also Hans 
Dietrich Irmscher, ‘Die geschichtsphilosophische Kontroverse zwischen Kant und Herder’, in 
Hamann - Kant - Herder. Acta des vierten internationalen Hamann-Kolloquiums im Herder-
Institut zu Marburg/Lahn 1985, ed. Bernhard Gajek (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 
143-53.  
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towards which progress inevitably moves. Again, it is man's position at the top of 
the chain of organisms that serves as the analogy from which Herder derives this 
end. If human beings’ exalted position in the chain is determined by their potential 
to use all their capabilities freely, it follows that the end towards which they must 
strive is to fully and freely develop all their capabilities. This is the essence of 
Herder's ideal of Humanität, positing the full actualisation of all inherent human 
possibilities as the end of the historical process: 
 
Humanität ist der Charakter unsres Geschlechts; er ist uns aber nur in 
Anlagen angebohren, und muß uns eigentlich angebildet werden. Wir 
bringen ihn nicht fertig auf die Welt mit; auf der Welt aber soll er das 
Ziel unsres Bestrebens, die Summe unsrer Uebungen, unser Werth 
seyn .... Das Göttliche in unserm Geschlecht ist also Bildung zur 
Humanität; alle großen und guten Menschen, Gesetzgeber, Erfinder, 
Philosophen, Dichter, Künstler, jeder edle Mensch in seinem Stande, 
bei der Erziehung seiner Kinder, bei der Beobachtung seiner Pflichten, 
durch Beispiel, Werk, Institut und Lehre hat dazu mitgeholfen.654
 
 
The reference to lawgivers, inventors, philosophers, poets, and artists etc. as 
promoters of Humanität indicates that this is a comprehensive concept that 
encompasses all aspects of human endeavours at the same time. A fully developed 
Humanität would involve, according to Herder, the harmonious conjunction of 
reason with sensuality and imagination, refined arts, sciences and technologies 
with virtue, morality and justice, as well as the organic, non-domineering 
embedding of individuals into larger societies. If man is the most complex, but 
also the most indeterminate, organism in the universe, it is his historical mission 
to use his own powers to develop and hone his manifold forces and impulses into 
a harmonious whole; he is, in other words, a second God on earth, a potential 
microcosm of the whole universe, and charged to freely establish a purpose and an 
order for himself that mirrors the macrocosm of God/nature.655
 
 
                                                 
654 Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, Suphan, vol. 17, letter 27, p. 138 (emphasis in the 
original). Herder already elaborated in some detail on the ideal of Humanität in the Ideen. See 
Hanser, vol 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 6, pp. 142-52; pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 1, pp. 580-5. For good 
accounts of Herder's usage of this ideal and its relation to his pantheism and naturalism, see 
Bollacher, ‘"Natur" und "Vernunft" in Herders Entwurf einer Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit’, esp. pp. 119-24; Adler, ‘Pantheismus-Humanität-Promethie’. 
655 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 6, pp. 142-3. 
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To trace the gradual actualisation or Bildung of Humanität over space and time is, 
as we shall see in more detail in the next section, the fundamental objective of 
history.656
  
 Here it is sufficient to note that Herder conceived this actualisation to 
move into two distinct directions: on the one hand, towards the gradual 
development of distinct local cultures through the inter-generational transmission 
of tradition; and, on the other hand, towards the gradual spreading of human 
culture across the globe by means of emigration, colonisation and inter-communal 
communication: 
Alle bisherige Tätigkeit des menschlichen Geistes ist Kraft ihrer 
innern Natur auf nichts anders als auf das Mittel hinausgegangen, die 
Humanität und Cultur unsres Geschlechts tiefer zu gründen und 
weiter zu verbreiten.657
 
 
To the extent that this progressive development is driven by the inner nature of 
human beings themselves, that is by the distinct configuration of human forces 
and impulses, which does not restrict man to one particular place nor to one 
particular mode of existence, but which equally necessitates cultural development 
as a means to survival, it happens inevitably. And yet, given human beings’ 
freedom and duty to fashion their own progress, there is no guarantee that every 
individual or every community will develop without interruption. Freedom to act 
equally implies freedom to make mistakes.658 Mistakes, Herder showed, typically 
manifest themselves in a dissonance between the intensity or the rootedness of a 
given culture, and its extent, leading to a situation which both prevents 
individuals to actualise their potential, and thereby achieve happiness, and 
communities to further develop.659
                                                 
656 Ibid., pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 1, pp. 307-9, 313-14. 
 Or, to put it differently, both aspects of 
657 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 4, p. 608. Emphasis in the original. See also Abhandlung vom 
Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 336, 341-2, 353-4. 
658 Ideen, Hanser vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 4, chap. 4, p. 135 (emphasis in the original): 'Der Mensch ist 
der erste Freigelassene der Schöpfung; er stehet aufrecht. Die Waage des Guten und Bösen, des 
Falschen und Wahren hängt in ihm: er kann forschen, er soll wählen. Wie die Natur ihm zwo freie 
Hände zu Werkzeugen gab und ein überblickendes Auge, seinen Gang zu leiten: so hat er auch in 
sich die Macht, nicht nur die Gewichte zu stellen, sondern auch, wenn ich so sagen darf, selbst 
Gewicht zu sein auf der Waage. Er kann dem trüglichsten Irrtum Schein geben und ein freiwillig 
Betrogener werden ... .’  
659 On Herder's discussion of the relation between the extent and intensity of a given culture, see 
also Wolfgang Pross, ‘Herder und die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft’, Germanisch-Romanische 
Monatsschrift 57, no. 1 (2007), pp. 39-43. 
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cultural development must be harmoniously combined; if not, stasis or alienation 
will rear their heads and prevent the progressive actualisation of Humanität.660
 
 
Stasis typically happens, according to Herder, in a culture that has predominantly 
developed in autarky, and, therefore, is marked by well-rooted, intense traditions. 
In such a situation, the traditional heritage can become an end in itself, rather than 
a means to continuous development by negotiating between the past and the 
present on the one hand, and the culture’s internal core and the outside world, on 
the other. Such a culture will provide its individual members with a strong sense 
of belonging, but it will prevent them from contributing to its continuous 
development. Inward- and backward looking receptivity, in other words, has 
completely stifled outward and forward looking creative spontaneity.661
 
 
Alienation is, in a sense, the opposite of stasis, but its results are similar. It occurs 
if a culture extends too far from its traditional, inner core, thereby reaching a level 
of complexity and diversity that prevents the organic assimilation of old and new 
and foreign and indigenous. The cultural whole, which enables individuals to find 
a sense of belonging and purpose, and thus happiness, becomes fragmented, and, 
as a consequence, individuals lose their mooring to a firm centre from which they 
can meaningfully reach out to the outside world.662
                                                 
660 Herder returns to this notion of a necessary balance between the two aspects of cultural 
development again and again in his writings. See, for instance, his equivocation on the question of 
censorship, which he implicitly discusses with reference to Rousseau's advocacy of upholding a 
ban on theatres in Geneva as a means to protect the republic from corrupting, foreign influences. 
Whilst generally an opponent of any restriction of freedom of expression, Herder partly agreed 
with Rousseau by arguing that foreign influences may have to be partly suppressed, if a given 
culture is not rooted strongly enough to absorb them. See, Vom Einfluß der Regierung auf die 
Wissenschaften, SWS, vol. 9, pp. 357-61. On the idea that Herder's anthropology is heavily 
influenced by an aesthetic theory of harmony, see also Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the 
Enlightenment, pp.189-90; Nisbet, ‘Herders Anthropologische Anschauungen’, pp. 19-21. On the 
importance of an ideal of harmonious proportions for teleological conceptions of history in late 
Enlightenment Germany in general, see Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of 
Historicism, pp. 62-70.  
 Moreover, the complexity 
involved in a highly extensive culture implies high levels of specialisation in 
cultural production, preventing individuals from immediately and directly 
engaging with their cultural environment in its totality. If a static culture is 
661 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bk. 12, chap. 6, pp. 469-70; pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 1, pp. 582-3.  
662 Ibid., pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 5, pp. 302-3. 
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threatened by death through inward ossification, an alienated one risks the same 
fate through outward disintegration and inward functionalisation.663
 
 
According to Herder, it is one of the key functions of government to establish 
institutions and structures that enable the necessary balancing of the two aspects 
of cultural development, thereby preventing both stasis and alienation. In order to 
understand this conception of government, we have to briefly look at Herder’s 
solution to the second key problem of his anthropology: to establish a firm basis 
of human sociability. 
 
The premise of Herder's conception of sociability is again provided by the notion 
of man as an animal with weak instincts. This conception is, in the first instance, 
directed against Rousseau, and particularly against the distinction between a 
natural and a social state, and the concomitant differentiation between natural 
man driven by a benign concern for his self-preservation and social man driven by 
a destructive and dehumanising concern for social recognition and domination. 
Herder's anthropology, by contrast, does not allow for any sharp opposition 
between nature on the one hand, and society and culture, on the other. In his view, 
man simply could never have been a completely isolated animal, able of find a 
fulfilled existence autonomously. Entering the world with weak instincts, survival 
would be impossible in such a situation, and parental love and integration into a 
wider community are needed to compensate for this weakness. From the moment 
an individual is born, it is a social animal in need of culture, and its sociability 
and its natural need for culture both express themselves in Bildung: that is the 
transmission of culture from parents to children by means of language, without 
which no survival, let alone a fulfilled existence is possible.664
                                                 
663 See, for instance, Herder's claim that savages may well be happier than extensively cultivated 
Europeans because their culture is more direct, immediate and less specialised - ibid., pt. 2, bk. 9, 
chap. 3, pp. 327-8. A similar argument can also be found in Herder's Auszug aus einem 
Briefwechsel über Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker where the strength, immediacy, spontaneity 
and capacity to describe a given scene in its totality of Greek and old Nordic poetry is favourably 
compared to the weakness, abstractness, artificiality and fragmentary nature of modern European 
literature. See, SWS, vol. 5, esp. pp. 164-83.  
 
664 Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, Hanser, vol. 2, pp. 319-20, 332. The argument 
about the natural basis of both culture and society is repeated in Vom Einfluß der Regierung auf 
die Wissenschaften, SWS, vol. 9 , pp. 313-19, and in the Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 
4, pp. 285-97. On Herder’s conception of human beings as cultural by nature see also Muthu, 
Enlightenment against Empire, pp. 226-38.  
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By thus conceiving society as being both necessary and natural to man, Herder 
equally turned against any description of sociability as being, at its heart, not 
really sociable at all, but driven by self-interest. Here the target is of course not 
solely, or even primarily, Rousseau, but a whole tradition of anthropological 
theorising which for Herder most prominently includes Mandeville, Helvétius, 
Hobbes and Kant, but which equally encompasses all the thinkers so far discussed 
in this thesis. According to Herder, weak man's primordial instinct for self-
preservation simply does not collide with the societal requirement of co-operation 
and peaceful co-existence; on the contrary, because man's self-preservation is by 
necessity collective, the two drives are intimately entwined. 665 Therefore, a 
perceived existential conflict within man that underlies much 18th-century 
anthropological thinking - as for instance expressed in Rousseau's opposing 
principles of amour de soi and amour-propre or in Kant's notion of man's 
ungesellige Geselligkeit666 - is a non-issue for Herder.667
 
 
The most important consequence of this account of sociability is political. If 
Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant believed that the question of how to institute a 
sovereign power above individuals that is able to impose limits on their asocial 
drives is the fundamental problem of politics, Herder profoundly disagreed. 
Indeed, he claims that Kant's principle to this effect, namely that man is an animal 
that requires a master668
 
 - i.e. the law-governed state - is an unnatural, evil one. In 
Herder's view, the most pressing issue a state faces vis-à-vis its citizens is exactly 
the same as the one parents have to confront in regard to their offspring: 
                                                 
665 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 8, chap. 4, pp. 284-7. See also, Haben wir noch jetzt das 
Publikum und Vaterland der Alten?, SWS, vol. 1, p. 24-6, and the essay on Mandeville in the 
Adrastea, pt. 8, SWS, vol. 24, pp. 103-19. 
666 See Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke in sechs 
Bänden, vol. 6, p. 37. 
667 On Herder’s notion of sociability in contrast to Hobbes’ and Kant’s, see also Hont, Jealousy of 
Trade, pp. 503-7. 
668 See Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke in sechs 
Bänden, vol. 6, p. 40: ‘der Mensch ist ein Tier, das, wenn es unter andern seiner Gattung lebt, 
einen Herrn nötig hat. Denn er mißbraucht gewiß seine Freiheit in Ansehung anderer 
seinesgleichen; und, ob er gleich, als vernünftiges Geschöpf, ein Gesetz wünscht, welches der 
Freiheit aller Schranken setzt: so verleitet ihn doch seine selbstsüchtige tierische Neigung, wo er 
darf, sich selbst auszunehmen. Er bedarf also einen Herrn, der ihm den eignen Willen breche, und 
ihn nötige, einen allgemein-gültigen Willen, dabei jeder frei sein kann, zu gehorchen.’ 
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Ein zwar leichter, aber böser Grundsatz wäre es zur Philosophie der 
Menschen-Geschichte: "Der Mensch sei ein Tier das einen Herren 
nötig habe und von diesem Herren oder von einer Verbindung 
derselben das Glück seiner Endbestimmung erwarte." ... Die Natur 
nämlich hat unserm Geschlecht keinen Herren bezeichnet ... Das Weib 
bedarf eines Mannes und der Mann des Weibes: das unerzogne Kind 
hat erziehender Eltern, ... der Haufe Volks eines Anführers nötig: dies 
sind Natur-Verhältnisse, die im Begrif der Sache liegen. Im Begrif des 
Menschen liegt der Begrif eines ihm nötigen Despoten, der auch 
Mensch sei, nicht... So wie es nun ein schlechter Vater ist, der sein 
Kind erziehet, damit es, Lebenslang unmündig, Lebenslang eines 
Erziehers bedörfe ...; so mache man die Anwendung auf die Erzieher 
des Menschengeschlechts, die Väter des Vaterlandes und ihre 
Erzognen.669
 
  
Man is a weak animal in need of a tutor, and parents and states are charged with 
ensuring the education of their children/citizens. But the reference to the despot, 
or the bad father, who educates in a way that ensures indefinite immaturity, 
indicates that Herder conceived education not as Erziehung but as Bildung: 
imposition and dependence is to be kept to a bare minimum and the aim of 
education is to put the educated into a position where Bildung can happen 
autonomously; or, to put it differently, governmental responsibility only extends 
to create opportunities and circumstances that allow Bildung to take place, its 
goal, ultimately the realisation of Humanität, can only be reached by the 
individual through the unhindered use of all his forces. 
 
This is also the upshot of Herder's most overtly political work, the essay Vom 
Einfluß der Regierung auf die Wissenschaften. Herder therein defined that a 
sovereign's reign can only be considered glorious if it had a beneficial influence 
on the development of the sciences (Wissenschaften) which are conceived very 
broadly as comprising all aspects of human culture.670
                                                 
669 Ideen, Hanser vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 4, pp. 336-7. For Kant's reply to Herder's attack, see 
his review of the second part of the Ideen in Kant, Werke in sechs Bänden, vol. 6, p. 804.  
 But he equally argued that 
such an influence generally best happens indirectly: by preparing the ground for 
the sciences to flourish through the granting of extensive, if not necessarily 
complete, freedom of thought and expression, by establishing institutions and 
structures that offer opportunities for learning, and by promoting emulative 
behaviour through the provision of beneficial examples for imitation and by 
670 SWS, vol. 9, pp. 351-2. 
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rewarding achievements.671 Any direct imposition of the sciences on a passive 
people is thereby in principle rejected, but Herder did grant the sovereign the 
power, in certain circumstances, to guide their development more directly. 
Especially the importation of foreign sciences needs supervision, Herder argued, 
and in case they should prove disruptive, a temporary and limited suspension of 
free expression may have to be considered.672
 
 
It is frequently argued that Herder was an essentially non-political thinker, or, that 
if he had a political theory, that it veered into the direction of anarchism or 
cultural nationalism. The underlying reason for this assessment is of course the 
rejection of a conception of the state along the lines suggested by Hobbes.673
                                                 
671 Ibid., pp. 351-71. 
 By 
refusing to conceive the state as ontologically different from the family, or, by 
extension, from a community or nation defined by a shared language and 
tradition, Herder can of course be read as arguing that the state, understood as a 
coercive mechanism charged with imposing and administering laws, is not only 
not needed, but, ultimately, diametrically opposed to the attainment of happiness. 
After all, Herder suggested that human socialisation, pacification and the 
promotion of cultural development cannot, or in any case should not, be imposed 
by a rational political actor residing above a given nation, but instead should flow 
spontaneously and freely from the nation itself through the complex process of 
Bildung, comprising both the organic integration of individuals and the gradual 
development of culture through the meshing of tradition and innovation. It is of 
course only a small step from such a portrayal of Herder's politics to Isaiah 
Berlin's claim that Herder's thought should, above all else, be considered as a 
radical rejection of the Enlightenment, involving the pitting of cultural 
672 On the question of censorship, see also Adrastea, pt. 4, Hanser, vol. 23, pp. 343-6, and footnote 
660 above. 
673 The classic accounts on Herder's alleged failure to deal sufficiently with either the state or 
politics are Haym, Herder esp. vol. 2, pp. 280-3, 506&ff.; Meinecke, Die Entstehung des 
Historismus, pp. 391-2, 445-7; Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis 
des deutschen Nationalstaates, 3rd ed., (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1915), pp. 29-33. 
For an argument that Herder should be considered as an advocate of a cultural and, fundamentally, 
apolitical version of nationalism which is close to anarchism, see Berlin, Three Critics of the 
Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, pp. 180-1, 205-6. For a good rejection of the claim that 
Herder's nationalism should be considered as non-political, see Frederick M. Barnard, Herder on 
Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), pp. 38-65. 
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nationalism, pluralism and populism against his contemporaries' cherished values 
of cosmopolitanism, universalism and étatism.674
 
  
There is of course some truth in such a portrayal. Most importantly, Herder had 
undoubtedly a very different understanding of human sociability and the state 
from, for instance, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, and Kant. And yet, to conclude 
from such differences that Herder radically opposed his own ideals to a 
monolithic Enlightenment tradition involves a significant misrepresentation of 
Herder's position as well as an over-simplified reading of the Enlightenment.675
 
 
Indeed, a consideration of Herder's Russian writings in the context of his 
anthropology demonstrates that, far from attempting to diametrically oppose 
doctrines or models, he endeavoured to mediate between opposing notions put 
forward by his contemporaries. In particular, in the context of Russia, his 
anthropological concept of Bildung enables Herder to carefully negotiate between 
Voltaire's championing of Peter as the prime example demonstrating the efficacy 
of rapid, willed, top-down civilisation by means of cultural importation on the one 
hand, and Diderot's attempt to convince Catherine of the virtues of slow, natural, 
bottom-up and indigenous development, on the other. Bildung combines 
determinate natural forces and contingent, willed human actions, internal and 
external influences, top-down imposition and bottom-up spontaneity; and the 
Bildung of an empire such as Russia, Herder consistently stressed, needs both 
Voltaire's Peter and Diderot's Catherine. 
 
Moreover, and despite Herder's unquestionable uneasiness about the modern 
state, his is far from an anarchical political theory based on a notion of 
spontaneous, natural growth from the grassroots. It is again in his Russian 
writings that he most succinctly makes the practical case for the need for state 
intervention. As man is an animal in need of a tutor, the state has an important 
educating role to play as soon as a community has extended beyond the 
                                                 
674 Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, pp. 168-242. For a shorter 
version of the same argument, see Isaiah Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, in Aspects of the 
Eighteenth Century, ed. Earl R. Wasserman (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965). 
675 For a very similar argument, see also Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire, pp. 210-12. 
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primordial family or tribe.676
 
 Even though this role is not qualitatively different 
from the one played by parents or a patriarch, and even though states should 
generally only act indirectly or negatively by creating opportunities for Bildung, 
especially in times when normal development has been blown of course, much 
more direct, positive and active guidance needs to flow from the top. 
Indeed, stasis and alienation - the two prime obstacles to continuous progressive 
development - both figure large in Herder's understanding of Russian history. 
Peter, having inherited a country in historical stasis, had managed to provide 
Russia with a new source of dynamism through his cultural imports; the reform 
programme proposed to Catherine was calibrated to prevent Russia from falling 
into a state of alienation. Hence, the concern with nationalising and assimilating 
the imports through a comprehensive programme of Bildung. Catherine's job, in 
other words, was to start the process of reconstructing a cultural whole, to 
reconnect tradition with recent innovations, and thereby provide Russians with a 
new sense of belonging and purpose. To put it differently, Herder, the alleged 
quasi anarchist, can in certain circumstances, advocate means of development that 
are surprisingly close to a doctrine of enlightened despotism without violating his 
own principle that man is an animal in need of a tutor: when stasis or alienation 
occur, figures able to see beyond a country's current predicament are needed to 
impose reforms, even if they are resisted, in order to create a situation that allows 
for natural development, mainly driven by the Nationalgeist rather than the will 
of the sovereign, to resume.677
 
 
If Herder's anthropology thereby provides us with important clues about how his 
assessment of Peter and his plans for Catherine might be related to each other, the 
                                                 
676 That Herder's anarchism is severely limited due to his advocacy of state education has also been 
stressed by Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 212-15. 
677 Barnard argues that Herder regarded state leadership as a transitional phenomena only: once a 
nation has been educated to a sufficient level of maturity, any imposition from above will have to 
wither away and be replaced by spontaneous joint-endeavour from below. Whilst Herder certainly 
made the case that diverging levels of imposition are needed depending on historical conjectures, I 
cannot find any firm textual evidence for a belief in a progressive historical decline of the state, 
matched by a related growth of the nation. A reading of Herder’s Russian writings would rather 
suggest that he considered the relation between top-down and bottom-up, or state and nation, as 
one of a harmony which needs constant reconfiguration depending on circumstances. See 
Frederick M. Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought. From Enlightenment to Nationalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp.76-83.  
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question remains as to how these two aspects of Herder's Russian writings relate 
to his prophecy of a future Russian civilisation, centred at the Black Sea and 
spreading out across the world. His philosophy of history, which is itself 
intimately related to his anthropology, provides the answer. 
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Philosophy of history of mankind: Asian stasis, European 
alienation, and the quest for a new dynamic centre 
 
According to Herder’s philosophy, human history is an extension of natural 
history and anthropology. Whilst the latter establish human beings' place and role 
within the order of nature, the former investigates the uses they have made of 
their relative freedom to establish a purpose and order for themselves that mirrors 
God/nature. The history of mankind traces the ascending chain of human 
Bildungen across time and space, thereby following the ways by which the ideal 
of Humanität has been successively approached: 
 
Es ziehet sich demnach eine Kette der Cultur in sehr abspringenden 
krummen Linien durch alle gebildete [sic.] Nationen … . In jeder 
derelben bezeichnet sie zu- und abnehmende Größen und hat Maxima 
allerlei Art. Manche von diesen schließen einander aus oder schränken 
einander ein, bis zuletzt dennoch ein Ebenmaß im Ganzen stattfindet, 
so daß es der trüglichste Schluß wäre, wenn man von Einer 
Vollkommenheit einer Nation auf jede andere schließen wollte.678
 
 
By conceiving the chain of culture as proceeding in ‘crooked lines’ and by 
indicating that different cultural perfections, achieved at different times and by 
different peoples, may well be mutually exclusive, Herder stressed that the history 
of mankind is a complex, non-linear story, marked by incessant cultural 
diversification as well as by a unity and harmony discernable if it is regarded as a 
whole. This double characterisation of history as constituting diversity in unity 
provides the basis for Herder’s scathing attack on contemporary historiography. In 
his highly polemical Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der 
Menschheit679 as well as in a number of shorter essays and book reviews written 
in the 1770s – most notably of Schlözer’s Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie 
and Millar’s Observations concerning the distinction of ranks in society680
 
 – 
Herder faulted his fellow historians of mankind for two, related faults, both 
caused by an insufficiently broad perspective. 
                                                 
678 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bk. 15, chap. 3, p. 599. 
679 Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 589-683. 
680 SWS, vol. 5, pp. 436-40, 452-6. 
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Indeed, he attacked at the same time those thinkers who solved the problem of 
how to find unity in history by elevating their own particular place or time to an 
universal yardstick by which the totality of the past can be measured, as well as 
the ones who have rejected such an optimistic view of the present and who are 
instead in danger of falling into complete scepticism, for whom, in other words, 
history threatens to become an essentially meaningless succession of random 
revolutions.681
 
 If we regard history from the perspective of a superior present, it 
may appear to be coherent and reveal purpose. But coherence and purpose, Herder 
argued, come at a high cost, since the past is reduced to a means for a higher end: 
the present. If, by contrast, we refuse to adopt any fixed point of view, and regard 
history only from within the hurly burly of events, we are in danger of seeing in 
the past nothing more than random flux. One perspective finds unity by 
destroying all diversity, the other loses sight of unity in the face of overwhelming 
diversity.  
To a considerable extent, Herder’s juxtaposition of presentists and sceptics is a 
continuation of the historiographical debate between philosophes and érudits 
which we have encountered several times already. Indeed, the former group most 
prominently includes the philosophically inclined Voltaire, Robertson, Iselin and 
Millar, and their presentist perspective is generated by their interest to uncover 
how modern, polite, commercial and civilised Europe emerged.682 The second 
group encompasses German professional historians such as Gatterer and Schlözer 
who pitted their positivist project to construct a universal history by means of 
ordering and systematising critically verified facts in explicit opposition to the 
philosophes. In Herder’s view such a project is doomed to fail: historical facts, no 
matter how well established and how meticulously systematised, will never speak 
for themselves. History thus conceived, far from revealing the nexus rerum 
universalis as the Göttingen professors had hoped,683 will always remain 
fragmentary and undermine, rather than strengthen, belief in an ordered, coherent 
and purposeful world.684
 
 
                                                 
681 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 614, 619-20.  
682 Ibid., p. 630; see also SWS, vol. 5, p. 454. 
683 Gatterer, Vom historischen Plan, p. 659. 
684 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 614; SWS, vol. 5, pp. 436-40. 
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In an early fragment Herder remarked that philosophy must be guided by history, 
and history be stimulated by philosophy.685
 
 By the time he came to write the Ideen 
he had resolved the question of how the two can be married. It is the point of view 
afforded by anthropology that can provide history with a philosophically unifying 
perspective that enables to relate disparate facts and events without losing sight of 
the relative merit of past cultures. 
As we have seen, Herder’s anthropology posits that man’s cultural development 
moves in two different directions: one driven by the inter-generational 
transmission of traditions towards the establishment of strongly rooted, distinct 
local cultures which in their diversity may well be incommensurable with each 
other; the other towards the meshing and spreading of local cultures across the 
globe through inter-communal communication and emigration. An 
anthropologically-inspired history thus entails by its very nature cultural 
diversification as well as unification, and it is the historian’s task to investigate 
and integrate both modes of cultural development. The tense relation between the 
intensity and extension of cultures becomes the engine of the historical process, 
and man’s successive resolutions to the problem of how the two can be 
harmoniously combined its main subject matter. Moreover, although the main 
trajectory of cultural development is progressive, or towards a deeper grounding 
and further extension of human culture, it is not linear, and the present is not by 
necessity more perfect than the past. As soon as a given community has 
established a harmonious cultural whole, it has, Herder argued, reached a point of 
perfection sui generis, and any future development is liable to result in 
dissonances and thereby amount to a loss rather than a gain. Indeed, such 
dissonances may well mean that the community in question will ultimately 
decline and fall. However, part of its cultural heritage may be taken up elsewhere 
and be used as a building block for the Bildung of a new cultural whole. Progress, 
in other words, follows a ‘crooked’ trajectory and is only discernable from a 
global perspective.686
                                                 
685 Von der Verschiedenheit des Geschmacks und der Denkart unter den Menschen (1766), SWS, 
vol. 32, pp. 27-8. 
  
686 See, especially, Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 9, chap. 1, pp. 313-14. For a very condensed 
outline of Herder’s conception of the overall historical process, see also Briefe zur Beförderung 
der Humanität, SWS, vol. 17, letter 25, pp. 115-22.  
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If we are to understand why Herder granted Russia such as prominent place in his 
conjecture about the future of human culture, we will have to follow his account 
of crooked cultural development both in its local and global dimensions, and in its 
ancient and modern guises, which is introduced as secondary division cutting 
across both directions in Herder’s historical writings. We will specifically have to 
enquire as to why and how these different lines of development converge in 
Herder’s mind spatially towards the Black Sea area, and temporally towards the 
near future. 
 
Herder’s account of the global spreading of human culture initially follows an 
East-West trajectory. According to Herder, the first flowering of culture occurred 
in South-East Asia, and throughout ancient history he described a cultural 
movement towards the West: from China to Egypt and Greece, with India, 
Babylonia, Persia, Israel and Phoenicia constituting important linking elements.687 
The transition from ancient to modern history occurs with the Roman Empire, 
which corresponds with a geographic change of direction in cultural development: 
rather than from East to West, the developmental trend is now from South to 
North and thereby ever deeper into Europe.688
 
 
It is important to note that for Herder the geographical spread of culture is not a 
contingent process, but one that is considerably degree determined by climate. 
The entire sixth book of the Ideen, is taken up by an exposition of the physical 
geography of the globe. The centre piece of this section is a chapter on the 
Erdstrich schöngebildeter Völker (the region of beautifully formed peoples).689
 
 
This region, located between Kashmir and Greece, is, because of its physical 
attributes, particularly endowed by nature for the advancement of culture. Indeed, 
Herder went as far as to suggest that the roots of all cultural perfections can be 
traced back to this particular region: 
Ersprießlich ists für das Menschengeschlecht gewesen, daß es in 
diesen Gegenden der Wohlgestalt nicht nur anfing, sondern daß auch 
                                                 
687 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bks. 11-13, pp. 389-527. 
688 See also Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 621-2. 
689 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 6, chap. 3, pp. 199-204. 
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von hieraus die Cultur am wohltätigsten auf andre Nationen gewirkt 
hat. Wenn die Gottheit nicht unsre ganze Erde zum Sitz der Schönheit 
machen konnte: so ließ sie wenigstens durch die Pforte der Schönheit 
das Menschengeschlecht hinauftreten und mit lang’ eingeprägten 
Zügen derselben die Völker nur erst allmählich andre Gegenden 
suchen. Auch war es Ein und dasselbe Principium der Natur, das eben 
die wohlgebildeten Nationen zugleich zu den wohltätigsten 
Wirkerinnen auf andre machte ... Aus den Gegenden schöngebildeter 
Völker haben wir unsre Religion, Kunst, Wissenschaft, die ganze 
Gestalt unsrer Cultur und Humanität, so viel oder wenig wir deren an 
uns haben. In diesem Erdstrich ist alles erfunden, alles durchdacht und 
wenigstens in Kinderproben ausgeführt, was die Menschheit 
verschönern und bilden konnte.690
 
 
The reason for the beauty of the people inhabiting this region, and for the 
perfection of their cultural productions, lies in the temperateness of their physical 
surrounding: lodged between high mountains and the sea, and between the 
extreme cold of the North and the heat of the South, nature offers here the 
spectacle of beautiful harmonious proportions in all her manifestations.691
 
 We 
have already seen that Herder’s cultural ideal of Humanität always involves the 
harmonious ordering of extremes, and that man’s striving towards this ideal is 
always influenced by the kind of sense impressions they receive from nature. 
Therefore, the preference shown by Herder for temperate climates in general, and 
the area of beautifully formed people in particular: it is here that God/nature has 
offered human beings a glimpse of what they are destined to achieve in its purest 
form. 
This is an element of Herder’s philosophy of history which is often under 
appreciated in modern scholarship, no doubt because Herder is generally 
portrayed as a radical cultural pluralist for whom every culture is equally valid, an 
hence incomparable to, and incommensurate with, others.692
                                                 
690 Ibid., p. 204. 
 Even though such a 
claim certainly holds true if we only consider Herder’s appreciation of individual 
cultures, it needs serious qualification in regard to his portrayal of the spreading of 
691 Ibid., esp. p. 203. On the importance of temperate climatic zones for cultural development more 
generally, see ibid., pt. 1, bk. 1, chap. 4, p. 31. On the idea that a concept of beauty requires a 
perception of beauty in nature, see Betrachtungen über das verschiedene Urtheil von menschlicher 
Schönheit, SWS, vol. 12, pp. 15-19. 
692 See, for instance, Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, pp. 231-
38; Brian J. Whitton, ‘Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus 
Cosmopolitan Rationalism’, History and Theory 27, no. 2 (1988). 
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culture from a global perspective. Looking at the history of mankind as whole, 
Herder very clearly revealed a preference for certain parts of the globe, and this 
preference is caused by an aesthetic theory of climate with a considerable impact 
on his philosophy of history as a whole. The arguably most striking effect of 
Herder’s climatic theory is that the Americas and Africa are largely written out of 
the history of mankind altogether. Both lack, Herder argued, an extended 
temperate zone, and are therefore significantly climatically challenged in terms of 
their capacity for cultural productions.693 In the Ideen, African and American 
peoples are only awarded a climatic and ethnographic description – in which their 
value relative to their physical environment is duly appreciated – but an account 
of their own historical and cultural development is never undertaken.694 Even 
though Herder projected to integrate Africa and the Americas into his historical 
narrative in the unfinished fifth part of the Ideen, this integration would have 
taken place in the context of European voyages of discovery and colonisation.695
 
 
According to Herder, in other words, the epicentre of the history of mankind is 
firmly centred in Asia and Europe, and is driven forward by nations that have 
been in contact with the region of beautifully formed peoples.  
The Black Sea area is of course located within this region. In fact, the area 
between the Caspian and the Black Sea constitutes the most desirable locus within 
the region of beautifully formed peoples: 
 
Man sollte glauben, daß in diesen Gegenden die Zunge der Waage 
menschlicher Bildung in der Mitte geschwebt und ihre Schale nach 
Griechenland und Indien öst- und westlich fortgebreitet habe.696
 
 
Given this climatic privileging of the lands surrounding the Black Sea, we can 
readily see why Herder would consider moving Russia’s capital to Azov as being 
beneficial for the country’s future development.697
                                                 
693 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 1, bk. 1, chaps. 6-7, pp. 41-4, 46-8. 
 However, the contention that 
694 Ibid., pt. 2, bk. 6, chap. 4, pp. 205-12; pt. 2, bk. 6, chap. 6, pp. 215-24. 
695 See Herder’s plan for the continuation of the Ideen in Hanser, vol. 3/1, pp. 1155-8. 
696 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 2, bk. 6, chap. 3, p. 201. 
697 Of all the studies concerned with Herder’s Russian writings only the ones by Stavenhagen and 
Drews have cursorily drawn attention to the climatic reasons that underlie the advocacy of moving 
Russia’s capital to Azov. See Stavenhagen, ‘Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und 
Geschichtsprophetie’, pp. 25-6; Drews, Herder und die Slaven. Materialien zur 
Wirkungsgeschichte bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, pp. 53-4. 
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Russia’s real centre lies at the Northern shore of the Black Sea is of course a 
highly dubious one, and serves as an indication that the concern underlying 
Herder’s prophecy may not primarily lie with the civilisation of Russia as such, 
but with the future of human culture more widely. In order to understand the 
global historical importance of a new Russia, transformed by Peter I and 
Catherine II and with its heart located at the very epicentre of cultural production, 
we have to turn to the second dimension of Herder’s philosophy of history: the 
inter-generational transmission of tradition leading to the development of distinct 
local cultures. 
 
 The story told by Herder about this second aspect of cultural development is 
again divided into two periods: ancient history, mainly centred in Asia on the one 
hand, and modern, European history on the other, with the Roman Empire again 
serving as transition. Crucially for our present concerns, Herder detected very 
distinct driving forces and stumbling blocks for progressive development in either 
period.698 This differentiation is best illustrated by the switch of analogies 
employed in the Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte to illustrate the 
development of culture in ancient and modern time. Whilst in ancient history the 
preferred analogy is the one of the life cycle – moving from childhood (Israel and 
South East Asia), boyhood (Egypt and Phoenicia), youth (Greek) to arrive at 
manhood (Rome) – this analogy is dropped as soon as he arrives at post-Roman 
European history.699 During this period the most commonly used metaphors to 
characterise the march of history is the one of the tree, whereby ancient history is 
represented by the upward movement from the roots to the trunk, and modern 
history by the sideways shooting of the different branches.700
 
 
Underlying the analogy of the life cycle is a perception of ancient, Asian history 
as being constituted by a progressive series of distinct national cultures. Whilst 
connected through successive processes of transmission, which serve as the 
engine for overall upward cultural development, each culture is nevertheless 
                                                 
698 The importance of Herder’s strict differentiation between ancient and modern history has also 
been highlighted by Stavenhagen, ‘Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichtsprophetie’, pp. 
33-6, and Pross, ‘Herder und die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft’, p. 37. 
699 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 596-8 (childhood); pp. 599, 603-5 
(Egyptian and Phoenican boyhood); pp. 605-6 (Greek youth); pp. 609-10 (Roman adulthood).  
700 Ibid., pp. 633-4. 
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described as a self-contained and highly original entity, defined by, for instance, 
particular, national systems of religion, philosophy and legislation. According to 
Herder, each such entity was intensely inward looking, and the behaviour of its 
members was informed by patriotism. Indeed, ancient cultures defined themselves 
predominantly in strict opposition to their neighbours; a proposition especially 
true in regard to China and Israel, but it equally applies to more open, receptive 
countries such as ancient Egypt and Phoenicia. In a highly evocative and 
characteristic passage, Herder characterised the relation between ancient cultures 
in the following manner: 
 
… siehe, wie der Ägypter den Hirten, den Landstreicher hasset! Wie 
er den leichtsinnigen Griechen verachtet! So jede zwo Nationen, deren 
Neigungen und Kreise der Glückseligkeit sich stoßen – man nennts 
Vorurteil! Pöbelei! Eingeschränkten Nationalism! Das Vorurteil ist 
gut, zu seiner Zeit: denn es macht glücklich. Es drängt Völker zu 
ihrem Mittelpunkte zusammen, macht sie vester auf ihrem Stamme, 
blühender in ihrer Art, brünstiger und also auch glückseliger in ihren 
Neigungen und Zwecken. 701
 
 
The cumulative effect of such national modes of Bildung were, according to 
Herder, inner strength, immediacy, simplicity and wholeness. There existed a 
unity of purpose of all societal forces - government, religion, arts and sciences - to 
draw the nation together towards its own particular centre.702 Indeed, one of the 
most prominent cultural manifestations of ancient times is myth, unifying 
philosophy, theology, politics and poetry, and giving immediate expression to the 
experience and aspirations of a nation in its totality.703
 
 Such simple, strongly 
rooted and immediately accessible traditions underlie the marked collective 
consciousness of ancient societies and the strong attachment of their members to 
their national identity. 
The flipside of such centredness provided by strongly rooted traditions, however, 
is the danger of stasis: 
 
                                                 
701 Ibid., p. 618. Emphasis in the original. 
702 See esp. Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bk. 12, chap. 6, pp. 469-70. See also Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 597. 
703 See also Vom Einfluß der Regierung auf die Wissenschaften, SWS, vol. 9, pp. 313-19. 
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 Die Tradition ist eine an sich vortreffliche, unserm Geschlecht 
unentbehrliche Naturordnung; sobald sie aber sowohl in praktischen 
Staatsanstalten als im Unterricht alle Denkkraft fesselt, allen Fortgang 
der Menschenvernunft und Verbesserung nach neuen Umständen und 
Zeiten hindert: so ist sie das wahre Opium des Geistes sowohl für 
Staaten als Sekten und einzelne Menschen. Das große Asien, die 
Mutter aller Aufklärung unserer bewohnten Erde hat von diesem 
süßen Gift viel gekostet und andern zu kosten gegeben.704
 
 
The strength of the Asian opium of tradition is not uniform across ancient 
cultures. On the contrary, Herder described a whole spectrum ranging from 
complete stasis to relative dynamism, and in which increased dynamic qualities 
correspond with a movement from East to West geographically, and from deepest 
antiquity to the threshold of modernity temporally. Its starting point is provided 
by China, and Herder, just like Voltaire, regarded it as the most stable, self-
sufficient and static civilisation known to mankind that has not changed since its 
institution despite the frequent shocks it has suffered through barbarian 
invasions.705 At the other end of the spectrum stands Greece. More open towards 
the outside and, thanks to its diverse and poly-centred nature, driven forward by 
strong internal emulation, Greece is the only ancient culture whose development 
was not cut short through internal ossification.706
 
 
In Herder’s philosophy of history, Greece is a special and revealing case. Indeed, 
the Greeks are the only people in history to have followed the whole career of 
Bildung: from the smallest beginning, they have over time developed a culture as 
perfect as it could be given the constraints of time and space; they had, in other 
words, fully developed their potential and their history provides as close an 
approximation to the ideal of Humanität as possible.707
                                                 
704 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bk. 12, chap. 6, p. 470. 
 The cause for this 
achievement was, according to Herder, a successful harmonious meshing of 
internal and external Bildung and of tradition and innovation, helped along by 
favourable geographic, climatic and world historical circumstances. The Greeks 
arrived on the stage of history at a favourable moment - the arts and science had 
already developed to a significant degree in Egypt and Phoenicia - and were 
705 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 11, chap. 1, pp. 398-400; pt. 3, bk. 12, chap. 6, p. 468.  
706 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 13, chap. 1, pp. 472-3.  
707 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 13, chap. 7, pp. 520-2. 
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geographically optimally positioned to take full advantage of this historical 
conjecture by soaking up aspects of their neighbours. However, their real 
achievement lie in effecting a comprehensive transformation of these cultural 
imports into a completely new and original Bildung, reflecting the beauty of the 
climate they inhabited, and kept alive over centuries through internal 
emulation.708
 
 
Not internal ossification, but external over-expansion following Alexander’s 
conquests finally put an end to the flowering of Greek culture. It was a 
combination of indiscriminate importation of Asian luxury goods, and of 
controlling territories disproportionate to the size of the motherland that brought 
Greece to its knees.709
 
 As such, Greece already stands at the border to modern 
history; a border that was crossed for good by Rome. 
As seen, Herder accompanied the change from antiquity to modernity with a shift 
in metaphor: rather than the metaphor of the life cycle, the one of the tree with its 
ancient trunk and modern crown is now used to illustrate the historical process. 
Rome stands right at the cross-road between the two: it occupies the last place in 
the life-cycle (manhood), and constitutes the transition from trunk to crown in the 
tree analogy.  
 
If the tree trunk represents the strength and stability of ancient cultures, the image 
of the crown points to the exact opposite: composed of a variety of small branches 
and leaves, it implies weakness, but also great height and extensive spatial spread. 
What Herder sought to symbolise with this change in metaphor, is a 
comprehensive transformation regarding the overall historical process: no longer 
towards the development of strongly rooted, largely autonomous, and distinct 
national cultures, but towards the soaking up and meshing of the ancient cultural 
heritage into a much more fickle general culture, and the spread of this 
increasingly universal culture across the globe. 
 
                                                 
708 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 13, chap. 1, pp. 473-8; Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, 
pp. 606-9. 
709 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 3, bk. 13, chap. 6, pp. 515-18. 
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In the Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Herder summarised Rome’s 
contribution to this transformation with characteristic flourish: 
 
Wie man auch die Sache nehme: es war “Reife des Schicksals der 
alten Welt.” Der Stamm des Baums zu seiner größern Höhe 
erwachsen, strebte, Völker und Nationen unter seinen Schatten zu 
nehmen, in Zweige. Mit Griechen, Phöniciern, Ägyptern und 
Morgenländern zu wetteifern, haben die Römer nie zu ihrer 
Hauptsache gemacht; aber indem sie alles was vor ihnen war, 
männlich anwandten – was wurde für ein Römischer Erdkreis! Der 
Name knüpfte Völker und Weltstriche zusammen, die sich voraus nicht 
dem Laut nach gekannt hatten. Römische Provinzen! in allen 
wandelten Römer, Römische Legionen, Gesetze, Vorbilder von Sitten, 
Tugenden und Lastern. Die Mauer ward zerbrochen, die Nation von 
Nation schied, der erste Schritt gemacht, die Nationalcharaktere aller 
zu zerstören, alle in eine Form zu werfen, die “Römervolk“ hieß.710
 
 
And yet, Rome’s project to render the whole known world Roman failed. Its 
constitution originally only calibrated to regulate a town was not equipped to 
support an extended empire, and Rome fell because of internal discord 
exacerbated by external over-expansion.711
 
 But the historic trend set in motion – 
the eradication of national differences through the spreading of a synthetic, 
shallow culture – continued; indeed, it is the story told by Herder about modern 
European history. 
Europe as it presented itself after the fall of Rome was fundamentally different 
from the Asia of antiquity. The latter had been a scene of a number of different 
peoples gradually developing relatively autonomously on the lands which they 
had inhabited since time immemorial. Their cultures, therefore, had a very strong 
climatic and national colouring perpetuated over centuries through inter-
generational transmission. In Europe, on the other hand, all seeds of truly 
indigenous cultures – Etruscan, Gallian, Iberian – had been rooted up by the 
Roman juggernaut.712
                                                 
710 Hanser, vol. 1, p. 610. Emphasis in the original. 
 Once Rome fell, Europe was carved up by a variety of 
nomadic barbarian tribes falling in from the East, and freely roaming and inter-
mixing with each other. The modern Europe described by Herder is from its very 
beginning a confused melting-pot of peoples, rather than an orderly garden in 
711 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 14, chap. 4, pp. 552-60. 
712 Ibid., pt. 3, bk. 14, chap 3, pp. 550-2. 
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which each plant or culture flowers in its particular way on its particular soil as 
had been the case in Asia.713
 
 
But the story of Europe is not one of a wildly propagating diversity. On the 
contrary, the gradual civilisation of the barbarians was from the outset driven by 
strongly unifying forces. The first such force is provided by Europe’s physical 
geography. Because of its location, and particularly because of its three main 
bodies of water – the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea – Europe 
was predestined to enjoy a lively internal traffic of peoples, goods and ideas as 
well as to entertain ample contact to the outside world. Herder argued that those 
convenient means of communication stand at the root of modern Europe’s 
historically unprecedented dynamism, generated through rapid cycles of intra-
communal imitation and emulation. Moreover, rapid exchanges between its 
constituent parts also provided a crucial precondition for the gradual emergence of 
a common, unifying European-wide outlook or spirit.714
 
 
Christianity is the second band that has tied Europe together. Indeed, Herder 
treated its emergence and spread as one of the key pieces of evidence to illustrate 
the fundamental historical transformation towards universality that occurred 
during the time of the Roman Empire: 
 
Die Zeit der einzelnen National-Gottesdienste voll Stolzes und 
Aberglaubens war vorüber: denn so notwendig dergleichen 
Einrichtungen in älteren Zeiten gewesen sein mochten, als jede 
Nation, in einem engen Familienkreise erzogen, gleich einer vollen 
Traube auf ihrer eignen Staude wuchs: so war doch, seit Jarhunderten 
schon, in diesem Erdstrich fast alle menschliche Bemühung dahin 
gegangen, durch Kriege, Handel, Künste, Wissenschaften und 
Umgang die Völker zu knüpfen, und die Früchte eines jeden zu einem 
gemeinsamen Trank zu keltern. Vorurteile der National-Religionen 
standen dieser Vereinigung am meisten im Wege; da nun beim 
allgemeinen Duldungsgeist der Römer in ihrem weiten Reich ... jetzt 
noch ein Volksglaube hervortrat, der alle Völker zu Einem Volk 
machte ... so ward dies allerding ein großer, zugleich auch ein 
                                                 
713 Ibid., pt. 2, bk. 6, chap 3, p. 203; pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 6, pp. 648-51. See also Vom Einfluß der 
Regierung auf die Wissenschaften, SWS, vol. 9, pp. 337-9. 
714 Ideen, Hanser, vol. 3/1, pt. 4, bk. 16, chap. 6, pp. 647-51.  
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gefährlicher Schritt in der Geschichte der Menschheit, je nachdem er 
getan wurde.715
 
 
The big, yet equally dangerous leap, the rise of Christianity marked in the history 
of mankind expressed itself in post-Roman Europe in the first instance through a 
wholesale cultural purging and unification process. After the conversion of the 
early Frankish kings, Herder traced the violent Christianisation of the Saxons, 
Slavs, Poles and Prussians, and the associated wholesale destruction of their own 
belief systems and rituals, ultimately leading to a more homogeneous cultural 
landscape.716 But Christianity’s unifying capacity also manifested itself more 
gently, particularly through the spreading of Latin across the continent’s elite. 
Apart from providing Europeans with a first lingua franca, thereby supporting 
traffic and communication, Latin also acted as a bridge back towards the cultural 
heritage of antiquity, initially brought to Europe by Rome, and, after its fall, 
remaining there in ruins and acting as the basis out of which a new synthetic 
culture developed.717
 
 
Indeed, modern Europe’s culture is not indigenous, and its development has not 
primarily been driven by inter-generational communication within one 
community, but through imitation of foreign cultures, frequently brought to her by 
third-party purveyors such as the Arabs. Whilst this is particularly true in regard 
to Christianity, which through the transformation it underwent at Alexandria 
carried the baggage of a great deal of Greek philosophy, and in regard to the 
flowering of classical arts and learning during the Renaissance,718 Herder 
throughout stressed the foreign roots of cultural manifestations which prima facie 
look particularly European such chivalry and Provencal poetry.719
 
 
Europe, in other words, is not particularly culturally creative. Nor has it provided 
its adopted culture with strong roots. Its particular strength rather lies in rapidly 
exchanging goods internally and externally; a trend which can be traced right back 
to the continent’s post-Roman beginning, but which has since become further 
                                                 
715 Ibid., pt. 4, bk. 17, chap. 1, pp. 655-6. 
716 Ibid., pt. 4, bk. 16, chaps. 2, 4, pp. 634, 642; bk. 18, chap. 3, p. 719.  
717 Ibid., pt. 4, bk. 19, chap. 2, pp. 757-60. 
718 Ibid., pt. 4, bk. 17, chap. 3, p. 676; pt. 4, bk. 20, chap. 4, pp. 820-3. 
719 Ibid., pt. 4, bk. 20, chap. 2, pp. 796-805. 
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enhanced through travels of exploration and overseas colonisation. Thereby, 
Europe has helped to establish an increasingly universalised culture by fusing 
elements from all times and all places: 
 
In Europa sollte das Gewächs der alten Weltjahrhunderte nur gedörret 
und abgekeltert werden: aber von da aus unter die Völker der Erde 
kommen ... Alles war schon erfunden, gefühlt, fein ersonnen, was 
vielleicht ersonnen werden konnte: hier ward alles nun in Methode, in 
Form der Wissenschaften geschlagen – und denn kamen nun eben die 
neuen, kältesten Mechanischen Erfindungen hinzu, die es ins Große 
spielten: Maschienen der kalten Europäischnordischen Abstraktion, 
für die Hand des Allenkers große Werkzeuge! Da liegen nun die 
Samenkörner fast unter allen Nationen der Erde.720
 
 
The reference to the cold, mechanical and abstract means employed to mould the 
achievements of all times and places into one general form, points to the ultimate 
weakness of modern European culture when compared to the ones of antiquity. 
Indeed, the idea of the abstract, mechanical machine has a negative connotation in 
Herder when compared to its antonym of the concrete organism. The former 
implies a forced, artificial kind of construction lacking the vitality, immediacy 
and spontaneity of the latter.721
 
 
This is a theme Herder elaborated upon throughout his career and the main lines 
of argument remain constant. Modern European culture is abstract, general and 
derivative rather than concrete, particular and original - a claim Herder typically 
supported with reference to the French Encyclopédie and its project to collect and 
systematize all human knowledge by using the most artificial of all ordering 
mechanism, or, as, already seen, by invoking Montesquieu and his attempt to 
taxonomise all forms of government.722
                                                 
720 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 663. Emphasis in the original. 
 Likewise, it is driven by mechanical 
imitation rather than organic meshing of old and new and foreign and indigenous 
– as for instance demonstrated by the strict, but untimely, adherence to Aristotle’s 
rule of the unity of place, time and action in classical French drama, and by the 
equally blind German imitation of French Classicism in particular, and of French 
721 On Herder's usage of the machine and organism metaphor, see Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the 
Enlightenment, pp. 186-7.  
722 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, pp. 640, 654. 
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culture in general, after it had assumed a hegemonic position in Europe.723 
Moreover, the outlook of Europe’s inhabitants is of an empty cosmopolitan kind – 
the love of everywhere and everyone in general, but of nobody and nowhere in 
particular – rather than of the intensely patriotic and xenophobic kind that acted as 
a unifying glue in antiquity.724 A host of similar examples could be added; they 
all point to the same conclusion. Modern Europe lacks the inner strength, unity 
and centeredness of the ancient, national cultures.725
 
 Whilst its openness to the 
outside world and its intense internal communication provide it with a source of 
dynamism that shields it from the Charybdis of ossified tradition and stasis, 
Europe, only unified by rootless, mechanical and artificial links, veers 
dangerously towards the Scylla of alienation. Or, to use Herder's own metaphor, 
the extent of Europe’s culture is disproportionate to its intensity; the manifold 
branches and twigs have become too far removed from the tree’s trunk. 
Herder is often described as a fierce critic of his own time. In particular, his 
philosophy is often conceived as a nationalistic reaction against the cosmopolitan 
and universalistic tendencies that he discovered operating in contemporary 
European culture.726 Such a portrayal seems to a large extent wrongly conceived, 
however, since Herder saw these tendencies as natural, and hence inevitable, 
aspects of the overall historical process.727
                                                 
723 Von Deutscher Art und Kunst, SWS, vol. 5, pp. 208-17. See also Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 1, 
pp. 68-73. 
 Herder was not primarily disquieted by 
the eradication of national differences in modern Europe, nor by the synthesising 
and universalising pattern of cultural development as such, but by a fear that these 
processes had gone too far and threatened to result in widespread alienation. In 
modern Europe the essential harmony between cultural rootedness and extent has 
become disrupted. However, he was adamant that a much needed equilibrium 
cannot be achieved through a return to the past, but only through a leap forward 
724 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 652. 
725 Herder's two lengthy contributions to the long-standing quarrel between the ancients and the 
moderns, undertaken in the Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität and the Adrastea, are premised 
on the same argument as is outlined here in regard to his philosophy of history. According to 
Herder, the quarrel is essentially meaningless because antiquity and modernity are fundamentally 
different and, as such, incomparable to each other. See Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, 
SWS, vol. 18, letters 81-107, pp. 5-144; Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 72-5. 
726 Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, pp. 198-201. 
727 That Herder’s advocacy of national modes of Bildung is not normative but historically specific 
has also been noted by Pross, ‘Herder und die moderne Geschichtswissenschaft’, p. 33.  
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into the future. Indeed, Herder’s laments about the contemporary state of Europe 
were invariably accompanied by conjectures about the next step in the historical 
process, and this step was typically conceived as leading to a new harmony at a 
higher, rather than lower, level of universality.728 Herder, for instance, concluded 
the Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte by expressing his conviction that a new 
world historical revolution similar to the one brought about by Rome was afoot, 
and predicted it would entail the spreading of universalised European culture 
across the globe towards a ‘allgemeine Bildung der Menschheit’.729
 
 
Herder’s prophecy about Russia’s future must be read in the context of such 
conjectures.730
 
 As with Diderot, Russia is important to Herder in the context of 
fundamental doubts about the future viability of European culture. But in clear 
contrast to Diderot, the future of Russian culture is not to be achieved through a 
complete beginning from scratch, but on the contrary, through the fusion and 
synthesis of ancient and modern, or Asian and European history. It is, in other 
words, conceived as a truly global culture. If Peter had prepared the ground for 
this fusion by emulating Europe, Catherine had to provide strong, internal roots 
for the imports. European dynamism and Asian inner strength, in other words, 
were to be combined in the Russia of the future. Located at the Black Sea, in the 
best possible climate, Russia could thus become a new Greece – a perfect 
harmonious whole – but one with a much wider reach than the one of antiquity. 
Having received a far more extensive culture from Europe than Greece did from 
Phoenicia and Egypt, and situated in the middle of a larger, more interrelated 
world, this new synthetic culture could ultimately radiate out, so Herder hoped, 
and lead to a global cultural regeneration. 
 
                                                 
728 See also, Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität, SWS, vol. 18, letter 122, pp. 286-90. In this 
letter Herder passionately argued that the decline of Europe does not imply the decline of mankind 
as a whole, and predicts that dying Europe will leave a seed for a future, better culture which will 
ultimately blossom elsewhere without, however, specifying where this may be.  
729 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Hanser, vol. 1, p. 683. 
730 That Herder’s Russian writing must at least in part be understood in the context of his negative 
assessment of the future of European culture, has also been highlighted by Stavenhagen, ‘Herders 
Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichtsprophetie’, esp. p. 17. 
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Conclusion 
 
Herder's dialogue Über die schnelle Kunstbildung der Völker in his Adrastea, 
contains the following lines: 
 
D. ... Ich dachte eben an Peter den Großen, der seine Nation auf 
Einmal, und zwar mit Gewalt in Künsten blühend machte. 
 
E. Ich auch; wir sind uns also auf Einem Wege. Laßen wir das 
Gleichniß und reden von Thatsachen der Geschichte. Es ist wohl das 
wichtigste Thema, wovon in unserm Jahrhundert, in dem Alles aufs 
schnellste cultivirt werden soll, geredet werden mag -- 
 
D. Und geredet wird, raisonnirend und deraisonnirend.731
 
 
The Adrastea, written at the beginning of the 19th century, was conceived by the 
elderly Herder as a look back over the previous century. When he forecast that 
Peter I and his attempt to civilise Russia quickly may well turn out to be the most 
important theme of the 19th century, it was as much a statement about the past, as 
it was a comment on the present, or a prediction about the future. Indeed, this 
thesis has attempted to show that the reign of Peter was a crucial topic for 
Enlightenment thought during the second part of the 18th century. Herder, 
moreover, was not only correct to stress the importance of Peter for late 
Enlightenment discourse as a whole, but in this dialogue, characterised by a 
plurality of voices, he managed very fittingly to explore the question of whether 
the czar had succeeded in quickly civilising Russia without betraying the facts of 
history. 
 
And yet, posterity has lost sight of what Herder asserted here. To the very limited 
extent that Europe's engagement with Russian history during the Enlightenment 
has been studied at all, it has generally not been considered as a dialogue, but as a 
defective monologue. Far from meaningfully discussing the interpretation of 
Russian history with each other, Enlightenment thinkers, so we are told by 
scholars such as Lortholary or Wolff, used the example of Russia's past and its 
most illustrious czar in order to lend support to problematic ideas that ostensibly 
                                                 
731 Adrastea, SWS, vol. 23, part 5, p. 444. Emphasis in the original. 
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defined the age as a whole: the efficacy of enlightened despotism (Lortholary), or 
the unquestionable perfection of European civilisation in light of which Russia 
appeared as a barbarous, semi-Oriental and backward ‘other’ (Wolff). This thesis 
has sought to revise such interpretations by drawing attention to the considerable 
diversity that is manifested in the late 18th-century debate about Russia.  
 
Regarding the claim that Russia provided above all an opportunity to extol the 
benefits of a politics of enlightened despotism, I have attempted to show that there 
simply does not exist an unequivocal celebration of Russia's two most prominent 
enlightened rulers - Peter I and Catherine II - in the texts considered here, despite 
the centrality afforded to their respective reigns. The closest approximation to 
such a celebration can be found in the Histoire de l'empire de Russie, where 
Voltaire indeed appears to suggest that Peter had single-handedly propelled 
Russia into the orbit of European civilisation by imposing his will on a passive 
nation. And yet, this Voltairian assertion needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, 
being, at bottom, a wake-up call to France's passive ruler rather than a formal 
elaboration of a theory of either historical causation or political reform. More 
importantly still, to the extent that Voltaire reduced the process of Russia's 
civilisation to the activities of Peter, his interpretation was firmly rejected, rather 
than adopted.  
 
The most radical rejection of Voltaire's central claim in the Histoire de l'empire de 
Russie - that the will of the sovereign is the key determinant of historical change - 
is provided by Diderot. According to Diderot, it is ultimately the march of nature 
that guides history and not willed human actions. Even though his dynamic 
conception of nature allows for considerable human intervention in the context of 
a young society - and he, at least initially, suspected 18th-century Russia to be 
such a society – the scope for such intervention is nevertheless limited both 
temporally and in terms of the kind of actions that are possible. When Diderot told 
Catherine II that she was able to build solid foundations for a future civilisation by 
imposing a programme of reform, he insisted that the success of this programme 
was dependent on her following the natural course of history. Most importantly, 
he stressed that Catherine’s first act would need to involve the use of despotic 
power in order to devise a political system that would prevent such usage in the 
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future. After all, the ascending slope of the natural historical cycle is defined for 
Diderot by ever tighter reciprocal relations between the members of the nation as 
a whole, and Catherine's scope for intervention is limited to create conditions that 
allow reciprocal social interaction to occur: once this is achieved, progress will be 
driven by the nation and not the sovereign, and it will happen according to the 
rhythms of nature – that is to say, only slowly and gradually. Moreover, no matter 
how solid the foundations laid, they can never last forever: as with everything else 
in the universe, they will over time weaken and dissolve.  
 
If Diderot thereby challenged the core assumption not only of enlightened 
despotism, but of any theory of history or politics that places a premium on 
deliberate human agency, Levesque and Schlözer elaborated in detail under which 
precise conditions willed actions by sovereigns may result in desired progressive 
outcomes. For both, the reign of Peter I stood as proof that the crucial factor 
determining human beings' ability to intervene purposefully in history is the 
quality and quantity of knowledge at their disposal. Although starting from a 
similar premise, they arrived at different conclusions. According to the sceptic 
Levesque, our capacity to generate sufficient knowledge to ensure that the 
outcomes of our conscious actions match their intentions is strictly limited. 
Hence, historically grown institutions possess a certain legitimacy simply because 
they have proven over time to fulfil a certain function no matter how imperfectly 
this may appear to be the case. If such institutions need to be altered, the reformer 
must proceed with utmost care and particularly ensure that he keeps the channel 
of communication with his nation open: the princely council or representative 
institutions are to be calibrated in such a way, that the reforming will is provided 
with constant feedback about whether the reformed institutions are working as 
intended, or whether they are leading to social upheaval and disruption and need 
adaptation. Sustainable progress, according to Levesque, can thus only ever 
happen gradually by means of a complex process of partial reform, feedback and 
further reform, and to the extent that Peter attempted to bypass this process by 
unilaterally imposing his will, he, almost inevitably, failed.  
 
According to Schlözer, by contrast, modern Gelehrsamkeit enables the generation 
and organisation of knowledge of a kind that enables a much more radical 
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approach to reform and more rapid development than Levesque admitted. Peter I 
and Catherine II are exemplary sovereigns for having imported the seeds of 
Gelehrsamkeit into Russia, thereby having created the vital precondition for their 
reforming projects. It is, in Schlözer’s view, the quality of the relationship 
between Gelehrte and government, rather than the level of communication 
between government and the nation via appropriate institutions, that 
fundamentally determines the success of reforming policies. 
 
Herder, finally, brought together, and mediated between, a number of conflicting 
strands discernable in the debate about Peter I and Catherine II since Voltaire. By 
considering these two rulers through the lens provided by his anthropological 
concept of Bildung, he sought to show that the precisely delineated freedom 
human beings possess to fashion their own fate had been fully exploited by these 
two rulers. Peter's forceful imposition of his will, manifested through his 
importation of aspects of European culture, had been successful in lifting Russia 
out of a situation of historical stasis - an ever present danger facing human beings 
allowed by God/nature to fashion their own cultural environment. Catherine, so 
Herder hoped, would reconnect Peter's innovations with Russia's past, and his 
imports with its indigenous cultural core, by nationalising them. If she succeeded 
in this task, Herder argued, she would prevent Russia from slipping into a 
situation of alienation - the flipside of the natural tendency towards stasis. 
Moreover, by providing Peter's imports with strong roots reaching down into the 
nation, the future flourishing of Russia's civilisation would no longer be 
dependent on the impetus provided from the top, but would be driven by creative 
cultural activity issuing from below. 
 
Russia, in other words, provided a topic for a sophisticated debate about politics 
and political reform. It was not primarily a debate about constitutional 
arrangements. All thinkers considered here regarded 18th-century Russia as 
possessing no formal limits on the czar's power, and, apart from Diderot, none felt 
that the country was in urgent need of constitutional reform. Despite this absence 
of sustained engagement with constitutional questions, the debate about Russia 
can nevertheless not be collapsed into a defence of enlightened despotism. From 
Voltaire to Herder, the questions about the proper relationship between state and 
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nation, government and society, top-down imposition and bottom-up 
development, as well as the relative importance of human agency and non-human, 
natural forces in effecting historical change, were constantly revisited. And after 
Voltaire, the conflicting answers provided, far from shoring up an ideal of 
enlightened despotism, undermined some of its crucial foundations. 
 
Nor can we hope to understand the debate about Russia if we approach it through 
the conceptual prism provided by the notion of 'otherness', and the concomitant 
idea that semi-Oriental and backward Russia served principally as a negative 
image against which Europe could define itself and assert its superiority. It is 
certainly true that throughout the second half of the 18th century, Russia, and its 
history, was predominantly assessed in relation to Europe, and the history of 
European civilisation. Such a comparative perspective, and the overriding concern 
with the development of civilisation, was inherent in the project of philosophic 
history, which provided the overarching framework by which Russian history was 
interpreted. 
 
And yet, there is no necessary connection between writing philosophic history and 
asserting the superiority of Europe's civilisation to all others, or conceiving the 
continent's historical journey as a universal model that needs to be emulated 
elsewhere if progress is to be achieved. Far from it, as the cases of Diderot and 
Herder amply demonstrate. Rather than being self-congratulatory regarding the 
perfection of their own civilisation and wishing to export its particular civilising 
mechanism across the globe, they were pessimistic about Europe's future, and 
convinced that the continent was on a course of historical decline. For both, 
Russia constituted a counterpoint to such pessimism: a glimmer of hope that a 
more stable and sustainable civilisation may develop there in the near future than 
had been the case at home. This glimmer of hope lasted in the case of Herder, but 
was ultimately extinguished in the case of Diderot and replaced by a profound 
pessimism about the country's future. This pessimism, however, was not based on 
a perception of Russian backwardness, but, on the contrary, on the idea that the 
country was already too advanced. In Diderot's final analysis Russia did become 
somewhat Orientalised, but its Oriental nature did not suggest a lagging behind 
Europe; rather, studying the Orient and, ultimately, Russia, provided Diderot with 
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a glimpse into the continent's unenviable future: despotism, decline and 
dissolution.  
 
Levesque and Schlözer likewise did not believe that the historical process of 
Russia's civilisation could be reduced to the simple imposition of European 
civilising mechanisms. Both asserted the importance of a profound understanding 
of pre-Petrine Russian history if the country's present situation and its relationship 
to Europe was to be properly comprehended. Pace Voltaire, they insisted that late 
17th century Russia could not be considered as being fundamentally the same as 
11th century Europe, and, pace Diderot, they rejected the idea that 18th-century 
Russia was a savage tabula rasa on which Catherine may build without 
interference from the past. Instead, they endeavoured to unravel the complex 
confluence of the particular historical forces that had defined medieval Russia, 
with particular emphasis placed on the interaction of Russian history with 
Byzantine and Tatar/Mongol history. Of course there may be similarities between 
the histories of Russia and Europe prior to Peter I - similarities explicable by the 
limited interaction between the two regions, and, as Levesque in particular 
observed, on account of the fundamental similarity of the historical process 
everywhere - but these should not blind us from perceiving the important 
differences.  
 
The perception of such differences, moreover, greatly informed Levesque and 
Schlözer’s respective assessments of Peter's project to civilise by means of 
Europeanisation. According to Levesque, this project was wrongly conceived in 
so far as it was based on Peter failure to recognise the civilising mechanisms 
already in existence when he took over the reigns of government. This is of course 
not to say that Levesque objected to Russia opening up towards Europe - on the 
contrary, he deemed all inter-state communication to be greatly beneficial - but to 
the extent that Europeanisation became a fixed idea of Peter’s to be ruthlessly 
imposed on the country, the czar undermined the progress of civilisation in Russia 
rather than advance it. Russians did not need to adopt European clothing habits in 
order to become civilised, they simply needed to increase the level of emulative 
communication with each other and the outside world. Given the long history of 
Russian interaction with its neighbours, the Europeanising Peter was not the first 
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to recognise the benefits of emulative communication, and some of his 
predecessors, Levesque argued, undertook measures to strengthen it in much more 
fruitful ways than the great czar himself. Schlözer was much more positive in his 
assessment of Peter, but agreed that Europeanisation was merely one part of the 
story of Russia's civilisation. Contrary to Levesque, he implied that both Peter and 
Catherine recognised this. Indeed, their attempts at importing the seeds of 
Gelehrsamkeit from Europe into Russia were only a means to formulate reforming 
policies appropriate to the particular situation of Russia. Modern, European 
Gelehrsamkeit is the tool the reforming czars sought to employ in order to 
understand the complexities of Russia's past and present. It is such particular 
knowledge about their own country, rather than general notions about Europe, 
Schlözer argued, that formed the bedrock of their respective reforming projects.  
 
The nexus between Russia, Europe and the Orient, and the tension between 
autochthonous and allochthonous modes of development, also stands at the heart 
of Herder's analysis of Russian history. Indeed, his account of the respective 
reigns of Peter I and Catherine II is premised on an assumption that is central to 
his conception of cultural development as a whole: namely, that any culture's 
receptivity to foreign influences and its rootedness in indigenous traditions must 
be carefully balanced. If this balance becomes disrupted, either stasis or alienation 
occur, preventing further growth. Therefore, the dynamism Peter engendered in 
Russia through his imports from Europe needed to be stabilised through a 
programme of nationalisation to be implemented by Catherine II. Herder hoped 
that in the aftermath of such stabilisation, a world-historical revolution could 
occur on Russian territory: ancient, Asian history - marked by strongly rooted 
national cultures - and modern European history - characterised by dynamic 
receptivity but lacking inner strength - could be combined. This newly fused 
Eurasian-Russian culture could, Herder predicted, become the principal engine for 
future cultural development across the globe. Far from perceiving a simple 
antithesis between a progressive Europe and a backward Orient, with Russia 
occupying an uncomfortable middling position, Herder ultimately related the three 
entities in one grand historical synthesis. As a result, he stands at the end of a long 
and conflicting debate in which relationships and modes of interactions between 
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different cultures and their histories were conceived in much more complex and 
interesting ways than can be captured by Wolff's reductive historical scheme. 
 
If Voltaire, Diderot, Levesque, Schlözer and Herder were therefore engaged in a 
proper debate about Russia's civilisation, each airing his own distinct position, 
rather than just adding yet another piece to one hegemonic account, the question 
remains as to whether unifying features can be found across their writings. What 
is certain is that no substantive philosophical unity can be found. Notions such as 
rationalism or adherence to a universal, natural law, which are often invoked as 
marking the Enlightenment project, are clearly too restrictive to capture the 
diversity of their thought. Instead, I have sought to argue that it is the idea of 
philosophic history – first formulated by Voltaire, and subsequently partly 
adopted, adapted and reformulated by each thinker considered here – that emerges 
as the common framework that gives coherence to their discussion, thereby 
making it possible to analyse it as a debate, rather than just a collision among 
widely diverging voices, each talking in a completely different tongue. 
 
And yet, the idea of philosophic history has little in common with the ostensibly 
substantially unified philosophy of history of the Enlightenment as it has been 
presented by generations of historians of the period, beginning with German 
Historismus. Philosophic history as written by Voltaire - with its overarching 
pragmatic concern to render the excavation of the past useful to the present – is 
different from, say, Diderot’s and Herder’s endeavours to define the relationship 
between the course of nature and the march of human affairs, or, indeed, from 
Levesque’s and Schlözer’s attempts to re-conceptualise the place of erudition 
within the enlightened historical project. The historicist critique of the 
Enlightenment as a fundamentally unhistorical current of thought that reduced the 
complex laws of historical development to simple mechanical ones, and all 
manifestations of historical and cultural individuality to timeless universals, is 
simply not applicable to any individual thinker considered here, and certainly not 
to their historical oeuvres as a whole. 
 
On the contrary, if there had been a ready solution to the problem of how to relate 
the individual to the universal, or a distinctive enlightened story about how to 
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account for historical development, the debate about Russia’s civilisation would 
never have occurred. It is exactly the contested question of how the particular 
history of Russia may relate to general, or at least generalisable, accounts of the 
development of civilisation that is the principal topic of the debate. This topic, we 
have seen, was most prominently explored by studying the complicated 
relationship between the history of Russia and that of Europe, and the outcomes of 
these investigations were markedly diverse. 
 
The prime reason for the investment of considerable energy into the resolution of 
such questions was political. Voltaire, Diderot, Levesque, Schlözer and Herder all 
agreed that philosophic history is politically useful history, and that any 
programme of reform must be informed by an historical understanding of how the 
present came about. In its most general terms, the debate about Russia’s 
civilisation is a debate about the interaction between history and politics. All 
recognised, albeit to varying degrees, that civilisation is man-made and that 
human beings have scope to improve their lot, provided they understand the 
complex historical forces, both general and particular, that define their condition. 
Studying the debate about Russia reveals the intensely historical nature of 
political understanding during the Enlightenment. The breadth and depth of 
enlightened thought about the interrelation between history, politics and 
civilisation, I believe, still provides food for thought today. 
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